

Government-Industry Data Exchange Program


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Counterfeit Reporting

GIDEP Program Manager
DSPO


About GIDEP

Governance Model



GIDEP Is:

A Partnership Between Government & Industry Teamed to Share Technically Valid, Fact-Based Information.




- Active Network of People
- Web-Accessible Databases

GIDEP Mission

- To foster technical information sharing among Government and Industry partners to:
 - Increase systems' safety, reliability, and readiness
 - Reduce systems' development, production, and ownership costs

About GIDEP

History



Federal Policy

Office of Federal Procurement Policy Letter 91-3

- “Exchanging information will help eliminate instances where individual agencies or their contractors acquire products and materials previously identified as nonconforming by other agencies.”
- “Nonconforming products often result from the failure of suppliers to adequately control quality and in some instances from criminal intent.”
- “Government/Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) operated by the Department of Defense will serve as the central data base for receiving and disseminating information about such products.”

About GIDEP

Information & Data

- Failure Experience
- Product Information
- Reliability
- Engineering
- Metrology


SAFE ALERTS
ALERTS
PROBLEM ADVISORIES
AGENCY ACTION NOTICES
LESSONS LEARNED
PRODUCT CHANGE NOTICES
PRODUCT INFORMATION
DMSMS
RELIABILITY METHODOLOGY
FAILURE ANALYSIS
RELIABILITY PREDICTIONS
RELIABILITY STATISTICS
FACILITIES DOCUMENTS
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
PROCESS SPECIFICATIONS
TEST REPORTS
ENGINEERING REPORTS
MANAGEMENT REPORTS
SOLDERING TECHNOLOGIES
TECHNICAL MANUALS
GENERAL METROLOGY
CALIBRATION PROCEDURES




Counterfeiting and Obsolescence

- Counterfeiters take advantage of shortage:
 - Hard to get new production or end-of-production
- Even if you have adequate supply, “counterfeit contamination” may put it all under suspicion.
 - Result: you no longer have adequate supply (DMSMS)

Link Between DMSMS and Nonconforming Parts



Counterfeit Reporting Number of Documents & Parts



Dept. of Commerce Survey indicated more than 7,000 counterfeit incidents during 2008.

The survey also indicated that less than 15% of Original Component Manufacturers (OCM) and Board Assemblers either checked a database for information or submitted data to a database when coming into possession of a counterfeit part.

ANN submitted w/o parts


Many other counterfeit cases have been discovered by users, but were not reported via GIDEP.

Data shown does not reveal instances where a GIDEP notice alerted another user who subsequently found counterfeits as a result of the notice.


Component manufacturers are aware of counterfeit cases involving their products, but generally do not report those cases via GIDEP or industry "watch dog" organizations.

We have been informed that one Government organization has reportedly discouraged such GIDEP notifications for fear of undermining a government investigation, but have had other Government agencies applaud GIDEP notifications.


Counterfeit Reporting Cumulative Number of Documents & Parts



Number of NSN by FSC Reported FY 93 - 09




**Number of Documents by Category
FY 93 - 09**



Counterfeit

GIDEP Reports (4 year avgs)



Guidance in Using Current Forms

Use existing GIDEP Form as appropriate...
This example shows the use of the Alert form

GOVERNMENT - INDUSTRY DATA EXCHANGE PROGRAM		
ALERT		
1. TITLE (Class, Function, Type, etc.)		2. DOCUMENT NUMBER
		3. DATE (DD-MMM-YY)
4. MANUFACTURER AND ADDRESS	5. PART NUMBER	6. NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
	7. SPECIFICATION	8. TYPE DESIGNATOR
9. LOT DATE CODE START	10. LOT DATE CODE END	
11. MANUFACTURER'S POINT OF CONTACT	12. CAGE	13. MANUFACTURER'S FAX
14. PHONE	15. MANUFACTURER'S PHONE	
16. REFERENCE VENDOR	17. CROSS REFERENCE CAGE	18. CROSS REFERENCE PART
19. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION / DISCUSSION / EFFECT		
20. ACTION TAKEN/PLANNED		
21. DATE MFR. NOTIFIED	22. MANUFACTURER'S RESPONSE	23. ORIGINATOR ADDRESS
	<input type="checkbox"/> REPLY ATTACHED	
	<input type="checkbox"/> NO REPLY	
24. GIDEP REPRESENTATIVE		25. SIGNATURE

Put the part identifier, as marked on the product, in the 'Part Number' block.

Insert "Suspect Counterfeit, "

Put the name of the impacted manufacturer in the 'Manufacturer' block.
(To facilitate BOM search... not intended to impugn the impacted manufacturer.)

Put the CAGE code of the impacted manufacturer in the 'CAGE' block.

Put the name of the supplier (e.g. broker) in the 'Problem Description' block.

Include the following paragraph ...
"The manufacturer identified in block 4 is the entity whose product may have been counterfeited. This reporting convention is necessary to facilitate GIDEP database searches for suspect counterfeit products and is by no means intended to imply that the manufacturer identified in block 4 is involved with the suspect product."

