

QUARTERMASTER ACTIVITIES

of

II CORPS THROUGH ALGERIA, TUNISIA, AND SICILY

and

FIRST ARMY THROUGH EUROPE

BY

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OVERSEAS MOVEMENTIndiantown Gap

Everything commenced on Tuesday June 23, 1942. On that day the personnel of Headquarters II Corps had been ordered to report to Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, there to be prepared for shipment overseas to an unknown destination.

The II Corps Headquarters had undergone a complete reorganization. On June 15, Major General Lloyd Fredendall had relinquished command to Major General Mark Clark. Coincidental with this change of command all of the chiefs of sections of the general staff, and all but a very few newly appointed chiefs of sections of the special staff were transferred from the Headquarters. Most of the new chiefs, together with the few staff officers and the handful of assistants who had previously served in the Headquarters, all converged on this day to become Headquarters II Army Corps (reinforced).

The Commanding General, the members of his general staff, and several members of the special staff had been flown to England at this time. In the latter category was the new Corps Quartermaster, Colonel Thomas H. Ramsey. Being a Lieutenant Colonel at the time, I was Executive Officer designate of the Quartermaster section. This section was complemented by two Majors, three Captains, three Lieutenants and approximately 40 enlisted men.

Corps Headquarters was intended to be merely a group of passengers in a transient role awaiting shipment overseas.

Be that as it may, the supply sections of the staff were soon confronted with a problem they had not anticipated -- to wit: the issuance of individual equipment to the personnel of headquarters. Previously, organizational equipment had either been packed or been requisitioned for shipment overseas and the troops had received their full allowances of clothing. However, the individuals in the headquarters were an ill-assorted group as far as uniformity of being equipped was concerned. At that time, Army Regulations required that all troops being shipped overseas be fully equipped as far as individual equipment was concerned. This meant that helmets, leggings, gas-masks, canteens, shelter-halves, pistols, etc., were required to be in the possession of everyone.

Although every individual had some article of equipment in his possession, no individual was equipped with all of the articles, and as the post supply agencies had announced a policy of issuing to the headquarters as a unit only, some degree of coordination as well as organization was necessary.

Just at this somewhat awkward juncture the supply officer of the Headquarters Company, whose administrative responsibility would ordinarily have included the performance of this duty, took occasion to enter the state of matrimony. At the same time he was well attended by his brothers-in-arms, who comprised the other officers of Headquarters Company.

Please let it be understood that I have no objection to matrimony. Nevertheless, there is a time and place for everything and when a newly formed corps headquarters supply officer and his colleagues take time out for a marriage and a honeymoon

while in the equipment phase of overseas staging, time does not necessarily suspend itself.

The acting Corps G-4 then announced that the Supply Staff (i.e., Quartermaster, Ordnance Officer, Chemical Warfare Officer, and Surgeon) would themselves see to it that each member in the Headquarters was fully equipped with his particular items of supply.

We were somewhat thankful for this statement inasmuch as it gave us something to do; it also gave us some assurance that when we arrived at our destination -- wherever it might be -- we would at least have blankets to sleep on and shelter-halves to sleep under. Accordingly, we had the entire personnel of Headquarters line up and give us their sizes, measurements and similar details, following which we made up requisitions on the Post Quartermaster, accepted shipment of the articles requisitioned, and served them up in the best retail department store style. Some three days later everyone had his 8 tent pegs and 2 extra pairs of shoe laces, the Headquarters Company officers had all returned to their duties, and we were ready to go.

On the following Tuesday, June 30th, we were alerted for shipment (which meant that no one left the Reservation). That night we drew our pay for the month of June, and at 6:00 AM the following morning we entrained for Jersey City. Inasmuch as all of the post facilities had been closed between the time we were paid and the time of our departure, we all boarded the train, well-healed with currency which we were no longer

able to spend and which we would carry with us to wherever we might go.

On that afternoon, we left the train at Jersey City for the ferry (each of us wishing that our individual equipment had never been issued, as it was a hot day) and then crossed New York harbor to Brooklyn, where we embarked on the good ship Monterrey.

Atlantic Crossing

At daybreak on the following morning we found ourselves heading out to sea, our convoy consisting of 8 troop ships, including the Monterrey, and the U.S.S. Texas, a battleship whose appearance must have struck terror into the heart of many a Spaniard in 1898, but whose presence next to us was most reassuring.

Around us was a screen of 12 destroyers, destroyer-escorts, and corvettes; we were never close enough to any of them to know just what they were, other than friendly.

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ENGLAND, 1942Tidworth Barracks

Twelve days and some 4,000 miles later the S.S. Monterrey sailed up the Clyde River to the village of Grenoch. There we boarded a train, which took us through the night and into the next afternoon to the Southern English town of Tidworth.

Tidworth was no metropolis, but it was quaint, neat, and exactly what one would imagine a town in Southern England to be. The major industry was Tidworth Barracks, a cavalry post on the edge of the village. Perhaps it would be more accurate to describe the village as a settlement outside the post limits. In any case, we were glad to be at Tidworth Barracks, if for no better reason than to get on with the war.

When we arrived at Tidworth Barracks on July 13, 1942, there were very few U. S. Army units in England, although two divisions and a corps headquarters had been sent in this direction and were garrisoned in Northern Ireland. There being no theater troop organization of any size, the U. S. Army depots were necessarily still in the formative stage. Although they were operating in certain localities, Tidworth Barracks was not within these fortunate areas, and for the next several months we had the benefit of eating His Majesty's best Royal Army Service Corps rations. These rations were developed largely upon such staples as brown bread, marmalade, tea, brussels-sprouts, and mutton, and were designed to eradicate obesity and any other symptoms accompanying undue corpulence. Indeed, whatever our sins might

have been against the laws of calories and starches, they were more than atoned for by our spartan use of fats, vitamins and sugars. However, at this time we had no supply responsibilities and no Quartermaster units. The only function of the Corps Quartermaster was the dissemination of information as to where the incoming units could draw their rations and "petrol" from the British and as to the location of the U. S. Army Quartermaster depot where they would find class II and IV supplies.

Salisbury

During the course of a few weeks the Headquarters moved gradually from Tidworth Barracks to the vicinity of Salisbury, approximately 25 miles distant. In Salisbury we divided into several groups and occupied Longford Castle (for the general staff) and three other country estates (for the special staff). The Quartermaster section was ensconced in a lovely country home called Cowsfield House; in the American idiom it was referred to as "Moo Manor". By any name it was seven miles from Salisbury and equally far from any distractions, and soon we began to get the feel of living in the English countryside. Since everything was normal and because the supply functions were so abbreviated, we adopted a training schedule for the enlisted men of the Quartermaster section, predicated largely upon map problems and weights and cubic capacities for supply movements.

It was during this summer that the responsibility of motor vehicle supply and maintenance was transferred from the Quartermaster Corps to the Ordnance Corps. This meant the loss of two of our officers, and a handful of our enlisted clerks. We had already lost one officer on a hospital transfer and another

to Headquarters Company, leaving us with a balance of six.

Meanwhile, the various sections of Corps Headquarters were becoming impatient in what they considered the slowness in receiving supplies. The fact that requisitions often took two or three days to be filled, occasioned some pressure from G-4 to designate a purchasing and contracting officer. Accordingly, one of our Quartermaster officers was honored by such a designation and forthwith the demands for such things as colored pins for maps, pencils, typewriter ribbons, automobiles, and fancy dressers were voiced with increasing degrees of urgency. Doubtless the most urgent was the demand of the Finance Officer for postage stamps. Under Army Regulations all Finance Officers were required to submit monthly statements to the Office of the Chief of Finance. These statements were to be shipped by parcel post. The Finance Officer of II Corps adopted the somewhat literal attitude that "parcel post" meant parcel post both in British postal service and U. S. mail. Therefore, he insisted that he needed to be supplied with both British and American postage stamps. Our suggestion that the APO service and the theater courier service might be adequate for his purposes were futile. He said that his report should be made by parcel post and parcel post it had to be -- requiring both British and American postage stamps. Just how he reasoned that the Quartermaster was responsible for the supply of postage stamps, we never quite understood. In any case our idea was to give service and service it was! We bought him his stamps.

Norfolk House

It was in the early part of August of that summer that Colonel Ramsey was mysteriously transferred from Cowsfield House to London. The message came late one evening and on the following morning he was on his way. Approximately two days later, a telephone call in the night informed me that I would report to Norfolk House in London as early as possible on the following afternoon. Thus ended my days in Southern England and I drove to London in anticipation of the secrets of Norfolk House. I never returned to Salisbury.

In Norfolk House the British Army had organized a planning staff, which was supplemented by a group of U. S. Army officers. The object of all the planning was "Operation Torch", which historians refer to as the invasion of North Africa. The matter was highly secret and each individual, officer or enlisted, who knew of it was required to be first classified for security purposes as "Bigot". As a result, special identity cards were shown at the entrance of the building, and everyone who entered was required to give the number of the room he was to visit and the name of the person he expected to see. The enlisted men stationed there not only ate and slept in the building, but were not permitted to leave it. The British were in charge of the planning and they left nothing to chance in the matter of security.

The need for this secrecy was obvious. For two years the Allies had talked of a cross-channel invasion but never had a public word been uttered about an amphibious operation in the Mediterranean. Above all it would have been awkward if the Free

French had learned of the project, inasmuch as an attack on their own countrymen might have become personalized.

We were in a position in which we were required to plan an amphibious operation some 1500 miles distant, to be mounted and initially supplied from England and to be thereafter maintained by equipment and supplies that had not as yet left the United States.

It was at that time that the Supreme Headquarters for the entire operation was formed from both the British and American sides and was designated "Allied Force Headquarters", commanded by Lieutenant General Eisenhower. General Clark was transferred from the command of the II Corps to be named as Deputy Commander of the Allied Forces. General Fredendall was brought from the United States to assume command again of the II Corps. During this shuffle Colonel Ramsey became Quartermaster, Allied Forces, and I succeeded him as Quartermaster of the Corps.

Torch

Neither I nor any of my officers had seen any of the troop units that I was to command in the forthcoming operation. Indeed, security regulations denied me the right even to discuss the matter with the other officers and enlisted men of the Quartermaster Section, save only two officers who had become classified "Bigot" and had participated in the planning of the operation. The mission of the II Corps was to seize and occupy Oran, in French North Africa. The striking force for the Oran operation was to consist of the 1st Infantry Division,

operating in three combat teams, and Combat Command "B" of the 1st Armored Division. These units plus the 20th Engineer Regiment (combat) and a few tank-destroyer units were to comprise the initial assault force. All units were to land on D-Day with 12 days of supply. From a Quartermaster sense this meant the following:

Class I

Each individual was to carry 2 "C" rations and 2 "D" rations on his person. Each unit kitchen was to carry 1 day's "B" ration, and 7 days of cased rations for the entire force would be shipped as cargo. These cased rations consisted of the "C" rations and the British "compo" rations (food for 14 men for one day).

Class III

Gasoline, oils and greases for 12 days for each vehicle in the force was to accompany the convoy, and T/O&E 5 gallon cans of gasoline were to be carried on each vehicle. The planning factors were 50 gallons per day per tracked vehicle and 5 gallons per day per wheeled vehicle. All 5 gallon cans, whether on vehicles or shipped as cargo, were marked for identification with wire strands about the handles: 1 strand meant 80 octane (for wheeled vehicles); 2 strands, 87 octane (tracked vehicles); and 3 strands, 100 octane (airplanes).

After computing the weights and cubages of these cargo requirements we turned them over to the British Transportation Office, which then found space for it in the 54 ships that were to comprise the assault convoy.

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Quartermaster Troops

In Quartermaster Units we were restricted. There were comparatively few Quartermaster troops in England and those that were there were needed for normal depot operations. Nevertheless, we ultimately had assigned to us the following units to participate in the D-Day landing force:

Company B - 205th Quartermaster Battalion (gasoline supply), and One platoon, 85th Quartermaster Company (depot supply).

This was our Quartermaster troop-list, numbering approximately 175 troops. On D-Day plus 4, another convoy was scheduled to arrive in Oran. This convoy was to bring approximately 18 days of supply for the entire force together with the 93rd Quartermaster Company (railhead) and the 1st Battalion for the 28th Quartermaster Regiment (truck), less Companies B and C. However, these truck units were to be under the exclusive control of the Corps G-4 and I, as Corps Quartermaster, had no responsibility for their use or administration.

By October 25th, we had done what we could in the way of planning the invasion of Oran. I felt dissatisfied because we had not been permitted to give any inkling of their missions to the few troop units that would be under our command, and, as I stated before, to my own assistants on the Corps staff. However, on that evening we entrained for Glasgow, where the advanced echelon of Corps Headquarters was split into two parts, one of which embarked on the "SS Orbita" and the other of

which went on the "SS Letitia". Both of these ships were White Star passenger liners of approximately 15,000 ton capacity.

General Fredendall and the chiefs of the General Staff sections were on an especially equipped headquarters ship, and we did not see them until after debarking at Oran.

In the D-Day convoy I was permitted to take two assistant Quartermaster officers and four enlisted men. We all embarked on the Letitia, on which there was also quartered the personnel of the gasoline supply company.

We embarked at Glasgow on the afternoon of October 26th. It was a miserable and dreary day, but we had the satisfaction of knowing that there was nothing further in our power that could be done. As I meditated upon this satisfaction I suffered a rude shock. We had shipped tons of all kinds of supplies, but there was not a medal in the convoy. To complicate matters, the ships were all under radio silence. Fortunately, I was able to have a "blinker" message sent to the Port Commander, asking him to forward to the main body of Corps Headquarters, still at Salisbury, a request to bring medals by the case with them on the D+13 convoy.

On the afternoon of November 6th our convoy met with convoys, which had come from the United States, at a rendezvous point not far from Gibraltar. At midnight that night we went through the Straights, with the lights of Tangiers on our right and the massive darkness of the Rock on our left. We did not realize at the time how long it would be until we would again see the lights of a city at night. On the following day we were headed east

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within sight of Spain, following the conventional ship route to Malta. By afternoon the land had completely fallen away and the hours before the landing had become few. "H" hour was to be at 1:00 A. M. on November 8th.

The attack was three-pronged, two forces going in at Mers-el-Kebir and Los Andalouses, respectively, to the west of Oran, and one column landing at the little fishing town of Arzeu, to the east.

III

ALGERIA

Invasion

The landing at Los Andalouses was made by Combat Command "B", of the 1st Armored Division, Brigadier-General Lunceford Oliver commanding. The landing at Mers-el-Kebir was made by the 26th Regimental Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division, under the command of Brigadier-General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. The main landing was made at the Port of Arzeu, where the balance of the 1st Division, went in, commanded by Major General Terry Allen and supported by the 20th Combat Engineer Regiment. Inasmuch as none of these three landings was aimed at taking over the immediate harbor facilities at Oran, there was scheduled a special force, consisting of two companies of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment, which was to invade directly the port area at three o'clock in the morning. These two companies were on two cutters, both of which were without armor.

The three main landings were made without undue incident; opposition had been expected and opposition there was. Nevertheless, the assaults on the beaches were on the whole successful and the Los Andalouses and Arzeu columns commenced their march to the south. The plan had been that, after going 5 or 10 miles to the south, they would come up toward the north again and take the city of Oran from a southerly direction. Meanwhile, General Roosevelt's force attacked from the west. Unfortunately, the successes of the three main forces did not extend to the two

cutters full of infantrymen which sailed directly into the Oran harbor. By the time they reached there, the French Naval forces had had approximately two hours' notice of the fact that there was an invasion in operation. Consequently, the French were fully alert to the situation, not only with their eyes, but also with their machine-guns. These weapons were turned onto the two cutters and the unfortunate Americans in them were butchered as they stood below-decks in the ships. We afterwards buried most of them in the cemetery at Oran.

Arzeu

It was about six o'clock on that morning of November 8th when I realized that at long last daybreak was on its way and I looked with searching eyes at the land at Arzeu. Right next to the little harbor in that town there was a good sized hill, on the top of which was a French fort. As the morning mists were clearing, the first sight that met my eyes was a column of prisoners--the French garrison of the fort--marching down the hill toward Arzeu, guided by members of our 1st Ranger Battalion. The Rangers had landed with the mission of taking that fort, and they had done so very effectively; not intending to belittle in the least the efforts of the Rangers, we must recall that this landing had taken place at one o'clock on a Sunday morning and the French have never believed in any equivalent of the Volstead Act.

Next I observed a small narrow gauge freight train pulling from the east along the Mediterranean Coast into its terminus Arzeu. I was glad to see it, as it appeared that this rail line

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was still intact and I had hoped that it would be helpful to us in moving supplies.

By this time, the little Gulf of Arzeu had become busy with LCT's and LCP's darting back and forth between the ships in the harbor and the land itself. The LCT's were supposed to mean landing craft, transport; while the LCP's were supposed to mean landing craft, personnel.

These LCT's and LCP's kept discharging troops, vehicles, and cargo all day. Late that afternoon I went ashore with the II Corps Headquarters, and we set up our temporary command post in a school-house two blocks from the beach. However, the balance of the troops were not completely unloaded until the afternoon of D/1, while discharge of the vehicles and the supplies was not concluded until D/4.

One of the interesting features of the operation had been the use of two ships called maracaibos. These were ordinary freighters, with bows that fell down as ramps when they approached the shore line. Obviously, they were shallow draft ships. They were used to transport tanks, half-tracks, and heavy vehicles which could thus be brought virtually to the beach itself and there unloaded right through the bow of the ship. These maracaibos were eminently successful on their performance at Oran.

Beach Supply

There were two piers at Arzeu, either of which could take and moor a good sized ocean-going vessel. However, the piers were needed for the discharge of the landing-craft, and as long as that operation was going on, they could not be used for the

mooring or discharge, direct from ship to dock, of any of the freighters. Inasmuch as three-fourths or more of the troop strength had come in at Arzeu, three-fourths or more of the supplies were discharged there also. These supplies, whether Quartermaster, Ordnance, Chemical, Engineer, or Medical, were all handled by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade. The function of this Brigade, which was composed of two shore regiments and one boat regiment, was to unload and carry cargo from the ships to the shore, where it would be picked up at the water line by the shore detachments and placed in appropriate dumps. Each of the several supply services had its own dump area. We had one Quartermaster dump for Class I supplies, which was operated just a few blocks from the piers in a little park; our troops operating it consisted of the one platoon of the 85th Quartermaster Company (depot supply), the balance of the company being scheduled to arrive on the D⁴/₄ convoy. Our other dump for Class III supplies was operated by Company "B" of the 205th Quartermaster Battalion (gasoline supply). This gasoline dump was slightly to the west of Arzeu and behind the hill at the top of which had been the French fort.

Unquestionably someone had had in mind the appropriate idea that the trucks of the Engineer Special Brigade would carry the supplies, of whatever type they might be, to the dump for which they were intended, where the trucks in turn would be discharged and the supplies properly sorted and stacked. Unfortunately, this obvious instruction had apparently not reached the Brigade. The troops of this command, both officers and men, worked hard

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and untiringly. They did their best to do a good job, but their operation had simply not been coordinated with the other services. This failure was certainly not that of the Engineer Brigade. When we had been planning the operation, we had been assured by G-4 officers that the Engineers would take care of everything. This fact had simply not been revealed to the Engineer Special Brigade. As the result of this lack of coordination, two unfortunate practices developed. One was that the Engineers were dumping the cargo at the spots most convenient to them, which were generally right at the water's edge, and the other was that they exercised no prerogative control over the landing area itself. That is, the docks and the beaches were open to visitors of all types and descriptions; French, Arabs, and Americans wandered among the stacks of supplies. The supply officers from the various American units had a field day laying in substantial reserves of rations and whatever else might be handy at the time. There was simply no discipline of any type evidenced in the supply area along the beach, and only a few truckloads were delivered to our Quartermaster dumps. Fortunately, our gasoline supply company had a comparatively heavy complement of trucks, and these were all used in hauling gasoline directly from the ships or the landing areas to the Class III dump. The Class I dump officer was resourceful enough to draw on the Corps motor pool for one truck, which he used to haul supplies from the stacks along the water's edge. With the use of this one truck and with occasional other trucks which some way or other found

their way to the dump, he managed to gain a little stock. Unfortunately, he was in competition with the 1st Infantry Division Quartermaster and with the respective supply officers of the other units which were then ashore.

The importance of this is in the fact that, as I have previously pointed out, the troops all went ashore with five days of supply, while another seven days was accompanying the force as cargo. This meant that a total of twelve days of supply for 40,000 men was coming across the beaches. At first, it would seem that this twelve days of supply, which was only supposed to last until the reinforcements came on D/4, would have been more than adequate. The fact is that when the D/4 convoy began to discharge on the day it was due, the Class I dump at Arzeu was empty. Twelve days of supply had been exhausted in the course of four days. This did not mean that there had been bad planning. The overdraw--and overdraw it was--simply reflected a total lack of supply discipline which was aggravated by the sloppy control over the dump areas. Supply officers could go down to the beach and take whatever they wanted. That they did, inspired with the knowledge that only seven days supply was coming in as cargo, and, therefore, "getting while the getting was good" prevailed.

Oran

Meanwhile, all was going well tactically. The air-fields to the south of Oran had been taken at once by Combat command "B", and on D/3 the French commander surrendered to General Fredendall and all hostilities ceased. Immediately upon the

surrender, I mounted my jeep and drove into Oran. The purpose of my trip was far from that of a sightseer; it was a very real one, namely, to choose depot sites for the mountains of Quartermaster supplies that I knew were going to be unloaded there.

In this connection, I might point out that our plan had been that the Oran Task Force, which had also been known as the Center Task Force, would be supplied directly by or from depots in England initially, and subsequently by shipments from the United States. The logistical plan for the operation had called for a fourteen day level of Quartermaster supplies to be on hand and ashore by D/30; by D/60, there was to be a thirty day level of supply ashore, and by D/90 there was to be a forty-five day level for all troops ashore.

In Class I supply, we had simply figured a ration per man per day. In Class II and IV supply, I had worked up some maintenance factors with a group of SOS Quartermaster officers in England. Class III particularly gasoline, required some more elaborate thinking, as previously stated. However our factors of 5 gallons of gasoline per day per wheeled vehicle and 50 gallons of gasoline per day per tracked vehicle proved more than adequate for that particular operation.

The supply plan had called for a follow-up convoy to arrive in Oran on D/4 with a second follow-up convoy arriving on D/13. The D/4 convoy would bring the strength of the force up to approximately 60,000, while the D/13 convoy would bring in another 20,000 troops, for a total strength of 80,000 men. Thereafter administrative convoys would bring in more troops and supplies in cycles of every six or seven days.

Storage Sites

For these reasons, the importance of choosing good and adequate depot sites in Oran was obvious. I had given this matter considerable thought prior to the landings. We had obtained some very fine maps of the city, and also some photographs of it taken both from the sea and from the sky. Readily seen on the photographs were some large gasoline refinery-type tanks which had belonged to the Shell Oil Company. They were located right near the harbor area and I made my first call there. The managers were most cooperative, with the result that on D/4 we began to discharge a tanker of gasoline into the Shell tanks. This was a considerable relief, as it meant that at least we had a receiving and storage point for the important item of gasoline.

My next call was somewhat unusual -- on a bull-ring in the southwest corner of the City. In both the maps and the aerial photographs that I had seen this bull-ring appeared to be a substantial structure, and I had anticipated that the spaces under the seats would be adequate and convenient for the storage of rations. Naturally the structure was on a good traffic net with plenty of parking space around, and it seemed like a splendid bet for a Class I storage point.

Unfortunately, appearances had been deceiving. The bull-ring was there all right and the site was fine, but there was no space whatsoever under the stands. What would have been space there in an American football stadium was filled up with stones, bricks, debris, and junk of such consistency that cleaning it out would have been impossible. Further, the bull-ring smelled like bulls.

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While driving the streets of Oran I gradually suffered a second disillusionment. On the maps we had seen, the streets were shown as broad, well-paved boulevards. I have never doubted that they were intended some day to be such by the City Planning Commission. That day had not yet come; what had appeared to be boulevards were in fact streets; streets were alleys; and alleys, where they existed at all, were donkey-paths. Finally, after making queries at the "Hotel De Ville" (City Hall to us) I learned of an unused warehouse at 66 Rue du Tetre. I went there, saw the owner and claimed it as the Quartermaster Class II and IV Warehouse. I knew that it was inadequate, but hoped to do better later. I found a park on the southeast side of the City and proclaimed it to be the Class III dump site. A vacant lot on a good street intersection became the Class I dump. We were set up for business!

I then drove down to the docks at Mers-el-Kebir and met the Quartermaster troops arriving on the D/4 convoy. These included the balance of the officers in the II Corps Quartermaster Section, together with two officers attached from the Quartermaster Section of the Mediterranean Base Section. This latter organization was scheduled to take over Quartermaster functions from us at a future date.

Also on this convoy there arrived the balance of the 85th Quartermaster Depot Supply Company, the 93rd Quartermaster Railhead Company, and the 1st Battalion (less 2 companies) of the 28th Quartermaster Regiment (truck). As previously mentioned this last unit was not to be under me, but operated directly under the Corps G-4.

I quickly directed the depot supply company to No. 66 Rue du Tetre , and sent the railhead company to the location that I had chosen for the Class I dump. Meanwhile, I had moved the gasoline supply company (less a small detachment) into Oran from Arzeu, and rations, gasoline, clothing and equipment at once commenced to roll into the three dumps.

