1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:00,000 2 00:00:09,840 --> 00:00:11,729 Good afternoon and welcome to the 3 00:00:11,729 --> 00:00:13,784 Campaign of Learning warfighter Talk 4 00:00:13,784 --> 00:00:16,007 hosted by Major General David Sanford . 5 00:00:16,007 --> 00:00:18,229 A special welcome to the members of the 6 00:00:18,229 --> 00:00:18,100 DLA team who are watching remotely . 7 00:00:18,399 --> 00:00:20,621 I'm Jake Boyer for DLA Public Affairs , 8 00:00:20,621 --> 00:00:23,540 your MC today . Rear Admiral Andrew 9 00:00:23,540 --> 00:00:25,596 Bean , the director of surface shipp 10 00:00:25,596 --> 00:00:27,373 Maintenance , modernization and 11 00:00:27,373 --> 00:00:29,596 Sustainment Naval Sea Systems Command , 12 00:00:29,596 --> 00:00:31,707 has held key operational roles aboard 13 00:00:31,707 --> 00:00:33,680 the USS Normandy and USS Truxton , 14 00:00:34,299 --> 00:00:36,521 deployed to Afghanistan , and supported 15 00:00:36,521 --> 00:00:39,259 major military operations ashore . He 16 00:00:39,259 --> 00:00:40,926 has served as a Naval Academy 17 00:00:40,926 --> 00:00:42,926 instructor , worked with US Central 18 00:00:42,926 --> 00:00:45,330 Command . And held significant project 19 00:00:45,330 --> 00:00:47,552 management and surface ship maintenance 20 00:00:47,552 --> 00:00:49,830 positions at Naval Sea Systems Command . 21 00:00:50,009 --> 00:00:52,231 I would like to welcome General Sanford 22 00:00:52,231 --> 00:00:53,453 for opening remarks . 23 00:00:58,389 --> 00:01:00,445 So I don't know if you could tell by 24 00:01:00,445 --> 00:01:02,611 Jake . We have quite the event planned 25 00:01:02,611 --> 00:01:05,050 for you . He's all choked up . He's 26 00:01:05,050 --> 00:01:08,180 tearing up . We're setting a high bar 27 00:01:08,180 --> 00:01:12,019 here , so , so , so just sit back it's 28 00:01:12,019 --> 00:01:14,241 gonna be that kind of a great meeting . 29 00:01:14,241 --> 00:01:16,408 So now , hey , first of all , thanks , 30 00:01:16,408 --> 00:01:16,260 uh , to everybody for , uh , for 31 00:01:16,260 --> 00:01:18,260 dialing in or attending or or being 32 00:01:18,260 --> 00:01:20,593 here in person . I really appreciate it . 33 00:01:20,593 --> 00:01:22,704 We're really lucky , uh , to have our 34 00:01:22,704 --> 00:01:24,927 guest , uh , today . So , um , little , 35 00:01:24,927 --> 00:01:27,204 little different , um , as far as , uh , 36 00:01:27,204 --> 00:01:29,204 background , right ? So it's , um , 37 00:01:29,204 --> 00:01:31,316 before we had a State Department last 38 00:01:31,316 --> 00:01:33,593 and thank you , uh , Marcus , for , uh , 39 00:01:33,593 --> 00:01:35,593 allowing Mr . or Honorable Green to 40 00:01:35,593 --> 00:01:37,538 come over . And then now we have a 41 00:01:37,538 --> 00:01:39,760 surface surface warfare officer , so no 42 00:01:39,760 --> 00:01:41,649 kidding surface warfare officer , 43 00:01:41,649 --> 00:01:41,339 somebody who's been a weapons officer , 44 00:01:41,459 --> 00:01:43,515 somebody who's been a combat support 45 00:01:43,515 --> 00:01:45,570 officer , somebody who's been out in 46 00:01:45,570 --> 00:01:47,626 the fight , somebody who can walk us 47 00:01:47,626 --> 00:01:49,792 through , uh , what it's like to be in 48 00:01:49,792 --> 00:01:49,379 those kind of ship to ship , well , not 49 00:01:49,379 --> 00:01:51,435 ship to ship , but , but ship to , I 50 00:01:51,435 --> 00:01:53,546 guess shore , ship to drone , shipped 51 00:01:53,546 --> 00:01:55,768 to , to missile type engagements is a . 52 00:01:55,768 --> 00:01:57,990 Different world right now , but to help 53 00:01:57,990 --> 00:01:59,990 understand what our sailors in this 54 00:01:59,990 --> 00:02:02,157 case are , are going through , um , so 55 00:02:02,157 --> 00:02:01,510 that we can provide the sustainment and 56 00:02:01,510 --> 00:02:03,732 realize the support and how they depend 57 00:02:03,732 --> 00:02:05,954 upon us , uh , to be as effective as we 58 00:02:05,954 --> 00:02:08,121 can so they can be as effective and as 59 00:02:08,121 --> 00:02:07,900 safe as they can be . So we're just 60 00:02:07,900 --> 00:02:10,122 really honored to have you here today . 61 00:02:10,122 --> 00:02:12,344 Thank you so much . Big congrats to the 62 00:02:12,344 --> 00:02:14,511 University of Virginia . It was a nice 63 00:02:14,511 --> 00:02:16,733 win on Friday . Nothing like seeing the 64 00:02:16,733 --> 00:02:18,844 Knolls get beat . It's almost as good 65 00:02:18,844 --> 00:02:18,070 as the Georgia University of Georgia 66 00:02:18,070 --> 00:02:21,830 getting beat . So we're , um . Yeah , 67 00:02:21,949 --> 00:02:24,116 sorry , I had to , had to roll that in 68 00:02:24,116 --> 00:02:26,116 there . So sorry , Chris , uh , but 69 00:02:26,116 --> 00:02:28,449 again , without further ado , thank you , 70 00:02:28,449 --> 00:02:30,671 uh , Admiral Bean for coming over and , 71 00:02:30,671 --> 00:02:29,830 and spending some time with us today . 72 00:02:29,979 --> 00:02:32,035 We really look forward to the talk . 73 00:02:36,610 --> 00:02:37,610 You 74 00:02:44,160 --> 00:02:46,382 Alright , can y'all hear me ? Alright , 75 00:02:46,382 --> 00:02:48,604 perfect . Uh , yeah , so it was great . 76 00:02:48,604 --> 00:02:51,199 Uh , I , I've , I was in San Diego on 77 00:02:51,199 --> 00:02:53,380 Friday . Plane got in at like 10 78 00:02:53,380 --> 00:02:56,279 o'clock and I , uh , checked my , uh , 79 00:02:56,320 --> 00:02:58,679 my phone , and I have a 16-year-old son 80 00:02:58,679 --> 00:03:00,735 who goes to prep school up in , uh , 81 00:03:00,735 --> 00:03:02,735 Rhode Island , and he's giving me , 82 00:03:02,735 --> 00:03:04,957 even though I can't receive them , text 83 00:03:04,957 --> 00:03:07,123 updates from the game and only the way 84 00:03:07,123 --> 00:03:10,509 a 16-year-old boy can , uh , and so the , 85 00:03:10,600 --> 00:03:14,250 the first text I get is holy . Like , 86 00:03:15,139 --> 00:03:17,361 I'm not sure what's going on here , and 87 00:03:17,361 --> 00:03:19,695 then I have to fold her back and figure , 88 00:03:19,695 --> 00:03:21,806 so , uh , so it was great , yeah , it 89 00:03:21,806 --> 00:03:23,972 was great to see , uh , UVA win that , 90 00:03:23,972 --> 00:03:26,028 uh , 30 years after UVA gave Florida 91 00:03:26,028 --> 00:03:28,083 State their first ever defeat in the 92 00:03:28,083 --> 00:03:30,361 ACC when I was an Ensign up in Newport , 93 00:03:30,361 --> 00:03:32,417 Rhode Island to surface Warfare Ofer 94 00:03:32,417 --> 00:03:34,583 school . So , um , it's really awesome 95 00:03:34,583 --> 00:03:36,639 to be here , uh , and thank you very 96 00:03:36,639 --> 00:03:38,972 much , General Sanford , for the invite , 97 00:03:38,972 --> 00:03:41,770 um . And to and to do a war fighter 98 00:03:41,770 --> 00:03:43,600 talk with you , which is very 99 00:03:43,600 --> 00:03:46,130 flattering to me because I'm , it's 100 00:03:46,130 --> 00:03:48,241 actually been a little bit since I've 101 00:03:48,241 --> 00:03:50,297 been a warfighter because I've got a 102 00:03:50,297 --> 00:03:52,297 foot in both camps . So , uh , next 103 00:03:52,297 --> 00:03:54,630 slide please . So this is my background . 104 00:03:54,630 --> 00:03:57,369 So surface warfare officer , um , for 105 00:03:57,369 --> 00:03:59,425 over 20 , just went over 30 , so I'm 106 00:03:59,425 --> 00:04:01,480 getting old , um , and , and a whole 107 00:04:01,480 --> 00:04:03,770 bunch of deployments and then , uh . So 108 00:04:03,770 --> 00:04:06,770 I was a straight stick typical seagoing 109 00:04:06,770 --> 00:04:09,570 surface warfare officer , uh , for 110 00:04:09,570 --> 00:04:12,449 pretty much the 1st 21 , 22 years of my 111 00:04:12,449 --> 00:04:14,671 career , uh , culminating in in command 112 00:04:14,671 --> 00:04:16,949 of USS Truckton , which is a destroyer . 113 00:04:16,949 --> 00:04:18,838 She's actually the , uh , the one 114 00:04:18,838 --> 00:04:20,949 astern there , so in the background , 115 00:04:20,949 --> 00:04:23,171 uh , DDG 103 , she's the better looking 116 00:04:23,171 --> 00:04:26,940 one , And uh and then the navy asked me 117 00:04:26,940 --> 00:04:28,773 to become what we call a surface 118 00:04:28,773 --> 00:04:31,399 warfare acquisition professional and so 119 00:04:31,399 --> 00:04:34,010 uh in lieu of going back to see , uh , 120 00:04:34,019 --> 00:04:36,290 I had the opportunity to work uh 121 00:04:36,290 --> 00:04:39,440 primarily in the combat systems world 122 00:04:39,940 --> 00:04:41,779 as a program manager doing fleet 123 00:04:41,779 --> 00:04:44,040 sustainment of combat systems of the 124 00:04:44,040 --> 00:04:45,929 Aegis weapons system , which is a 125 00:04:45,929 --> 00:04:47,873 weapon system on all of our . Uh , 126 00:04:47,873 --> 00:04:50,040 dwindling number of Aegis cruisers and 127 00:04:50,040 --> 00:04:52,318 all of our Aegis destroyers as well as , 128 00:04:52,318 --> 00:04:54,709 uh , in about 6 foreign navies as well , 129 00:04:55,250 --> 00:04:57,361 and then , uh , and then became the , 130 00:04:57,361 --> 00:04:59,329 uh , the integrated combat system 131 00:04:59,329 --> 00:05:01,529 program manager , uh , so , so really 132 00:05:01,529 --> 00:05:04,149 10 years in the acquisition world 133 00:05:04,450 --> 00:05:06,561 focused on both development of weapon 134 00:05:06,561 --> 00:05:08,783 systems and then support of the fleet . 