Submit draft copies of documents for comment to:

- Companing supplying suspect product (required)
- Impacted manufacturer (recommended)

After 15 working days, attach all responses and submit document to GIDEP.

“Suspect Counterfeit” Report

 GOVERNMENT - INDUSTRY DATA EXCHANGE PROGRAM ALERT		
1. TITLE (Class, Function, Type, etc.)		2. DOCUMENT NUMBER
Suspect Counterfeit, Leaded Small Signal Transistor		C7E-A-09-01
		3. DATE (DD-MMM-YY)
		04 AUGUST 2009
4. MANUFACTURER AND ADDRESS	5. PART NUMBER	6. NATIONAL STOCK NUMBER
[Redacted] Corp.	JANTX2N2920	5961-01-387-2984, 5961-00-179-4366
[Redacted] Company who's part was counterfeited	7. SPECIFICATION	8. TYPE DESIGNATOR
	MIL-PRF-19500	NOT AVAILABLE
	9. LOT DATE CODE START	10. LOT DATE CODE END
	0309	0309
11. MANUFACTURER'S POINT OF CONTACT	12. CAGE	13. MANUFACTURER'S FAX
[Redacted] Director of Quality	43611	[Redacted]
14. MFR. POC PHONE	15. MANUFACTURER'S E-MAIL	
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	
16. CROSS REFERENCE VENDOR	17. CROSS REFERENCE CAGE	18. CROSS REFERENCE PART
NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE
19. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION / DISCUSSION / EFFECT		
The parts were purchased from: ABC ELECTRONICS TRADING CO (HK) A819 Room, Stars Plaza, Hua Qiang bel Road, Shenzhen, China 518031 (No CAGE).		
The parts are marked MSC, JANTX2N2920, 0309 on the top. The word "KOREA" is etched in very fine letters on the side of can. Defense Supply Center Columbus (DSCC) was contacted, and pictures of the parts were forwarded. DSCC responded on 4/22/09 that the parts were counterfeit for the following reasons. The manufacturer designation "CDWR" typically is what Microsemi-Lawrence places on the device. Also, Microsemi places the marking on the side not the top. Lastly,		

“Suspect Counterfeit” Report

[REDACTED] has no operations in KOREA for JAN products or any other products. This was also confirmed by the Director of Quality, M [REDACTED] e.

The parts were also determined to be counterfeit by an Independent Test Facility. The parts failed electrical testing and incorrect die were found in subject parts.

We purchased a total of 700 pieces. (NCC Purchase Order # 63280 / 200 pieces / Sep 07 & NCC Purchase Order # 63308 / 500 pieces / Oct 07) **Supplier actions:**

260 pieces failed testing and were scrapped and destroyed.

140 pieces – in stock Ne [REDACTED] its warehouse - quarantined

300 pieces – sold locally - all 300 pieces have been located and will be recalled

We have attached photographs of the subject parts.

Note: The manufacturer identified in block 4 is the entity whose product may have been counterfeited. This reporting convention is necessary to facilitate GIDEP database searches for suspect counterfeit products and is by no means intended to imply that the manufacturer identified in block 4 is involved with the suspect product.

20. ACTION TAKEN/PLANNED


Ne [REDACTED] s has done the following;

Contacted DSCC and M [REDACTED] .

Notified customers who purchased this product.

Located all components and currently in process of their containment.

“Suspect Counterfeit” Report



Groups Working

- AIA Counterfeit IPT
- DoD Counterfeit IPT

DoD Counterfeit IPT Observations

- What is counterfeit?
- Magnitude of problem?
- How to identify counterfeits?
- Nuances between CM and UPS?
- What to do when you have CM?
- Dynamics when legal/investigative is involved?
- Who to report to?
- Supply chain (before government acceptance)

DoD Counterfeit Material IPT status

- DoD Adopted AS-5553

- IPT established 5 subgroups:
 - Policy
 - Training/Awareness
 - Standard Procedures/Processes
 - Reporting
 - Metrics

Policy

- Draft DTM establishing anti-counterfeit program
- Create DODD or DODI for Counterfeit Material
- Update DODI 4140 (Supply Chain Mgmt) and DFAR

Training/Awareness

- Establish training/awareness program
- Create web-base DOD awareness sites
- Promote training/awareness with Components

Standard Procedures/Processes

- Procedures/Processes for storage & handling
- Detection and disposal
- Standard Reporting Procedures

Reporting

- Establish counterfeit reporting officials in Components and Agencies
- Establish GIDEP as the official reporting forum for counterfeit materiel
- Build more formal collaboration network with industry

Metrics

- Create DOD counterfeit metrics
- Create Component and Agency metrics

“Déjà Vu All Over Again”

- West Coast Aluminum Heat Treat
- Temperform
- Western Titanium

W.T. In the Supply Chain

- Mars Rover
- C-17
- F-15
- F-22
- etc