The Port Commander for Oran had assigned to his staff an extremely aggressive and effective officer named Captain Franklin Kreml. Captain Kreml had been an instructor in traffic engineering at Northwestern University before the war, and upon arrival in Oran on D/4 he was assigned as traffic officer of the Port. In this capacity he had been carefully indoctrinated with the fact that the mission of the Port was to unload as many ships as possible in as short a time as possible. Therefore, as soon as he stepped on dry land he visited every truck owner in Oran and signed them up on contracts whereby their drivers and trucks, which were fueled with alcohol, worked solely for the Port Commander. Simultaneously, he ascertained the location of our dumps, placed signs leading to them from the docks, and in no time had his hundreds of civilian trucks hauling to our installations.

Meanwhile, the Arzeu phase was still going on. When the D/4 convoy arrived at Oran, several of its ships were discharged at Arzeu. The dock facilities were sufficient for only a few ships at a time, but time was important and the unloading operation went on night and day.

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Daily Train

On D/2 the 1st Infantry Division had entered the City of Oran, but its supply area was near a suburb called Sidi Chamy. This suburb was on the narrow-gauge rail line that ran south from Arzeu, over a range of hills, and then down into Oran. The Division had ample trucks with which to haul its supplies, but existence of the railroad caused many supply-minded individuals to wince at the thought that trucks were being used when civilian rail facilities were available. The fact that no one had made a reconnaissance of the rail line did not detract from the strength of this feeling.

Therefore, on D/3, the Corps G-4, from his office on the headquarters ship, ordered that before sundown on that day a "daily train" be dispatched to the 1st Division at Sidi Chamy. He further ordered that the train carry supplies of all types. This directive was not questioned, although Lt. Colonel Clarence Eymer, the Division G-4, accompanied by a column of trucks, had been in the beach area for several hours that morning, after which there was noted a marked decrease in the number of stacks of supplies.

In giving his order the Corps G-4 indicated that, of course, the responsibility for the shipment would be that of the Quartermaster. With that mission in mind, one of my officer assistants conferred with the Engineer Brigade Commander and with the civilian stationmaster, with the result that a train of freight cars was actually made up, the cars containing gasoline, oils and greases, rations, ammunition of all kinds, and fresh

water in 55 gallon drums. The cars, loaded with this variety of supplies, had just happened to be lying there on the railroad-tracks by the dock at the time they were coupled together, so that it was simply accidental as to how and with what assortment of items each car had been loaded. Several hours later the train actually departed, the Quartermaster officer ensconced in the caboose.

The distance from Arzeu to Sidi Chamy is approximately 30 miles by rail, and slightly less by highway. The rail line goes over the hills for most of the distance, and then descends into the valley that surrounds Oran. There was a town approximately every 2 miles on the line, and the train stopped faithfully at each station, while the locomotive crew discussed the events of the day with the local villagers. At each stop the Quartermaster officer noted the shooting-gallery complexion of the signs, semaphores, and the inevitable water-tower, all of which had received the attention of the Division's riflemen.

In due course, the train arrived at the village of St. Cloud. It was now nearing twilight, and the locomotive crew again greeted their friends with the latest news from Arzeu, relaxed a few minutes, and then inspected the engine. Suddenly, a burst of galling conversation was heard over the snorts and pants of the steam engine, and even to the non-gallic ear of the Quartermaster officer it was noticeable that all was not well. The fact seemed to be that, in order to continue the uphill trip to the crest of the hills, the locomotive simply had to have more water. Moreover, the riflemen of the 1st Division had not lost any of their accuracy as they

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passed through St. Cloud. Even without the use of syllogisms appeared the frustrating conclusion that the train would go no further-up hill, that is.

The Assistant Corps Quartermaster came forward with what seemed to be a plausible thought. "Pourquoi ne utilisez pas de l'eau dans les vingt-vingt gallon boites?" No, this water was all right to drink, but the only kind of water that would make the engine run was water from the tower! At a loss to contend further with such unreasonable determination, but not unthankful to know that he would probably get to bed at some time that night, the American re-boarded his caboose and the train backed back to Arzeu, nonstop and toute suite.

Oran

Three days later, on D/6, the balance of the Arzeu contingent of Corps Headquarters and of the QM troops in the area moved into Oran, leaving the operation of the Port of Arzeu (as well as of the Arzeu-Oran rail line) exclusively to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade.

By this time Corps Headquarters was ensconced in and about the Grand Hotel D'Oran. My QM Section had its office in what had until a few days previously been a gambling-casino of some note, and we commenced to face the problems of storing the supplies, anticipating the tremendous build-up that was scheduled to commence at once.

The most pressing problem was that of burial. Although I had requested that at least a Quartermaster Graves Registration Platoon (1 officer, 24 enlisted men) accompany the force, this

was rejected by G-3 on the ground that only combat troops were important. Due primarily to the slaughter in Oran Harbor, we had to bury more than 400 American soldiers. I selected a site near a civilian cemetery on the outskirts of the City, obtained some Engineer troops with digging equipment, and then turned this serious operation over to one of my Assistant Corps Quartermasters. There he organized and laid out the cemetery, buried the dead, and reported the burials.

However, two more lasting problems that each day continued to grow were those of storage space and operating personnel. As the month of November wore on, the rains became more frequent, and the ground softer. Covered storage was simply nowhere to be found. We did locate an unused French Army cavalry barracks, complete with stables. The buildings were clean and in good condition; but as soon as I requested the use of the site, through our City Hall liaison staff, the French insisted that they needed it. Had they been an enemy nation, we might properly have requisitioned the installation; being friendly, we could only use what they did not want. One of the few sites that no one seemed to want at all was a winery that had met with reverses owing to the war. It had large, paved storage yards, was surrounded by a cement wall, was on a good road, and, most important, was separate from a railroad side-track only by that wall. Further, the proprietor, doubtless not unmindful of a fair rental for the use of his premises in the future, was quite willing for us to move in. Move in we did with the 93rd QM Railhead Company, and the winery became the Class I Depot. The Engineers blew down the

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cement wall by the railroad tracks with dynamite and we had a loading track at our disposal. We continued to use the old Class I dump, keeping it in operation as a truckhead for local issues only; the new site was our depot. This division of functions was good, as unit supply trucks and personnel were thus kept away from the depot. Our Class II & IV Depot remained at Number 66 Rue du Tetre, where we were badly confined; we were unable to find any place in which to expand these facilities, and the walls and the ceilings (if not the floors) fairly bulged with clothing and equipment.

Troop List

In operating personnel the problem was difficult although not without some solution. As I have pointed out, we only had three Quartermaster companies in the II Corps. On about D/6, Allied Force Headquarters ordered one platoon of the depot supply company to Constantine, where it was to operate a Quartermaster Depot for Air Force units in eastern Algeria. This weakened our meager troop strength, leaving approximately 260 QM troops for a 60,000-man force. One week later the D/12 convoy brought another 20,000 troops, but it also brought a second QM depot supply company, a QM mobile bakery company, and a QM salvage repair company. While all three of these units were assigned to the Mediterranean Base Section, Colonel McMasters, the Quartermaster of that command, kindly turned them over to us for our own purposes upon their arrival.

We placed the new depot supply company in the Class I truckhead, thus freeing the balance of the 93rd QM Railhead Co. for use in the Class I Depot. The salvage repair company was

placed in a vacant block, where it went into immediate operation repairing shoes, clothing, and equipage, as well as operating a QM Salvage Dump. The bakery company set up shop in another field, and fresh bread immediately augmented the canned rations that we were eating.

However, before and after the arrival of these companies, we needed more QM troops. I had predicted this during the planning phase, but had been told that there was plenty of civilian labor available in Oran.

Civilian Labor

Indeed, there was a surfeit of labor available in Oran, but it was largely of an unsatisfactory calibre. The Arab race is one of the most populous in the world. In its numerical strength, there is--as there is in all races--a not unsubstantial fraction of useless, worthless, illiterate, dishonest, and diseased people who will do or promise to do anything for an honest franc (or a dishonest franc). These people were the labor market from whence we were compelled to draw.

In filling gasoline cans they were fairly satisfactory. There was nothing but gasoline in the hose they used, and there were no cans to fill but gasoline cans. However, in stacking cases of food their performance was not as adequate. They were reasonably good in knowing what side of the case was "up", but the fact that "C" Rations were arriving in five different menus at that time utterly failed to impress them. They were uninhibited by any restraints of personal modesty. Such freedom may

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reflect cleanliness of heart, although I doubt it. However, it very definitely reflects a low degree of sanitation for a ration dump.

This labor problem became more and more urgent as Captain Kreml's civilian trucks lined up outside our dumps for unloading. He complained to us of delays in freeing those vehicles, and I thought then and think now that his complaints were justified and reasonable. However, they emphasized the need for personnel.

Subsistence

In an attempt to make the most of an undesirable situation, we divided the Class I depot into two parts. In one part was the flour, dried beans, and any other foods which were not packaged in imperviously sealed cans or containers. The native laborers were not admitted to this part, nor did they handle any food items that belonged there. Their work was limited to handling the cases of food that could not physically be exposed to the air.

Meanwhile, the mountains of food had grown and grown. In addition to the "C", "D" and British "compo" rations, vast quantities of "B" rations had commenced to arrive on D/4. On D/18 we commenced to issue "B" rations to all units, and we remained on this basis the balance of our time in Oran.

The "B" ration was well augmented with fresh meat. In requisitioning the initial shipment of rations from England, I had been careful not to ask for either perishable foods or foods that required refrigerated storage. We had known that a refrigerated warehouse existed in Oran; but we had no knowledge as to its capacity. On my first day in the City I had been directed to

it by the Prefet, but I found it loaded with meat belonging to the French Navy. I thereupon called upon the French Admiral, who had that day surrendered to General Fredendall. Through an interpreter I told him that I wanted to use some space in the warehouse. He assumed a cavalier attitude toward me, obviously forgetting that he had surrendered to us. I then said that I had observed seven rooms in the cold-storage plant and that in 24 hours I would expect one of them to be vacant, and a second room empty on the following day, following which I would notify him of our future needs. He made a counter-offer that I issue out their meats and then replace it with the first meats that we received. Knowing nothing of their veterinary standards, I declined. However, by the next day one room was vacated, a second room by the following day, and by the end of the week we shared half and half.

The proprietor of the plant was M. Armand Toledano, who most graciously received me into his home and subsequently invited me and my officers to frequent and lavish dinners.

M. Toledano's cold-storage plant was found none too soon. Regardless of the fact that I had asked for no fresh meat, the D/13 convoy brought with it one refrigerated ship with an entire cargo of frozen beef, frozen pork and chilled hams, bacon, and legs of lamb. A few days later a second refrigerated ship arrived, with more meat and tons of frozen turkey. We had no room in which to store these delicacies, and we certainly were not going to re-consign them back to the United States; therefore, steaks, chickens, roasts and lamb abounded on our menus, and for

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Thanksgiving Day, November 26, 1942, we issued the frozen turkeys right from the ship's side. These food items, together with the bakery company's fresh white bread (which we had not seen in England), and the delicious Algerian oranges that we purchased at approximately one cent (US) per orange from a local fruitgrowers' cooperative, well augmented our ration to a point where it was a strong morale factor among the troops.

One unexpected augmentation was made on a fine November day when approximately twelve thousand gross of fresh eggs arrived at the cold storage plant. Our officer in charge there protested that there was no room to store them, but the truck drivers--as usual--in turn protested that their trucks had to be unloaded at once, and that they wanted no nonsense about it. We were telephoned and advised of the situation, but we had no alternative but to order the crates unloaded and issued that day as a forced item. This was done, and on the following morning every American in the vicinity of Oran had a brace of fresh eggs for breakfast--a dish that we had nearly forgotten about. It was several hours later that a telephone call from Port Headquarters shed some light on the situation, but the light was too late in shining. The eggs had arrived via a French ship and had been consigned to the French Navy. We do not doubt that a charge was later made on our reverse lend-lease ledger to pay for the eggs.

It was while we were compelled to store our rations out in the open in Oran that a serious deficiency displayed itself concerning the labels on our subsistence. The moisture of the atmosphere caused them to peel right off the containers. A crate

of food, with a label off, is a mystery that challenges anyone, and especially an Arab who can't read English in the first place. The unremitting weather stimulated the destruction of these labels, and piles of "unknown" rations grew around the Class I depot. While I understand that they were ultimately identified and did not go to waste, this lesson in food identification caused the manner of labeling subsistence to be modified so that the descriptive words were stamped into the containers.

Railheads

Our forces grew in numbers. A battalion of the 20th Combat Engineer Regiment was stationed near the Moroccan border at Tlemcen, guarding the Casablanca-Oran rail line. To supply them we shipped a car of rations and a car of Class III supplies everyday. These daily shipments were made from the rail-siding at our Class I depot. Moreover, the rain and mud had made travel from the Tafarui Airfield (south of Oran) more and more difficult, so that the same train was used to drop off cars of rations and gasoline at that station also.

As stated, I had been apprised months in advance of the large quantities of Quartermaster supplies and of the high reserve that would be discharged in Oran. In order to meet this situation, I had decided to activate depots outside of Oran along the two railroad lines that ran to the east and to the west, respectively. It was too much to assume that Oran itself could supply sufficient depot space for the storing of large reserves within the city limits. Therefore, within ten days after our arrival there, I dispatched teams of officers to

to survey depot sites along both railroad lines from Orleansville in the east to Oujda in the west. Through Lt. Colonel William Carter, Assistant Mediterranean Base Section Engineer in charge of construction, we had arranged to have covered storage platforms constructed at several of these stations. Shortly his Headquarters took-over the operations from us, the Quartermaster of Mediterranean Base opened such a depot in the town of Perregaux, about 50 miles south and east of Oran.

In the initial phase of the invasion, while we were subsisting entirely on "C" and "Compo" rations, we used the cigarettes that were included therein. Subsequently, when we adopted the "B" ration, these items ceased to be included. Accordingly, coincidental with the adoption of the "B" ration, we opened a sales store in Oran, where unit sales of cigarettes, candy, and post exchange items, were made and where officers' and nurses' clothing were sold.

Nurses

Speaking of nurses' clothing reminds me that there was none. They simply had to wear the clothes that they had or the GI uniform. This was a most unfortunate oversight which was corrected by our first cable to the U.S.; it nevertheless took two months before the first shipment of nurses' clothing could be unloaded in the Mediterranean Theater.

Laundry

It was fortunate for us that the II Corps had available the facilities of Oran, inadequate as they were. We had no laundry service of our own. However, the French civilians for

a small bar of soap would gladly do a soldier's laundry for him. The hospitals presented a more urgent need, and our one QM Laundry Platoon (which had four laundry units) was divided among them as soon as it arrived in Oran.

Class II & IV supply

During this time our Class II and IV supply operation was causing comparatively little problem, other than that of storage, which we have already discussed. We had ordered, as I have stated before, maintenance plus a build-up. Nevertheless, even the build-up was intended primarily as force maintenance and not for initial issue. Unfortunately, during the phasing of troops into the Mediterranean Theater, many units were separated from their vehicles and T/O&E equipment. This was not accidentally done but happened by design. Of course, it is always planned that the troops and the equipment will immediately meet with each other upon landing. Nevertheless, in spite of the best laid plans, these happy reunions did not always transpire. The result was that the troops--who are virtually useless without their equipment--needed to draw, as initial issue, from the maintenance stocks. This need had an extremely weakening effect on those stocks. The fact that ultimately the troop units might receive their own T/O&E equipment should have meant that they would return the equipment that they had drawn to tide them over; unfortunately, this very seldom happened. In a new theater supply discipline is characteristically somewhat relaxed in the early stages of an operation, and unit supply officers as well as commanders realize that they are not likely to have an Inspector

General's inspection while living in tents in a field or on a beach. Therefore, there is no particular impetus, other than that of honor, to return the equipment that they have drawn from maintenance stocks. Regardless of the psychology of the situation, the fact was that the equipment was not returned. Around D/21, we had a substantial number of replacement troops, casualties, loose ends, and units arriving in the Mediterranean area without their T/O&E equipment. Inasmuch as these units were unable to provide for themselves, the Corps G-4 directed that a certain area on the outskirts of Oran be set aside for them, and also that it be set up, manned and equipped for their housekeeping. The name of this location was Camp Myers. It was up to the Quartermaster to see that Camp Myers was equipped with sufficient supplies to handle a figure of approximately 10,000 casualties. This we did, but with the feeling that we were mis-using the maintenance stocks that we had in the theater. In any case, it simply had to be done, as otherwise the troops would have gone without hot meals, dry places to sleep, and other basic comforts of life. Please understand that I am not in the least criticizing the point of making life as bearable as possible for our own troops with our own Army equipment; my point is that it is not expedient at any time to separate troop units from their T/O&E equipment, and that whatever saving is made in transportation is more than overbalanced by the loss of the usefulness of the troops as well as the waste of maintenance equipment sidetracked for their initial issue.

On D/30 the supply operations at Oran were relinquished by the II Corps to the Mediterranean Base Section. All our Quartermaster troops, installations, and supplies were turned over as a going concern. The Corps Quartermaster Section took a deep breath and prepared to relax. We had completed our first job.

Mediterranean Base Section

In planning the invasion of Oran I had worked closely with Major General Robert M. Littlejohn, Chief Quartermaster of the European Theater of Operations, and his staff in London. It was from the Quartermaster officers who were assigned to the Services of Supply in the ETO, and who at that time were under General Littlejohn, that the officer personnel for Mediterranean Base Section would be supplied. Further, the Quartermaster units which would be assigned to Mediterranean Base Section were in England prior to the mounting of Torch. As has been indicated, the plan was that Mediterranean Base Section, as soon as it became organized in and around Oran, would take over from the II Corps all supply and administrative installations and services.

While we were in England, we had no idea as to what use would be made of the II Corps, or its troops, after the landing had been made in Oran. Specifically, we had no idea as to whether we would continue to stay in that area, or whether we would be moved to another vicinity. I felt a natural concern to effectuate as smooth a transfer of depots and other installations from Corps command to Mediterranean Base Section command as would be possible. With this thought in mind, I requested General Littlejohn to arrange for two of his officers who would

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be assigned to Mediterranean Base Section Headquarters to accompany my Quartermaster Section on the D/4 convoy arriving at Oran. I also requested that a further movement of officers be made on the D/13 convoy, and that some of his Quartermaster units also be shipped on this latter convoy.

Consequently, by the time the turn-over of control took place, which was on D/30, there were a number of Mediterranean Base Section QM officers who had been with the II Corps Quartermaster Section continuously for at least several weeks previously, and there were as many, if not more, Quartermaster units working in the installations in and around Oran which were assigned to Mediterranean Base Section as there were Quartermaster units assigned to the II Corps. As a result of these attachments, when the take-over did transpire, it was without incident or confusion.

Retrospect

Nevertheless, it is with some degree of humility that I look back upon this operation. Virtually no coordination or advanced thinking had preceded or accompanied the Oran operation. Our Quartermaster units had no concepts of their missions until we met them on a pier and told them where to go, what to do, and, often, how to do it. The enlisted men were physically overburdened with food, ammunition, and accoutrements. The two "C" rations that he carried on his person as he went into Oran alone weighed 10 pounds. The bandoliers of ammunition, the clothing, gas-masks, weapon, and other incidentals that the combat troops carried on their persons weighed an additional 122 pounds, making an aggregate of 132 pounds per man. This

simply represents about 110 pounds too many for a combat soldier to carry and enough to make anyone else utterly useless. Moreover, each man had (either carried by him, or for him) two barrack-bags, each full of more equipment and clothing. Because the men actually used much of this equipage, after approximately D/10, when Oran became a city in which only Class A uniforms were permitted, I shall not discuss this topic further at this time.

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TUNISIA

Next Mission

On the afternoon of December 31, 1942, I received a long distance telephone call which summoned me to Algiers at once. Arriving there late that night, I met several other staff officers from II Corps, some of whom had preceded me there. On the following morning we were called to conference with General Fredendall, the Corps Commander. He outlined the next mission of the II Corps.

At the time of the invasion of North Africa, the British Eighth Army, under General Montgomery, was engaged with the Axis forces, under General Rommel, in the vicinity of Tripoli. Tunis, six hundred miles to the northwest, was a city of no military potentiality or importance as of that time. It had been a part of the over-all plan of Allied Force Headquarters that immediately upon the consolidation of the landings, a force from the British First Army, which had landed in Algiers, would move east and seize the city and port facilities of Tunis. This move was obviously designed so that German supply would be denied through this port when and if the advance of the Eighth Army reached a point at which no other means of supply was available.

Early Phase

Unfortunately, the merits of this plan were as obvious to the Germans as they were to Allied Force Headquarters. In fact, they

were even more obvious, inasmuch as the Germans moved much faster and within a week after our landing were sending troops by air from Sicily to Tunis at an estimated rate of 500 men per day.

Accordingly, by the time the British First Army got around to moving towards Tunis, the Germans had a resourceful and tough handful of troops with which to hold them off. It was only a week after we landed in Oran that Combat Command "B" of our 1st Armored Division was ordered to move overland from the Oran area to support the British in their move against Tunis. This move was one which was very nearly successful. In fact, it was so nearly successful that our troops arrived within sight of Tunis.

Unfortunately, the lack of a supply line and the lack of sufficient infantry with which to support our armor compelled this force to withdraw to an area some sixty miles west of Tunis. As the German strength increased in this vicinity, skirmishes became more and more frequent and our potential for reaching the sea, either at the Gulf of Tunis or the Gulf of Gabes, became more and more reduced.

However, in January, 1943, the British Eighth Army was about to launch an all-out attack against the Axis Mareth Line, and Allied Force Headquarters directed that the British First Army and the U. S. II Corps would launch an attack on or about January 19, 1943, from Southern Tunisia to the City of Sfax, where a line would be established to cut off the Rommel Forces from the Tunis-Bizerte port facilities.

While back in Norfolk House in London, I had discussed this possibility from a supply viewpoint with one of our British

opposite numbers", who was to be stationed on Malta. We had speculated as to the feasibility of such a move and had concluded that it could best be supplied by a coordinated seaborne shipment from Malta into the port of Sfax. Here the point of our force would receive the shipment, and then the force would withdraw to the hills in the west. The mission we were now to accomplish was tactically the same in substance; however, there would be no subsequent withdrawal.

Plan

The group of II Corps officers in Algiers immediately moved to the old Roman city of Constantine, approximately 200 miles to the southeast. There we organized into a planning headquarters. At first the plan appeared to be relatively simple. The strength of the Corps would consist of the 1st Armored Division and the 20th Engineer Regiment (combat), plus supporting tank-destroyer, anti-aircraft, and service troops, for an aggregate troop strength of only 40,000 thousand men. The axis of our advance would be through Sbeitla and Faid to Sfax. On our left flank there was already in place a division of lightly armed French infantry; Sbeitla, directly in front of us and which would be on our jumping-off line, was held by Combat Command "B" of the 1st Armored Division, commanded by Brigadier-General Paul M. Robinett; and on our right, in the city of Gafsa, Colonel Edson Raft, USA, commanded a mixed garrison of paratroopers and infantrymen, and some supporting French troops. Col. Raft's force plus the mountains would protect our flank from any enemy maneuver.

Transportation

With this over-all plan in mind, the site of our supply base was designated to be in the vicinity of Tebessa, an old walled city that (like most of those in this area) had been founded by the Romans circa the third century. Tebessa is located approximately 125 miles east of Constantine, with which it is connected by a good vehicular road and a one-track narrow-gauge railroad. This meant that every rail shipment to us from Oran or Algiers, both of which cities are on standard-gauge tracks, would necessarily be trans-shipped onto narrow-gauge cars at Ouled Rhamoun, a few miles east of Constantine.

Tebessa was also connected by highway and narrow-gauge rail with the city of Souk-Ahras, some eighty miles to the North. Souk-Ahras was only sixty miles southeast of Bone, a minor port from which shipments would be made to us, but here, also, the rail line to the north was standard-gauge. It was estimated that the maximum supplies that could be moved into Tebessa by rail per day would be 250 tons. There were no trucks available in support of us to increase this estimate materially.

Supply

Considering the facts that the campaign was scheduled for a date only a few weeks away, and that it would probably be for a short duration, and in view of the severely tight supply picture, a command decision was made that the operation would be performed with Class I, III, and V supplies, only, excluding Class II and IV supplies of all services. A ten day reserve of these three classes of supply was to be stocked at Tebessa before January 17

On the basis of the same reasoning, it was further decided that, unlike the classic concept of supply whereby the troops move into bivouac and then receive the supply build-up while being maintained, on this occasion the build-up would first be established in the Tebessa ara, following which the troops would move through this region to the east and attack the enemy.

QM troops

Needless to say, the number of service troops for the campaign was to be left to a minimum. Accordingly, the following list of QM units was assigned to us:

- 1 Railhead Company
- 1 Depot Supply Company
- 1 Gasoline Supply Company
- 1 Mobile Bakery Platoon
- 1 Service Company
- 1 Laundry Platoon (only two hospitals were scheduled)
- 1 Fumigation and Bath Platoon
- 1 Salvage Collecting Company
- 1 Truck Battalion (less 2 companies)
- 1 Graves Registration Platoon

The numerical strength of this Quartermaster Command according to the T/O's as they existed at that time, would have approximate 1100 men. However, it was thought at that time that the width of the Corps front would be approximately 110 miles, whereas the initial distance from the front to the Corps rear boundary would be approximately 60 miles. Considering that I had the responsibility of operating the Quartermaster depot as

well as forward supply points for all the troops in the area, whether they be British, American or French, a command of eleven hundred Quartermaster troops was very small for the mission.