135 00:05:08,783 --> 00:05:11,989 And uh and then I did a uh a year uh 136 00:05:11,989 --> 00:05:13,767 sentence in the Pentagon as the 137 00:05:13,767 --> 00:05:15,989 executive assistant to the Navy Service 138 00:05:15,989 --> 00:05:18,950 Acquisition Executive uh ASNRDA um and 139 00:05:18,950 --> 00:05:21,630 then uh and then was picked up for flag . 140 00:05:21,989 --> 00:05:24,679 And uh you know , all the Navy people 141 00:05:24,679 --> 00:05:26,901 here will understand this , but this is 142 00:05:26,901 --> 00:05:29,123 probably the same in the Army , the Air 143 00:05:29,123 --> 00:05:28,920 Force , the Marine Corps , and Space 144 00:05:28,920 --> 00:05:31,640 Force as well , uh , years of combat 145 00:05:31,640 --> 00:05:34,160 systems experience , expert in like 146 00:05:34,160 --> 00:05:36,640 long range fires and radars and stuff 147 00:05:36,640 --> 00:05:38,696 like that . So now I'm doing surface 148 00:05:38,696 --> 00:05:40,751 ship maintenance and modernization , 149 00:05:40,751 --> 00:05:42,918 and I worry a lot about pumps and heel 150 00:05:42,918 --> 00:05:45,084 hanger doors and all that stuff . So , 151 00:05:45,084 --> 00:05:47,140 so flag officer detailing is just as 152 00:05:47,140 --> 00:05:48,973 organized as all the rest of the 153 00:05:48,973 --> 00:05:51,140 detailing in the Navy . But um so I've 154 00:05:51,140 --> 00:05:53,950 got a foot in both camps uh as I was 155 00:05:53,950 --> 00:05:57,519 telling uh Mo earlier um in that 156 00:05:57,790 --> 00:05:59,846 still very much think of myself as a 157 00:05:59,846 --> 00:06:02,109 war fighter and an operator but also 158 00:06:02,109 --> 00:06:04,309 understanding what I think of as the 159 00:06:04,309 --> 00:06:06,989 secret sauce of the Department of War 160 00:06:06,989 --> 00:06:09,045 now which is all the men and women . 161 00:06:09,045 --> 00:06:11,209 That provide whether it's building 162 00:06:11,209 --> 00:06:13,510 ships , sustaining ships , delivering 163 00:06:13,510 --> 00:06:16,350 combat systems capability , uh , or 164 00:06:16,350 --> 00:06:18,572 delivering all the other logistics that 165 00:06:18,572 --> 00:06:21,059 makes us the most capable military in 166 00:06:21,059 --> 00:06:23,190 the world . So where we're gonna do 167 00:06:23,190 --> 00:06:25,301 this is is . We'll kind of talk about 168 00:06:25,301 --> 00:06:27,134 what the navy , the surface navy 169 00:06:27,134 --> 00:06:29,246 particularly , has been doing for the 170 00:06:29,246 --> 00:06:31,412 last couple of years , uh , in the Red 171 00:06:31,412 --> 00:06:33,523 Sea and Eastern Mediterranean . We'll 172 00:06:33,523 --> 00:06:35,690 do it at the on class level , but I'll 173 00:06:35,690 --> 00:06:37,801 try to walk you through it , and I'll 174 00:06:37,801 --> 00:06:37,605 try to talk about the logistics 175 00:06:37,605 --> 00:06:40,045 implications of that , and we'll talk a 176 00:06:40,045 --> 00:06:42,845 little bit about what I do in C21 and 177 00:06:42,845 --> 00:06:44,901 how that relates to that in terms of 178 00:06:45,045 --> 00:06:47,364 getting ships in and out of shipyards 179 00:06:47,364 --> 00:06:49,586 and major maintenance and modernization 180 00:06:49,586 --> 00:06:52,429 availabilities on time . Uh , and how I 181 00:06:52,429 --> 00:06:54,769 have to balance delivering capability 182 00:06:55,070 --> 00:06:57,459 with providing forces to commanders 183 00:06:57,459 --> 00:06:59,630 with making sure that our ships meet 184 00:06:59,630 --> 00:07:01,852 their expected service life , all three 185 00:07:01,852 --> 00:07:03,908 of which have significant logistical 186 00:07:03,908 --> 00:07:06,074 implications , um , and so , so try to 187 00:07:06,074 --> 00:07:08,186 relate , uh , what's happening in the 188 00:07:08,186 --> 00:07:10,297 world to what we're doing to make the 189 00:07:10,297 --> 00:07:12,352 surface navy and the navy writ large 190 00:07:12,352 --> 00:07:14,519 better , and then we'll talk . About , 191 00:07:14,519 --> 00:07:16,574 uh , how we need to work better with 192 00:07:16,574 --> 00:07:18,630 the logistical community both inside 193 00:07:18,630 --> 00:07:20,963 the navy with NASU , our partners there , 194 00:07:20,963 --> 00:07:23,130 um , who if we don't have a government 195 00:07:23,130 --> 00:07:25,297 shutdown , I'll be up in Mechanicsburg 196 00:07:25,297 --> 00:07:24,975 on Friday talking to them . If we do , 197 00:07:25,054 --> 00:07:27,387 it'll probably be a phone call and , um , 198 00:07:27,387 --> 00:07:29,443 and then , uh , and then also , uh , 199 00:07:29,494 --> 00:07:31,934 with our partners here at DLA . So , uh , 200 00:07:32,015 --> 00:07:34,071 we'll get after it next , next slide 201 00:07:34,071 --> 00:07:37,019 please , so . So since the fall of 202 00:07:37,019 --> 00:07:40,739 2023 , so October 7th of 2023 , 203 00:07:41,010 --> 00:07:43,859 uh , you had the um Hamas attacks on 204 00:07:43,859 --> 00:07:46,140 southern Israel , and then , uh , 205 00:07:46,149 --> 00:07:48,371 within months after that we were seeing 206 00:07:48,371 --> 00:07:51,140 a large number of attacks coming out of 207 00:07:51,140 --> 00:07:53,739 Yemen , so Iranian proxies , the 208 00:07:53,739 --> 00:07:57,619 Houthis in Yemen , um , attempting to 209 00:07:57,619 --> 00:08:00,769 uh to engage targets in Israel and USS 210 00:08:00,769 --> 00:08:02,713 Carney , the first time USS Carney 211 00:08:02,713 --> 00:08:04,936 happened to be in the central Red Sea . 212 00:08:04,936 --> 00:08:07,102 Uh , had some indications and warnings 213 00:08:07,102 --> 00:08:09,213 that things were happening and Carney 214 00:08:09,213 --> 00:08:09,200 was just knocking stuff down . So , as 215 00:08:09,200 --> 00:08:11,679 I said , I was the Aegis combat system 216 00:08:11,679 --> 00:08:13,880 program manager . Um , all the ships 217 00:08:13,880 --> 00:08:16,047 that have been doing these engagements 218 00:08:16,047 --> 00:08:18,047 from the surface side have all been 219 00:08:18,047 --> 00:08:19,713 Aegis ships , so I take a not 220 00:08:19,713 --> 00:08:21,880 insignificant amount of personal pride 221 00:08:21,880 --> 00:08:23,936 in the fact that , uh , they've been 222 00:08:23,936 --> 00:08:25,880 highly successful . So here's some 223 00:08:25,880 --> 00:08:27,936 pictures here we have conducted over 224 00:08:27,936 --> 00:08:30,047 400 engagements , that's 400 missiles 225 00:08:30,089 --> 00:08:32,400 have left the rails , uh , in either 226 00:08:32,400 --> 00:08:34,640 the eastern Mediterranean or the Red 227 00:08:34,640 --> 00:08:38,280 Sea , um , and that's , uh , that's a 228 00:08:38,280 --> 00:08:40,169 pretty significant portion of the 229 00:08:40,169 --> 00:08:42,320 inventory . So , so tons of lessons 230 00:08:42,320 --> 00:08:44,520 learned from that . And , and I will 231 00:08:44,520 --> 00:08:46,631 tell you that the Houthis have been , 232 00:08:46,919 --> 00:08:49,919 uh , an adaptive enemy , and so we've 233 00:08:49,919 --> 00:08:53,770 had to adapt too and so . I would say , 234 00:08:53,869 --> 00:08:56,309 uh , you know , and I'll kinda talk 235 00:08:56,309 --> 00:08:58,365 about the geographic lay down in the 236 00:08:58,365 --> 00:09:00,909 next slide , but to set that that theme 237 00:09:00,909 --> 00:09:04,450 of adaptation . The initial attacks , 238 00:09:04,869 --> 00:09:08,489 single missiles flying high , um , 239 00:09:08,869 --> 00:09:10,869 and , uh , and getting knocked down 240 00:09:10,869 --> 00:09:14,270 pretty quickly , uh , more as , as time 241 00:09:14,270 --> 00:09:17,169 went on we began to see a variety of 242 00:09:17,169 --> 00:09:19,391 missile types from ballistic missiles , 243 00:09:19,391 --> 00:09:21,113 anti-ship ballistic missiles , 244 00:09:21,113 --> 00:09:23,336 anti-ship cruise missiles , and one-way 245 00:09:23,336 --> 00:09:25,391 attack drones . Um , and we saw them 246 00:09:25,391 --> 00:09:27,799 being employed simultaneously , uh , 247 00:09:27,919 --> 00:09:29,919 not what we would call simultaneous 248 00:09:29,919 --> 00:09:33,679 time on top , but certainly a more 249 00:09:33,679 --> 00:09:35,679 stressful environment where you had 250 00:09:35,679 --> 00:09:37,790 missiles coming in from multiple axes 251 00:09:38,210 --> 00:09:40,266 at pretty close to the same time and 252 00:09:40,266 --> 00:09:42,543 our ships were having to adapt to that . 253 00:09:42,760 --> 00:09:44,927 So , uh , pretty significant amount of 254 00:09:44,927 --> 00:09:46,982 learning , and we'll talk about that 255 00:09:46,982 --> 00:09:49,093 and how that learning impacted us and 256 00:09:49,093 --> 00:09:50,871 one of the , one of the biggest 257 00:09:50,871 --> 00:09:52,816 learning pieces there has been the 258 00:09:52,816 --> 00:09:54,816 importance of material readiness of 259 00:09:54,816 --> 00:09:56,816 weapons systems so we'll talk about 260 00:09:56,816 --> 00:09:56,559 that as well , not to mention just , uh , 261 00:09:56,590 --> 00:09:59,000 munitions and munitions expenditures in 262 00:09:59,000 --> 00:10:01,000 general . If you took a look at the 263 00:10:01,000 --> 00:10:03,167 Wall Street Journal today , there is a 264 00:10:03,167 --> 00:10:05,000 front page article on , um , the 265 00:10:05,000 --> 00:10:07,167 Department of War's efforts to rapidly 266 00:10:07,167 --> 00:10:08,833 ramp up the rate of munitions 267 00:10:08,833 --> 00:10:10,667 production . Uh , and two of the 268 00:10:10,667 --> 00:10:12,778 missiles that are listed in there are 269 00:10:12,778 --> 00:10:15,000 the , uh , uh , Patriot missile and the 270 00:10:15,000 --> 00:10:17,056 Standard missile 6 SM-6 , and two of 271 00:10:17,056 --> 00:10:19,056 those have been used extensively in 272 00:10:19,056 --> 00:10:21,409 these campaigns . So , uh , so we're 273 00:10:21,409 --> 00:10:23,520 certainly seeing the impact of that . 