Josey Kidd won’t waste a second figuring out what number to call if a nuclear-weapons-related item shows up at any Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services location. He has DLA’s Nuclear Enterprise Support Office on speed dial.
“I have direct contact with DLA Headquarters in case an issue ever comes up. And I have [points of contact] at the Air Force who can get me an answer instantly if I have a question about nuclear-weapons-related material that mistakenly comes through our doors,” said Kidd,
DLA Disposition Services’ nuclear enterprise coordinator.
NWRM includes classified or unclassified system components that pre-arm, arm, launch or release a nuclear weapon. The Air Force is responsible for accountability, storage and handling of NWRM, and if DLA discovers it at any of its distribution or disposal facilities, the agency must take immediate action to protect and return the material to the Air Force.
Detecting NWRM at DLA locations became a priority in 2006 after four fuse assemblies used on the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile were erroneously shipped to Taiwan. The components weren’t properly recovered until March 2008 because of deficiencies in supply-chain management, said Terry Simpson, NESO deputy executive director.
Then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ordered a complete inventory of the nation’s nuclear arsenal, and in 2009, DLA entered an agreement with the Air Force that transferred all NWRM assets back to the service. Since then, DLA has aimed for 100 percent visibility and control of NWRM items it receives through methods such as misrouted shipments or misidentification of materiel accepted during property turn-ins.
“We’ve set up our business rules and operations around the fact that the Air Force may accidentally turn in NWRM. If it comes to us, we want to make sure our people and systems can recognize and stop it opposed to just letting it roll on through,” Kidd said.
The agency has strict policies and procedures to detect NWRM, said Patty Myers, executive officer for logistics operations at
DLA Distribution. Employees use the kind, count and condition inspection process to match item documentation with identification labels, then verify part numbers and national stock numbers. And a special screen alerts users every time a transaction involving NWRM is logged in to the Defense Standard System, DLA’s data inventory system.
“DSS is programmed to stop any transaction that involves NWRM so we can take appropriate actions,” she said. Notifications are automatically sent to the DLA Joint Logistics Operations Center, which must alert the DLA director within three hours of NWRM being found at any of the agency’s locations.
DLA Disposition Services employees, who sometimes receive locally purchased material without NSNs or property with missing or incomplete turn-in documents, are also taught to look for clues that an item could be NWRM.
“The vast majority of military-owned equipment has what’s called a ‘data plate’ on it. Oftentimes, it will have the NSN or a part number stamped on it. It could also have the manufacturer, manufacture date or contract numbers, all things we can use to research the material to determine whether it’s NWRM,” Kidd added.
Disposal experts call Kidd’s office every day requesting information to verify whether an item is NWRM. Rather than being a burden, he says the constant contact with field sites proves that employees are dedicated to protecting the nation’s nuclear assets.
Monthly exercises conducted by NESO, DLA Distribution and DLA Disposition Services also ensure employees know how to prevent NWRM from entering DLA’s supply chain and are familiar with the procedures for handling the material if it does show up. The exercises follow five core scenarios with over 500 variations that test various types of turn-ins and delivery methods at more than 125 sites.
“One of the key things we work on is misidentified material because that’s the most likely scenario that NWRM will be turned in to Disposition Services. Someone created a receipt and put that receipt with the wrong material, for example, or put the material in the wrong box and sent it to us,” Kidd said.
Exercise results are shared across the DLA enterprise and with Air Force officials to spread lessons learned, and corrective actions such as remedial training and improved controls in DSS are made to improve detection when necessary.
If NWRM is found, DLA works to return the material to the Air Force “as fast as humanly possible,” Kidd added. “We will lock it down and secure it until the generating activity comes to pick it up or the Air Force gives us instructions for returning it.”
Leaders at DLA major subordinate commands, NESO and the JLOC are informed of every subsequent step taken upon detection to ensure complete visibility.
Air Force Col. David Sanford, commander of the 635th Supply Chain Operation Wing, called tracking, monitoring and sustaining NWRM a no-fail mission that DLA helps make successful.
“We have experienced loss of accountability in the past and are determined to maintain 100 percent positive inventory control at all times,” he said. “With the Defense Logistics Agency, we have a partner who understands the complexity of NWRM and is willing to support and fulfill Air Force needs to ensure we never lose accountability again.”
DLA has come a long way in the last 10 years protecting NWRM and ensuring it isn’t transferred to the public, Kidd added.
“If an item came to us coded as sellable and it was sold to the general public, then one of our enemies could get it. That’s why it’s so important for us to have our systems up to date and our personnel well trained to catch these things if they come to us.”