The supply impetus would be provided by the British First Army. Because the entire Eastern Algerian-Tunisian Sector was primarily conceived as their responsibility, they had already organized the civilian railroads, had established movement-control points on both rail and road nets, and had organized ration, gasoline and ammunition dumps in the Tebessa area.

Movement

Meanwhile, the Corps headquarters had been reduced in size to fit a "type corps" TO&E. The surplus officers and enlisted men were transferred to the Mediterranean Base Section Headquarters in Oran. The balance of the Headquarters left Oran by motor convoy on January 3rd, to make the 500 mile journey to Constantine in 4 days. Leaving their warm beds and hotel rooms behind them, the officers were quick to sense that these comforts were ended for a highly indefinite future, in which conjecture they were not mistaken.

The first night out from Oran the Headquarters camped in a field outside the town of Orleansville. There, although guards were posted about the camp, they acquired a deeper appreciation for the resourcefulness of the ubiquitous Arabs. Colonel Damon Gunn, the Corps Judge Advocate General and a brilliant and alert officer, had gone to sleep that night in a tent with his suitcase next to him. In the morning it had disappeared. This experience was multiplied six or eight times around the camp.

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The following night was spent at Blida, a short distance south of Algiers. On the third night camp was made at Setif, and on the afternoon of the fourth day they arrived outside Constantine, where a temporary headquarters was set up in tents.

Tebessa

Only briefly was the Headquarters together again. On the following morning a detachment commanded by Lt. Colonel Samuel L. Myers, Assistant Corps G-4, and consisting of one officer and two enlisted men from each of the Engineers, Ordnance, Quartermaster and Artillery Sections, left by a convoy of jeeps for Tebessa, 125 miles distant. There they moved into a half-underground hut that they bought from an Arab family for the United States equivalent of \$10.00, and set up their office in an adjacent race-track grand-stand office. Telephone lines were installed by both the British and United States Signal Corps, and the group -- naturally enough -- thereafter became known as "the race-track crowd".

Dumps

The ration dump had already been opened by the Royal Army Service Corps in a good sized theater from which the seats had been removed. Gasoline and ammunition had also been stacked along the roadways by the British. As soon as our service troops arrived, they relieved the British from the operation of the installations, although the latter for the next two months continued to operate the railroad station, particularly the unloading of freight cars. We left the ration dump in the theater, but removed our Class III dump off the roadside into the only

cover nearby, which was in a wooded ravine approximately seven miles east of Tebessa.

Operations

Our own troops commenced to arrive on the evening of January 8th. On this night the 85th Quartermaster Depot Supply Company moved in and took over the operation of the ration dump; simultaneously, Company "B" of the 205th Quartermaster Gasoline Supply Battalion moved in and opened up the new Class III dump, and the 200th Quartermaster Service Company moved into a bivouac area from whence they supplied details of labor to both the Class III dump and the Ammunition dump. At the same time, the first battalion of the 28th Quartermaster Truck Regiment (less Companies "B" and "C") arrived and became the Corps Motor Pool. On the following day they commenced to shuttle ammunition from the British supply point of Souk-el-Arba down to Tebessa. These Class V items included Engineers' demolition items as well as Ordnance ammunition.

On the next day a detachment of one officer and fifteen enlisted men from the service company was sent to Sbeitla, where they opened a Class I and III railhead in support of Combat Command "B" and all other troops in that area. The daily train was made up by the simple process of reconsigning cars of cased rations and of gasoline as they arrived in Tebessa. The distance from Tebessa to Sbeitla was about 40 miles by air, 60 miles by automobile, and 100 miles by rail. The explanation is that the rail line went first northeast from Tebessa to Thala, thence south to Kasserine, which is south and east of Tebessa, and thence again northeast to Sbeitla.

Build-Up

The supply build-up was underway and our reserves of Class III began to increase. Reserves in Class I also increased, but this increase was in tonnage rather than in the number of balanced rations. We were receiving substantial quantities of "B" Ration components. I have never doubted that at some point in their travels these shipments were balanced according to a master-menu of some kind. However, the failure to send us that menu or any other documentation on the shipment, the failure to guard trains against pilferage, and the failure to keep trains intact when they were carrying rations combined to make a maximum effort in the direction of unbalanced rations. The result was that the use of the "B" Ration was curtailed in Southern Tunisia. While the clerks of the Depot Supply Company exercised much resourcefulness in the compiling of several menus per day in order to issue balanced "B" Rations, the number of balanced rations were so few that the only units that ate them with any regularity were those which were sufficiently close to Tebessa that they could draw directly from the ration dump.

Corps C.P.

On about January 17th Corps Headquarters moved from Constantine to an olive grove approximately 6 miles east of Tebessa - just up the road from our gasoline dump. On the following day the attack scheduled for January 19th was postponed. On January 22nd the 168th Combat Team of the 34th Infantry Division was added to the Corps. One week later the 1st Infantry Division was also assigned.

These increases and those of other supporting artillery, tank, and tank-destroyer units were splendid from a tactical viewpoint, but by the end of January we had a force of 60,000 men to supply on the same two narrow-gauge rail lines.

Railheads

At that time we had sent half of the railhead company to Gafsa, 90 miles southeast, to operate a Class I and III railhead for the 1st Armored Division and other units in that area. The other half of the company was sent to Maktar, in the Ousseltia Valley, where elements of the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Division were in contact with the enemy. These moves gave us Class I and III railheads at three places simultaneously, all of which were supplied from Tebessa, itself a major railhead.

Command

An unusual command situation was prevailing in the Corps at that time. Divisions were not operating as such other than from an administrative viewpoint. The entire force was broken into task forces and regimental and battalion combat teams, all of which were under direct Corps Command. Further, the Corps Commander was subject to the command of the British First Army Commander, even for the disposal of these elements within the Corps.

Withdrawal

In any case, on February 14th, 1943, a large number of German and Italian tanks and half-tracks were observed approaching Gafsa from the east. The evacuation of the town was ordered and was carried out that night without the loss of any Quartermaster

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troops or equipment. The railhead was withdrawn to Ferianna, 45 miles from Tebessa. All of our supplies were evacuated by rail. However, there was some uncertainty as to the success of this evacuation by train, inasmuch as the rail line went from Gafsa toward the northwest and then curved back northeast again. As it made this triangular path westward it went through a fairly long tunnel. The proximity and speed of the German advance convinced the crew of the train, which composed of civilians, that they would be very discreet if they were to leave the train in that tunnel and leave themselves in any place other than within the scope of the German advance -- all of which they did.

Logistic Support

On the day after the Gafsa evacuation, the 2nd Battalion of the 168th Infantry Combat Team walked into an ambush in that area, as a result of which they lost practically all of their equipment. They were pulled out of the line after suffering heavy casualties and with the troops having nothing more than what they had on their backs. The Corps Chief of Staff gave immediate instructions to one of my Assistant Quartermaster officers that this battalion was to be completely equipped not later than the following day and made it very definite that this was what was to be done. This order in itself was a reflection upon the staff-work that had been done in the preparation for the operation. To begin with, the entire campaign, as we have noted before, was based on the assumption that there would be no maintenance for loss replacements of any Class II and IV equipment.

As the weeks wore on, units would go back to SOS bases towards the west and would there present requisitions. Some of these depots would fill them, and others would not. The stated policy of Colonel Vere Painter, Quartermaster of the Eastern Base Section, whose principal depot and headquarters were in Constantine, was that he would fill only requisitions submitted by the II Corps Quartermaster, and they were to be consolidated and submitted on a weekly basis. I think that Colonel Painter was absolutely right in his position; on the other hand, the tightness of the transportation situation was such that G-4 denied me any priority for Class II and IV supplies. It took at least 24 hours to move a narrow-gauge train from Constantine to Tebessa, although the same trip could be made by truck in a few hours. Neither truck nor rail transportation was made available to us for this purpose. Consequently, our troops as well as I were all at an impasse in drawing Class II and IV supplies from the Eastern Base Section. Occasionally (I think more by accident than by design) stray shipments of miscellaneous Class II and IV items arrived. How they happened to get that far, I do not know. I do know that during the 90 days from January 7, 1943 to April 7, 1943, we had a total receipt of 6000 chocolate candy bars, for a force whose minimum strength at any time was 40,000 men. I also know that during this same three-month period we received fresh meat shipments on four different occasions; on not one of these occasions was there sufficient quantity to make any issue to the entire troop strength of the Corps. On the contrary, the largest shipment

was one which meant an issue of .35 lbs. of fresh beef to every infantryman in the Corps. I might add that by infantryman I mean the members of each infantry regiment in the Corps. Four issues, partial issues if you please, of fresh meat in a three months period of time emphasized the tightness of the transportation situation.

In any case, as to the needs of the 2nd Battalion of the 168th Combat Team, it was impossible to meet this request without spending at least three or four days. The request was met, but it took just about this long in which to gather the supplies by truck from the rear and deliver them to this battalion. With the slightest degree of advance planning this situation would never have prevailed. By that I mean that had a system of re-supply been designed either in advance of the operation or during the operation, it would have been simple to re-equip one battalion. At no time was any such system ever organized or left to any other medium than chance, guess, or accident.

Kasserine

On 17 February 1943, the enemy gathered increased strength in the area south of the Kasserine Valley. Inasmuch as all indications pointed towards a thrust to the northwest through Kasserine Gap, a withdrawal of our forces from Sbeitla and from the Thelepte-Ferrianna area was ordered to take place that night.

The evacuation of Sbeitla caused a considerable problem because of the single rail line and road that went west from there. The problem was accentuated because the telephone lines were out at Sbeitla. Luckily, the railhead commander had gone to the

nearby city of Kasserine to telephone the race-track as to whether he would receive any supplies the following day, and he was then instructed to move his men and supplies from Sbeitla back to Tebessa immediately. The supply part of the order was easy for him to fill, because he had already issued to the 1st Armored Division everything that he had, and had nothing left. In any event, he was able to obtain trucks to accomplish his move, arriving in Tebessa by daybreak.

In Ferianna, however, our railhead had issued all of its rations, but did have approximately 55,000 gallons of gasoline and diesel fuel lying on the ground. There was not time to send them additional trucks, so their orders were simply to take what they could and to destroy the rest. They were able to obtain very little in the way of transportation, and were required to destroy approximately 50,000 gallons of gasoline, which was done by firing tracer ammunition into the drums and cans. This was the only occasion during my campaigns when any supplies for which I was responsible were destroyed.

Meanwhile, the truckhead at Maktar had been withdrawn, not owing to any enemy activity, but because of the fact that the troops that it was supplying were moved to the south to bolster our forces in the Kasserine Valley. All of our Quarter-master troops were again in Tebessa.

By this time, we had acquired a bakery platoon in Tebessa, which had gone into operation on February 8, 1943. As usual the fresh bread was a great favorite with everybody. Also, a

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fumigation and bath platoon had come in and had been set-up in a stream in the vicinity of our gasoline dump, where it was doing a good business. Bath-tubs were extremely rare anywhere in North Africa, and were actually unknown in that part of the country. Fortunately, there were some old Roman natural hot baths back in a town called Youks-les-bains, 10 miles west of Tebessa, and these received a lot of use from any of us who could take an hour or so off and get back there for a bath. Other than those facilities, and that of our fumigation and bath platoon, it was simply use the outer part of your helmet or no bath at all.

On February 16th, after all these withdrawals had been made, we had on hand in Tebessa 1,000,000 rations, plus a number of unbalanced "B" Ration components. We also had 500,000 gallons of gasoline in our dump 7 miles southeast of the city. In brief, we were in a favorable supply position. Unfortunately, of all the times in my life when I did not want to be in a favorable supply position, this period heads the list.

Although we were protected by mountains on the south and, to some extent by mountains toward the east, the fact was that there were passes and roads over those mountains which would have been passable to Tebessa. The principal threat was posed when the Germans successfully broke through the Kassarine Pass and then marched northwest thru the Kassarine Valley. This force was composed of German and Italian infantry and armor, supported by the excellent German artillery. Although we had barbed-wire entanglements and mine-fields laid out at the entrance of Kasserine Valley and before Kassarine Gap, they were not

sufficiently protected by our own artillery fire to make them effective against the enemy. Therefore, the latter was delayed very little. Our infantry and combat engineers fought valiantly from positions on either side of Kassarine Gap, but they also were insufficient to hold off the advancing enemy. In any event, in only a day or two, the Germans were through the Gap and well up into the Valley, headed toward the northwest and Tebessa.

On the 19th, 20th and 21st of February the 9th Division Artillery arrived on the scene. Prior to that time they had been in the vicinity of Casablanca, having participated in the invasion of that city the previous November. The infantry regiments of that division had already been brought to the eastern front, where they had been deployed piecemeal under British or American command from time to time. The fire of this artillery and that of some British battalions with their "25 pounders", plus an attack from the north by a British brigade known as the Derbyshire Yeomanry, were sufficient to blunt the force of the German attack. Meanwhile, all the effective combat strength of the II Corps was turned on the German force in the Kassarine Valley, and on the afternoon of February 22nd, the enemy's withdrawal therefrom commenced.

However, we had not been able to anticipate that such a happy result would come of the Kassarine Valley battle. I had several days previously given orders that no further shipment of Quartermaster supplies should be made to the Tebessa area; in addition thereto, I had requested unlimited numbers of empty freight cars in Tebessa, and we had used all of our available

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trucks to shuttle gasoline in 5 gallon cans from the dump to the railroad station, from whence the trains were moved to the west. In a few days time, this retrograde movement, plus the consumption that was being continued, had reduced the gasoline down to a figure below 100,000 gallons. I had emphasized the evacuation of the gasoline, rather than the food. While a million rations would have been a lot of food to lose, it was my judgment that its loss would not nearly have been as serious as that of the gasoline, which, if captured, might have permitted the Germans to make a far more substantial advance to the north, to the extent that they might possibly have separated us from Algiers and the supply ports on the Mediterranean. So serious was this threat on February 22nd, that Corps Headquarters had previously been removed from the Tebessa area first to a place called El Kouif, some 20 miles north, with the rear echelon in a town called Morsott, about 15 miles west of El Kouif; subsequently, the CP was moved from these two towns to a city some 30 miles west of Tebessa called Ain Beda. Our bakery company had been moved back there, and also whatever Class II and IV supplies we had on hand were also evacuated to this area. Similarly, our fumigation and bath platoon was also withdrawn to Ain Beda. However, by the morning of February 23rd, the skys were cleared both literally and figuratively. It was a beautiful morning, and to us it looked even better, the enemy was withdrawing from the Kassarine Valley, and we realized that the tide had turned and that we would not be likely to feel the strength of the German power again in the North African phase of World War II.

Aftermath

The Germans withdrew back to the Faid Pass area from whence many of them had come, and also down to Gafsa in the southeast. During the next three weeks the position of both sides remained substantially unchanged, during which time we returned to the Tebessa area our Quartermaster service units and also opened another Class I and III railhead at Ferianna. As we re-entered this latter town, we received quite a set-back. The single-track rail line from Gafsa up to Thelepte and Ferianna went over a relatively high bridge just between the two latter named towns. Either before we had evacuated those towns, or after they had fallen into the hands of the Germans, this bridge had been destroyed. My best judgment in the case leads me to believe that the decision to destroy it was that of a United States commander; I have never been able to learn definitely by whose authority it was destroyed. In any case, it was a costly destruction as far as we were concerned. The bridge was so high, that it would have been impossible to have replaced it without the passing of several months, and the terrain was such as to make it impossible to have built a spur-line around it.

Salvage

Meanwhile, on March 1, 1943, Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., became Corps Commander, relieving General Fredendall. Prior to the arrival of General Patton, I had received a salvage collecting company, with which I opened a salvage dump just north of the city of Tebessa. We had this salvage collecting company, in addition to its other duties, patrol the roads and pick up gasoline cans. Supply discipline had become quite sloppy

this latter regard, and the sloppiness had been accentuated by the policy of expediency which had been permitted during the withdrawals from Gafsa, Sbeitla, Ferianna and Thelepte. In any case, we did everything that we could do to police up the roads and to retrieve discarded or abandoned materiel, whether our own or the enemy.

In this salvage operation, I have always believed that we went further in our endeavors than we should have. It was a common concept that the Quartermaster was responsible for salvage; this is true, he was then and he is now. The difference in understanding is as to just what salvage is. The mere fact that a vehicle becomes worn out or a gas-mask gets a hole in it does not necessarily mean that it automatically becomes salvage. No item of supply becomes salvage until it has been declared useless for any purpose by the appropriate service in question. Then, when it is relegated to a junk-heap, it becomes salvage and becomes a Quartermaster responsibility. In any case, we did the scavenging for all the services, brought back all types of items of supply to our own salvage dump, and then they sent their representatives there to go thru the items that we had collected. They took what they wanted and what they left was ours to send back to the rear.

Reorganization

When General Patton assumed command of the Corps, its strength had increased to four Divisions. I've already mentioned the 1st Infantry, 1st Armored and 9th Infantry Divisions; we had gradually acquired elements of the 34th Infantry Division and, after the Kassarine Pass Battle, the entire division was assigned

to Corps command. The divisions were immediately reorganized, so that each division commander resumed control of his own troops - something that he had not had since arriving in the Combat Zone. General Patton's first project was an attack on the city of Gafsa. This attack was finally made on March 17th, but the Germans had withdrawn immediately prior thereto and the city was taken without any fighting. General Patton immediately moved his Corps Headquarters into Gafsa and we opened up a truckhead at what had formerly been the railroad station. I say "truckhead", because, as I have already pointed out, rail communications had been cut. After Gafsa was taken, General Patton ordered three simultaneous attacks. The 9th Infantry Division moved toward the south, to mop up any enemy resistance, whereas the 1st Infantry Division moved south and east to the city of El Guettar. Lastly, the 1st Armored Division was ordered east to take the city of Maknassy. Further north in the vicinity of Fondouk the 34th Division was to launch an attack to the east with the British. None of these attacks was especially successful.

Shoes

One day General Patton suddenly noticed that the shoes of the troops were in bad condition, owing to the rocky and sandy terrain. That night the G-4 relayed to me his message that the General wanted 80% of the troops in new shoes by the following night. This meant 80,000 pairs of shoes, and we had none in our small depot stock. Thanks to a few good friends in Quarter-master echelons behind us, this was done in 24 hours. However,

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El Guettar

Meanwhile, the British Eighth Army was approaching from the south, and a juncture between its westerly forces and our forces on the south end of our line was expected almost any day. In order to prevent such a juncture, a strong and well executed counter-attack was made by German armored forces against the 1st Infantry Division at El Guettar. Although this attack met with some initial success, the superiority in numbers was in our favor, and our artillery and tank-destroyers destroyed most of the attacking forces before any substantial damage was done to our lines.

The failure of this attack cost the Germans nearly 5,000 prisoners of war, and immediately thereafter the junction was made between the British Eighth Army and our own forces.

Immediately after this meeting, the Germans withdrew their forces to the north. This withdrawal permitted the British Eighth Army to advance in pursuit of the Germans and in doing so they crossed our front and we were out of the conflict for that time.

During the battle of El Guettar a tremendous artillery concentration had been developed in support of the 1st Infantry Division. Obviously, this concentrated artillery power meant a heavy expenditure of ammunition. In order to meet this situation, our strength in truck units had increased from

the 2 companies that we had had the previous January up to a force of 22 companies. While these companies were not under my command, they were under my control. Many of them had been formed from the three Engineer regiments that had made up the 1st Engineer Special Brigade back at Oran. These troops made good truck-drivers and the companies were well run and well administered. They were also welcome. The truck supply of artillery ammunition was rendered more difficult, inasmuch as there was no other means of supply beyond Ferianna. In order to save time, it was hauled by truck from Tebessa for the 90 mile journey to El Guettar. All ration and gasoline shipment to Gafsa had to be re-handled at Ferianna, which became a combination railhead and trans-shipment point.

Supply Exaggeration

It was during the Battle of El Guettar that I experienced a conference which made a lasting impression upon me. General Allen, Commanding the 1st Infantry Division, had complained to General Patton, the Corps Commander, as to the desperate supply state of his Command. Accordingly, General Patton directed Colonel R. W. Wilson, The Corps G-4, to invite the Division G-4 to a conference for the purpose of ascertaining just how serious the situation might be. Lt. Colonel Clarence Eymer, the Division G-4, called at Colonel Wilson's office and displayed a stack of unfilled requisitions. Inasmuch as a lengthy one of these was for Quartermaster Class II and IV supplies, Colonel Wilson called me and requested that I report to his office immediately, which I did. Colonel Eymer stated in my presence that his Division was

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no longer combat worthy because of the bad supply situation, and that it should be removed from the line in the El Guettar battle. Colonel Wilson asked me for my view on the matter, and I replied that I doubted very much that the Quartermaster supply situation within the Division was serious enough as to affect its combat worthiness. I further added, that I knew that this Division was probably better equipped with Quartermaster items than any other unit within the Corps command. Colonel Eymer flourished his unfilled Quartermaster requisitions and said that every item on them was desperately needed, without which his troops were unfit to fight. I asked Colonel Eymer a direct question, "Are you saying that every item on this requisition is so essential that its absence will render the Division incapable of performing its mission?" He replied in the affirmative. I then asked "Will you permit me to make any substitutions?" He answered that every item listed on the requisition was so essential that it would be impossible for substitutions to be made if the Division was to continue to be a combat unit.

This was not the first experience I had had with requisitions for Quartermaster Class II and IV supplies from the 1st Division. It had been characteristic of them that they were not numbered, nor did they cover any given period of time; each was simply marked "special". Moreover, each requisition appeared to have been prepared simply by copying the Quartermaster items from the tables of equipment, as well as from tables of individual allowances, upon the Form 400.

I then turned the pages of the requisition down to the letter "T". Near the bottom of the T's was listed the following item "Trumpet, with slide from F to G". Pointing to this item, (and I have forgotten how many of them were so desperately needed by the Division) I said "now, Colonel Eymer, are you insisting that the trumpets that you requisitioned must have a slide from F to G, or will not a slide from E to F be adequate in order for your Division to remain in combat?" Colonel Eymer replied "I do not appreciate humor at the expense of my men"; but the drama of the meeting was gone, the bubble of urgency had been pricked, and the lightning-bolts that he had appeared ready to hurl had fizzled while in his hands. At the request of Colonel Wilson, Eymer accompanied him into the Office of the Chief of Staff, where they explained the "misunderstanding".

Burial

All during this time, we were operating an army cemetery at Tebessa. This cemetery had been opened as a II Corps cemetery in early January, when one of our combat engineers was killed by a rifle grenade fired during a training program. This had happened before any heavy fighting had taken place in that vicinity, and before more than a few troops had been moved into the area. Accordingly, he was buried in a grave on the side of a hill over-looking the city of Tebessa. During that first funeral a bugler had blown "taps", a guard of honor had fired its volleys, and a chaplain had given the burial service of the man's religious faith. It was the only formal military funeral

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that I know to have taken place in a cemetery in a forward area, and in itself served to be the dedication of the cemetery at Tebessa.

By mid-April the work of the graves registration platoon was far from finished. Although the fighting was ended in Southern Tunisia, search parties from this platoon and from the salvage collecting company were required to comb the battlefields and the roads leading thereto, in an effort to remove all dead, enemy or friendly, and all materiel abandoned thereon.

While these operations were going on, Major General Omar N. Bradley assumed command of the Corps, relieving General Patton. The latter went back to his I Armored Corps, which had been redesignated as the U. S. Seventh Army and was then in the planning stage of the invasion of Sicily.

Movement North

At this time the British First Army, the British Eighth Army, and the U. S. II Corps, together with the French XXX Corps, were under General Alexander, the commanding general of the Eighteenth Army Group. In his position he amounted to General Eisenhower's supreme ground force commander in the North African Theater. II Corps had not been under the British First Army since early March, but had been directly under the Eighteenth Army Group during the interim. General Bradley immediately requested that II Corps be given a part and a sector in the concluding phase of the campaign against the Axis forces in North Africa. Inasmuch as there were no Axis forces left in our vicinity, the granting of his request would have meant a movement. His request

was granted, and the American II Corps was given the northernmost sector of the allied line, from Cape Serrat on the Mediterranean Coast south for a distance of some 60 miles to a point approximately 25 miles east of Beja. Beja was on the sector line dividing the U. S. II Corps from the First British Army, and was the site of our first command post in Northern Tunisia.

This assignment meant that the entire Corps, then consisting of approximately 100,000 troops with accompanying vehicles, would be moved from Southern Tunisia up to the northern flank of the Allied lines. Further, this movement would necessarily cross the supply lines of the British First Army. A system of excellent coordination was worked out between the British Movement Control officers, our own G-3, and my Assistant Quartermaster in charge of transportation, with the result that the entire troop movement was done with our organic transportation and with our 22 truck companies in four days. This move I have always considered to be one of our outstanding contributions to the successful conclusion of the Tunisian campaign. When it was concluded we were in position for our final attack to the east.