274 00:10:24,109 --> 00:10:26,619 OK , so next slide please . So this is , 275 00:10:27,109 --> 00:10:29,442 uh , the area of operations if you will . 276 00:10:29,442 --> 00:10:31,498 So just to orient you , obviously at 277 00:10:31,498 --> 00:10:33,331 the north you've got the Eastern 278 00:10:33,331 --> 00:10:35,276 Mediterranean Sea . You see Israel 279 00:10:35,276 --> 00:10:37,165 right there , the Gaza Strip , so 280 00:10:37,165 --> 00:10:39,276 that's , uh , that's been kind of the 281 00:10:39,276 --> 00:10:43,070 locus of , uh , of activity . And then 282 00:10:43,359 --> 00:10:45,470 uh at the northern end of the Red Sea 283 00:10:45,470 --> 00:10:47,581 you have the Suez Canal . Who here is 284 00:10:47,581 --> 00:10:49,692 on the Suez Canal transit ? Yeah , so 285 00:10:49,692 --> 00:10:51,803 there's a few , so it's a basically a 286 00:10:51,803 --> 00:10:55,489 giant ditch . Um , with the , with 287 00:10:55,489 --> 00:10:58,469 the largest flies you have ever seen . 288 00:10:59,450 --> 00:11:02,770 And uh and it takes about 24 hours to 289 00:11:02,770 --> 00:11:05,500 do from one end to the other , um , and 290 00:11:05,500 --> 00:11:08,140 that's uh if you're a ship CO you're up 291 00:11:08,140 --> 00:11:11,900 for those 24 hours and uh I did 5 in 292 00:11:11,900 --> 00:11:14,640 one month in command doing duty so it , 293 00:11:14,650 --> 00:11:16,706 it , it takes it out of you . It's a 294 00:11:16,706 --> 00:11:18,872 long ditch , yeah you get to anchor in 295 00:11:18,872 --> 00:11:20,817 the middle of it because there's a 296 00:11:20,817 --> 00:11:22,928 convoy going north and a convoy going 297 00:11:22,928 --> 00:11:24,928 south and southbound you go and you 298 00:11:24,928 --> 00:11:27,094 anchor so the northbound convoy can go 299 00:11:27,094 --> 00:11:26,690 by and then you get underway again , 300 00:11:26,770 --> 00:11:28,714 yeah , it's awesome . It was great 301 00:11:28,714 --> 00:11:32,340 stuff , oh . Um , so I , I will also 302 00:11:32,340 --> 00:11:35,919 point out that you get pilots , 303 00:11:36,659 --> 00:11:39,380 uh , from Egypt , and it is usually 304 00:11:39,380 --> 00:11:41,602 expected that you will provide gifts to 305 00:11:41,602 --> 00:11:43,658 the pilot to thank him for the great 306 00:11:43,658 --> 00:11:45,658 work that he's doing . Um , and the 307 00:11:45,658 --> 00:11:47,880 supply officer is of no help whatsoever 308 00:11:47,880 --> 00:11:49,769 there . That all comes out of the 309 00:11:49,769 --> 00:11:52,330 captain's pocket . So , uh , so , so 310 00:11:52,330 --> 00:11:56,049 you just make that work . So , all 311 00:11:56,049 --> 00:11:58,229 right , so this is the Red Sea here . 312 00:11:58,900 --> 00:12:01,122 What I'll call your attention to at the 313 00:12:01,122 --> 00:12:03,178 southern end is the Strait of Bab el 314 00:12:03,178 --> 00:12:06,049 Mandeb , OK , or the Bam , or some 315 00:12:06,049 --> 00:12:08,105 sailors refer to it , the Straits of 316 00:12:08,105 --> 00:12:09,993 Barbara Mandrel if you're of , if 317 00:12:09,993 --> 00:12:12,049 you're the appropriate age , but the 318 00:12:12,049 --> 00:12:14,160 Straits of Bab el Mandeb . And uh and 319 00:12:14,160 --> 00:12:16,160 that is basically the closest point 320 00:12:16,160 --> 00:12:18,719 between uh the Horn of Africa and uh 321 00:12:18,719 --> 00:12:20,960 southwestern Yemen . So those are the 322 00:12:20,960 --> 00:12:23,690 two choke points and the Bab el Mandeb 323 00:12:23,690 --> 00:12:26,119 has really been , um , the most 324 00:12:26,119 --> 00:12:28,940 challenging portion of this campaign 325 00:12:29,200 --> 00:12:32,849 for the navy . So we would refer to 326 00:12:32,849 --> 00:12:36,760 this area really all around Yemen from 327 00:12:36,760 --> 00:12:39,489 about here . To here in the Gulf of 328 00:12:39,489 --> 00:12:41,690 Aden as a weapons engagement zone or 329 00:12:41,690 --> 00:12:44,219 the West . And so ships operating in 330 00:12:44,219 --> 00:12:46,650 the , so we have had ships continuously 331 00:12:46,650 --> 00:12:48,750 operating in the west . We normally 332 00:12:48,750 --> 00:12:51,270 have not put our aircraft carriers in 333 00:12:51,270 --> 00:12:53,437 the west . Uh , one of the nice things 334 00:12:53,437 --> 00:12:55,492 about aircraft carriers , they stand 335 00:12:55,492 --> 00:12:57,603 off . The airplanes can fly in and do 336 00:12:57,603 --> 00:12:59,603 their thing , but our surface ships 337 00:12:59,603 --> 00:13:01,826 have been operating there and certainly 338 00:13:01,826 --> 00:13:03,659 escorting both American merchant 339 00:13:03,659 --> 00:13:05,381 traffic , uh , doing Operation 340 00:13:05,381 --> 00:13:07,214 Prosperity Guardian , protecting 341 00:13:07,214 --> 00:13:09,381 international merchant traffic through 342 00:13:09,381 --> 00:13:12,440 there , as well as escorting . Uh , you 343 00:13:12,440 --> 00:13:15,429 know , uh , amphibious ships , 344 00:13:15,780 --> 00:13:18,400 oilers , auxiliaries , etc . that need 345 00:13:18,400 --> 00:13:20,456 extra protection . So our destroyers 346 00:13:20,456 --> 00:13:22,511 have been , been earning their money 347 00:13:22,511 --> 00:13:24,456 down there , uh , in the Strait of 348 00:13:24,456 --> 00:13:26,400 Babelmandeep . Just this morning , 349 00:13:26,400 --> 00:13:28,622 based on open source intelligence , a , 350 00:13:28,622 --> 00:13:30,844 a Dutch ship was hit about here , about 351 00:13:30,844 --> 00:13:33,979 200 miles south of Aden . Um , 352 00:13:35,000 --> 00:13:38,150 And uh and so so we'll see so it's not 353 00:13:38,159 --> 00:13:40,250 not over yet . Where do the weapons 354 00:13:40,250 --> 00:13:43,289 come from ? Primarily Iran , so the 355 00:13:43,289 --> 00:13:45,289 Houthis are Iranian supported proxy 356 00:13:45,289 --> 00:13:47,456 group and they're getting support both 357 00:13:47,456 --> 00:13:49,678 in terms of delivery of the weapons and 358 00:13:49,678 --> 00:13:51,830 then , uh , targeting and execution . 359 00:13:52,239 --> 00:13:54,350 So , so it is , it is very much a bit 360 00:13:54,350 --> 00:13:57,890 of a proxy fight . So 361 00:13:58,630 --> 00:14:02,190 what , let's talk about the since it's 362 00:14:02,190 --> 00:14:04,412 called the campaign of learning , let's 363 00:14:04,412 --> 00:14:06,634 talk about the learning in this fight . 364 00:14:06,634 --> 00:14:08,357 So as I said originally , um , 365 00:14:08,357 --> 00:14:10,579 targeting was pretty simplistic and our 366 00:14:10,579 --> 00:14:10,270 responses were equally simplistic . 367 00:14:10,309 --> 00:14:12,420 They would shoot something , we would 368 00:14:12,420 --> 00:14:14,531 shoot it down . But they were rapidly 369 00:14:14,531 --> 00:14:16,309 learning . They were learning , 370 00:14:16,309 --> 00:14:18,365 improving their targeting as well as 371 00:14:18,365 --> 00:14:20,531 just improving the complexity of their 372 00:14:20,531 --> 00:14:22,865 attacks , but we had to improve as well . 373 00:14:22,865 --> 00:14:24,865 The Red Sea is a really challenging 374 00:14:24,865 --> 00:14:27,087 place for radar operations . The reason 375 00:14:27,087 --> 00:14:29,450 why is it's really hot and dusty and 376 00:14:29,450 --> 00:14:31,770 relatively small . All of those 377 00:14:31,770 --> 00:14:34,380 contribute to bad radar environments . 378 00:14:34,500 --> 00:14:37,090 First off , land sea interfaces are 379 00:14:37,090 --> 00:14:40,340 difficult to to conduct radar 380 00:14:40,340 --> 00:14:42,507 operations over , and you're basically 381 00:14:42,507 --> 00:14:45,619 in a giant surrounded by a giant land 382 00:14:45,619 --> 00:14:47,730 sea interface . The second piece , if 383 00:14:47,730 --> 00:14:50,460 it's hot , you get ducting along the 384 00:14:50,460 --> 00:14:52,859 surface of the water . So as the water 385 00:14:52,859 --> 00:14:54,970 temperature goes up based on from the 386 00:14:54,970 --> 00:14:57,940 sunlight , that creates an area maybe 387 00:14:57,940 --> 00:15:00,107 about 50 to 100 ft over the water that 388 00:15:00,107 --> 00:15:02,162 gets really , really hot . And radar 389 00:15:02,162 --> 00:15:03,940 waves get trapped in there . So 390 00:15:03,940 --> 00:15:06,162 normally along the surface of the water 391 00:15:06,162 --> 00:15:08,329 radar , you're gonna see something out 392 00:15:08,329 --> 00:15:10,496 to the radar horizon , figure about 15 393 00:15:10,496 --> 00:15:09,719 nautical miles just based on the 394 00:15:09,719 --> 00:15:12,400 curvature of the Earth . But if your 395 00:15:12,400 --> 00:15:14,840 radar , if that , if that radar wave 396 00:15:14,840 --> 00:15:16,951 that's in that section gets caught in 397 00:15:16,951 --> 00:15:19,173 that duct , it will go out to 50 , 60 , 398 00:15:19,173 --> 00:15:21,599 70 miles , and so you will see things 399 00:15:21,599 --> 00:15:23,960 much further away than the radar's 400 00:15:23,960 --> 00:15:26,182 computer processor would ever expect to 401 00:15:26,182 --> 00:15:28,404 see . It's a very complex environment . 