Transportation Net

In the new Corps sector there were only two highways coming from the west. It needs no saying that whatever supply bases would support us would necessarily be in that direction. It appeared that the plan of the Eastern Base Section was that all of our Class II and IV supplies would come from Algiers, whereas Class I would come from the port of Bone, and Class III would

come from the small port of La Calle. However, even though there were two roads which ran from the west to our sector, the southerly road, which entered Beja directly, was denied to us and was reserved for the British First Army. As a matter of fact, that particular road ran approximately on the sector line between the British and American forces. This decision left just one road, which was a northerly road from Algiers, Philippeville, Bone, La Calle, and Tabarka, to Beja, thence going east in the direction of Mateur. The rail-net was equally simple. One rail-line ran from Tabarka to Djebel Abiod and then to Mateur. However, this line was never in use during our time, so no further mention of it need be made. The other line was very much in use and ran from the port of Bone to Souk-Ahras, to Souk-el-Arba, to Souk-el-Khemis, to Beja and thence to Mateur. This latter railroad was to supply us and the British forces. We were told that we could expect full maintenance in Class I and III from the Eastern Base Section, and that all Class II and IV supplies, although being supplied from the Algiers-Bone area, would be shipped by train so that they might be delivered with the rations and gasoline.

Logistical Support

Inasmuch as we had no opportunity whatsoever to take-over the situation but were simply moving in to the area with orders that we would be supported by the Eastern Base Section, we were in a position in which we had to rely implicitly upon the assurances of that organization. I recall very definitely a discussion with the Eastern Base Section G-4, wherein I stated that one high-

way and partial use of one railroad for the supply of a Corps of 100,000 men, especially when large quantities of ammunition were likely to be used, was a somewhat slender thread. Nevertheless, I was assured that our supply needs would be met satisfactorily.

Fortunately, we had the continued use of a substantial number of the truck companies. This Corps pool helped out magnificently in bringing our own supplies -- mainly of gasoline -- from the La Calle area forward for use by our own divisions. We initially commenced the campaign with Class I and III truckheads at Djebel Abiod on the north, and with another pair of distribution points at a railroad station immediately east of Beja on our south sector line. These truckheads and railheads served the units of the Corps from the time of their arrival in the area on April 14--16th, and until after the final attack started on April 22nd.

It was early in this time that a famous "daily train" arrived at the Class I Railhead near Beja; it was the first one which had been scheduled to arrive on the track, and was to have rations for 50,000 men. The train did carry a substantial tonnage of food; indeed, it had sixteen carloads of peanut-butter and one carload of crackers. This, together with a case of grapefruit juice and a sack of flour equalled rations for 50,000 men. Fortunately, we were able to use Corps trucks to go back to Tabarka and to draw on the Eastern Base Section Depot there for more rations. Otherwise, the only good feature of this particular daily train was to impress upon the Eastern Base Section that

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17 carloads of food did not necessarily mean 17 carloads of rations. In fairness it must be said that from that time on, all shipments of rations were in well balanced quantities.

Railheads

As the attack progressed, we looked for more advanced railhead and truckhead sites, along the two roads going in the direction of Mateur. However, approximately ten days later, and before we were able to effect a move of any of our distribution points to a good location, all Quartermaster units under my command were transferred to Eastern Base Section. However, they remained in our area for the purpose of servicing our troops. On our recommendation, Colonel Vere Painter, Quartermaster of Eastern Base Section, established a row of supply points on the road from Mateur north to Bizerte. These consisted of a ration dump and a gasoline dump, together with the bakery, all of which were located near Michaud, a town 5 miles north of Mateur. This was the final location of our Quartermaster installations, at the time that the Germans surrendered on May 9, 1943. Also, in the Michaud Area was a salvage dump operated by the Salvage Collecting Company. The final cemetery site was at El Auina, near the air-field that serviced Tunis and Bizerte.

Surrender

Therefore, when the campaign ended, I had no installations under my command. However, the Quartermaster service at this time was excellent and, although we had no substantial stocks on

hand, the fact was that the Class I and III supply did come in regularly and requisitions for Class II and IV items were promptly filled.

Prisoners

The only troops that did remain under my command were the truck companies. The Quartermaster of Eastern Base Section was not responsible for transportation; therefore our truck companies remained under me. I was very thankful for this, inasmuch as at the time of the surrender we found ourselves with 26,000 German and Italian prisoners on our hands in one day. Prior to this time we had been moving them back to Eastern Base Section just as fast as possible, but 26,000 prisoners in one day was simply a figure too great to be reckoned with. Moreover, the Chief of Staff gave orders that not more than 25 prisoners would be loaded per $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck. This meant more than 1,000 $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton truckloads of prisoners to be moved. They were put in an enclosure outside of Michaud, and the Engineers constructed barbed-wire fences around the field where they were. The Signal Corps was asked for the loan of its post-hole diggers to quickly and effectively provide latrines. We had discovered a German ration dump near Ferryville, in which I estimated that there were approximately 1 million rations. I might add that this estimate did not allow for the careful balancing that we required for our own rations; nevertheless there was enough food there to keep 1,000,000 men going for one day. We hauled this food from Ferryville to the enclosure, where the Germans had their own camp organization. We simply turned the food over to the camp commander or to his designated officer, and

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they had so organized their camp that they were able to cook and distribute it to their fellow prisoners themselves. I might add that we had also found a number of German field kitchens, all of which were delivered to the prisoner of war enclosure and thereby facilitated the feeding problem.

This captured German subsistence dump provided the basis for a humorous story on me. We had been moving so rapidly that our supplies of soap had deteriorated. The Germans had what appeared to me to be cellophane packages of dehydrated soap in quantity at this dump. I made a forced issue of it immediately to our troops in order that our mess kits could be cleaned after each meal. This was important in this hot and dusty area.

A few days later a mess sergeant asked me what it was. I told him, dehydrated soap. He said he was glad to know because when he put it in the G.I. can full of hot water in which the mess kits were to be dipped after meals, it smelled just like pea soup. I immediately had my good sergeant Tannenbaum translate the German description on the package. It turned out to be pea soup!

The problem of water supply for the 26,000 prisoners was more difficult. They were entitled to water to drink and water in which to wash both themselves and their cooking and eating utensils. Fortunately, the Algerian-Tunisian agriculture makes for a good development of the grape. The Algerian grape makes an excellent and saleable wine. Wineries used vats, and wineries there were with vats in Mateur. The vats were in the form of huge hogs-heads, approximately 20 feet in diameter, but cut in two. That is, they were actually in the form of half-barrels, open at the center. We were able to move a number

of these vats over to the prisoner of war enclosure, where the Engineers faced their problem of water supply. This they solved by hauling water in 750 gallon tank-trucks, and then draining the water from the trucks into the wine-vats.

I must add that the prisoners of war in this case demonstrated a philosophy that made them very easy to please. For three days after the surrender, the roads to the east of Michaud were clogged with German and Italian prisoners walking or riding on bicycles, automobiles, or motorcycles, either singly or in large numbers, all headed towards wherever it was they were supposed to go. Having no idea as to the latter, they were completely docile; the only thing they wanted from anyone was the knowledge as to where the prisoner-of-war enclosure was. They made no bones about the fact they were delighted to be out of the war. Accordingly, once in custody, they were well disciplined and no unfortunate incidents of any kind took place to my knowledge.

Mules

Now that all of our installations had been taken over by the Eastern Base Section, all of our Quartermaster troops had been assigned to that headquarters, and the prisoner of war problem was fait accompli as far as the Quartermaster was concerned, there remained but one loose end in Tunisia. In mid-April, shortly prior to the final attack, a number of our combat units were in highly rugged and even mountainous terrain. In these areas they had not the benefit of roads of any kind or description, and were forced to rely entirely upon pack-animals in order to be supplied within their own units. Accordingly, we were forced to send officers out to requisition mules from the native population.

The latter was extremely cooperative in this regard, and the procedure was simple; the officer would simply call on the local caid in a given city, and he would round-up all spare mules, following which he would order their turn-over to our representative. The mules were used with success for the balance of the campaign. Nevertheless, when the end came, it was necessary that they be returned to their rightful owners.

Physically this presented very little problem, inasmuch as we simply put the mules on trucks and drove the trucks back to their original localities, where they were turned over to their owners. Fiscally it was a problem. Unfortunately, whereas to us a mule is a mule, to an Arab a mule is a personality, and returning just any mule to a former mule-owner was an inadequate completion of the contract. While there was some small demurrer to this disappointing end of the bargain, the fact was that they had not been paid; the contemplation of handsome profits of \$1.00 a day per mule was enough to keep the several mule-owners in a state of mind which induced them to be reasonable with us. Then, literally, came the pay-off. After the surrender, two of my officers were detailed to draw from the Finance Officer sufficient cash, in French francs, with which to pay for the rent of these mules. The drawing of the cash was simple, but the stashing of it was something else. These thousands of franc-notes made a pile large enough to displace an ordinary jeep seat cushion and one of them was obliged to sit on it in the jeep in order to hold it down all the way from the Michaud area to the various areas in which it was distributed.

They went to the five or six cities from whence the mules had been drawn and in each case located the caid and paid him off with no difficulty. However, in the City of Souk-el-Arba a complication arose. The mules had been paid for at the rate of 50 francs per mule per day, which was our contract price. This amounted to, as I said previously, \$1.00 U. S. per day. We were fortunate in being able to return the same number of mules that we had requisitioned. (Luckily, there had been no losses owing to disease, death or anything else.) In this particular locality we had taken 19 mules at 50 francs per day for a total of 24 days. A fair arithmetical answer to the aggregate cost of this transaction would have been 22,800 francs. This amount was tendered in script of the realm to the caid. He, however, was not a purist in his thinking. He magnanimously advised our officers that they could call it a flat 22,000 francs. The latter, having visions primarily of explaining for some months to come to the Finance Officer why they were able to turn back 800 francs in change on a 22,800 franc contract, and secondarily of the legal possibility of our Government being embarrassed by settling a contract which called for a liquidated sum for an amount less than that sum, stood pat. The Caïd explained that, after all, to his people what did the 800 francs mean? When our officers replied that from the appearance of his city it looked as though they would mean a good deal, said that his people didn't understand arithmetic anyway and would take whatever he gave them and accept it as whatever amount they were entitled to. He also added that they were getting more money than they had ever seen in their lives anyway. In any

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event, after much haggling and some 30 minutes of bickering back and forth, our own officers refused to accept any change and finally succeeded in getting the Caid's receipt for the full amount of cash. To this day I have speculated as to just how much cash per mule per day any mule-owner in Souk-el-Arba realized net from that transaction.

SICILYRelizane

While this mule paying-off was going on, the II Corps Headquarters personnel mounted their trucks and vehicles and moved off towards the west, arriving finally in the city of Relizane. Relizane was located on a highway approximately 60 miles south and east of Oran and about 20 miles south of the Mediterranean coast. It was a pleasant and clean town, after the unattractive vistas in Eastern Algeria and Tunisia, and represented a certain breath of civilization to us. However, we had no sooner found our quarters before we were informed of our next operation -- Sicily. It was then May 20, 1943. The Sicilian invasion was scheduled to take place some seven weeks later, on July 10, 1943. However, in this operation, for the first time, we were to be under a higher headquarters for administrative as well as tactical control. The Seventh Army, formerly the I Armored Corps General Patton commanding, was in charge of the operation for all purposes.

The Sicilian operation was to be undertaken by the British Eighth Army under General Montgomery and the United States Seventh Army under General Patton. Over both of these Armies was the reorganized Fifteenth Army Group, under General Alexander. As a practical matter, the Fifteenth Army Group was a redesignation with an enlargement in personnel of what had formerly been the Eighteenth Army Group during the Tunisian campaign. The British Eighth Army was to be composed of both British and Canadian

divisions. The United States Seventh Army was to be divided into two principal commands, namely the II Corps, commanded by General Bradley (whose promotion to Lieutenant General had just been announced at the conclusion of the Tunisian campaign) and what was called the Provisional Corps, commanded by Major General Geoffrey Keyes.

Divisions

For the operation, the II Corps was initially to be composed of the 1st and 45th Infantry Divisions, the 1st Ranger Battalion, the 13th Field Artillery Brigade, and the 19th and 39th Engineer Combat Regiments, together with supporting troops. The Provisional Corps was to be organized on similar lines, with its main strength being in the 3rd Infantry Division and Combat Command "B" of the 2nd Armored Division. At sea in floating reserve would be "Task Force Kool", composed of the balance of the 2nd Armored Division. In addition, the 82nd Airborne Division was scheduled to make an airborne assault on the Island on the night of D-Day, following which it would be in Army reserve.

Supply Plan

The tactical plan of the operation called for the British Eighth Army to land along the southeast tip of the Island in the vicinity of Siracusa and on Beaches both to the north and south thereof. Meanwhile, the II Corps was to make simultaneous landings along the southern side of the Island with two task forces. The 45th Division, commanded by Major General Troy Middleton, was to land in the vicinity of Scoglitti. This was to be our easterly force, whereas, the 1st Infantry Division,

under the command of Major General Terry Allen, was to land at Gela. Meanwhile, the Provisional Corps was to make landings in the vicinity of Licata and Agrigento.

Upon learning the tactical nature of the operation, I visited Seventh Army Headquarters at Mostagnam, which was only about 30 miles from where we were located in Relizane. Colonel Clyde Massey was the Army Quartermaster, and he explained to me that all units would land in Sicily with 4 days' rations in their possession. These rations were to consist of at least 1 day's individual ration, that is "C" or "K" ration, and the balance could be drawn of a type at the option of the unit commander. Seven days' of cased operational rations were to accompany the assault troops as cargo; that is, a seven day supply for all troops in the assault. On D/4, another 7 days' rations for all troops ashore were to be landed, and on D/8, a third shipment of 7 days' rations for all troops ashore were to be landed. All of these rations were to be either 10-in-1 rations or "C" rations.

Regarding Class III, a contemplated 7 days' supply of gasoline for all vehicles ashore was to be landed in 5 gallon cans on D-day, and, similarly, another shipment of 7 days' supply for all troops ashore would be landed on D/4, and a third shipment of 7 days' supply for all vehicles ashore on D/8. Subsequently thereafter all supplies would be shipped by Mediterranean Base Section as requested by Seventh Army through Headquarters Fifteenth Army Group. Quartermaster Class II and IV supplies would commence to arrive on D/4 in modified balanced

lots of clothing and equipment, for beach dump distribution. Previously to D/4 the only Quartermaster Class II and IV shipments would be what were called "combat-packs". These consisted of a water-proof bag about the size of a barracks-bag, in which was a .45 caliber pistol with 3 clips of ammunition, a pistol-belt, a helmet complete with liner, a set of clothing with extra socks, a carton of cigarettes and, in general, the clothing and QM equipment for one man.

After this Quartermaster plan for the invasion had been explained to me, it was pointed out that in eight days' time they would have 21 days' supply landed on the far shore. I suggested that according to my own arithmetic, 7 days' supply for those ashore on D-Day plus another 7 day supply for those ashore on D/4, plus a third 7 days' supply for those ashore on D/8 did not equal 21 days' of supply at any time. I suggested that possibly a greater quantity of both rations and gasoline might be requisitioned if shipping permitted, and pointed to my own experience at Arzeu where we had exhausted our 7 days' supply of rations within 4 days. My comment, offered simply as a suggestion, was ignored.

Consequently, I had no planning responsibilities whatsoever for the Sicilian operation, the entire administrative duties having been assumed by Seventh Army. My own responsibility would be to disseminate the logistical data from a Quartermaster viewpoint thru normal channels and to report on our situation thru Quartermaster channels to Seventh Army.

Needless to say, there were no troops assigned to us.

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Embarkation

Toward the end of June, ships and LST's were loaded with troops, vehicles, and supplies at the ports of Oran, Algiers, Philippeville, Bone, and Bizerte, and assembled in the Gulf of Tunis. There they waited for approximately a week, prepared to make the 24 hour trip to the beaches of Sicily. On the afternoon of July 9th they moved out and that evening went into a storm that was severe enough to cause the Force Commander to question whether or not the invasion should go according to plan or should be postponed. Nevertheless, the decision to invade was not changed, and the operation went off on schedule.

Enemy

At that time there were approximately six Italian divisions in Sicily, together with elements of four German divisions. The Italian divisions were largely of the "coast defense" type, which meant that they were not mobile, and that their personnel were not of the healthiest type. On the other hand, the German troops on the Island were of a decidedly different caliber in every way. For one thing, they were mobile; secondly, they did not appear to be lacking anything in the way of health and physical stamina; and thirdly, they were trained to fight until the end and were definitely not surrender-minded.

Assault

While the actual landings were accomplished with considerable success and very little difficulty, the mobility of the German armor showed itself just a few hours later on a plain just north of the town of Gela. Here the 1st Infantry Division received

a first class counter-attack from tanks of the Herman Goering Panzer Divison, which counter-attack was stopped by the most timely arrival ashore and speedy going into-action of the 1st Division Artillery.

The landings along all of the beaches having been consolidated, the troops established liaison along their flanks and moved northward. On the night of D-Day, the airborne attack was scheduled to take place. Our C-47 planes, loaded with paratroopers, came over at about midnight that night, and I watched them with the greatest of interest from the beach. Their arrival along the shoreline followed a raid by Luftwaffe planes, which had stirred the anti-aircraft defenses both on land and sea to considerable nervousness. Although it was well known among the Staff that the airborne invasion was to take place at this time, apparently this information had not been disseminated to a degree where our own gunners were expecting our own planes at that time and place.

The result was unfortunate, inasmuch as it was my sad experience to watch twenty-seven of our own planes shot down by our own anti-aircraft fire on that night. The survivors of this disaster were unable to accomplish much in the way of good, although several days later sufficient of their number were re-organized so as to be used as a holding force on the extreme left of the Seventh Army line.

Engineer Brigade Supply

The principal beach dumps established ashore in the Seventh Army sector were at Gela and at Licata. Although the Quartermaster dumps at those locations were operated by Quartermaster

units, the control and command of the dumps was exercised by the commanding officer of the 1st Engineer Brigade. This was not unanticipated, as it had all been announced prior to the invasion. What I had not anticipated was that this command and control over supplies would continue to be vested in the Brigade Commander throughout the entire Sicilian operation. The G-4 and chiefs of supply services of Seventh Army had simply delegated their complete operational responsibilities to this officer.

Such a plan had, I know, worked with considerable success in the island campaigns of the Pacific Ocean prior to that time and subsequently thereto. However Sicily is not just a small atoll by any means. It is an Island of some 30,000 square miles in area, but except for certain areas bordering the coastline, it is almost entirely mountainous. Indeed, it is so mountainous that brand-new pairs of Quartermaster shoes were wearing out on infantrymen in as short a time as a few days. Hill-crests, defiles, valleys, and ridges make up virtually the entire terrain of the Island. While distances were short by a straight line, this factor meant nothing in supply operations. I have in mind an example of one unit whose trucks took 26 hours to make a 60 mile supply haul.

Subsequently, the Engineer Brigade began to ship supplies by a rail line that covered the Island in a general way. Nevertheless, the task of supplying all of the U. S. Forces on Sicily was simply too much for the Brigade; our strength at the time the operation ended was approximately 150,000 troops, too many for a brigade of a few thousand men to maintain. The fact was that the

trains simply didn't arrive -- no matter how good the intention had been in deciding to use them. Fortunately, after the initial beach phase on Sicily, the Seventh Army Quartermaster attached two truck companies to me as II Corps Quartermaster. These trucks I used myself to go back and haul supplies from the Army beach dumps to the Army truckheads. Had they not been used in this manner, I have no doubt that some of our units might not have been able to accomplish their tactical missions because of lack of essential supplies.

Conclusion

The Sicilian campaign lasted 37 days, at the end of which time the Island had been secured and whatever Germans had been on it were either killed or captured, or had evacuated themselves onto the Italian mainland. Corps Headquarters were moved to a delightful town on the northern coast of Sicily called "Termini Imerese" where we lived in an olive grove again, went swimming regularly in the warm waters of the Mediterranean, and relaxed and wondered what our next assignment would be.

Critique

In looking back upon the Sicilian campaign, I am again forced to the conclusion that I had reached at the end of the Tunisian campaign, namely, that there was lacking any organized system of supply coordination. The principal function of the Corps and Army G-4's seemed to be to initiate and publish administrative paragraphs for the field orders. No more than that was done by the Technical Services, including my own. The result was that the staffs on these levels were in the position of mere liaison

officer. Further, there was not enough work to do for the other members of the Quartermaster Section, or of any other supply section on Corps or Army level. On the other hand, the personnel of the 1st Engineer Brigade were overworked to a point wherein they were unable to accomplish their mission. This I do not consider to be their fault in the least, as their mission was simply far too large and far too great in its scope for any brigade, as I have already pointed out. They were attempting to do the jobs that the Corps and Army Staffs themselves should have done, and this attempt was unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, the extreme confidence shown by the Army Staff in the Engineer Brigade permitted the Staff to lose control of the supply picture as it progressed. Specifically, on two occasions within the first fourteen days of the operation, emergency requests were sent by Seventh Army Headquarters to Mediterranean Base Section for the shipment of more rations from Africa. Within these first two weeks several million rations were shipped to Sicily by the Mediterranean Base Section ports for a force which did not exceed 150,000 men -- all shipments being over and above what had been requisitioned. This was simply a reflection of the fact that the Army Staff had not followed the arrival, storage, and distribution of these supplies, and the Brigade Staff itself had been numerically incapable of doing so. The result was that the Class I operation had gone out of hand, and, had not the North African ports been as near as they were, a far more serious situation might have existed.

I mention these facts as background for a converse that became very strongly fixed in my mind and that influenced my plans to a substantial extent in the future. The converse was that, in order for a supply operation to work effectively, the technical service responsible for each particular type of supply must keep its finger on it and must follow it closely in all of its ramifications. Inasmuch as the responsibility is that of the chief of technical service on the tactical force staff, he cannot delegate it to a subordinate command, but must face it himself either personally or through his own assistant staff officers.

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INTERIM RESOLVES

In early September General Bradley was notified of his transfer to England, where he would take command of the United States First Army for the European campaign.

The General had transferred with him approximately 25 officers and 60 enlisted men from II Corps Headquarters. This group was from all services and staff sections, and was designed to be a nucleus of experience which would be seeded within the First Army Headquarters.

Among those with us who later were to serve on the staff of the First Army Commander were:

Colonel Benjamin Dickson	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Colonel Truman Thorsen	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Colonel Robert W. Wilson	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
Colonel Damon Gunn	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Colonel Samuel L. Myers	Deputy Chief of Staff
Colonel C. E. Hart	Artillery Officer
Lt. Colonel William Carter	Engineer
Lt. Colonel Grant Williams	Signal Officer
Lt. Colonel J. B. Medaris	Ordnance Officer

With me to the Quartermaster Section I was permitted to bring 2 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 3 enlisted men.

We left Sicily by plane for Algiers on September 12, 1943. Our morale was very high. General Bradley and Brigadier General W. B. Kean, his Chief of Staff, had flown back to the United States for conferences in Washington and for further

implementation of the First Army Headquarters. The rest of us anticipated a few weeks of leisure in Algiers, followed by a comfortable boat-ride (we hoped) back to England. All of us were proud to have been chosen for this new assignment and looked forward to it with the greatest enthusiasm. Upon reporting at Algiers we found that there would be no water-borne transportation to England available for two weeks, so that there was nothing for us to do except rest and meditate. During these two weeks, I was able to review in my mind my experiences in functioning as a field force Quartermaster during the 11 months last past. In thinking of the future, all I knew that it held in store for me was that I was to be designated the Quartermaster of the First Army, which would be the American invasion force across the Channel into France; beyond that I knew not. Nevertheless, I realized, after having reviewed the experiences of the last year, that this was the time to do my thinking. It would be in abstract terms perhaps, but it would also be my planning for the future to as far an extent as possible. In this period of reflection, as well as of thinking for the future, there were five conclusions to which my reasoning pointed. These were as follows:

(1) I was extremely hopeful that the organization in our rear, that is, the organization to which we would look for support, would be strong, responsive, and one which would have confidence in my own organization. I realized that I would have little to say about this organization itself, but I well knew how extremely important it would be to our own operation that it be one in which my entire confidence could be well placed.

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(2) I would be the individual who would be personally responsible for the success of the operation of the First Army from a Quartermaster viewpoint. Whereas any personnel failure might be the fault of people other than myself, either directly under me or in support of me, nevertheless I would be the one to answer for it to the Army commander. Therefore, I determined that whatever happened of a QM nature within the Army area would be under my direct control. I did not wish any other command, or any troops other than those who were under my command, to have any part in the Quartermaster operation within the First Army. Specifically, I did not wish any other echelon of command to operate First Army QM installations. These installations would be operated by troops under my own command, for whom I would be completely responsible. Further, it was my concept that the supply agency supporting us would have the duty of laying down its supplies in bulk in our area for the entire Army. It would be my responsibility to see that they were distributed within the Army area to all units whether they be divisions, corps troops, Army troops, or Air Force or Communication Zone units.

(3) Under existing TO&E, an Army Quartermaster Section was allowed 24 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 57 enlisted men. This heavy numerical strength had been allowed the Quartermaster Section for a definite purpose, and this purpose could only be fulfilled satisfactorily in the event that the officers, in particular, be given certain designated responsibilities with a minimum of interference from anyone. The responsibility of supervising Quartermaster service for a field army was far more

than any 1, 2, or 3 men could share within themselves. I was determined that as long as we had 24 officers in the Quartermaster Section, these responsibilities would be shared in 24 several and separate fractional interests.

(4) I was determined that the relationship between the Army Quartermaster and the Quartermasters of the several corps and divisions, respectively, within that Army would be as pleasant and congenial as possible, but would nevertheless be relations in which not only would the Army Quartermaster have exclusive responsibility for Quartermaster service, but also the Quartermasters in subordinate commands would be unable to challenge his meeting of those responsibilities. I was particularly determined that under no circumstances would any division or corps Quartermaster go around the Army Quartermaster in any supply problem. For example, it had happened on numerous occasions in North Africa that a division Quartermaster would send his trucks hundreds of miles to the rear without the knowledge of the Corps Quartermaster and without any authority whatsoever, other than his own initiative, for the purpose of attempting to draw fresh meats or some other luxury - or necessities - for his troops. Even though I could excuse the division Quartermasters for the urgency of some situations in Africa, I was not able to excuse a system of supply which permitted them to be in these positions. After pursuing this thought, I could see no reason why any corps Quartermaster should have an operational part in an Army supply picture. It seemed to

me that with the Quartermaster facilities and services being under Army control, a corps Quartermaster's part should be advisory within his own command, as well as toward the Army Quartermaster. Moreover, if the corps Quartermaster were to operate, it would merely lead to conflict in conceptions of duties, and therefore, in the executions thereof.

(5) The practice of supply discipline seemed to me as being of paramount importance. In Tunisia, where clothing and equipment were never in copious supply and were frequently in short supply, I remember seeing one division Quartermaster move 9 truckloads of shoes at one time. It was simply a division reserve, none of which had been authorized by any headquarters. I recall another division Quartermaster who had to borrow 14 trucks from the corps motor pool in order to help move his Quartermaster Class II and IV "depot". Here again, no such depot, stock, or reserve had been authorized the divisions by any echelon of command.

I was also extremely conscious of the tendency of division Quartermasters and of unit supply officers to ignore the meaning of a ration. Specifically, I had in mind that the ordinary over-draw of rations within the II Corps was at least 15%. That is, to 100,000 troops we generally issued 115,000 rations or more per day. At worst, this meant that a substantial amount of food that civilians at home are standing in ration lines to buy was going to waste, or, at best, it meant that some units were eating 15% per man more than other units who might be doing the same work or engaged

in the same combat. In any case, it clearly meant a sloppily, if not dishonestly, administered system of supply within the units of the command.

Having come to these conclusions, my meditations were punctuated by the receipt of a cable which summoned the Corps G-4, Engineer, Signal Officer, Ordnance Officer, and myself to England by air immediately. We departed at once, flying to Marrakech, in French Morocco. Here the weather compelled us to wait for three days before our journey could be resumed.

Of all the places in Africa where it would be desirable to be stranded for three days, I can imagine no place more suitable than Marrakech. The hotel ordinarily used by itinerant members of our armed services was filled. With many apologies to us, we were relegated to the Villa Taylor, a rented palace lifted from the context of "A Thousand and One Nights." A private swimming pool, sun baths, good books, and good food made those three days all too few.

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Laundry Co
Bakery Com
Tank-Truck
Fumigation

VII

ENGLAND, 1943

Overlord

On the fourth day we arrived in London, where we returned to reality with considerable abruptness. We were given the plan for "Overlord" to study. At the same time we were given to understand that the First Army would consist of three corps, and of six infantry divisions and two armored divisions, making a total of eight divisions. Upon this premise, we were directed as a first step in a formation of the Army to outline our own troop requirements for each service.

QM Troop Requirements.

The required QM troop list, as I saw it, based upon the capacities of the units according to tables of organization and based upon my own experience as to these capacities, was as follows:

<u>UNITS</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>EACH CORPS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Railhead Companies .	7	0	7
Gasoline Supply Companies	5	1	8
Service Companies	16	1	19
Truck Companies	28	2	34
Troop Transport Companies	9	0	9
Laundry Companies (SM)	5	0	5
Bakery Companies (M)	5	0	5
Tank-Truck Companies	4	0	4
Fumigation and Bath Companies	2	0	2

<u>UNITS</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>EACH CORPS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Salvage Collecting Companies	3	0	3
Salvage Repair Companies	3	0	3
Sales Company (M)	1	0	1
Refrigeration Companies (M)	2	0	2
HQ and HQ Det. QM Group	3	0	3
HQ and HQ Det. QM Battalion (M)	9	1	12
Petroleum Products Laboratory	1	0	1
HQ and HQ Det. QM Battalion	2	0	2

The total number of troops in such a command would approximate 22,000 officers and men. My theory in developing this troop-list was that there would be one large Quartermaster Army Depot, together with a number of Class I and Class III distributing points, be they railheads or truckheads, in support of the several corps. One large group would operate this depot as well as the truck transportation to the truckheads. In addition, there would be an Army motor pool, consisting of two groups of truck companies. In this connection, I should mention that a troop transport company was a truck company by another name.

Further, for each corps I had contemplated one Quartermaster battalion, consisting of two truck companies, one service company, and one gasoline supply company. The truck companies and the service company were for the purpose of permitting the corps Quartermaster to meet what I know would be daily demands for trucks and labor, without necessitating his referral of these

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demands to the Army Quartermaster. I tentatively added the one gasoline supply company to each corps Quartermaster battalion, because I considered that each armored division should have at least one such company in its direct support, although the company would remain an Army unit. In order to discount the absence in advance of these gasoline supply companies from the Army troop strength, I thought it well to have the three gasoline supply companies serving under the several Corps quartermasters, thus also becoming acquainted with the corps Quartermaster officers and procedure. My justification for this troop-list was accepted by the First Army G-4 and the First Army Chief of Staff; it was then up to me to arrange to have these troop units assigned to us by the Theater Quartermaster.

Theater QM Organization.

Major General Robert M. Littlejohn, who, together with his staff, had been so helpful to me during the planning of "Torch" had remained as Chief Quartermaster of the European Theater of Operations. Immediately upon having been designated for this assignment in early 1942, General Littlejohn had planned the supply of the US Forces in the United Kingdom from Washington, D. C., and then took with him to Europe a group of carefully selected officers who became the nucleus about which he built his organization. They had initially organized their headquarters in the city of Cheltenham, a resort that had been fashionable for hot natural baths during the Victorian Era. They also organized a planning headquarters in London, and it was from this headquarters that much of our planning in connection with Operation "Torch"

had been done. Specifically, it was in this headquarters that I had worked out with General Littlejohn's officers the maintenance factors for Class II and IV supplies that would be used during the early phases of the operation. [I say "early phases" because after the first few weeks following the landings, all supply for North Africa was scheduled to come from the United States.] Though most of General Littlejohn's officers had only arrived in England at about the same time I had, in early July, 1942, they had not only organized a system of operating depots in England that summer, but had also been able to mount successfully the "Torch" Operation. During the period of nearly a year while I was in the Mediterranean Theater, this organization had expanded and grown to a point where they were prepared to supply and service the force of nearly one and one-half million American troops who were scheduled to be shipped to England prior to and during the early stages of the invasion of France.

The detail of this planning was such that as each unit arrived in England, it received its initial issue of Quartermaster equipment (under Tables of Organization and Equipment) as soon as it reached its home station. Full maintenance in all types of Quartermaster supplies was at all times available upon requisition. Inasmuch as the normal time between the submission of a requisition upon the Quartermaster of the New York Port of Embarkation and the actual delivery of the supplies thus requisitioned to troops within a theater was approximately four months, nothing could be left to guess; details of a most meticulous nature had to be envisioned, considered, worked out, and justified before any requisitions were sent back to the United States.

By this time, General Littlejohn had built-up his planning staff in London. As a result of their imagination, deep-thinking, and acceptance of responsibility, they were able then, some eight months before the scheduled time of the invasion, to give me a complete plan for their support to us on any invasion and follow-up operation.

Communications Zone Coordination.

It was to General Littlejohn that I took my proposed Quartermaster troop-list for First Army. General Littlejohn's acceptance of this list was not without some demurrer inasmuch as he expressed the opinion that he considered I was usurping some of his responsibilities. I explained to him the operational plan that I had in mind and especially emphasized the fact that I would be looking to his Quartermaster organization in our rear for alert and complete responsiveness to all of our requirements. I pointed out that within the Army area I would be fully responsible for the distribution of Quartermaster supplies as well as for the performance of QM service. I explained to General Littlejohn that in my experiences in North Africa and in Sicily I had been obliged to work on a shoe-string, and that, in my opinion, I had not been able to give the troops the Quartermaster service to which I felt they were entitled. Further, I had not been able to have adequate supervisory personnel for the troop units that I had, having had only one battalion headquarters at any time, and that was used for the administration of our few truck companies. It was my intention that in a prolonged

continental campaign full use should be made of salvage collecting companies, salvage repair companies, and fumigation and bath companies within the Army area. Further, I considered that the baking of fresh bread should be done as close to the using units as possible. One thing I especially did not wish to see was valuable shipping space used for the movement of loaves of bread a distance of possibly several hundred miles from the Communications Zone to the using units, while a shipment of flour and other bread ingredients would consume much less space if made to bakery companies in the Army area. Moreover, the bakery companies could supply bread that much fresher to the troops. I also contemplated that it was my responsibility to see that items of officers' clothing should be made available for sale to officers of the First Army through a Quartermaster Sales Store located in the Army Depot Area, implemented by mobile sales units visiting the corps and division headquarters from time to time.

Most important, [the topic of Graves Registration had always been one of particular concern to me. I considered that it was exclusively an administrative responsibility of the Army, and, specifically, of the Army Quartermaster.] This responsibility was not merely to see that our own dead and those of the enemy or Allied troops were in fact buried, but also to see that faithful and accurate records were kept of these burials not only as to their locations, but also as to the identities and causes of death in each instance. This was a matter concerning which I felt that

nothing less than a perfectionist's viewpoint would be suitable. It was not that I felt that under the supervision of Communications Zone it would be done to any less degree, but I did feel that from Army Headquarters the responsibility and the performance of the same could be far better supervised and administered than from elsewhere.

I also explained to General Littlejohn my concept as to the use of corps and division Quartermasters, and stressed the fact that my plan for Quartermaster operation would exclude them from these responsibilities. Conversely, according to my theory, he and his staff would be dealing directly with me and I, in turn, would deal with the corps and division Quartermasters, thus eliminating direct dealings between the Communications Zone and multiple Quartermaster commands within the Army area.

General Littlejohn agreed to accept both my proposed troop list on a tentative basis, as well as my modus operandi. These basic fundamentals having been agreed upon, I and my fellow staff members then moved to Bristol, in southwestern England; here the First Army Headquarters was to be housed in the buildings of Clifton College. By "housed" I mean that the offices and rooms actually to be occupied by headquarters would be in the College, while we would be billeted individually in houses surrounding the College grounds.

Reorganization of Army HQ.

On October 8th, the balance of the officers and enlisted men from the II Corps arrived in Liverpool by ship. There they were

met by General Kean, the Chief of Staff, and they immediately boarded a train which took them to Bristol.

In moving into Clifton College, had it not been for the commendable state of army discipline, an eviction suit would have been necessary in order to oust the personnel of Headquarters V Corps. This Headquarters had been here for nearly a year, and had acted as the senior Army ground force headquarters in England. During this time they had, understandably enough, taken some root in that area, particularly in the vicinity of Clifton College. Therefore, it was not without some degree of personal disappointment that they departed this pleasant city upon our arrival; but depart they did, and on October 18th the main body of First Army Headquarters arrived by ship (at Grenoch), from where they traveled by train down to Bristol. Thus there was formally constituted the Headquarters, First U. S. Army, in the European Theater of Operations.

QM Units.

The next task for us was the reception and meeting of the Quartermaster units which were coming into the Theater and which themselves were to comprise the QM command of the First U. S. Army. The actual reception and housing of these units was done by the Commanding General of Services of Supply, through his appropriate base section commanders. However, as soon as possible after their arrival I had individual officers of my Section call upon them formally.

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Upon the occasion of these calls, the commanding officer of the unit would be briefed as to the administrative and supply procedure in England, following which he would be instructed to prepare at once a training program for his unit. This training program would then be submitted weekly to my office for approval by me. Needless to say, where a unit was under a battalion or group headquarters, training programs at battalion or group level, when appropriate, were submitted for the entire command.

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Meanwhile, I made it a policy to have one officer from my section inspect units on every day of the week. This assignment was rotated in a roster system, and after each inspection a detailed check-list was submitted to me as to the status of training of each unit. The check-list further included comment as to the respective abilities of the officers of the company, and the general over-all proficiency of the unit. I instructed my officers to be particularly circumspect on these inspection trips and to make their calls in an effort to do everything possible to assist the unit in any problems that it might have. Very often my officers were able to be of considerable help, especially in assisting or expediting the obtaining of needed unit equipment.

In the case of those Quartermaster battalions that were with the several corps, the Army Quartermaster officers inspected them after clearing with the corps Quartermaster in each instance. I know that these particular units were inspected far more frequently by the corps Quartermaster and his assistants, the corps QM having command over those units for all practical purposes.

Although assigned to First Army, these battalions were attached to the several corps and customarily wore the shoulder patch of the corps to which they were attached.

Rankin "C"

In the fall of 1943, the First Army Staff was briefed on what was then a TOP SECRET plan known as "RANKIN C". Following the German reverses in Africa and Sicily that summer and, considering the pressure being exerted in Italy by the Fifteenth Army Group, considering the tremendous losses the Germans had suffered in their Russian campaign, and, lastly, considering the tremendous beating the German cities and industries were taking from our daily air raids, there appeared to be reasonable grounds to anticipate, at least as an enemy capability, the collapse of Germany. Inasmuch as there was this definite capability, appropriate thought had to be given as to what would be done in the event that that happy ending should take place. Accordingly, RANKIN C had been prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the over-all plan for the peaceful invasion of the European continent.

From a humane point of view, RANKIN C was ideal. From a logistical point of view, it was strictly a nightmare. It called for shipment to the continent of some nine United States divisions, through the Port of Le Havre, following which the divisions would deploy first across France and then, as simultaneously as possible, into Germany. The Zone of Occupation for the United States forces was to have been substantially the same as it was in 1945 after our troops were withdrawn

from the Elbe River. The extreme difficulty of fulfilling the missions envisioned by this plan was in the field of transportation. We had to assume that the continental railroads would not be operational for at least thirty days. On the other hand, we knew that we did not have sufficient trucks in the theater to move divisions about Europe suddenly, and, at the same time, to supply them. Another material difficulty in having to put the plan into effect on a short notice was that instead of having nine United States divisions in the British Isles, there were at that time only three; one of which (the 29th Infantry) was in England, and the other two (the 5th Infantry and 8th Infantry, under Headquarters XV Corps) being in Northern Ireland.

Ours not having been to reason why, the two officers and warrant officer who had come with me from the Mediterranean and I went to work and implemented Plan RANKIN C from an Army viewpoint. We spent days and hours working out necessary tonnages of Class I, III, and II and IV supplies that would be needed to maintain this operation and also made our recommendations as to the order in which our Quartermaster troops should be lifted to the continent. The fact that most of these troops, namely about 90% of them, had not yet arrived in England did not deter us in the least from facing the reality of the problem. However, once this arithmetic was done, the plan was simply put on file.

The existence of the RANKIN C Plan in the Quartermaster Section, meant that we had TOP SECRET papers and maps in our possession. Under theater regulations we were required to keep

these documents in a separate room, to which only persons classified for TOP SECRET information had access. An armed guard was required to be posted at the door of this room 24 hours per day, every day of the week. This TOP SECRET room was in my own office, which I shared with the other officers who were also classified as TOP SECRET. I did not like this division of our Quartermaster Section, because the majority of the officers were not classified as TOP SECRET and, therefore, were denied the right to call at my office. However, we were shortly to need this room for a project far more serious than RANKIN C.

Shortly before Christmas of 1943, G-2 reported that launching platforms had been observed along the French shoreline and that they indicated that some type of a rocket or self-propelled missile would be launched therefrom. Further, the sighting of these platforms made it appear the principal targets of these missiles would be the two cities of London and Bristol, respectively. Up to this time, no such weapons had been used during World War II. While these launching platforms received the immediate attention of our Air Force, General Bradley considered that the matter was serious enough to merit reconnaissance for an alternate site for an Army command post to be used in the event that enemy activity should make the City of Bristol impracticable for that purpose. Accordingly, I was detailed to make this reconnaissance and spent several days traveling about southern and western England, examining the capabilities of the numerous cities for use as possible headquarters location for First Army.

Neptune

It was during my absence that a staff meeting was called one night by the Chief of Staff, to be attended by the chiefs of the general staff sections and of the supply services. One of my officers attended this meeting as my representative. It was truly a historic meeting inasmuch as on this night General Bradley personally outlined the First Army part in the invasion of Normandy (called Operation "Neptune"). The General explained that "U" beach (subsequently known as Utah Beach) and "O" beach (subsequently known as Omaha Beach), would be the two immediate objectives of the U. S. Forces.

He went on to describe the huge naval armada which would carry the troops across the Channel, and the operations of the Air Force in preparing the Normandy Peninsula for our landings. He pointed out the drop locations of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, which were scheduled to take place on the night before D-Day, and were designed to cut-off the Cherbourg Peninsula.

General Bradley pointed out that on the morning of June 5, 1944, the beaches would be assaulted by an Allied force consisting of the British Second Army and the First U. S. Army, under a combined headquarters to be known as the Twenty-First Army Group. This headquarters would be commanded by General Montgomery. The British Forces, which would consist of both British and Canadian divisions, would be to the left of the United States Forces.

The larger of the two U. S. beaches was "O" Beach, which would be assaulted by the V Corps, which, in turn, would use the

1st Infantry and 29th Infantry Divisions as its assault forces. Meanwhile, "U" Beach would be assaulted by the VII Corps which, in turn, would use the 4th Infantry Division as its striking force. General Bradley pointed out that for the first time the use of "DD" tanks would take place and explained that these were ordinary Sherman tanks in what appeared to be canvas bathtubs thru which propellers were mounted. He explained that they would be able to be floated in from a landing-craft to the beach, without requiring the landing-craft to come to the beach.

General Bradley further explained the construction and use of the "Mulberries", which was the code name for the two large artificial docks. Each was to be made of large blocks of concrete, which were to be towed across the Channel in sections and then assembled, one on Omaha Beach and one in the British sector. He also explained the use of the proposed "Gooseberry" on Omaha Beach. This was another code name for an artificial breakwater that would be formed by a number of old freighters. They would go to Normandy, discharge cargo, and then form in line approximately a mile from the Beach, where their crews would be evacuated and their sea-cocks would be opened. Because of the shallow depth of the water at that point, their hulls would rest on the bottom and enough of each ship would be above the surface so as to form an artificial breakwater for the protection of the beaches.

General Bradley further stated his own minimum requirements for combat troops, including artillery, antiaircraft, tanks,

tank-destroyers, chemical warfare units and barrage-balloon units. These were to fill out the assault divisions as the minimum troops to be landed on D-Day or D+1, as the case might be. He further explained that he would permit the Corps Commanders to use their discretion as to the priority of the lifting of these units, but that they represented his own minimum ideas. He also explained that Engineer Shore Brigades would be used on the beaches for the off-loading of the lighters and landing-craft, and also, by the use of DUKW's, for the off-loading of ships themselves. [He added that for the first day or two, supplies would simply be dumped right on the beaches, and no more elaborate logistical plans would be required for that brief period.] With these premises in mind, General Bradley requested the supply services to state the minimum troops of each service to be lifted to the beaches on D-Day. The Quartermaster representative replied that his suggestion would be for 1 graves registration platoon to be landed on each beach, and for 2 truck companies to be landed on Utah Beach for each of the two Airborne Divisions. This of course would mean four truck companies going in on Utah Beach. General Bradley's reply was that the truck companies would take up a good deal of space, and that he had already turned down tentatively a comparable recommendation by the Army G-4 for truck companies to go across the beaches on D-Day. The Quartermaster officer invited the General's attention to the fact that the two Airborne Divisions had absolutely no transportation of their own, other than jeeps. And that, unless some transport were provided for them, they would be without any trucks whatso-

ever, unlike other divisions. General Bradley stated that, with that explanation, he would do everything in his power to see that these truck companies would be carried on the D-Day list. The initial troop requirements from each of these services for D-Day alone having been submitted that evening, the meeting was concluded.

Planning

Immediately after January 1st, a First Army planning staff was organized in London, in a row of buildings known as Bryanston Court. This was a row of identical looking houses, built wall-to-wall, with no side-yards or walks between them, all of dark red stone construction. There were about ten of these houses in this row, and from the outside, the block appeared to be just another middle class residential street. What no outside observer would have known was that the entire row of houses were all connected by a corridor that ran right thru from one end to the other.

In Bryanston Court, General Bradley had two planning staffs. One was our own -- that of First Army Headquarters -- while the other was the planning staff of what was then called the First Army Group. This latter organization subsequently was redesignated as Headquarters Twelfth Army Group. The Army Group was to be General Bradley's Headquarters when the time came that more than one United States army would be operational on the Continent of Europe. Its part in the planning of the invasion of Normandy and of the operation NEPTUNE was, at this time, largely that of an observer.

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In any event, I went to London, together with one of my officers and two of the enlisted men who had come from the Mediterranean Theater. There our initial problem had to do with tonnage. Naturally, the entire logistical plan for the operations on both Omaha and Utah Beaches was to be the responsibility of the First Army -- both in its concept and in its fulfillment. [The first part of this problem was in connection with the shipping that would be required to lay on the Normandy Beaches two days' Class I and III supplies by the night of D-Day.] Our assumptions were to be that the landing force on Omaha Beach as of D-Day would be 50,000 troops, whereas the Utah Beach force would number 30,000. Corps and Division Commanders were authorized to strip down strengths of the forces both as to units and as to their vehicles. Therefore, we knew that all T/O&E vehicles would not go ashore on D-Day on either Beach. Nevertheless, we were to assume that all vehicles would move 25 miles per day for the first 14 days, and 50 miles per day thereafter.

Regardless of the probabilities as we saw them, it would be necessary for us to have this two day supply for the full force. We were not able to bank on probabilities, but only on certainties as well as we could see them. However, we were not permitted to use such convenient round numbers as 50,000 and 30,000 troops. On the contrary, we were given a list of units by designation and, referring to T/O&E strengths both of vehicles and men, were obliged to use these figures, which aggregated substantially less than the 50,000 and 30,000 estimates that I have already mentioned. Referring then to

the master plan for the support of Overlord and Neptune, which had been prepared by the Office of the Chief, Quartermaster, ETO, we were able to obtain the factors that they had used as to weights of appropriate rations and Class III supplies. Applying these weight and cubage factors to the troop lists, as we were able to determine them by the use of T/O&E's, we arrived at the tonnage figures by arithmetic. The difficulty with the problem was that, inevitably, hardly more than 24 hours went by when there was not some change, and I mean a substantial change, in the projected troop-lists for D-Day. Almost always the change would be in the form of an increase in the troops going ashore. Therefore, as relatively simple as this problem in arithmetic had initially appeared to be, the changing figures necessitated a daily practice session in arithmetic on the part of myself and my group.

To further stimulate our practice in multiplication and division as the days wore on, the G-4 of the Army was able to obtain more and more "lift" in the way of freighters, landing-craft, coasters, and barges, including literally almost anything that could float across the Channel. And as each one of these "bottoms" was made available to us, that meant a further re-shuffling of the figures as to the amount of tonnage that would be shipped across the Channel for D-Day. Thus was spent the month of January, concentrated on the initial tonnages for the assault forces and immediate follow-up. After a few weeks spent in attacking the problem in this manner, the planning directive became stabilized to the extent that by D/14 a four

day reserve of all Quartermaster supplies was scheduled to be unloaded and on hand on each Beach. Further, this reserve was to be increased to a fourteen day level by D/41. Requisitions for all troops on the continent up thru D/14 were to be prepared and submitted by the Quartermaster, First Army. Requisitions for all First Army units to the exclusion of all other troops from the period from D/15 thru D/41 were to be prepared and submitted again by the Quartermaster, First Army; meanwhile, during this same period, requisitions for all other troops ashore, whether they be Communications Zone, those of the Third U. S. Army, or Air Force, were to be prepared and submitted by the Quartermaster of the Advanced Section Communications Zone, who would submit his requisitions directly upon the Chief Quartermaster, Communications Zone. Needless to say, the requisitions of the First Army Quartermaster were also to go to the Chief, Quartermaster, Communications Zone, but thru the Quartermaster of the Advanced Section Communications Zone.

A detailed account and narrative of this planning is published in the First United States Army Report of Operations from 20 October 1943 to 1 August 1944, in Annex No. 14, pertaining to the Quartermaster Section. This is particularly set forth on pages 125 thru 131 of this Annex, together with the appropriate Appendices therein referred to.