402 00:15:28,460 --> 00:15:30,571 Um , because that , that is confusing 403 00:15:30,571 --> 00:15:32,682 for the radar as well . And then last 404 00:15:32,682 --> 00:15:34,738 you get wind storms , you got sand , 405 00:15:34,738 --> 00:15:36,849 all of that creates things that radar 406 00:15:36,849 --> 00:15:38,960 want radars want to track , and so it 407 00:15:38,960 --> 00:15:40,960 creates , uh , what we would call a 408 00:15:40,960 --> 00:15:43,182 high clutter environment . So our ships 409 00:15:43,182 --> 00:15:45,404 are operating in that environment . And 410 00:15:45,404 --> 00:15:47,460 it's very challenging . So the first 411 00:15:47,460 --> 00:15:49,571 thing is their weapon systems have to 412 00:15:49,571 --> 00:15:51,682 have a really high degree of material 413 00:15:51,682 --> 00:15:53,849 readiness . You cannot have a degraded 414 00:15:53,849 --> 00:15:55,682 air search radar and effectively 415 00:15:55,682 --> 00:15:57,738 operate in this environment . So the 416 00:15:57,738 --> 00:16:01,719 first thing that the um . That the 5th 417 00:16:01,719 --> 00:16:04,820 Fleet commander had to set was a set of 418 00:16:04,820 --> 00:16:06,987 material readiness red lines for ships 419 00:16:06,987 --> 00:16:09,209 operating within the weapons engagement 420 00:16:09,209 --> 00:16:11,209 zone . If your combat system wasn't 421 00:16:11,209 --> 00:16:13,153 100% materially ready , he was not 422 00:16:13,153 --> 00:16:15,153 interested in putting you into that 423 00:16:15,153 --> 00:16:16,931 high threat environment . Now , 424 00:16:16,931 --> 00:16:19,098 obviously that's a risk assessment and 425 00:16:19,098 --> 00:16:20,987 that changes based on operational 426 00:16:20,987 --> 00:16:23,042 requirements , etc . but for this we 427 00:16:23,042 --> 00:16:24,987 were being very , very cautious in 428 00:16:24,987 --> 00:16:27,209 making sure that the only ships we were 429 00:16:27,209 --> 00:16:29,320 putting in there were those that were 430 00:16:29,320 --> 00:16:31,059 materially ready . So if uh if 431 00:16:31,059 --> 00:16:33,229 something breaks on a combat system . 432 00:16:34,109 --> 00:16:36,190 Almost always it drives a part 433 00:16:36,190 --> 00:16:38,590 replacement and so getting those parts 434 00:16:38,590 --> 00:16:41,669 there was a challenge . So where are we 435 00:16:41,669 --> 00:16:43,669 supporting our strike groups out of 436 00:16:43,669 --> 00:16:45,891 primarily out of Dukum Oman . So if you 437 00:16:45,891 --> 00:16:48,002 look all the way at the right side of 438 00:16:48,002 --> 00:16:50,820 the map , so about 1200 nautical miles 439 00:16:50,820 --> 00:16:53,469 from the Strait of Baba Mandeb , so not 440 00:16:53,469 --> 00:16:55,747 a small , not a small piece of terrain . 441 00:16:57,030 --> 00:17:00,909 And so , um , that part will have 442 00:17:00,909 --> 00:17:04,270 to be sourced primarily , uh , most 443 00:17:04,270 --> 00:17:06,437 commonly from within the United States 444 00:17:06,989 --> 00:17:09,709 and then flown to Duca . And then we've 445 00:17:09,709 --> 00:17:11,910 got to do the last logistical mile to 446 00:17:11,910 --> 00:17:14,030 get it to that destroyer that's 447 00:17:14,030 --> 00:17:17,298 operating there . And that is probably 448 00:17:17,298 --> 00:17:20,918 3 or 4 hops to get it there , uh , 449 00:17:20,928 --> 00:17:22,984 because there's no helicopter that's 450 00:17:22,984 --> 00:17:24,872 gonna fly 1000 miles for you , so 451 00:17:24,872 --> 00:17:26,928 you're getting it out to the carrier 452 00:17:26,928 --> 00:17:29,095 and then , uh , probably closer via an 453 00:17:29,095 --> 00:17:31,095 oiler and then hopefully eventually 454 00:17:31,095 --> 00:17:33,150 getting it transferred , uh , to the 455 00:17:33,150 --> 00:17:34,928 ship there . So that has been a 456 00:17:34,928 --> 00:17:36,984 significant challenge , uh , is that 457 00:17:36,984 --> 00:17:38,928 last tactical mile of logistics to 458 00:17:38,928 --> 00:17:38,879 support the ships there that are 459 00:17:38,879 --> 00:17:41,046 operating in the west when they have a 460 00:17:41,046 --> 00:17:43,101 combat systems casualty or any other 461 00:17:43,101 --> 00:17:45,046 sort of casualty . Uh , the second 462 00:17:45,046 --> 00:17:48,699 piece that we saw is the importance of 463 00:17:48,699 --> 00:17:51,640 a rapid feedback loop on data . 464 00:17:52,569 --> 00:17:55,849 So , uh , in 2016 , the USS NHTSA and 465 00:17:55,849 --> 00:17:58,310 the USS Mason were fired upon by Houthi , 466 00:17:58,670 --> 00:18:02,569 um , uh , Houthi separatists , uh , in 467 00:18:02,569 --> 00:18:04,849 the southern , uh , in the Southern Red 468 00:18:04,849 --> 00:18:07,569 Sea , and I , I was the guy who was 469 00:18:07,569 --> 00:18:09,847 trying to get the data off those ships , 470 00:18:09,847 --> 00:18:11,847 and it took us about a month to get 471 00:18:11,847 --> 00:18:14,489 that data transported off the ship and 472 00:18:14,489 --> 00:18:17,569 then evaluated in a , in a laboratory 473 00:18:17,569 --> 00:18:19,791 environment to understand precisely how 474 00:18:19,791 --> 00:18:23,420 the combat system performed . Um , and 475 00:18:23,420 --> 00:18:25,642 we , we literally had to take tapes and 476 00:18:25,642 --> 00:18:27,809 then like a chief petty officer got in 477 00:18:27,809 --> 00:18:29,976 a helicopter , flew to an oiler , rode 478 00:18:29,976 --> 00:18:29,540 the oiler somewhere , and then 479 00:18:29,540 --> 00:18:32,380 eventually flew home . We are now able 480 00:18:32,380 --> 00:18:34,500 to get data off of our surface ships 481 00:18:34,500 --> 00:18:37,560 within 24 hours of an engagement . This 482 00:18:37,560 --> 00:18:40,819 is a combination of uh Cyronnet email , 483 00:18:41,119 --> 00:18:43,341 Starlink , etc . but we're pulling data 484 00:18:43,599 --> 00:18:45,766 data off and we're getting it back and 485 00:18:45,766 --> 00:18:47,932 evaluating that data uh within days of 486 00:18:47,932 --> 00:18:50,099 the engagement happening . Why is that 487 00:18:50,099 --> 00:18:52,430 important ? Well , for about 50% of the 488 00:18:52,430 --> 00:18:55,430 engagements . We , uh , we find that 489 00:18:55,430 --> 00:18:57,208 the ship has set up their radar 490 00:18:57,208 --> 00:18:59,430 perfectly and they've done exactly what 491 00:18:59,430 --> 00:19:01,486 we would want them to do . So that's 492 00:19:01,486 --> 00:19:03,597 pretty good . For about 50% , there's 493 00:19:03,597 --> 00:19:06,239 room for improvement . And so some of 494 00:19:06,239 --> 00:19:08,572 that room for improvement is in tactics , 495 00:19:08,572 --> 00:19:10,572 techniques , and procedures . So we 496 00:19:10,572 --> 00:19:12,795 have the Naval Surface and Mine Warfare 497 00:19:12,795 --> 00:19:15,017 Development Center , uh , which is made 498 00:19:15,017 --> 00:19:17,239 up of a bunch of , uh , warfare tactics 499 00:19:17,239 --> 00:19:19,461 instructors which we blatantly borrowed 500 00:19:19,461 --> 00:19:21,683 from the aviation community both in the 501 00:19:21,683 --> 00:19:21,359 Air Force with , uh , weapons school 502 00:19:21,359 --> 00:19:23,469 patch wars and the naval aviation 503 00:19:23,469 --> 00:19:25,302 community with Top Gun . We just 504 00:19:25,302 --> 00:19:27,525 modeled on them . So for about 10 years 505 00:19:27,525 --> 00:19:29,525 we've been creating warfare tactics 506 00:19:29,525 --> 00:19:29,119 instructors in the surface warfare 507 00:19:29,119 --> 00:19:31,286 community , and those WTIs take a look 508 00:19:31,286 --> 00:19:33,452 at that , evaluate and go , OK . Hey , 509 00:19:33,452 --> 00:19:35,730 this is what we gotta do to get better . 