Engineer Brigades

As we have previously stated, [the off-loading of cargo and reception of the supplies on the Beaches had been the assigned responsibility of the Engineer Special Brigades.] On Utah Beach

the First Engineer Shore Brigade would operate, while on Omaha Beach the Fifth and Sixth Engineer Shore Brigades, under the Provisional Engineer Brigade Group, were charged with the beach operations. Each of these Brigades had their own organic Quartermaster railhead and gasoline supply companies. They also had their organic truck companies and Quartermaster battalion headquarters for the administration of their Quartermaster troops. Inasmuch as the Army Quartermaster Depots for Class I and III supplies, respectively, would initially be in these beach dumps of the Brigades, I had a very genuine interest in the training of their Quartermaster troops. I might add that this posed a problem of some delicacy in our understanding with the several Brigade Commanders. These officers very naturally were jealous of their command prerogatives over their own troops. It was at no time my intention to interfere with those prerogatives. On the other hand, I had a definite responsibility in the manner in which those depots were to be operated. After conferences with the several Brigade Commanders and their appropriate staff officers, we worked out an arrangement whereby their own units would operate our dumps and would be subject to Brigade Command for all administrative purposes, but would be under our instructions as far as the policy and management of the dumps might be concerned. This was a satisfactory procedure as far as I was concerned, but it still left undone the training of the Brigades' Quartermaster Units. Accordingly, we arranged with each Brigade Commander that we would have a Quartermaster battalion headquarters attached to his brigade during the initial stages of

a the operation, and that this battalion commander would act as
my liaison officer. The mission of the Quartermaster battalion
ch headquarters in each case would be to transmit training data
from my Headquarters to the Quartermaster units of the brigades
also in advance of the operation, and, after the landings, to receive
the numerous Quartermaster units which were scheduled to arrive
ops. and to assign them to bivouac areas. In addition to these
matters, the battalion commanders were to act as my representa-
tives in any other contingencies which might reasonably be
expected to arise.

These Battalion Headquarters were selected with much care
on our part, and left to join the Brigades in their training
areas at once.

t SOP's

At this time, the uniformity of training of all QM units
of a similar kind that would participate in the First Army
operations became self-apparent. To attain this end, we pre-
pared and disseminated a series of standard operating procedures
for Quartermaster units. These are referred to and described on
pages 128 of Annex No. 14 to the First Army Report of Operations
during the period above referred to, and are therein duplicated
as appendices.

In this connection, neither of the Engineer Brigades had
assigned to them a Quartermaster depot supply company. Because
I felt that only this type of a Quartermaster company could
receive and issue Class II and IV supplies properly, I made
arrangements with each of the Brigade Commanders to move all

Class II and IV supplies to a Class II and IV depot inland from each beach, which depots would be operated by our Army Quartermaster depot supply companies. In order to alleviate this problem, and, because I felt that the first few days of an operation was no time when Class II and IV supplies should be handled over a beach, we requisitioned no supplies of this class during the first four days of the invasion. (Even then only the Beach Maintenance Sets referred to in the Annex No. 14 of the First U. S. Army Operational Report were ordered.) Nevertheless, this timing proved to be good, and when the II and IV supplies did arrive they were received directly by our depot supply companies.

Amphibious Training

During the early spring of 1944 amphibious exercises were being held as a matter of routine practice off the southern coast of England. During these exercises, troops would embark from the southern English ports onto LST's and other transports, on which they would be carried out to sea for a day or so and then would be brought back off the English coast and unloaded into landing-craft, which would then carry them ashore. In the case of the LST's, they themselves would come to the beach and drop their noses. In order to stimulate training and also to increase the awareness of QM troops as to what they might expect in a cross-Channel operation, I instructed my Operations and Training Officer to make arrangements for certain Quartermaster units to undergo this type of exercise. As I have previously stated, most of our Quartermaster units of a supply type were

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operating in the depots in Southern and Western England for
on-the-job training. Therefore, any unit which could receive
the benefit of these landing exercises would necessarily be
one not so engaged.

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Accordingly, arrangements were made and several Quarter-
master units did go through these exercises. On one particular
exercise a salvage repair company was participating and, while
the ships were out at sea, a fleet of German "E Boats", the
name used for high-powered torpedo-carriers, swarmed in and
attacked our convoy, sinking one troop-carrying ship. This
resulted in the death of approximately 30 men of the salvage
repair company.

By mid-April 1944 the planning phase for operation
Neptune was concluded. It was at this time that we realized
that the dye was cast, so that nothing more could be done in
the way of anticipating what might happen after the landings
in Normandy.

Demolition Charges

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It was at this time, that I was able to be of small
assistance to one of the other supply services. Colonel
William Carter, the First Army Engineer, came to me with a
problem, which was of importance to the entire landing opera-
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tion. From intelligence sources, we knew of underwater
obstacles the Germans had placed along the beaches. These,
for the large part, were huge steel burrs, shaped like large
models of the jacks with which children play. The purpose
of these obstacles was, of course, to wreck or to obstruct

the path of any ship or landing-craft as it approached the beaches. So formidable were they that the very first body of troops scheduled to go ashore was an Engineer demolition group, whose sole mission was to destroy them.

In any case, Colonel Carter told me that he was able to find no suitable containers for the explosives that would be used by his demolition men, and he inquired as to whether there might be anything in Quartermaster lines which would be suitable. I suggested that he try some salvage socks. We had a shipment of salvage socks sent to us from one of the Quartermaster depots in England, and they worked most satisfactorily as containers for the charges of explosion. Some time later, Colonel Carter accused me of having given him socks with holes in the feet, but we were able to dispose of that complaint by explaining that unless a sock had a hole at each end no Engineer would be able to put it on anyway.

Staging Areas

Meanwhile, large areas in Southern England, near the sea coast and port facilities, had been turned into camps as a staging area. A tremendous operation was undertaken in order to effect this change and to maintain the staging area according to the plans that had been made for its use. This entire mission was done by the Commanding General of Southern Base Section. Needless to say, one of the most responsible elements of the operation was that of the Quartermaster. The Chief Quartermaster of the European Theater of Operations had assigned Colonel F. Chapin Weed as Quartermaster of the Staging Area.

Colonel Weed, a most capable officer at all times, was meticulous and imaginative in his planning and thorough and energetic in his performance of those plans. The result was a magnificent job in preparing units and troops for shipment across the Channel.

Probably one item that impressed the troops more than anything else that they experienced in the Staging Area was the menu. The Chief Quartermaster of the Theater had directed Colonel Weed that, inasmuch as the feeding facilities on the far shore might be somewhat irregular for a while, the troops that passed thru the Staging Area were to eat well. As a result, fried chicken, steaks, and apple pie ala mode were staples in the diet as long as the troops were in the area.

The First Army Staff prepared its own Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting, in which the Quartermaster Appendix filled in the QM details. These instructions are mentioned in Annex No. 14 of the First U. S. Army Report of Operations from 20 October 1943 to 1 August 1944, on page 131, and the QM Sections are set forth as Appendix No. 12 from pages 207 thru page 215 of said volume.

Barrack-Bags and Duffle-Bags

In these Quartermaster paragraphs for the Administrative Instructions it was clearly specified that troops of Infantry, Field Artillery, Tank, Tank-Destroyer, and Reconnaissance units would not be equipped with duffle-bags; instead, they were to have what were called blanket-rolls, in which only a very few small items of personal clothing would be carried (i.e., socks, handkerchiefs, a suit of underwear, etc.). (Reference Annex

No. 14 to First Army Report of Operations 20 October 1943 to 1 August 1944, page 209.) This decision had been made by me as a result of observation as to what had happened to the old barrack-bags (the predecessors of the duffle-bags) in Oran, Tunisia, and Sicily.

As I have earlier pointed out, every man going into Oran had two barrack-bags. If he did not carry them personally, they had to be carried on vehicles for him. Thus, many trucks were used for this purpose when they might otherwise have been carrying more valuable cargo.

I could not disagree with the fact that these bags may have served some useful purpose in the vicinity of Oran, because that city quickly became one in which only Class A uniforms might be worn. However, when the movement to Tunisia was made, there was nothing Class A about any of the towns along the East Algerian-Tunisian border. In fact, no field duty ever came closer to being field duty. Consequently, the blouse, wool, O. D., the neckties, the extra trousers, the caps, service, etc., became utterly useless appendages for everyone. Had the troop-units retained their barrack-bags, and at the conclusion of the campaign distributed them again so that the original clothing contained therein would be delivered to the individual to whom it had originally been issued, still in good condition, even then the use of these bags might very well have been justified. However, this was not the case; as soon as they reached the Tunisian area, the combat units immediately asked for a place in which to store the

barrack-bags. Inasmuch as there were no storehouses, warehouses, or other accommodations, in the entire Tunisian area, we were obliged to refer them back to Constantine, Algiers, or Oran. Once in storage, the barrack-bags became anonymous casualties of the Tunisian Campaign. In most cases, the units that had stored them never again resumed interest in them, and they were simply left in storage indefinitely; in the cases of those few units which actually did take the trouble to go back at some time, and get them out of storage, the contents of the bags were so damaged by mildew and dampness that very little was salvaged therefrom. In brief, no good had come of the barrack-bags.

In 1943 and 1944, troops crossing the Atlantic for England were equiped with duffle-bags, the successor to the barrack-bags and an improvement thereon. Nevertheless, the duffle-bags were still heavy baggage as far as combat troops were concerned. Therefore, because (1) of the transportation problem presented, (2) of the fact that I knew that there would be no storage facilities available on the Normandy Beaches, or in any city in close approximation thereto, and (3) of the fact that experience had shown that a slow but sure manner of changing clothing from the classification "serviceable" to "salvage" was to store them in duffle-bags (or barrack-bags) for any appreciable period of time, I had written these provisions into my Quartermaster Plan, which, in turn, had been incorporated into the administrative orders and, as such, approved by the Army Commander thru his Chief of Staff.

However, when the First Army's "Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting" were published and disseminated in the spring of 1944, they left no doubt that we were very serious about this matter of duffle-bags for combat troops; indeed, they provided expressly that the items which would ordinarily be carried in a duffle-bag would, in the case of these five types of combat units, be turned in without replacement while the units were in the staging areas. Some surprise was expressed over these provisions by some combat commanders; however, at no time thereafter did I regret having inserted them into the First Army's administrative policies.

Departure

In the early morning of May 30, 1944, certain individuals were up and stirring unusually early around Clifton College in Bristol. At five o'clock that morning, some 15 officers met for breakfast in the mess, although the conversation at the breakfast table was somewhat sparse. On the night before we had packed our foot-lockers and suit-cases, the former to be placed in storage and the latter to go with the main part of Army Headquarters as baggage. We had also packed our bedding-rolls and musette-bags, thus disposing of all our worldly belongings. The bedding-rolls were picked up to go with our motor transportation, and by the time we had had breakfast all that any of us had in the way of personal baggage was a musette-bag, a filled canteen, a gas-mask, and the other accouterments worn on our pistol-belts.

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Immediately after breakfast, we, together with a similar number of enlisted men in the Army Headquarters, mounted sedans and command cars and drove in a convoy to the city of Falmouth in Southwest England.

Embarkation

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Here at Falmouth we were divided into three groups, each one of which embarked on an LST. I and one of my enlisted clerks were on one LST, another Quartermaster officer and a clerk were on a second, and a Quartermaster Warrant officer and a clerk were on the third. These LST's were to be our homes until D+1, at which time we were scheduled to debark and organize Army Headquarters ashore.

Although we were fully conscious of the awful responsibility that lay ahead of us, the time on the LST's made for a fine physical rest. Our last days in England had been lived under some pressure, but aboard those ships we had nothing to do but eat good Navy food, supplied by the Quartermaster Corps of the ETO, get plenty of sleep, read novels and play cards. The weather in Southern England was delightful, and the days passed most pleasantly under the circumstances.

VIII
OVERLORD

English Channel

On the afternoon of June 6th the LST's commenced to move. They headed south and then turned to the east when they were several miles off-shore. In turning to the east we found ourselves a part of a steady and endless procession of ships. The ships around us were LST's, LCI's, headquarters ships, cargo ships, and hospital ships, with destroyers, cruisers, and carriers in the distance in every direction in which we looked. When darkness fell that night, we were midway out in the Channel and several hours later were well aware that we were in a war, inasmuch as the German Luftwaffe came overhead on a bombing raid against us. Anti-aircraft guns of all calibers fired at the planes from positions about us, with the result that the air became full of falling fragments and spent bullets. One of the Headquarters Company lieutenants on our LST was struck in the back of his calf by one of these falling bits, and had to be transferred to a hospital ship on the following day.

Omaha Beach

Daybreak the following day found us off Omaha Beach, watching our Naval guns pound the beach fortifications as they fired over our heads. It was plain that the attack had not been as successful as it had been planned. Indeed, geysers of sand and smoke were arising all along the beach; at first I

thought that these were caused by our own troops touching off enemy mines. Then I realized that there were no troops in the areas in which these explosions were taking place. No amount of wishful thinking could alter the fact that the Germans were shelling the beach. I then noticed spouts of water occasionally rising out among the ships, and the further realization came to me that the Germans were also doing their best to shell us at sea. There was very little that we could do about this, and all day the LST's moved up and down the coast from Omaha Beach to Utah Beach, and back.

Meanwhile, landing-craft and DUKW's were scurrying back and forth from the ship to the shore, moving troops and supplies as fast as they could. Long lines of troops could be observed moving from the beaches themselves inland along the very few beach exits. Overhead our planes patrolled constantly, and it was with much sadness that we noted one of them falling into the sea, and another plummeting to earth just beyond the beaches after having made a strafing run. The fact that our planes were strafing just a few hundred yards beyond the bluffs which overlooked the beaches, indicated clearly that the enemy was not far inland.

[Inasmuch as the enemy was that close to the beach, the area that had been selected as the site of the First Army CP would necessarily still be in enemy hands. Consequently, our plan to go ashore on that morning was suspended. Later on the afternoon of D-1, I sent a message to one of our other LST's and instructed the Quartermaster officer aboard to go ashore at

daybreak on the following day, to survey the situation, and then to return and report to me on my LST before nightfall. I was particularly alarmed over unconfirmed reports that heavy casualties had been afflicted on the Quartermaster troops ashore.]

At about five o'clock that afternoon of D/2 he reported to me on my LST, and informed me that he had visited both the V Corps Quartermaster and the Quartermaster of the 29th Infantry Division, but that neither of them had any information about any Quartermaster casualties. Inasmuch as they were in contact with all Quartermaster activities ashore, I was understandably relieved to hear this.

He reported further that our own artillery was firing from positions just beyond the beaches, which meant that the front line was not far away. He had estimated 500 dead lying on the beach. [Because of the difficulty of digging decent graves in sand, I had instructed the Quartermasters of the invasion Divisions and Corps, as well as the graves registration platoons that accompanied them during the early days of the operation, that no burials were to be performed on the beach.]

He also reported large numbers of prisoners of war being evacuated out to ships at sea, and that the treating and evacuation of our own casualties was proceeding well. Supplies of both Class I and Class III were coming ashore and, although not in large quantities, the latter Class appeared to be sufficient to keep the vehicles moving temporarily. We had planned that the Class I dumps would not open until D/2, and the troops ashore were so busy on D/1 that they were subsisting on the individual

rations that they carried or the reserve rations that were brought ashore in the organizational kitchens. It was reassuring to know that our plans were being followed at least in this early and most critical stage.

Debarkation

On the afternoon of D/3 the First Army Headquarters at sea went ashore. By this time, the Germans had been cleared from some fields near the little French town of Grand Campe, which had been designated in advance as the first location of our CP. Shortly before our LST's commenced to move, a few German planes had come overhead at a high altitude. Regardless of their altitude and the fact that they dropped no bombs, they drew a terrific amount of anti-aircraft fire.

Consequently, there was the usual falling flak and dropping of spent bullets. One of the latter, probably of incendiary type, had struck a stack of cans of some kind of lubricant in an Ordnance motor shop on the beach where vehicles were being de-waterproofed. Whatever was in the cans commenced to burn, and the burning caused smoke, and the smoke smelled. As the breeze wafted this odor up and down the beach area, some nervous individual did not recognize the smell, and growing panicky, cried "gas". By this time our three LST's had dropped their ramps and were approached by what were known as "Rhino" ferries. These Rhinos looked like long pieces of structural steel bound together, but, strangely enough, they floated. They were just broad enough to accommodate a truck or a passenger vehicle of

standard width, and at the sterns they had diesel engines mounted. As each one of these ferries approached the ramp of an LST it was made fast, following which the vehicles on the LST were driven onto the Rhino, which in turn propelled them right up and onto the beach itself.

We had been watching the proceedings ashore with much interest as we were going thru this process, and, upon reaching the beach, we were amazed to see American soldiers running for their gas-masks and putting them on. Although we were skeptical about the entire thing, we donned our gas-masks, mainly because the military police stationed at the beach exits told us to do so. We noted that the splotches of yellow paint on the hoods of our motor vehicles had not changed in color, which they would have done had they been exposed to poison gas.

Once ashore, our vehicles from First Army Headquarters followed the prearranged road net from the beach exits to the site of our CP at Grand Campe. On reaching there we dug slit trenches for ourselves, ate our K-rations, and spent our first night ashore.

Beach Operations

On the following day, I went back to the beach and inspected the several Class I and Class III dumps that were in operation. As I knew would be the case, all of the rations were of the C, D, K, 10-in-1 and 5-in-1 types, with some hospital supplement packs. I had requisitioned no other kind of rations for the first sixteen days. In any case, the piles were growing larger and larger, and the issues were not heavy enough to detract from the reserve that was being piled up. A similar situation existed in

Class III, and there were several tidy stacks of cans of gasoline, oils and greases. The troops operating these dumps were the railhead companies and gasoline supply companies of the Fifth and Sixth Engineer Special Brigades. It was heartening to note that the efforts we had spent in preparing them with SOP's were reflected by the organization that they had in their areas, plus a high degree of enthusiasm that was being shown by officers and men alike.

I visited the V Corps Headquarters, and observed that the 309th Quartermaster Railhead Company, which had been scheduled to land on D+2, was ashore and its members were being used by the V Corps Quartermaster for the purpose of collecting and burying the dead. I had not understood why the Quartermaster of that Corps had phased a railhead company ashore at that early date, but did not question him, as it was the Corps' prerogative to phase whatever troops they wanted ashore during those early days. In any case, I was willing to acknowledge that, although a railhead company was not intended for this purpose, I was glad that they were getting on with the important work of burying our dead.

[I then went down to the beach itself, and, contrary to all my instructions, I found a cemetery started by the graves registration platoons that were attached to the Engineer Brigades. I was not able to countermand the orders given by the General who commanded the Provisional Brigade Group. However, they buried 487 American dead in the sands of the beaches, and each body was disinterred by us just three days later and buried inland in the cemetery that had been started by the V Corps.]

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1- However, I well remember some French civilians laying flowers on the graves of those American soldiers even at that early date.

By this time, the landing-craft and the DUKW's were coming ashore in swarms, and the beach area was alive with trucks, tanks, and long files of troops. Overhead were the barrage balloons, and as far as we could see out to sea were the transports and ships of the U. S. and British Navies.

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Beachmaster

I located the office of the Beachmaster for Omaha, in a large concrete gun emplacement that until a few days before had been used by the Germans. There were present three or four American officers, one of whom was the Beachmaster. I knew that it was his function to keep in touch with both the ships at sea off-shore and the G-4 of First Army, for the purpose of effecting landing priorities and coordinating arrivals of troops, vehicles, and cargo. As I observed the room, it became apparent to me that, although their liaison with the Army G-4 was good, I could not see what coordinating influence was being exerted on the ships off-shore. I do not doubt that there was some kind of a liaison between the Beachmaster thru the U. S. Navy to the ships, but it was difficult to be perceived.

2a- This observation on my part is probably predicated largely upon a conversation that I overheard in that office between the Beachmaster and Lt. Colonel James Matthews, who commanded an Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division. Colonel Matthews' Regiment had been landed on that day, but it had been separated from its heavy weapons. I am sure that this separation would never

have taken place had anyone surmised that the Regiment would go into the line on its first day ashore. However, Colonel Matthews' Regiment had been ordered to go into the line that night, and he was pleading for assistance from the Beachmaster in his efforts to find his heavy weapons. Matthews knew the numbers of the ships in which the vehicles with these guns were. In spite of his firm and persistent, although patient, pleading, the Beachmaster kept repeating that there was nothing that he could do to help him. Knowing what the mission of the Beachmaster was, I was surprised to hear this admission of helplessness. I could see nothing more important than landing those weapons at once, but not one thing was done to achieve this end. Matthews' Regiment was committed against the enemy that night and a few days later he was killed in action.

Army Control

On D/7, I, as Army Quartermaster, took over the operation of all Quartermaster installations ashore on Omaha Beach. On the previous day, another detachment of the first echelon of Army Headquarters had arrived ashore, and our original group was augmented by a dozen more of the officers of the Quartermaster Section. In taking over the installations, there was no change, as the Class I and III dumps of the Engineer Brigades became in effect the Army Quartermaster Class I and III depots. The troops operating them remained under brigade command, as had been planned months previously; meanwhile the dumps had always been under our direct control regarding policies and operations.

Utah Beach

Meanwhile, we had very little information as to developments on Utah Beach. Colonel Paul Warfield was the Quartermaster of VII Corps, and we had unlimited confidence in his ability and good judgment. Nevertheless, some 6,000 Army Quartermaster troops together with vast quantities of Quartermaster supplies were coming in over this Beach, and we were anxious to effect a very close liaison with the operations there.

Only on D/6 had contact been made between the troops on Utah Beach and Omaha Beach when the V Corps and VII Corps were linked together. Therefore, on D/7 I ordered two Assistant Quartermaster officers and one enlisted man to proceed to Utah Beach, where they were to take over all Quartermaster operations as my representatives. Meanwhile, the Army G-4 had advised the G-4 VII Corps that the Army Headquarters would assume control of all supply operations on that day.

The trip by jeep from Omaha to Utah Beach was not without incident on that morning. The road from one beach to the other crosses the Douve River at a little town called Carentan. As their jeep approached this River, they found the northbound traffic congested by a column of tanks of the 2nd Armored Division. These tanks were standing motionless on the roadway.

Undaunted, they passed the column and came to the bridge across the River. It was at that moment that they heard sounds overhead which reminded them of the days that they had spent in the target pits on rifle ranges. The column of tanks was there for the purpose of attacking the town, and with an alertness that

was something more than characteristic, the officers' jeep turned around and sped off in the direction from whence it came. Jeeps were not constructed to lead tank attacks. However, they were able to cross the River on a pontoon bridge some 2000 yards to the northeast, although this detour cost about 45 minutes in time. The main bridge at Carentan remained under enemy artillery fire for the next three weeks and was the scene of many deaths.

On reaching Utah Beach, they reported to the Corps Quartermaster, and then went to the Beach Maintenance Area, where they had a tent pitched (as their CP) in the QM Class II and IV Depot. Nearby were Class I and Class III dumps, and immediately adjoining the Class II and IV dump was the salvage dump.

The Quartermaster units operating these installations were all bivouaced in fields nearby, and other fields were reserved for the use of those Quartermaster units which would soon be arriving ashore in that area. A telephone line was installed in the CP tent, and inspections of the installations were made, following which they reported to the VII Corps Quartermaster that they were in business.

Truckheads

The VII Corps Quartermaster requested them to open up Class I and III Truckheads at two points inland from the Beach. This was done with railhead and gasoline supply companies on D/8, and on that day the Army Quartermaster officer called a meeting of all Quartermaster troop commanders on Utah Beach. At this meeting, the orders for shipment of rations and gasoline

from the respective Class I and Class III dumps to be made on the next day were issued, detachments from the truck companies were ordered to report and to be loaded at a given hour the following morning, and then to haul the supplies to the several truckheads. The truckhead commanders being present, they knew just what to expect in the way of receipts on the following day. These meetings were continued on a daily basis at five o'clock each afternoon, and were eminently successful in coordinating the Quartermaster activities in the Utah area. They were continued throughout the European Campaign. A few days later two more truckheads were opened, and a string of four Class I and Class III distribution points was thus spread across the Cherbourg Peninsula. An accurate history of all of these operations is contained in the First United States Army Report of Operations from 20 October 1943 to 1 August 1944, in Annex No. 14, from page 132 thru page 147, together with the Appendices thereto.

As the First Army Quartermaster opened these installations, there was no need for the gasoline supply companies to be attached to the several Corps Quartermasters any further. Accordingly, these companies were transferred from the Corps to the Army. Although the Corps Quartermasters had known that this transfer would be made, they demurred mildly when it happened; upon reminding them that there would be no corps supply points for Quartermaster supplies, and that no such supply points had been intended at any time, as these Quartermaster knew, they withdrew whatever objections they may have felt to the transfer of these units.

Beach Communications

Although there was telephone communication to our Quartermaster CP on Utah Beach, the line was heavily used for Beach to Beach and it was very difficult to make contact between my two CP's. The necessary daily reports which were made by the Utah Beach CP to me were carried every evening by officer courier. The heavy traffic along the road which connected Omaha and Utah made this a somewhat lengthy trip from a viewpoint of time, although I was anxious to obtain these reports as soon as possible each evening.

At that time Colonel Grant Williams, the First Army Signal Officer, had brought to the Continent some carrier pigeons, which he was anxious to have used. However word of the availability of these carrier pigeons had been received with some lack of enthusiasm, the telephone still being a much preferred instrument.