510 00:19:35,730 --> 00:19:37,786 We need to set up the radar a little 511 00:19:37,786 --> 00:19:39,939 bit differently or , uh , we need to 512 00:19:39,939 --> 00:19:42,161 drive the ship a little bit differently 513 00:19:42,161 --> 00:19:44,272 or we need to have a different firing 514 00:19:44,272 --> 00:19:46,495 policy for standard missiles . So we're 515 00:19:46,495 --> 00:19:45,619 constantly learning from that . So 516 00:19:45,619 --> 00:19:47,841 that's been one piece of learning . The 517 00:19:47,841 --> 00:19:50,008 other piece of learning is how are our 518 00:19:50,008 --> 00:19:51,952 weapon systems performing . And so 519 00:19:51,952 --> 00:19:53,952 we've actually been able to provide 520 00:19:53,952 --> 00:19:56,119 multiple software updates over the air 521 00:19:56,119 --> 00:19:55,380 to improve the performance of the 522 00:19:55,380 --> 00:19:58,640 weapon system in theater . So that has 523 00:19:58,640 --> 00:20:00,751 been really rapid learning for us and 524 00:20:00,751 --> 00:20:03,239 been super critical . Because as we 525 00:20:03,239 --> 00:20:05,128 have learned , uh , the enemy has 526 00:20:05,128 --> 00:20:07,295 adapted as well , and as I mentioned , 527 00:20:07,295 --> 00:20:09,628 their threats are getting more and more , 528 00:20:09,628 --> 00:20:11,961 uh , complex . So I was out at the , uh , 529 00:20:11,961 --> 00:20:14,072 surface warfare flag officer training 530 00:20:14,072 --> 00:20:16,719 seminar about 3 weeks ago , and , uh , 531 00:20:17,040 --> 00:20:19,199 we had a panel with USS Spruance , 532 00:20:19,319 --> 00:20:21,486 which is an RA Burke class destroyer , 533 00:20:22,239 --> 00:20:26,050 and . About 4 of their junior officers 534 00:20:26,050 --> 00:20:28,449 and 1 chief petty officer talking about 535 00:20:28,449 --> 00:20:30,560 the running 2 day missile battle that 536 00:20:30,560 --> 00:20:32,727 they had going north and south through 537 00:20:32,727 --> 00:20:35,569 the Strait of Babel Mendeb and first 538 00:20:35,569 --> 00:20:38,069 off as a swell like totally motivating 539 00:20:38,369 --> 00:20:42,239 like like like steely eyed killers , um , 540 00:20:42,250 --> 00:20:45,280 doing absolutely fantastic work . Uh , 541 00:20:45,400 --> 00:20:48,520 it was very eye opening to me how much 542 00:20:48,520 --> 00:20:52,459 more tactically proficient our junior 543 00:20:52,459 --> 00:20:54,570 officers are than I was at that age , 544 00:20:54,570 --> 00:20:56,403 and so I think that reflects the 545 00:20:56,403 --> 00:20:58,403 investment that we have made in the 546 00:20:58,403 --> 00:21:00,403 training and war fighting readiness 547 00:21:00,403 --> 00:21:02,515 there . Um , we're now seeing that we 548 00:21:02,515 --> 00:21:04,237 need to make that same sort of 549 00:21:04,237 --> 00:21:06,348 investment and increased professional 550 00:21:06,348 --> 00:21:06,260 development across the board , 551 00:21:06,400 --> 00:21:08,511 engineering , sustainment , etc . but 552 00:21:08,511 --> 00:21:10,456 we've done it for tactics and it's 553 00:21:10,456 --> 00:21:12,789 really paid off . Uh , the second piece , 554 00:21:13,089 --> 00:21:16,349 uh , from that is just how complex 555 00:21:16,650 --> 00:21:18,810 these fights are , and it was just 556 00:21:18,810 --> 00:21:21,143 really fascinating listening to a young , 557 00:21:21,143 --> 00:21:24,170 uh , female TAO talking about , you 558 00:21:24,170 --> 00:21:26,503 know , hey , one cruise missile came in , 559 00:21:26,503 --> 00:21:28,760 great , we shot it down , and 560 00:21:28,770 --> 00:21:30,826 immediately I was scanning because I 561 00:21:30,826 --> 00:21:33,609 knew that they had been firing two at 562 00:21:33,609 --> 00:21:36,339 about a 90 degree offset simultaneously , 563 00:21:36,410 --> 00:21:38,410 so I knew there was another one out 564 00:21:38,410 --> 00:21:40,466 there and we didn't see it yet . And 565 00:21:40,466 --> 00:21:42,521 then , and then , and then the radar 566 00:21:42,521 --> 00:21:44,688 picked it up and we were able to shoot 567 00:21:44,688 --> 00:21:46,910 that one down too , but you know , very 568 00:21:46,910 --> 00:21:48,688 much tracking what had happened 569 00:21:48,688 --> 00:21:50,632 previously , how the change in the 570 00:21:50,632 --> 00:21:50,579 enemy TTP was and how they were 571 00:21:50,579 --> 00:21:53,300 responding to it . So that's , that's 572 00:21:53,300 --> 00:21:55,522 the nature of that fight there and that 573 00:21:55,522 --> 00:21:58,500 has been ongoing , um , uh , for quite 574 00:21:58,500 --> 00:22:00,667 a while . It's been tamped down in the 575 00:22:00,667 --> 00:22:02,859 past few months , uh , but I don't 576 00:22:02,859 --> 00:22:04,915 think it's , I don't , I don't think 577 00:22:04,915 --> 00:22:07,248 we're done yet and so we'll kind of see . 578 00:22:07,248 --> 00:22:09,359 The other interesting fight is in the 579 00:22:09,359 --> 00:22:11,699 eastern Med . So we had the 12 day war 580 00:22:11,699 --> 00:22:14,979 between Iran and Israel , and several 581 00:22:14,979 --> 00:22:17,090 of our destroyers were in the eastern 582 00:22:17,090 --> 00:22:18,979 Mediterranean providing ballistic 583 00:22:18,979 --> 00:22:21,201 missile defense support of Israel , and 584 00:22:21,201 --> 00:22:22,812 that is a really challenging 585 00:22:22,812 --> 00:22:24,900 environment . So , um , let's talk a 586 00:22:24,900 --> 00:22:26,900 little bit about the kinematic . So 587 00:22:26,900 --> 00:22:28,956 Iran is shooting a ballistic missile 588 00:22:28,956 --> 00:22:31,067 that goes up into space basically and 589 00:22:31,067 --> 00:22:33,233 then it is coming down to hit Israel . 590 00:22:33,400 --> 00:22:36,250 And then In the eastern Mediterranean 591 00:22:36,530 --> 00:22:38,810 we have Eli Burke class destroyers that 592 00:22:38,810 --> 00:22:40,532 have ballistic missile defense 593 00:22:40,532 --> 00:22:43,810 capability . Now traditionally , if 594 00:22:44,130 --> 00:22:45,852 think about it from a football 595 00:22:45,852 --> 00:22:47,797 perspective , if you wanna make an 596 00:22:47,797 --> 00:22:49,574 interception on a pass that the 597 00:22:49,574 --> 00:22:51,908 quarterback is throwing to the receiver , 598 00:22:51,908 --> 00:22:54,130 ideally you would want to be in between 599 00:22:54,130 --> 00:22:56,352 the receiver and the quarterback . That 600 00:22:56,352 --> 00:22:58,408 is the best place to knock down that 601 00:22:58,408 --> 00:23:00,910 pass or make an interception , uh . We 602 00:23:00,910 --> 00:23:03,069 can't get ships in between Israel and 603 00:23:03,069 --> 00:23:06,750 Iran from the eastern Med . So instead 604 00:23:06,750 --> 00:23:08,790 what they're doing is shooting over 605 00:23:08,790 --> 00:23:10,901 Israel to knock something down on the 606 00:23:10,901 --> 00:23:13,319 other side of Israel . It's a super 607 00:23:13,589 --> 00:23:15,829 challenging shot . The kinematics of 608 00:23:15,829 --> 00:23:18,099 that are really hard . And so what that 609 00:23:18,099 --> 00:23:20,266 means is your success rate is a little 610 00:23:20,266 --> 00:23:22,432 bit lower because you're taking harder 611 00:23:22,432 --> 00:23:24,377 shots and so we're , we're burning 612 00:23:24,377 --> 00:23:26,321 missiles , but that's exactly what 613 00:23:26,321 --> 00:23:28,377 happened and that was in combination 614 00:23:28,377 --> 00:23:30,599 with the joint force and , uh , as well 615 00:23:30,599 --> 00:23:33,810 as . Israeli forces . And we saw 616 00:23:33,810 --> 00:23:35,810 several times , you know , we would 617 00:23:35,810 --> 00:23:37,699 shoot things and the Israelis are 618 00:23:37,699 --> 00:23:37,089 shooting at it too , and ideally you're 619 00:23:37,089 --> 00:23:38,978 like , well , really we should be 620 00:23:38,978 --> 00:23:41,033 deconflicting , and the Israelis are 621 00:23:41,033 --> 00:23:43,145 like , Hey dude , it's my house . I'm 622 00:23:43,145 --> 00:23:45,367 gonna shoot at it . So , uh , so really 623 00:23:45,367 --> 00:23:47,589 interesting environment there as well . 624 00:23:47,589 --> 00:23:49,811 Uh , great deal of learning from that , 625 00:23:49,811 --> 00:23:52,033 but you can imagine , uh , that is very 626 00:23:52,033 --> 00:23:54,145 much considered a no failed mission . 627 00:23:54,630 --> 00:23:56,869 What are the implications of being able 628 00:23:56,869 --> 00:23:59,430 to do that with the destroyers we have 629 00:23:59,430 --> 00:24:02,140 now ? So a little bit , so Aegis has 630 00:24:02,140 --> 00:24:04,619 been around for 50 years and we've been 631 00:24:04,619 --> 00:24:06,675 operating with different variants of 632 00:24:06,675 --> 00:24:09,660 the SPYO radar . Um , so the radar we 633 00:24:09,660 --> 00:24:12,810 have on all of these ships is really 634 00:24:13,109 --> 00:24:15,930 the best 1970s technology has to offer . 635 00:24:17,630 --> 00:24:21,319 And um the way we have gotten more out 636 00:24:21,319 --> 00:24:24,000 of that radar is basically by increased 637 00:24:24,000 --> 00:24:26,750 processing power . Um , and , and we've 638 00:24:26,750 --> 00:24:28,528 been able to squeeze just about 639 00:24:28,528 --> 00:24:30,583 everything that radar has , but what 640 00:24:30,583 --> 00:24:32,770 that has cost us a little bit is in 641 00:24:32,910 --> 00:24:34,989 redundancy . When the radar was 642 00:24:34,989 --> 00:24:37,100 originally designed , it was designed 643 00:24:37,100 --> 00:24:39,267 to have spy radar was designed to have 644 00:24:39,349 --> 00:24:41,699 what we would call 3 driver pre-drivers , 645 00:24:42,030 --> 00:24:43,974 basically the final amplifier that 646 00:24:43,974 --> 00:24:45,974 creates the energy that's needed to 647 00:24:45,974 --> 00:24:48,141 track something . With 2 of those down 648 00:24:48,800 --> 00:24:50,967 or with , with one of those down , you 649 00:24:50,967 --> 00:24:53,160 could still have full capability . The 650 00:24:53,160 --> 00:24:55,216 type of fight we're in now , we need 651 00:24:55,216 --> 00:24:56,938 all three , so we've lost some 652 00:24:56,938 --> 00:24:58,882 redundancy there . We had a signal 653 00:24:58,882 --> 00:25:01,216 processor that originally had two sides , 654 00:25:01,216 --> 00:25:03,382 an A side and a B side , and there was 655 00:25:03,382 --> 00:25:05,382 full redundancy . There is not full 656 00:25:05,382 --> 00:25:07,549 redundancy now for this integrated air 657 00:25:07,549 --> 00:25:09,604 and missile defense thing . You lose 658 00:25:09,604 --> 00:25:11,771 one side of the signal processor . You 659 00:25:11,771 --> 00:25:13,938 have lost a portion of your ability to 660 00:25:13,938 --> 00:25:15,993 execute these high-end missions . So 661 00:25:15,993 --> 00:25:17,938 that loss of redundancy just makes 662 00:25:17,938 --> 00:25:20,216 parts support that much more important , 663 00:25:20,216 --> 00:25:22,271 and it's contingent on us as program 664 00:25:22,271 --> 00:25:24,493 managers and the logistics community to 665 00:25:24,493 --> 00:25:26,920 remodel to do that . So those are some 666 00:25:26,920 --> 00:25:28,920 of the challenges that we're seeing 667 00:25:28,920 --> 00:25:30,400 there . Um . 668 00:25:33,760 --> 00:25:36,560 So now as we move uh and oh and then 669 00:25:36,560 --> 00:25:39,239 the last thing on spy one so I I was 670 00:25:39,239 --> 00:25:41,930 the easiest program manager . Spy One 671 00:25:41,930 --> 00:25:44,041 production line was running basically 672 00:25:44,041 --> 00:25:46,374 for 50 years in Moorestown , New Jersey , 673 00:25:46,374 --> 00:25:48,597 and we were building the last few , and 674 00:25:48,597 --> 00:25:50,652 I actually took , took multiple flag 675 00:25:50,652 --> 00:25:52,541 officers , uh , up there from the 676 00:25:52,541 --> 00:25:54,763 Pentagon and said , sir , these are the 677 00:25:54,763 --> 00:25:58,089 last . Spy antennas coming down this 678 00:25:58,089 --> 00:26:00,089 line . We're getting ready to close 679 00:26:00,089 --> 00:26:02,256 down this . If you go there now , they 680 00:26:02,256 --> 00:26:01,810 make missile launchers . They don't 681 00:26:01,810 --> 00:26:04,510 make radars there anymore . Um , I 682 00:26:04,510 --> 00:26:07,310 don't have any ability to sustain this 683 00:26:07,310 --> 00:26:09,699 radar once this line shuts down . For 684 00:26:09,699 --> 00:26:11,421 50 years we lived off of a hot 685 00:26:11,421 --> 00:26:13,588 production line . If I had a problem , 686 00:26:13,588 --> 00:26:15,421 I could pull something off a hot 687 00:26:15,421 --> 00:26:17,643 production line and just order one more 688 00:26:17,643 --> 00:26:19,699 for a new construction ship . That's 689 00:26:19,699 --> 00:26:21,810 not happening anymore . So what we're 690 00:26:21,810 --> 00:26:23,866 doing now , we were actually talking 691 00:26:23,866 --> 00:26:23,790 about this , Mo , is as we're 692 00:26:23,790 --> 00:26:25,901 decommissioning . So my ship , my old 693 00:26:25,901 --> 00:26:27,568 ship , the USS Normandy , was 694 00:26:27,568 --> 00:26:29,290 decommissioned last Thursday . 695 00:26:29,290 --> 00:26:31,457 Ironically , that means she belongs to 696 00:26:31,457 --> 00:26:33,679 me now because I own inactive ships for 697 00:26:33,679 --> 00:26:35,790 the Navy . And so now what we will do 698 00:26:35,790 --> 00:26:37,901 is we will go across , we will go all 699 00:26:37,901 --> 00:26:37,130 over Normandy as we've done with the 700 00:26:37,130 --> 00:26:39,130 rest of these cruises . We're gonna 701 00:26:39,130 --> 00:26:41,352 pull off her spy radar . And her combat 702 00:26:41,352 --> 00:26:43,463 system on all those key components as 703 00:26:43,463 --> 00:26:45,574 well as key HMME components , but for 704 00:26:45,574 --> 00:26:47,797 the for the Spyrider , we're gonna take 705 00:26:47,797 --> 00:26:47,150 those , we're gonna ship them all off 706 00:26:47,150 --> 00:26:49,428 to the largest naval base in the world , 707 00:26:49,428 --> 00:26:51,539 which weirdly is in Crane , Indiana , 708 00:26:51,539 --> 00:26:53,761 to Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane , 709 00:26:53,761 --> 00:26:55,928 Indiana . Uh , where we're standing up 710 00:26:55,928 --> 00:26:57,650 in organic depot , so that's a 711 00:26:57,650 --> 00:27:00,760 fundamental . Lesson learned for the 712 00:27:00,760 --> 00:27:03,770 Navy . Hey , we did not think . Um , or 713 00:27:03,770 --> 00:27:05,881 we did think we just didn't write the 714 00:27:05,881 --> 00:27:07,659 check for , and no , nobody was 715 00:27:07,659 --> 00:27:09,714 surprised by this , this sustainment 716 00:27:09,714 --> 00:27:11,603 that was needed for this critical 717 00:27:11,603 --> 00:27:11,270 weapons system that's gonna be around 718 00:27:11,270 --> 00:27:13,381 for another 2030 years , and so we're 719 00:27:13,381 --> 00:27:15,326 doing that now by harvesting these 720 00:27:15,326 --> 00:27:17,437 older parts , refurbishing them , and 721 00:27:17,437 --> 00:27:19,381 then creating the depot in Crane , 722 00:27:19,381 --> 00:27:21,492 Indiana . So lots of challenges there 723 00:27:21,492 --> 00:27:23,492 and that is not a , I can't imagine 724 00:27:23,492 --> 00:27:25,659 that that's a unique challenge to that 725 00:27:25,659 --> 00:27:27,881 weapon system or frankly to the navy on 726 00:27:27,881 --> 00:27:30,214 that . So those are the lessons learned , 727 00:27:30,329 --> 00:27:32,496 uh , that we're getting out of the Red 728 00:27:32,496 --> 00:27:36,410 Sea . Uh , it's been a , um . I 729 00:27:36,410 --> 00:27:39,719 would just say , uh , as a , as a 730 00:27:39,719 --> 00:27:42,000 surface warfare officer , it is super 731 00:27:42,000 --> 00:27:44,000 inspiring to see the performance of 732 00:27:44,000 --> 00:27:46,056 these ships . Um , as a former Aegis 733 00:27:46,056 --> 00:27:48,278 program manager we haven't had a single 734 00:27:48,278 --> 00:27:50,839 ship get hit yet , um , so , so we're 735 00:27:50,839 --> 00:27:53,061 batting 1000 which is , which is pretty 736 00:27:53,260 --> 00:27:55,371 good , um , but there's a combination 737 00:27:55,371 --> 00:27:58,119 of luck and , and skill in there , uh , 738 00:27:58,209 --> 00:28:00,153 but , but the lessons learned that 739 00:28:00,153 --> 00:28:01,876 we've had from this are pretty 740 00:28:01,876 --> 00:28:04,849 fantastic , and , um . And the ability 741 00:28:04,849 --> 00:28:07,016 to fight in a choke point , you know , 742 00:28:07,016 --> 00:28:09,238 should we get into a fight in the South 743 00:28:09,238 --> 00:28:11,460 China Sea , chokepoint fights are gonna 744 00:28:11,460 --> 00:28:13,793 be what we're in for a great deal , and , 745 00:28:13,793 --> 00:28:15,849 uh , and the logistics there will be 746 00:28:15,849 --> 00:28:15,390 far harder than the logistics here , 747 00:28:15,400 --> 00:28:17,456 and the logistics here has been hard 748 00:28:17,456 --> 00:28:19,622 enough . So , OK , next slide please . 749 00:28:19,869 --> 00:28:21,980 All right , so , uh , we've got a new 750 00:28:21,980 --> 00:28:25,910 CNO in the Navy , and , uh , and if 751 00:28:25,910 --> 00:28:28,132 you , you know , for , for those of you 752 00:28:28,132 --> 00:28:30,132 who are dressed like me , hopefully 753 00:28:30,132 --> 00:28:32,466 you've seen his guidance on the foundry , 754 00:28:32,466 --> 00:28:34,466 the fleet , and the fight . So , so 755 00:28:34,466 --> 00:28:36,243 Admiral Caudle , um , is really 756 00:28:36,869 --> 00:28:39,036 emphasizing , you know , his end state 757 00:28:39,036 --> 00:28:41,150 of course is combat readiness , but 758 00:28:41,150 --> 00:28:43,483 beginning with the concept of a foundry , 759 00:28:43,483 --> 00:28:45,594 and the foundry for us is pretty much 760 00:28:45,594 --> 00:28:47,817 everybody who's in the . And you know , 761 00:28:47,817 --> 00:28:50,039 in the United States Navy or supporting 762 00:28:50,039 --> 00:28:52,699 the United States Navy , so , uh , so 763 00:28:53,359 --> 00:28:55,589 not just the ships themselves but those 764 00:28:55,589 --> 00:28:57,839 that provide training , those that 765 00:28:57,839 --> 00:29:00,061 provide the people , those that provide 766 00:29:00,061 --> 00:29:02,283 the material that's necessary to design 767 00:29:02,283 --> 00:29:04,561 the system , support the systems , etc . 768 00:29:04,561 --> 00:29:06,561 uh , so it's a combination of uh of 769 00:29:06,800 --> 00:29:08,760 uniformed personnel , government 770 00:29:08,760 --> 00:29:11,038 civilians , contractors , and industry . 771 00:29:11,839 --> 00:29:13,895 And so we're , I'm very much part of 772 00:29:13,895 --> 00:29:16,680 the foundry in C21 , uh , everybody 773 00:29:16,680 --> 00:29:18,791 here , whether you want to be part of 774 00:29:18,791 --> 00:29:20,236 the Navy Foundry or not , 775 00:29:20,236 --> 00:29:22,347 congratulations , you're , you're all 776 00:29:22,347 --> 00:29:24,513 in the Navy now , um , as far as we're 777 00:29:24,513 --> 00:29:26,680 concerned . So , uh , so , so that's , 778 00:29:26,680 --> 00:29:28,902 uh , that's really very much what we're 779 00:29:28,902 --> 00:29:31,069 focused on . Coming out of that is the 780 00:29:31,069 --> 00:29:33,013 fleet . Our decisive instrument of 781 00:29:33,013 --> 00:29:35,124 national power and then coming out of 782 00:29:35,124 --> 00:29:37,291 that is the way we're gonna fight . So 783 00:29:37,291 --> 00:29:39,236 this is how CNO Caudle is thinking 784 00:29:39,236 --> 00:29:41,347 about this , and he's really focusing 785 00:29:41,347 --> 00:29:43,569 his energies because ironically we call 786 00:29:43,569 --> 00:29:45,791 him the Chief of naval operations , but 787 00:29:45,791 --> 00:29:45,500 he's actually not in the operational 788 00:29:45,500 --> 00:29:47,667 chain of command because the Navy were 789 00:29:47,667 --> 00:29:49,833 weird . Um , he is very much the man , 790 00:29:49,833 --> 00:29:51,722 train and equip guy , very , very 791 00:29:51,722 --> 00:29:53,778 focused on the foundry , uh , and so 792 00:29:53,778 --> 00:29:55,778 that's , that's where his head is . 