As a step towards facilitating my communications with Utah Beach, and also as a favor to the Army Signal Officer, I agreed to use carrier pigeons from Utah Beach to my own Headquarters on Omaha Beach. Accordingly, a cote of pigeons was delivered to my Quartermaster officers on Utah, and on one historical afternoon a report as to the status of the supplies in the dumps was prepared on rice paper and rolled up into a capsule, which in turn was fastened to the leg of one of the pigeons. Army Signal Corps photographers were on hand to preserve the scene for posterity, and the Quartermaster officer in command released the pigeon from his hand, and watched the

bird take off thru the sky in the general direction of Omaha Beach. The photograph of the occasion shows in faithfulness the look of extreme disgust on the officer's face; while the pictures were being taken, the bird -- unnerved by the fact that it was making history -- had badly abused his outstretched hand on which it had perched.

ler. Much to the surprise of everyone (except the Army Signal Officer) the pigeon actually arrived on Omaha Beach and the message was delivered to me.

Cherbourg

On June 26, 1944 the City of Cherbourg fell to the U. S. 4th Infantry Division. This was the first major city to be taken by our forces, and our victory was largely significant because of the fact that Cherbourg had been a large port. Unfortunately, the German command was all too conscious of this fact, and they had done everything within their power to sabotage the port facilities and the harbor itself. Floating mines and sunken ships were all over the harbor, and it took our Engineers several months to make it usable.

The capture of Cherbourg is memorable for another reason. The German garrison in that city, as was characteristic of the German Army wherever it might have been, had adopted a philosophy that nothing was too good for themselves. So that their digestive tracts might not suffer from lack of stimulation, they had a vast warehouse which was stocked entirely with the best of wines and liquors. It was reported that the troops of the 4th Division who had located this cache had used it to a considerable extent that night, with the result that on the following morning their

efficiency was something less than normal. However, by that time, the word had spread and G-4's, supply officers, and aides-des-campe were attracted to this bonanza like ants after sugar.

Class "X"

General Bradley, quick to grasp the situation, gave personal orders that I as Army Quartermaster would take over the custody of these "Class X" supplies forthwith, and would divide the same equally among every soldier ashore in Normandy as of the date of the fall of Cherbourg.

I responded to this order first by requesting the VII Corps Quartermaster to have a tight MP guard kept on the building at all times. I then went to Cherbourg and satisfied myself as to the security as I witnessed the MP private politely but firmly denying admission to a Major General.

Then, I asked the Army G-1 for a list of all units ashore on D/26, together with their strength as of that date. While this list was being assembled, I had a team of officers go to the warehouse and take an inventory. The inventory and the troop strength ashore as of D/20 was in such proportion that there were two bottles of wine and three bottles of liquor for every man ashore. I then sent thru channels a letter to each unit commander, which would authorize him to present the same and to draw the proportionate bottles of liquor and wine for his unit. This was done in a few days' time, the warehouse was emptied, and the problem was licked.

Another important find in Cherbourg was a large civilian bakery installation, which had been left intact by the Germans. I might add that it was a German Army bakery, as distinguished from one which had been in the civilian economy. I notified Major Jack McManus, Assistant to General Littlejohn, in charge of bakeries and bakery companies, and he immediately took over these facilities and used them as an integral part of the bakery supply system for the Communications Zone.

Bakeries

One week later, on July 3, 1944, while in my office-van at our Headquarters (then at La Cambe), I noticed a convoy of trucks approaching on the road, and as it grew closer, I recognized that there were large canvas signs on its lead vehicles. As the convoy passed, I was able to read them; they said in substance "Littlejohn-McManus Secret Weapon!" -- and under another line, "Courtesy 3029th QM Mobile Bakery Company". This was followed by another convoy bearing similar signs, all of which was owing to the courtesy of the 3028th Quartermaster Bakery Company. I sent for the two Company Commanders and they reported shortly thereafter. After making it clear that neither the contrivances of Messrs. Littlejohn and McManus nor the courteousness of either Company or its members would be further advertised openly within the First Army area, I asked the two Commanders how soon their bakeries could go into operation. They replied cheerfully that they would have their first batch of bread ready for issue in 48 hours. The following day was the 4th of July, and I was determined that the American troops in

Europe know that the Quartermaster Corps had not forgotten the importance of this date. I explained to the two officers that our Class I truckheads on Omaha Beach would commence issuing rations on the following morning at approximately 8 o'clock, and that the rations for issue on that day would include fresh bread. This was done; some bakers may have worked overtime that night, but the troops ate fresh bread on July 4th.

While we had been in England we had used the brown bread that food conservation had required to be in exclusive production in the British Isles. It was nutritious, but not nearly as good as plain white bread. When you haven't seen white bread - fresh white bread - for a long time, it not only looks good and smells good, but it tastes good. Therefore, I went to the bakery companies on that first morning and asked for the first sheaf of loaves to be cooled. I took this sheaf over to the nearest hospital, and presented it to the commanding officer for his patients' meals that day. I kept one loaf and asked him to arrange for me to see a wounded soldier whose morale might be bucked a little by the loaf of warm bread. He took me to such a man, to whom I presented the loaf and a certificate saying "This is the first loaf of bread baked by the United States Army on the Continent of Europe. Certified to this 4th day of July, 1944". This certificate was signed "Omar N. Bradley, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army".

The soldier smelled the bread, fondled it with his hands, and over the oxygen tubes fastened to his nose murmured "Boy,

if we could eat like this all the time, everything would be all right". Leaving him with the loaf of bread clutched to his chest, I departed from the hospital with the knowledge that certainly one American would think well of the Quartermaster Corps on that day. It was with sadness that I learned several days later that the man had died.

Force Expansion

Within the next three weeks our strength grew to a force of 18 Divisions. These did not include the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, which had been moved from the Continent back to England, where they were held in Theater Reserve. These divisions were divided among the V, VII, XIX and VIII Corps. The VIII Corps was designated to be a part of the Third Army. That Army's Headquarters was on the Continent of Europe, as were most of its troops and all of its divisions. However, Third Army was not operational at that time.

With this vastly expanded force, all Quartermaster service was being rendered with the same number of units that had been requested for the service of an army of eight divisions and three corps. On August 1, 1944 the breakthrough had been made in the vicinity of St. Lo, the Third Army became operational and no longer had any connection with First Army, the Twelfth Army Group went into operation, General Bradley commanding, Lt. General Courtney Hodges having succeeded to command of the First Army, and Communications Zone took over from us all depot operations on the Beach. Some time previously, on approximately D/ 23, Communications Zone had taken over the operation of the

Quartermaster installations on Utah Beach. First Army, however, continued to operate the installations on Omaha Beach and did so until relieved by Communications Zone as aforesaid.

Breakthrough

After the breakthrough had been made the Third Army proceeded south and then turned towards the east. The First Army wheeled towards the east, and in this movement there was a time when our left flank was considerably exposed to the enemy. It was at this point that the Germans rallied their forces which had been sent down to Normandy from the vicinity of Calais, and with these forces they launched a counter-attack aimed to cut our lines in the vicinity of Avranches. This counter-attack was commended with some degree of success, but General Bradley ordered the 30th Infantry Division out of its advance to meet it. Our maneuver was successful and the enemy's edge was blunted at Mortain. Meanwhile, to the east of Mortain a large German force had been surrounded in all directions but the east as our troops proceeded in that line of advance. The British and Canadians were on the north and our main forces were holding in the west and moving eastward along the south of this ellipse. On the south a large concentration of American artillery was arrayed and fired interdicting fire in conjunction with the British artillery in the north, upon the road over which the Germans were moving from the trap. The enemy forces which escaped were to remain ineffective until they had reorganized behind the safety of the Siegfried Line. It was with some concern that I viewed the responsibility of cleaning up the destruction on the road,

particularly having in mind the problem of burials. The French 2nd Armored Division had already been designated by General Bradley to mop up the area, and it was with some feeling of relief that I learned that their sector had been broadened to take in the entire length of the road through Falaise. Thereafter the French referred to that road as the "Avenue de Mort".

While the 30th Division was committed at Mortain one of its regiments became seriously engaged with the German forces in that vicinity. One afternoon the situation was so critical that a battalion was surrounded by the enemy and, therefore, was cut off from its supplies. Air supply was indicated and this was called for by the Army G-4. Pursuant to a prearranged plan, a squadron of P-38 combat planes flew over the area to reconnoiter for drop zones. In one of the planes was Major William Cullinane, GSC, Assistant Army G-4, who was riding "piggy back" behind the pilot. He had arranged for the drop and was going along so that he might observe that the supplies were received. I had had dinner with him on the evening before, and I never saw him again. His plane was seen while spiraling to earth, and one parachute was reported to have mushroomed from it. He was never found, and his wife received the Distinguished Service Cross for him.

In exploiting this breakthrough, the strain on our supply lines became terrific. The numerous moves of our depot area from Omaha Beach on to the south and then to the east is recorded in the First United States Army Report of Operations from 1 August 1944 to 22 February 1945 in Annex 10, on pages 45

thru 47. One factor that helped us at this time was the use of the Cub planes. These were assigned to us by the First Army Artillery Officer and enabled us to observe traffic conditions on the roads, especially to watch and look for truck convoys which might be carrying gasoline; they also permitted us to move quickly from our own Army area back to Communications Zone Headquarters in the rear.

Supply Problems

Between 1 August and 16 September our Quartermaster Depot moved six times. These moves, which meant that in effect we would have the Depot operating in two, three, or four locations at one time, taxed considerably the personnel resources of our 471st Quartermaster Depot Group. Nevertheless, that Group was able to handle the matter with elasticity, and the Quartermaster operation remained orderly at all times. Meanwhile, the gasoline supply problem was the one that was most critical. On one day, August 11, 1944, our receipts of gasoline from the rear were only 15,000 gallons, barely enough to supply one infantry division. On another day, shortly afterwards, we received only 25,000 gallons.

It was in the latter part of August, 1944, that General Hodges summoned me to his command tent and asked me "how far can I go from here". At that time we had scarcely been receiving maintenance in gasoline each day, and I had sent back to Omaha a convoy of 150 trucks for the purpose of returning loaded with gasoline.

This convoy was due to reach the La Loupe area that evening, and I knew that the trucks would be overloaded with gasoline so as to give us approximately 175,000 gallons of fuel in the shipment. I told General Hodges that he could go as far as he wished within France and Belgium without running out of gasoline again. I realized as I spoke that nothing must happen to the gasoline convoy on its way to us from the Beach. By that, I mean that we had been hearing rumors that people -- Americans, not from First Army -- were "high-jacking" gasoline shipments and taking them for themselves. I do not know whether or not these rumors were true; nevertheless, I was determined that this convoy of my trucks was not going to be high-jacked. Therefore, I sent one of my Army Quartermaster officers of sufficient rank to meet on equal level the officer whom I heard had been doing the high-jacking, and he escorted the convoy up to the VII Corps Quartermaster at Melun, southeast of Paris. We never ran out of gasoline again, although we had some close days. I need not say that I am glad that I did not feel obliged to apologize to General Hodges for the prediction and assurance that I had given him.

A few days later, I again called on General Hodges at his command tent and was discussing the gasoline supply situation with him, when he was telephoned by Major General J. Lawton Collins, Commanding General of the VII Corps. General Hodges "scrambled" his telephone so that he could discuss secret matters freely with General Collins. The latter asked for permission to attack at the city of Mons; looking at the map.

General Hodges told Collins to hold his ground. At the same time, he said that he would make arrangements with "G" (Major General Leonard Gerow), Commanding General of V Corps, and that he would have the latter attack from one direction while Collins attacked from another. Accordingly, the coordinated attack was made by both Corps on the following morning, with the result that 20,000 German prisoners of war were taken. We were glad to have bagged the prisoners of war when we did, rather than have them wandering as individual stragglers thru our dump areas.

This was the last enemy stand of any consequence west of the Siegfried Line. This entire period is accurately described in the First United States Army Report of Operations from 1 August 1944 to 22 February 1945, Annex No. 10, from pages 45 thru 54 thereof.

During this time, as we were approaching Belgium the rations and gasoline were arriving regularly in the Army area, although we were not building up any reserve. However, Class II and IV items became sadly neglected. We did not have transportation to move our Class II and IV depot at any time, although small amounts of supplies -- expendables -- were moved from time to time to ArpaJohn, La Loupe and La Capelle. We were expected to report our arrivals by Classes of supplies in tons. We were actually showing receipts of a few tons of Class II and IV supplies a day, but it became necessary to emphasize that it was "items" of supplies that counted as distinguished from tons.

Supply Improvement

Fortunately, some six weeks after the St. Lo Breakthrough, on or about September 16, 1944, we organized our Quartermaster Depot for all classes of supplies in the Belgian City of Herbesthal. It was a fortunate move, as we never again experienced a dearth of Quartermaster supplies or services in the Army area. By this time the French railroads had been repaired and were in regular operation from Cherbourg all the way up to Belgium. The Chief Quartermaster had planned for us to have a ten day reserve of rations in our own Army area. This ten day supply was very quickly built up at Herbesthal, where trains were arriving and being unloaded day and night. From Herbesthal, the supplies were hauled by truck and by rail to forward truckheads. It was a highly suitable and satisfactory depot-truckhead-railhead operation.

At the same time, gasoline was arriving by railroad tank-car, tank-trucks, and airplanes, and was being kept in dumps as Army reserve or moved by truck or by rail to the forward distribution points. The details of this operation are set out in the First United States Army Report of Operations, 1 August 1944 to 22 February 1945, in Annex No. 10, on pages 60 and 61.

Also, we were building up a reserve of post exchange supplies. These articles had necessarily been relegated to the role of luxuries during the breakthrough and march across France. However, upon reaching Belgium, they arrived in large quantities, and we were able not only to make gratuitous issues of those items permitted in a combat zone by Army Regulations,

but also to sell to unit Exchange Officers a broad line of supplies for their respective post exchanges.

Captured Materiel

As we advanced into Belgium and Luxemburg, increased reports reached me as to the over-running of enemy warehouses and supply bases. Indeed, these sources of enemy materiel became so numerous that the problem outgrew our regular salvage operation. Accordingly, I formed a special unit in my office which I called the "Captured Materiel Branch." At the same time I authorized the officer in charge of this unit to utilize in his discretion two of our salvage collection companies and one of our service companies which had in the past performed very well as a depot guard company. With these units he then proceeded to locate, guard, inventory, and dispose of the enemy materiel that our forces had over-run. An account of our operations in Captured Materiel is in Annex No. 10 of the First U. S. Army Report of Operations from 1 August 1944 to 22 February 1945, P. 64-65, and also in Annex No. 10 to the same report from 22 February 1945 to 8 May 1945.

Of especial interest in this connection were the intelligence teams that were used to locate the enemy stores. These teams consisted largely of officers "borrowed" from the replacement center in support of the First Army. These officers were from the supply services (where the casualties had been few), and we used them with the understanding that they would be returned to the replacement center upon twenty-four hours'

notice. Nevertheless, the individual officers were delighted to be fully occupied, and they performed their duties in a most enthusiastic and thorough manner.

Winter Clothing

It was in mid-September 1944, while living in a field of mud at Verviers, Belgium, that I received a personal call from General Littlejohn. He knew that we had not brought along woolen underwear nor had we ever issued it in First Army. Further, anticipating that long underwear would be in demand by the end of September, he had vast quantities of it available at Cherbourg. Unfortunately, the transportation system was still tight, and it appeared that it might take some time -- that is, several weeks -- to move the clothing by truck or by rail from Cherbourg to Belgium. General Littlejohn's solution was excellent. He knew that, as a prelude to our planned crossing of the Rhine, several hundred DUKWs had been assembled at Cherbourg and were to be moved up to the First Army area in the immediate future. With this information, he had obtained clearance from the Theater G-4 to load these vehicles with long woolen underwear for the shipment. Owing to this exercise of foresight on his part, we had hundreds of thousands of suits of heavy underwear in our depot stocks within the next seven days.

Simultaneously, General Littlejohn had moved woolen overcoats onto the Continent. Fortunately, the First Army G-4 gave us priority on transportation for the purpose of bringing up these garments, and they had been issued and were being worn by the troops by the time cold weather set in.

Special Winter Clothing

In the spring of 1944 -- several months before the invasion of Normandy --- I had been asked by Major Morris Bryan, Assistant Quartermaster under General Littlejohn, whether the First Army would need overshoes and special winter clothing. I immediately wrote a note to our G-3, in which I inquired whether we would be spending the winter months in a cold climate zone and explained the reason for my question; the note was returned with a negative answer. Accordingly, I notified Major Bryan that we could see no need for overshoes or special cold weather clothing, but that he might make arrangements to have overshoes available when and if the need for them arose.

This answer did not particularly impress General Littlejohn, who nevertheless submitted requisitions upon the New York Port of Embarkation for vast quantities of special winter clothing, sufficient for all infantrymen in the First Army.

This cold weather clothing arrived in Europe on schedule, but the delivery of it was delayed because of the congestion in shipping at the Port of Antwerp, and also by the fact that the German V-1 weapons had badly hindered port activities. Antwerp had been slow in the taking, and considerable work had to be done on its installations before ships could unload in quantity. Unfortunately, we were in a northerly sector with extreme cold temperatures and the cold weather clothing was not distributed to our troops until the end of December 1944. Had it not been for the imagination and foresight of the Chief Quartermaster and his staff, we would not have had it then.

Further, accepting our statement that we might need overshoes, General Littlejohn and his staff arranged to provide them for 50% of the troops in the First Army. I do not know how he went about this, but I do know that at his instigation the Air Force troops in England voluntarily turned in their overshoes so that they might be used by our infantrymen and the other foot troops.

Spa

On October 25, 1944 First Army Headquarters moved into Spa, Belgium, a delightful resort city which had been popular for centuries. It had also been Von Hindenburg's field headquarters during World War I. Here (again) the First Army Quartermaster Section was located in a former gambling casino. It was positively the most luxurious office I have ever seen. The walls and windows were draped, carpeting covered the entire floor, chandeliers and crystal-ware hung from the ceilings, and a small but adequate (also unstocked) bar adjoined the main room. This was my office. We hauled out the roulette tables and chemin-de-fer tables and moved in our own simple field-desks, but even they did not detract in the least from the luxury of the room.

Gasoline Fires

Also at Spa we had on the out-skirts of the City some large dumps of Class III supplies. If there is anything that horrifies a Quartermaster, it is the thought of a fire in a gasoline dump. We had had our first experience of this type on Omaha Beach, about a month after the landings. While decanting some bulk gasoline one evening, the gasoline-motored pumping machine had backfired, and the backfire in turn had ignited some gasoline vapors over the

empty cans. A fire had followed, as a result of which we lost some 17,000 gallons of gasoline. We would have lost substantially more than this, had it not been for an Air Force Engineer fire fighting unit which came over to our dump from a nearby combat air-strip. This detachment, using foam, -- and also using much in the way of physical courage -- put out the fire in a matter of a few minutes.

In the latter part of October 1944, we had our second fire, this time at Bastogne, Belgium. There a railroad track entered our gasoline dump, and one evening an engine within the dump area unloaded its coals. The live coals ignited some gasoline fumes, and we lost 7,000 gallons of gasoline.

However, our most serious gasoline dump fire took place at Spa in mid-November. There a 2½ ton cargo truck loaded with 5 gallon cans of gasoline was being driven under a railroad bridge just at a moment when some welding was being done on the bridge. A spark from the welders fell into the rear of the truck and ignited some gasoline cans. The driver, oblivious to the fact that a fire was going on in his vehicle, drove nonchalantly into the Class III dump and backed the truck up to a stack of gasoline cans for discharge. We lost 20,000 gallons of gasoline that night.

However, we never again had a gasoline fire, the three fires that we had experienced having so impressed our gasoline personnel that extreme caution became characteristic in handling this dangerous item.

Class I Supply

ly By Thanksgiving Day in 1944 we had our ten-day reserve of Class I supplies in our depot at Herbesthal, and had become accustomed to eating fresh meat for at least two meals per day. Steak, leg of lamb, fresh bacon, ham and sausages, and fried chicken were commonplace items on our menu. Approximately a week before Thanksgiving, we were advised by the Quartermaster of Advance Section Communications Zone that Lt. Colonel Jack McManus of General Littlejohn's office had been designated to see that all troops had a Thanksgiving dinner. Sure enough, shortly before Thanksgiving we received a shipment by truck of turkeys (at the rate of one pound per man in the Army), cranberries, sage, and other special vegetables and fruits about which the Thanksgiving Day menu would be planned. Every man in First Army had a fine Turkey dinner on that day.

Battle of the Bulge

On December 16, 1944 the famous counter-attack of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt was made. Better known as the "Battle of the Bulge", this counter-attack became a personal matter with me, inasmuch as I sensed that the immediate objective of the enemy in this maneuver was to seize as much as possible of our supplies -- especially gasoline.

Butgenbach

I first became aware of it in view of the fact that we had a truckhead in support of the V Corps in a town called Butgenbach. On the afternoon of December 16th I cancelled further shipments of rations or gasoline to this truckhead, and directed the units that would ordinarily use its facilities to go instead to another

truckhead. It appeared from our maps that the Germans were approximately 10 miles away. On the next morning, we still had unknown quantities of gasoline and rations on the ground at the Butgenbach. I dispatched some trucks from Eupen in the north to go down and evacuate the troops and supplies. Unfortunately, communications with Butgenbach were out, inasmuch as the 99th Division Headquarters, which had been there until that morning, had moved, leaving no telephones behind. Feeling some concern about the situation at this truckhead, I dispatched one of my officers, a warrant officer, and two enlisted men to go to Butgenbach and to survey the situation there, expediting the evacuation of supplies if possible.

Several hours later I was telephoned by the officer in charge of the detail, who reported that there were then about 50,000 gallons of gasoline and several thousand rations at Butgenbach, which were being shipped out to the north, but that they needed more trucks in order to complete the evacuation. He also mentioned that the 26th Infantry Regiment had marched into the town while he was there, and had gone into the line to defend against any attack from the south. I ordered more trucks to Butgenbach and the truckhead was evacuated completely by nightfall.

My concern, however, was unfounded, inasmuch as the Germans never did take the town. Nevertheless, their artillery was a very short distance away and I had always made it a policy never to have any Quartermaster supplies within ten miles of the front lines; there was no advantage in such a close proximity of supplies to enemy lines.

Gasoline Evacuation

By this time the major force of the German counter-attack was only too apparent. Equally apparent was the danger that existed in the fact that we had over 3,000,000 gallons of gasoline on the ground at Spa, with the Germans moving our way. This presented a problem with far more danger than the one that I had just successfully met at Butgenbach. I was determined to get that gasoline out of Spa just as soon as possible, and, to this end, marshalled some 600 trucks and sent them down to the dump. There I had a service battalion loading the trucks, which in turn shuttled the gasoline to rail stations along the Meuse Valley. In three days time the 3,000,000 gallons of gasoline were moved, and were hauled by rail back to western Belgium and France. All the gasoline was in 5-gallon cans, so that we had no bulk gasoline with which to contend. On the last day of the evacuation, my Quartermaster troops were loading trucks out in front of our infantry lines, and, on occasion, a German tank poked its nose over a hill-crest, to be pinned back by the fire of our 90mm anti-aircraft guns with barrels lowered. I regret to say that approximately 120,000 gallons of this gasoline was lost, when one of our artillery officers ordered it ignited so as to form a roadblock against the Germans. I regarded it as being a somewhat expensive roadblock -- although I did not question its effectiveness.

Re-equipping

Meanwhile, we had a Quartermaster problem presented to us by the 106th Infantry Division. This Division was the newest

one of the Continent and had been in the line only two days in northern Luxemburg when the Von Rundstedt thrust was made. The attack landed virtually in the lap of the Division; two regimental combat teams were surrounded by the enemy and, several days later, surrendered. The other regimental combat team and Division Headquarters survived. However, they lost virtually all of their clothing and equipment. Fortunately, their casualties had not been heavy.

Prior to this time, Advance Section Communications Zone had opened and stocked a Class II and IV Quartermaster Depot in the Belgian city of Huy. At the time I regarded the depot as being somewhat close to the front, anticipating the possibility of a counter-attack with an ensuing retrograde movement of our troops. My misgivings to the contrary, I was now very thankful for the existence of this depot at Huy. The 106th Division Quartermaster was able to have the remaining elements of his Division re-equipped completely with Quartermaster items of supply within 24 hours. Further, with their new stoves and kitchen utensils, the balance of the Division was able to enjoy a Christmas dinner only a few days later.

Ciney

A few days after the Battle of the Bulge commenced, I had ordered that some of our gasoline trains from Spa go to a city in southwestern Belgium named Ciney. There they were to be unloaded and the gasoline put into a temporary dump. On the day that the first train was scheduled to arrive, I drove to Ciney and was inspecting the railroad station area as a likely dump-site

when two of our trains rolled in. There were no sounds of shooting or other indications of combat in the area, but in all my life I had never felt more lonely. Purely on a hunch, I directed the train crews to move those trains further to the west, across the Meuse River and not to stop them until they were in France. The train crews obliged with some apparent degree of pleasure, as their sensibilities to the German advance must have been as delicate as my own. Nevertheless, that night the Germans entered Ciney. That was one time that a hunch paid off.