793 00:29:55,778 --> 00:29:57,833 That's where our head is right now . 794 00:29:57,833 --> 00:30:00,000 And next slide please . All right , so 795 00:30:00,000 --> 00:30:02,167 C21 , what do I do ? I do surface ship 796 00:30:02,167 --> 00:30:04,056 maintenance , modernization , and 797 00:30:04,056 --> 00:30:05,889 sustainment , so 140 non-nuclear 798 00:30:05,889 --> 00:30:07,889 surface ships in the Navy , and I'm 799 00:30:07,889 --> 00:30:07,839 supposed to take care of all of them . 800 00:30:08,339 --> 00:30:10,459 So I had a buddy who , uh , is a 801 00:30:10,459 --> 00:30:12,681 retired commander , has a boat . He was 802 00:30:12,681 --> 00:30:14,792 like , Man , sometimes it's a pain in 803 00:30:14,792 --> 00:30:16,848 the owning a boat . I'm like , Man , 804 00:30:16,848 --> 00:30:20,180 tell me about it , um . So , so , 805 00:30:20,250 --> 00:30:23,459 uh , so this is , this is what we do . 806 00:30:23,739 --> 00:30:25,906 Uh , I've got two program offices that 807 00:30:25,906 --> 00:30:27,628 are focused on sustainment and 808 00:30:27,628 --> 00:30:29,628 modernization of all of our surface 809 00:30:29,628 --> 00:30:31,795 ships . I've got a program office that 810 00:30:31,795 --> 00:30:33,683 does sustainment of international 811 00:30:33,683 --> 00:30:35,850 navies that use US systems or or ships 812 00:30:35,850 --> 00:30:38,072 that they purchased from us . Uh , I've 813 00:30:38,072 --> 00:30:40,239 got a program office that does all the 814 00:30:40,239 --> 00:30:42,461 training systems for the surface navy . 815 00:30:42,579 --> 00:30:45,060 And then I uh I own inactive ships as 816 00:30:45,060 --> 00:30:47,109 well . I work very closely with the 817 00:30:47,109 --> 00:30:49,165 Commander Naval Regional Maintenance 818 00:30:49,165 --> 00:30:51,387 Centers , which are all of our , all of 819 00:30:51,387 --> 00:30:53,609 our regional maintenance centers , uh , 820 00:30:53,609 --> 00:30:55,720 support our surface ships maintenance 821 00:30:55,720 --> 00:30:57,831 and modernization . OK , next slide . 822 00:30:57,831 --> 00:30:59,998 And this is where I live in the middle 823 00:30:59,998 --> 00:31:02,331 of the bouncing around in this triangle . 824 00:31:02,380 --> 00:31:04,602 So I'll just go through the , the three 825 00:31:04,602 --> 00:31:06,713 points on the triangle . The first is 826 00:31:06,713 --> 00:31:08,880 80% combat surge ready . I'm gonna let 827 00:31:08,880 --> 00:31:10,991 you guys in on a secret . Our navy is 828 00:31:10,991 --> 00:31:14,849 too small . OK , um , right 829 00:31:14,849 --> 00:31:17,729 now we have over 100 ships under 830 00:31:17,729 --> 00:31:19,840 contract for new construction . 59 of 831 00:31:19,840 --> 00:31:21,896 them are in construction right now , 832 00:31:22,040 --> 00:31:24,670 about 56 of them are behind schedule . 833 00:31:25,689 --> 00:31:28,479 OK , the other three are too early to 834 00:31:28,479 --> 00:31:32,020 be to be behind schedule yet . Um , 835 00:31:33,520 --> 00:31:36,550 So we have about 75 Arley Burke class 836 00:31:36,550 --> 00:31:38,772 destroyers in the Navy and we're really 837 00:31:38,772 --> 00:31:41,160 probably between 4 and 5 short of where 838 00:31:41,160 --> 00:31:42,760 we ought to be based on new 839 00:31:42,760 --> 00:31:46,000 construction , uh , timelines and so 840 00:31:46,000 --> 00:31:47,869 that hurts . That means a higher 841 00:31:47,869 --> 00:31:50,160 percentage of the fleet has to be ready 842 00:31:50,160 --> 00:31:52,800 to go to sea at any given time . So the 843 00:31:52,800 --> 00:31:55,920 CNO has directed us to achieve 80% 844 00:31:55,920 --> 00:31:58,087 combat surge ready . A surface ship is 845 00:31:58,087 --> 00:32:01,479 combat surge ready if it is not in a 846 00:32:01,479 --> 00:32:03,535 maintenance cycle , so it's not in a 847 00:32:03,535 --> 00:32:07,010 shipyard . OK , um , and it has 848 00:32:07,010 --> 00:32:09,969 gone through , uh , its basic phase up 849 00:32:09,969 --> 00:32:12,329 through what we call , uh , surface 850 00:32:12,329 --> 00:32:14,551 warfare advanced tactical training . So 851 00:32:14,551 --> 00:32:16,773 basically it has completed about 2/3 of 852 00:32:16,773 --> 00:32:18,885 its training cycle and is ready to be 853 00:32:18,885 --> 00:32:20,551 plugged into a , uh , carrier 854 00:32:20,551 --> 00:32:22,607 expeditionary strike group and go on 855 00:32:22,607 --> 00:32:24,829 deployment . So that's how you define , 856 00:32:24,829 --> 00:32:26,940 oh , it has to be manned properly and 857 00:32:26,940 --> 00:32:28,996 its equipment has to be working . So 858 00:32:28,996 --> 00:32:31,107 that's how we define 80% combat surge 859 00:32:31,107 --> 00:32:33,162 readiness . So I need to have 80% of 860 00:32:33,162 --> 00:32:35,385 the fleet at that point , which means I 861 00:32:35,385 --> 00:32:37,107 can have 20% of the fleet in a 862 00:32:37,107 --> 00:32:39,219 maintenance period or in the early 863 00:32:39,219 --> 00:32:41,579 phases of the training cycle . That is 864 00:32:41,579 --> 00:32:44,020 a really , really difficult thing to 865 00:32:44,020 --> 00:32:45,909 accomplish . And the reason we're 866 00:32:45,909 --> 00:32:47,964 trying to do that is because we just 867 00:32:47,964 --> 00:32:50,020 don't have enough ships , uh , right 868 00:32:50,020 --> 00:32:52,020 now , um , we've got , uh , carrier 869 00:32:52,020 --> 00:32:54,076 strike groups deployed in the Middle 870 00:32:54,076 --> 00:32:56,131 East . And in the Pacific we have an 871 00:32:56,131 --> 00:32:58,131 expeditionary strike group employed 872 00:32:58,131 --> 00:33:00,242 down in SouthCO , the Iwo Jima strike 873 00:33:00,242 --> 00:33:02,353 group , along with a bunch of surface 874 00:33:02,353 --> 00:33:04,298 ships including a couple that just 875 00:33:04,298 --> 00:33:06,464 returned from combat operations in the 876 00:33:06,464 --> 00:33:08,631 Red Sea and thought they were going to 877 00:33:08,631 --> 00:33:08,060 be taking the pack off for a little bit , 878 00:33:08,069 --> 00:33:10,540 and they are down off of , uh , either 879 00:33:10,540 --> 00:33:13,770 side , um , east either coast of 880 00:33:13,770 --> 00:33:15,770 Central America supporting enhanced 881 00:33:15,770 --> 00:33:17,920 counter-narcotics operations , so the 882 00:33:17,920 --> 00:33:19,976 demand signal on the fleet is really 883 00:33:19,976 --> 00:33:22,142 high . And so we're trying to generate 884 00:33:22,142 --> 00:33:24,969 more more available forces to go to sea . 885 00:33:26,160 --> 00:33:28,216 So that's on one side . So what does 886 00:33:28,216 --> 00:33:30,327 that mean for me ? It means I need to 887 00:33:30,327 --> 00:33:30,290 get ships in and out of maintenance and 888 00:33:30,290 --> 00:33:33,050 modernization availabilities on time so 889 00:33:33,050 --> 00:33:35,106 they can do their training and go to 890 00:33:35,106 --> 00:33:37,328 sea . So that's one demand signal . The 891 00:33:37,328 --> 00:33:39,550 other demand signal is , hey , we gotta 892 00:33:39,550 --> 00:33:41,772 deliver capability to the fleet through 893 00:33:41,772 --> 00:33:43,883 modernization . If we're not building 894 00:33:43,883 --> 00:33:45,994 new ships fast enough , then the only 895 00:33:45,994 --> 00:33:47,994 way I can get new combat capability 896 00:33:47,994 --> 00:33:49,939 onto those ships is by modernizing 897 00:33:49,939 --> 00:33:52,161 those ships , and this is where I freak 898 00:33:52,161 --> 00:33:54,328 out the Air Force guys . OK , we don't 899 00:33:54,328 --> 00:33:56,550 just modernize a ship by sending it off 900 00:33:56,550 --> 00:33:58,661 to like a depot and something happens 901 00:33:58,661 --> 00:33:58,660 and it comes back to the squadron . It 902 00:33:58,660 --> 00:34:00,827 goes to a shipyard with the crew on it 903 00:34:00,827 --> 00:34:02,993 and we do repairs and modernization at 904 00:34:02,993 --> 00:34:04,938 the same time . So you got the guy 905 00:34:04,938 --> 00:34:06,993 installing the new stereo in the car 906 00:34:06,993 --> 00:34:08,882 while the guy is changing the oil 907 00:34:08,882 --> 00:34:11,669 simultaneously , OK . And some of those 908 00:34:11,669 --> 00:34:13,870 modernization depending the big I 909 00:34:13,870 --> 00:34:15,926 talked about the SPY-1 radar and the 910 00:34:15,926 --> 00:34:17,870 fact that it's done great but it's 911 00:34:17,870 --> 00:34:19,926 pretty old . We want to retrofit the 912 00:34:19,926 --> 00:34:21,870 SPY 6 radar , which is a much more 913 00:34:21,870 --> 00:34:24,092 modern radar on there . The early Burke 914 00:34:24,092 --> 00:34:26,148 class destroyer was built around the 915 00:34:26,148 --> 00:34:29,189 SPY-1 radar . The , the transmit signal 916 00:34:29,189 --> 00:34:31,510 for that radar begins somewhere around 917 00:34:31,510 --> 00:34:34,750 the main deck and it goes up through a 918 00:34:34,750 --> 00:34:37,189 series of amplifiers and waveguides to 919 00:34:37,189 --> 00:34:39,949 antennas that are on the 05 level , so 920 00:34:39,949 --> 00:34:43,280 5 decks up . It is literally and the 921 00:34:43,280 --> 00:34:45,502 cooling skids are in the engine rooms . 