In the early days of the Battle of the Bulge the U. S. 7th Armored Division did a heroic job holding off the German counter-attacks. It was an organization comparatively new in the Theater and it had been ordered transferred from Ninth Army to First Army when the attack first commenced. Making a forced march from the north down into our sector, they held off the Germans in the vicinity of St. Vith. In any case, they were ultimately overwhelmed by superior numbers of Germans and were forced to withdraw. In their withdrawal from St. Vith they left behind them some 50,000 gallons of gasoline. This to my knowledge was the only U. S. gasoline in any amount which was taken by the Germans, either in Africa or in Europe.

V-1's

On the day after the Battle of the Bulge commenced, our Headquarters were moved from Spa to Chaudfontaine, a city on the Vesdre River southeast of Liege. Chaudfontaine appeared to be an attractive city, but we soon became conscious of the

fact that it was on "Buzz Bomb Alley". The route of the V-1 weapons from Germany to Liege passed directly overhead, and it was disturbing, to say the least, to hear the loud noise of a buzz-bomb suddenly cut out, which meant that the power had failed and that the missile was coming down to do its destruction. Actually they would cut out over Chaudfontaine to descent on Liege, some 5 miles distant. Nevertheless, a near-miss was not a comfortable thought. Fortunately, we moved three days later back to the town of Tongres, also known as "Tongerren". There we set up our Headquarters in a former Germany Army barracks.

While at Chaudfontaine, we had watched one night as a buzz-bomb cut out overhead and then descended into Liege. We were able to see and to hear the explosion but, to our dismay, there appeared a bright flame around its site. It took no more to tell us that the V-1 had struck a Class III dump maintained by the Quartermaster of Advance Section Communications Zone. We knew that gasoline dump to have had some 6,000,000 gallons of gasoline in 5-gallon cans on hand, and it was painful to watch this valuable fuel destroy itself. I have never learned just how much gasoline was lost that night, but I watched the fire long enough to know that it was substantial.

89th QM Company

The Battle of the Bulge taxed our Quartermaster resources in many ways, but it is with great pride that I look back upon the performance of one of our units, the 89th Quartermaster Railhead Company, Captain Leslie T. Cox, Commanding. This

ed Company of four officers and 180 men was operating a Class I railhead for us in the Belgian city of Gouvy. Two days after the German counter-attack commenced, on December 18, 1944, Gouvy was surrounded by the enemy. Captain Cox reported to the commanding officer of a local anti-aircraft unit, whose name was Colonel Stone, and the railhead company, together with platoons and detachments of various sizes and numbers also in the vicinity of Gouvy, were organized into a holding force. The result was that the railhead troops were in the line defending the City of Gouvy for six days, during which time it suffered casualties of two men missing in action and several others wounded. However, when it was pulled out of the line and relieved on December 24th, I must say that I have never seen officers and men whose morale could have possibly been higher. I was extremely proud of this Company and the manner in which its members had conducted themselves when suddenly confronted with a dangerous situation. I might add that at the time that they found themselves surrounded, they had 70,000 rations in their truckhead. They issued these rations to the other troops in their force, and thus performed Quartermaster functions at the same time that they were in combat.

Strong Supply Support

By the 17th of January 1945, the Bulge had been straightened out and our headquarters returned to Spa. More important to me, our depot was returned to the Herbesthal area. Tremendous quantities of Class I and II and IV supplies immediately began to roll in, and we had a better supply of the latter items than

we had had at any time in the past. Indeed, the impetus from Communications Zone was so strong that never again did we have any problems in Quartermaster supply, other than within our own Army area. Specifically, at all times thereafter, we had more than ample quantities of all classes of supplies. There were certain shortages of a few critical items such as: stoves, one burner; heaters, water immersion type; and lanterns, electric. The reason for the shortages in these items was manifest: they were all extremely useful and, therefore, popular items of supply, with the result that TO&E's were ignored in requisitioning for them. Many a sin of false certification was committed in the drawing of these items; it is no wonder if from time to time the theater supply ran on the short side.

On March 10, 1945, General Littlejohn asked me just what our needs were in these three items. I estimated them to be 2000 lanterns, 4500 stoves, and 1500 heaters. He immediately established depot credits for us in these quantities, and never again were we to know a critical shortage of any QM items of supply.

For the period from late January until March, our supply system within the Army functioned as smoothly as any operation could function. The details of the operation are set forward in the First United States Army Report of Operations, 23 February-8 May 1945, Annex No. 10, from pages 39 through 45. Suffice it to say that our rations were moved promptly and regularly from our depot to our truckheads, as was our gasoline, on both trucks and railroads. Meanwhile, the depot issued Class II and IV

supplies immediately upon requisition, our bakeries were performing at the truckheads, and our bath-points were daily receiving battalions of troops, who would turn in their soiled clothing and then receive fresh clean clothing after they had taken their hot showers. Our laundries were accommodating the hospitals as well as the bath-points, and would do the laundry for any unit in the Army area that would request the service. Our salvage collecting companies were patrolling the roads and operating our salvage dump, together with our salvage repair companies. In captured materiel, we were processing more and more tons as our front lines grew closer to the Rhine River. The entire operation was a satisfactory and satisfying experience.

Rhine Crossing

On March 5, 1945 the City of Cologne was taken by the VII Corps. Just two days later, on March 7th, the famous Von Hindenburg Bridge was found intact at Remagen. This latter unanticipated opportunity was the beginning of the end of the war. On the following day, elements of three divisions had crossed the Bridge and a firm foothold had been gained on the far side of the Rhine. The traffic problem became most acute, and only one way (i.e. eastbound) traffic was permitted on the bridge. However, in a few days time, additional pontoon bridges had been laid across the Rhine River, thus permitting two-way vehicular traffic. Ten days after its capture the Hindenburg Bridge collapsed, but our pontoon bridges were there to stay.

Needless to say, this bridgehead meant an increased problem in Quartermaster operation. There was no rail bridge anywhere on the Rhine River, and the speed with which our units progressed east of the Rhine was such that our supply lines rapidly began to expand again. Because it was represented to me that a pontoon bridge would be laid across the River in the vicinity of Andernach, I ordered our Quartermaster depot to be moved to that city. Andernach had excellent rail and road connections. Unfortunately, the nearest bridge was thrown across the Rhine, not at Andernach, but at a point 25 miles to the north. This meant that our supply convoys had to travel up the river 25 miles before they could even cross it.

On March 31, 1945, our Headquarters moved to Bad Godesberg. This was a resort town which had been a favorite of Adolph Hitler. This is one instance in which I am forced to agree with "der Fuehrer"; it was a lovely city. We had our Quartermaster section in a house right close to the banks of the Rhine in which Ludwig von Beethoven had once lived. Every room in the house had in it a grand piano.

Class III Supply

On the following day, Easter Sunday, April 1st, we opened up a Class III dump approximately 50 miles east of the Rhine River in the City of Giessen. There we had gasoline trucked initially from the west bank of the Rhine, but we also had an air-strip, where the U. S. Air Force sent its older bombers with their bomb-bays loaded with cans of gasoline. In order to keep in touch with the operation at Giessen I had to borrow two radio-

equipped command cars from the Signal Officer. One of these was stationed on a hill-top at a point halfway from Bad Godesberg to Giessen, the other one being in Giessen. I was able to communicate with the officer in command of the dump at Giessen by these radios. Unfortunately, those reports which showed the issues and stocks on hand of gasoline were necessarily classified "SECRET", and the coding and decoding of the messages took considerable time. Nevertheless, we had to have the communications and they proved to be excellent.

The problem of supplying our fast moving troops was becoming more and more acute. We had already surrounded a force of some 300,000 German troops in the Ruhr pocket, which operation had prevented our forces from going as fast as they might otherwise have traveled. However, after these 300,000 prisoners had been taken, there was no holding our forward elements. Meanwhile a particularly astute and far-sighted project had been prepared by Colonel Jack Persons, Assistant to the Theater Engineer in charge of pipeline construction. Anticipating a Rhine crossing, Colonel Persons had three separate pipelines loaded on trucks and a pipeline construction company standing by. In response to a call from me on this Easter Sunday, he came to Bad Godesburg, after having started his company and one pipeline on the road. The Army G-3 had refused to permit a gasoline line across the River on any of the vehicular pontoon bridges. I did not question the wisdom of this decision, but the need for bulk gasoline across the Rhine was becoming more and more self-evident.

Accordingly, Colonel Persons, with an Engineer Company borrowed from the VII Corps, constructed a special pontoon bridge at Mehlem for the sole purpose of carrying across the Rhine our gasoline pipeline. Over this bridge his construction company laid the pipe and on Thursday it was in use. This enabled tank cars of gasoline to be shipped down the west bank of the Rhine River to the pipeline where they were drained of their gasoline, which in turn was pumped across the river to Strollberg, where Colonel Persons had also constructed some gasoline storage tanks.

Here at Strollberg this bulk gasoline was decanted into 5-gallon cans or into tank-trucks, in which it was shipped to the forward truckheads. As fast as our troops advanced on the east side of the Rhine River, we had no trouble in the supply of gasoline. This fortunate situation all stemmed from the fact that Colonel Persons had arranged to have his pipeline in readiness months in advance of the Rhine crossing and was able to put it across the River in just a few days after I telephoned him.

Although the length of our hauls from the west bank of the Rhine to our truck-heads became more and more exhausting as far as Class I supply was concerned, our problems in Class III supply remained small. However, Colonel James Wright, Assistant Theater Quartermaster (formerly Quartermaster of the 1st Infantry Division) had under his control two gasoline supply companies. These units ordinarily had 3 officers and 125 enlisted men. Colonel Wright, thru means known only to him, had procured a number of ten ton semi-trailers, with prime-movers to haul them.

He equipped his gasoline supply companies with these large cargo vehicles and "attached" the two companies to our command. Neither the Army G-4 nor anyone else who did not actually see these vehicles would have suspected that the two gasoline supply companies actually were in effect simply heavy truck companies, with large hauling capacities. Consequently, they assisted materially in the movement of canned gasoline from Stollberg to the forward areas, and, together with the other trucks that G-4 allowed us for Class III movements from the Army Motor Pool, they were more than sufficient to keep our supplies of this type in good shape at all points within the Army area.

Prisoners of War

After crossing the Rhine River, we soon learned that for the rest of the war we would have many mouths to feed other than those of the troops in the First Army. We were taking many prisoners of war, and by the end of April we had a daily population of approximately 100,000 prisoners of war in our cages within the Army area, although we were moving them back to Advance Section Communications Zone as fast as possible.

Displaced Persons

Further, we had a tremendous number of displaced persons. These poor individuals were civilians from Russia, the Balkan countries, France, Italy, Poland, etc., who had been placed in labor camps wherever they were needed in Germany. As our forces advanced, they of course were free to go where they wanted to, but they had no transportation and very little food. Our civil

affairs officers organized camps for them, where they were housed and fed. This was a very humane act, as some of them were in bad physical condition. In any case, by the end of that month we had an average of 500,000 DP's to feed each day. This figure together with 100,000 prisoners of war and 350,000 United States troops, gave us a total ration requirement of nearly a million per day.

Repatriates

Another complicating factor was that of the prisoner of war camps which were overrun by our forces. We found few American personnel in these but we did find numerous Russian and Polish prisoners. The policy of the Germans had been to keep the prisoners from eastern Europe in the western part of Germany, and to keep the American, British and French prisoners in stalags in the eastern part of Germany.

Regardless of the fact that there were few Americans in these stalags that we overran, we still wished to do as much as possible for the physical rehabilitation of these unfortunate men. Accordingly, DDT powder, fumigation and bath facilities, and hospital care were provided for them whenever they were overtaken.

Captured Subsistence

By the end of April, our Captured Materiel Section was fully engaged in the locating and guarding of captured enemy supplies. Most important of these were the supplies of subsistence that we found. With 950,000 some odd people to feed each day, these food items were very helpful. It was an announced policy at that time

in the Eastern Theater of Operations that American Army rations were not to be used for the feeding of prisoners of war or displaced persons. On the contrary, they were to eat the food that was in the overrun warehouses. Actually, the captured food was in most cases very good, and consisted largely of fine cheeses and both fresh and canned meats, which had been denied to the civilians for the sole use of the German Army. I am sure that those DP's had "never had it so good before" for some years until they found themselves in our sector.

Subsistence Problems

In any case, the problem of feeding these large numbers of people plus our own lack of supply discipline in over-drawing rations, focused considerable attention from higher Headquarters on the subsistence operation within First Army. Every evening we received a telegram signed "Eisenhower" in which we were instructed to report at once as to how many rations by types were issued to troops, prisoners of war, displaced persons, etc., during the past 24 hours. We, of course, made our replies accordingly, as the purpose of these special reports was to implement and to control the stated Theater policy that only captured enemy food items would be used for the feeding of prisoners of war and displaced persons. It would have been an unfortunate note had the excellent American food, for which our families had stood in ration lines at home, been misdirected into the feeding of these other people, as long as their own food was available for them.

I have mentioned the lack of supply discipline on our part in drawing rations. At this time, every day we were issuing 118,000 rations for every 100,000 troops in the Army. This, obviously, represented an overdraw of 18%. Certain divisions were drawing the same number of rations day-in and day-out, such as 20,000 per day or, I recall, the 9th Infantry Division on every day was drawing 19,000 rations. When these facts would be mentioned to the Division Quartermasters, they would simply say that they had other troops attached to them. We knew that the normal troops attached to a Division approximated a strength of 3,000 men. These together with the organic strength of the division, would make a total of approximately 18,000 men. However, the roundness of the figures, plus the liberality of the difference between rations drawn and number of troops attached, indicated that no one was much concerned as to the meaning of a ration and that far more rations were being drawn by the division than there were men therein to be fed. This meant that one of two things was happening; either food was being wasted, -- or some units were eating more food and were having more meals per day than were other units. Either alternative was unfair and wrong. We had repeatedly mentioned these discrepancies to G-4, and, finally, when the Theater interest in stringency on supply discipline became more pronounced, the G-4 advised the Commanding General of the situation. The Commanding General, in turn, referred the matter to his Inspector General, who conducted a somewhat brief and cursory investigation.

We showed The Inspector General the records on the more serious offenders who had ignored their true strengths in order to draw rations. The Inspector General asked us for an opinion as to what could be done to stop it. We replied that if one division commander were ordered to survey his ration overdraw for just one day, the overdrawing habit in First Army and on the Continent would come to an end very quickly. The Inspector General reported the facts -- they were simply arithmetic -- to the Army Commander, who wrote a letter to all First Army units to the effect that in the future overdrawing of rations would be obviated. Nothing happened to the division commanders or the division Quartermasters.

This investigation might have gone much further. Consequently, the overdrawing of rations was only reduced slightly.

The problem was accentuated by the fact that we had, as I have previously pointed out, nearly a million persons to feed in the First Army sector. A good store of U. S. Army rations was on hand in our depot at Herzfelt, but, as previously mentioned, they were for U. S. troops exclusively. On the other hand, by the end of April, 1945, in estimating the entire stock of captured enemy subsistence, it appeared likely that we would have sufficient quantities to maintain our prisoners of war and displaced persons until approximately May 20, 1945. After that time, I did not see how we could possibly feed these numerous other people without using to some extent American ration components. Of course, the displacement of prisoners of war to the rear would alleviate the situation to some extent.

Similarly, any movement of the displaced persons out of the Army area would be extremely helpful. Not being able to count definitely on either of these two contingencies, I was forced to accept the worse alternative, namely, that they would remain with us, and, on the basis of that surmise, I was forced to the conclusion that after May 20th we would have no captured subsistence with which to feed them.

Withdrawal

Fortunately, on May 4, 1945, First Army Headquarters was notified of its impending move back to the United States from whence it would be sent to the Philippines. Just a few days later, a detachment of officers from Ninth Army Headquarters visited us for the purpose of arranging a take-over on their part of all of our QM troops and installations. It was with regret that I was forced to foist this problem in subsistence on the Ninth Army Quartermaster; nevertheless, the problem had not been of our doing and I knew that it would be handled competently by him and his excellent staff.

Communications Zone QM Support

On May 15, 1945, First Army Headquarters departed by motor convoy from Weimar, Germany, the location of our last CP, to the Port of La Havre. By direction of our Chief of Staff, I traveled by plane to Paris, where I had my final interview with General Littlejohn. It was with deep sincerity that I expressed to him my appreciation for making possible all that I had been able to do in providing Quartermaster service within the First Army. The fact that the supplies and the troops had been

available in Europe to be assigned or attached to the First Army, did not happen by accident. On the contrary, it happened because of the vision and imagination, as well as the intelligent planning, of General Littlejohn and the splendid staff of officers with which he had surrounded himself.

In the fall of 1943, after my arrival in England from the Mediterranean, it was easy for me to place my demand upon General Littlejohn for the QM troop units that I considered necessary to support the First Army. However, I was asking that he give me the troop units that he had already planned for the entire theater. Unless he had made it possible by his foresight that the units be available in the European Theater for the Continental Operation, I would never have been able to obtain them for use in the First Army. Similarly, the fresh bread, the fresh meat, the fresh eggs, the cigarettes and cigars, new razor blades, and other items that were characteristically in demand and relished by the troops, would never have been available had they not been considered and thought of months in advance by this same staff.

The fact that we had laundry service in the field, the fact that our combat troops when pulled out of the line would go by battalions towards bath points where, after hot showers, they would exchange their dirty clothing for clean clothing, the fact that in our system of burials less than two per cent of our own dead were required to be marked "unknown", and the fact that by our salvage operations hundreds of tons of clothing and equipment were repaired and were kept in circulation among our own

troops, were all reflections upon the ability and providence of the Chief Quartermaster of the Theater.

Our QM Soldiers

There were other people to whom I would have liked to express my thanks, had it been physically possible to do so. I was thinking of the truck drivers, who often carried our supplies and troops past a point of human physical endurance but who nevertheless kept going because they felt it their duty to do so; I was thinking of the officers and men of the 89th Quartermaster Railhead Company, who with enthusiasm had accepted their role as combat troops during the Battle of the Bulge; and I was thinking of those men who had stood out between our own infantry and the enemy tanks in the gasoline dumps at Spa while loading the cans of gasoline on our trucks, with the result that not one ounce of gasoline was lost to the enemy. It was this impetus, this enthusiasm and spirit on the part of these subordinate officers and enlisted men which had made it possible to accomplish the Quartermaster mission within the First Army.

QM Command

And lastly, I thought of the responsibility and the resiliency that had typified our Quartermaster groups, battalions and companies. All during the campaign we had been operating the First Army with a Quartermaster troop command that I had thought appropriate for an Army of 8 divisions and 3 corps. The minimum number of divisions that we had had within First Army after the Normandy operations were 12, divided into 3 corps. Most of the time, we had 15 or more divisions within the First Army; during the early phase of

the Bulge, we had 22 divisions. Consequently, the Quartermaster units of First Army had far exceeded their capacities as the same are noted on the appropriate tables of organization and equipment. Our multiple movements of depot areas, however, placed even a higher strain upon these troops, and I marveled then, as I do now, that at no time did a unit commander ever tell me or any of my staff officers that any assignment, plan, or order would be impossible in its execution.

Summation

I consider that these three factors, namely, the farsightedness of the Chief Quartermaster of the Theater, the individual spirit of our Quartermaster soldiers, and the ingenuity and ability of our troop commanders, together combined to make possible the Quartermaster service that was given in First Army. It is my further opinion that this service was of such nature as to have reflected credit upon the Quartermaster Corps.

7 Inclosures

7 Inclosures:

Inclosure I -

First Army Headquarters - Organization
and Functions - an extraction from Combat
Operations Data First Army Part III
Section V - The QM Section

Mission

Organization

Functioning

Staff Procedures

Historical Examples of Functioning of the
Section

Brief Summary - Class I Rations Issued

- Consumption of POL

- Transportation

Inclosure II -

An attempt by QM First Army to establish
uniform Quartermaster operational procedures
within Armies, Corps and Divisions - written
in Germany at Bad Willogen and submitted there
to Colonel "Lobo" Wolfe, Office of the
Quartermaster General who visited me.

Inclosure III -

Part II, Logistical Data extracted from
Combat Operations Data First Army Pages 67 - 96 -
Service Troops Organic to an Army
Traffic Headquarters, Troop Movements, and
the Movements of Supplies
Supply - Area needed and various average
tonnages

- Levels of Supply in Army Area

Inclosure IV -

Annex No. 14 Quartermaster Section First
U. S. Army Report of Operations

20 October 1943 - 1 August 1944

- I. Initial Period in the United Kingdom
- II. The Planning Phase
- III. The Operation

List of 31 Appendices

- 1. QM Section Allocation of Duties
- 2. Transportation Dispatch Form; Traffic Control
- 3. Oil and Grease Factors in Proportion to Gasoline
- 4. S. O. P. For Class I Truckhead
- 5. S. O. P. For Class III Truckhead
- 6. S. O. P. For Quartermaster Depot
- 7. S. O. P. For Quartermaster Bakeries
- 8. S. O. P. For Quartermaster Truck Companies
- 9. Quartermaster Units to Arrive on Far Shore
- 10. Extract of Rations Requisitioned D to D/41
- 11. Extract of POL Requisitioned
- 12. Quartermaster Annex to Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting
- 13. Quartermaster paragraphs to Administrative Order No. 1
- 14. Class I Consumption Record
- 15. Class III Consumption Record
- 16. Memorandum to Corps QM's re responsibilities
- 17. Circular, re Shoe and C&E Repair

18. Statistics on Salvage Collected to
1 August 1944
19. Statistics on Salvage Repaired to
1 August 1944
20. Statistics on Laundry Done to 1 August 1944
21. Statistics on Bath Done to 1 August 1944
22. Letter from First U. S. Army
23. Statistics of QM Sales Store to
1 August 1944
24. Bakery Statistics to 1 August 1944
25. QM Troop Assignment List
26. QM Transportation Tonnage Report June
27. QM Transportation Operational Statistics
28. Class II Beach Maintenance and Follow-up
Maintenance Sets
29. Extract of Maintenance Sets Requisitioned
Class II and IV Supplies
30. Layout of QM Class II and IV Depot
31. Photographs - Figures 1 to 97 inclusive
(only in the printed books of official
history)

Inclosure V -

- Annex 10 Report of Operations First
U. S. Army 1 August 1944 - 22 February 1945
- I. Exploitation of St. Lo Break thru
1 August - 12 September 1944
 - II. The Battle of Germany 13 September -
15 December 1944

III. The German Counter-Offensive 16 December 1944

22 February 1945

Note for each of these three periods
coverage is made under the following headings

- A. General
- B. Depot Operations
- C. Class I Supplies
- D. Class II and IV Supplies
- E. Class III Supplies
- F. Transportation
- G. Graves Registration

An additional coverage of Captured Materiel
is added to II and III.

There is a list of 41 Appendices covering
the three Sections under these headings

- 1. QM Troop Assignment List for Period
- 2. Class I Consumption Record for Period
- 3. Bakery Statistics for Period
- 4. Salvage Statistics for Period
- 5. Salvage Repair Statistics for Period
- 6. Laundry Statistics for Period
- 7. Bath Statistics for Period
- 8. Class III Consumption for Period
- 9. POL Analysis Record for Period
- 10. Transportation Tonnage Report for Period
- 11. Transportation Operational Statistics
for Period

12. Status of Cemeteries as of

12 September 1944, 15 December 1944,
22 February 1945

In the last two Sections appendices have
been added on

25. S. O. P. for Captured Materiel

26. Procedure for Distribution of
Captured Materiel

27. Analysis of Captured Materiel for
Period

28. Letter to Units re Captured Equipment
and Supplies

Inclosure VI -

Annex No. 10 - Quartermaster Report of
Operations 23 February 8 May 1945 First
U. S. Army

Section I - The Attack of the Roer

23-28 February 1945

II - Drive to the Rhine 1-24 March 1945

III - Exploitation of the Remagen

Bridgehead 25 March - 18 April

IV - Final Operation 19 April - 8 May

Each of these Sections have coverage on

A. General

B. Operations

C. Class I Supplies

D. Class II and IV Supplies

E. Class III Supplies

F. Transportation

G. Graves Registration

H. Captured Materiel

In addition there are 28 Appendices
covering the four Sections under

1. Quartermaster Troop Assignment List
2. Class I Consumption Record and Bakery
Statistics
3. Salvage Collected, Salvage Repaired,
Laundry and Bath Statistics
4. Class III Consumption and POL
Analysis Record
5. Transportation Tonnage Report and
Operational Statistics
6. Status of Cemeteries
7. Analysis of Captured Materiel

Inclosure VII -

War Department Observer Board Reports to
Army Ground Forces for QM Activities in First
U. S. Army - Colonel C. C. Wilson, QMC -

A Report on QM Troop Employment, Supply,
Clothing and Equipment, and Administration
in First U. S. Army dated 22 May 1945 contains -

1. S. O. P. QM Truck and Troop Transport
Companies
2. S. O. P. Captured Enemy Materiel
3. Circular on Graves Registration and
Disposition of Effects

4. S. O. P. Mobile Field Bakery Companies
and Sample Production Schedule -
British Mobile Equipment
5. S. O. P. Class III Truckheads
6. Employment and Operation of QM Troops
7. S. O. P. Class I Truckheads
8. Letter of Instructions to Commanding
Officer, 534 QM Group
9. As of 1 January 1945 List of Officers
Assigned to QM Section First Army