922 00:34:45,520 --> 00:34:47,742 The entire the ship is built around the 923 00:34:47,742 --> 00:34:49,964 radar , so we're gonna take all of that 924 00:34:49,964 --> 00:34:52,131 out . We're gonna put a new radar in . 925 00:34:52,131 --> 00:34:54,353 That is not a trivial effort . In order 926 00:34:54,353 --> 00:34:57,120 to do that , I have to , uh , replace 5 927 00:34:57,120 --> 00:34:59,398 air conditioning plants on these ships . 928 00:34:59,399 --> 00:35:01,455 The way we're going to do that is by 929 00:35:01,455 --> 00:35:03,510 putting , putting them in dry dock . 930 00:35:03,510 --> 00:35:05,677 The air conditioning plants are in the 931 00:35:05,677 --> 00:35:04,439 engine rooms down at the bottom . 932 00:35:04,574 --> 00:35:06,685 Bottom of the ship we're going to cut 933 00:35:06,685 --> 00:35:08,630 holes in the bottom of the ship to 934 00:35:08,630 --> 00:35:10,741 lower the old AC plants out and bring 935 00:35:10,741 --> 00:35:12,796 new AC plants up . As a professional 936 00:35:12,796 --> 00:35:14,907 ship driver , I will tell you hole in 937 00:35:14,907 --> 00:35:17,074 ship is not where we want to be . So , 938 00:35:17,074 --> 00:35:19,185 so that is a that is a complex effort 939 00:35:19,185 --> 00:35:21,296 and , and the question I get from the 940 00:35:21,296 --> 00:35:23,407 fleet , and it's not a bad question , 941 00:35:23,407 --> 00:35:25,685 is Andy , why is it taking you so long ? 942 00:35:25,685 --> 00:35:27,907 I'm like boss , this is not simple . So 943 00:35:27,907 --> 00:35:30,130 that is a balance that we're working to 944 00:35:30,130 --> 00:35:32,074 achieve there um is hey , how much 945 00:35:32,074 --> 00:35:34,074 modernization do we do ? when's the 946 00:35:34,074 --> 00:35:36,241 right time to do it , how can we do it 947 00:35:36,241 --> 00:35:38,352 faster so that we get capability that 948 00:35:38,352 --> 00:35:40,130 those ships need in order to be 949 00:35:40,130 --> 00:35:42,296 relevant throughout their service life 950 00:35:42,296 --> 00:35:44,241 uh and and get capability that the 951 00:35:44,241 --> 00:35:43,870 sailors and marines on those ships need 952 00:35:43,870 --> 00:35:46,203 to be safe to go to sea , fight and win , 953 00:35:46,203 --> 00:35:48,629 as well as generate 80% combat surge 954 00:35:48,629 --> 00:35:50,851 readiness . And then the third piece is 955 00:35:50,851 --> 00:35:53,209 this surface surface ship surface ship 956 00:35:53,209 --> 00:35:56,649 service life . These are capital assets 957 00:35:57,010 --> 00:36:00,899 for the nation , all right , um . In 958 00:36:00,899 --> 00:36:04,459 2010 , the average age of a ship being 959 00:36:04,459 --> 00:36:06,459 decommissioned in the United States 960 00:36:06,459 --> 00:36:08,515 Navy was 22 years old . And that was 961 00:36:08,515 --> 00:36:10,737 way too early . We had to get more of a 962 00:36:10,737 --> 00:36:12,959 return on investment out of these , you 963 00:36:12,959 --> 00:36:15,129 know , $2.2 billion dollar ships for a 964 00:36:15,129 --> 00:36:17,185 destroyer , up to $20 billion dollar 965 00:36:17,185 --> 00:36:19,296 ship for an aircraft carrier . We had 966 00:36:19,296 --> 00:36:21,462 to get , we had to get more capability 967 00:36:21,462 --> 00:36:23,850 out of those , out of those ships . And 968 00:36:23,850 --> 00:36:26,570 so uh we've started to really focus on 969 00:36:26,570 --> 00:36:28,570 achieving , uh , the ship's service 970 00:36:28,570 --> 00:36:30,737 life which primarily means not letting 971 00:36:30,737 --> 00:36:33,250 it rust . You take the way you create 972 00:36:33,250 --> 00:36:36,300 rust is you take metal . 973 00:36:37,239 --> 00:36:39,461 You put a lot of electricity through it 974 00:36:39,461 --> 00:36:41,683 and you dip it in salt water , which is 975 00:36:41,683 --> 00:36:43,850 also known as the definition of a navy 976 00:36:43,850 --> 00:36:45,909 ship , and so , um , so we're in a 977 00:36:45,909 --> 00:36:47,909 constant battle against corrosion . 978 00:36:47,909 --> 00:36:50,187 Russ never sleeps , so we can't either , 979 00:36:50,187 --> 00:36:52,409 um , and so deep life cycle maintenance 980 00:36:52,409 --> 00:36:55,110 tanks , structural things , stuff like 981 00:36:55,110 --> 00:36:57,221 that is very important for us to do . 982 00:36:57,221 --> 00:36:59,388 So we created a class maintenance plan 983 00:36:59,388 --> 00:37:01,332 for each ship . Uh , we focus that 984 00:37:01,332 --> 00:37:02,943 energy on , on assessing and 985 00:37:02,943 --> 00:37:05,110 understanding the life cycle health of 986 00:37:05,110 --> 00:37:07,166 every ship . And then doing that and 987 00:37:07,166 --> 00:37:09,332 we've been very successful . So , uh , 988 00:37:09,332 --> 00:37:11,332 we've recently extended the service 989 00:37:11,332 --> 00:37:13,554 life of early Burke class destroyers 17 990 00:37:13,554 --> 00:37:15,554 early Burke class destroyers who've 991 00:37:15,554 --> 00:37:17,777 been able to extend the service life up 992 00:37:17,777 --> 00:37:19,943 to 5 years per ship . Extending a ship 993 00:37:19,943 --> 00:37:22,110 for an additional 5 years is about the 994 00:37:22,110 --> 00:37:23,999 same as getting a ship out of new 995 00:37:23,999 --> 00:37:25,999 construction 5 years early , just 5 996 00:37:25,999 --> 00:37:28,054 years of , uh , 5 years of ship life 997 00:37:28,054 --> 00:37:30,388 that you didn't originally plan to have , 998 00:37:30,388 --> 00:37:33,320 so . So we're working very hard with my 999 00:37:33,320 --> 00:37:35,649 customer , the surface warfare , uh , 1000 00:37:35,669 --> 00:37:37,725 the , the swill boss or commander in 1001 00:37:37,725 --> 00:37:41,629 Naval Surface Forces . Um , uh , OptNav , 1002 00:37:41,750 --> 00:37:43,972 my resource sponsor , the Navy's budget 1003 00:37:43,972 --> 00:37:46,028 office that that writes the checks , 1004 00:37:46,070 --> 00:37:48,570 and my own engineers to try to balance 1005 00:37:48,570 --> 00:37:51,350 those three things . So that that's the 1006 00:37:51,350 --> 00:37:53,294 challenge that the surface navy is 1007 00:37:53,294 --> 00:37:55,350 facing right now , um , and it's and 1008 00:37:55,350 --> 00:37:58,669 it's driven almost entirely by a uh . 1009 00:37:59,350 --> 00:38:01,659 If not a mismatch , a challenging 1010 00:38:01,659 --> 00:38:05,040 relationship between fleet size and 1011 00:38:05,060 --> 00:38:08,310 operational requirements . Next slide 1012 00:38:08,310 --> 00:38:10,909 please . All right , so how can you 1013 00:38:10,909 --> 00:38:14,909 help ? So the number one thing I do 1014 00:38:14,909 --> 00:38:17,076 to generate 80% combat surge readiness 1015 00:38:17,076 --> 00:38:18,949 is getting ships in and out of 1016 00:38:18,949 --> 00:38:21,171 maintenance availabilities on time . In 1017 00:38:21,171 --> 00:38:24,689 2024 we did that to about 65% , 1018 00:38:25,149 --> 00:38:27,260 which was awesome . That was like the 1019 00:38:27,260 --> 00:38:29,260 best ever . I mean that's a failing 1020 00:38:29,260 --> 00:38:31,482 grade if my kids bring it home , but we 1021 00:38:31,482 --> 00:38:33,816 were so this year less than 50% on time . 1022 00:38:34,080 --> 00:38:36,302 There are 2 things that drive a surface 1023 00:38:36,302 --> 00:38:39,489 ship availability to go along . The 1024 00:38:39,489 --> 00:38:42,169 first one is unplanned work , work that 1025 00:38:42,169 --> 00:38:44,336 we didn't expect to have to do that we 1026 00:38:44,336 --> 00:38:46,280 wind up having to do , and there's 1027 00:38:46,280 --> 00:38:48,502 really two big things that drive that . 1028 00:38:48,502 --> 00:38:50,669 Uh , the first is we didn't understand 1029 00:38:50,669 --> 00:38:50,209 the scope of the modernization we were 1030 00:38:50,209 --> 00:38:52,542 doing or we were surprised by something , 1031 00:38:52,542 --> 00:38:54,709 or secondly , we didn't understand the 1032 00:38:54,709 --> 00:38:56,876 material condition of the ship when it 1033 00:38:56,876 --> 00:38:56,489 came into the shipyard , you know , we 1034 00:38:56,489 --> 00:38:58,850 went to go look at something and if 1035 00:38:58,850 --> 00:39:00,929 you've ever started a , uh , home 1036 00:39:00,929 --> 00:39:04,360 improvement project . And uh and you 1037 00:39:04,370 --> 00:39:06,370 you you open something up and go 00 1038 00:39:06,370 --> 00:39:08,314 that's a that's a lot worse than I 1039 00:39:08,314 --> 00:39:10,314 expected that's uh that's unplanned 1040 00:39:10,314 --> 00:39:12,919 work . So that was responsible for 1041 00:39:12,919 --> 00:39:16,060 about 40% of delays . The second 1042 00:39:16,060 --> 00:39:18,540 biggest one was material availability . 1043 00:39:19,659 --> 00:39:23,149 OK , so , so we have had , uh , frankly 1044 00:39:23,149 --> 00:39:25,370 a pretty crappy habit of going into , 1045 00:39:26,429 --> 00:39:28,651 uh , surface maintenance availabilities 1046 00:39:28,651 --> 00:39:30,707 and saying , yeah , I don't have the 1047 00:39:30,707 --> 00:39:32,929 material , but I'm sure it's gonna show 1048 00:39:32,929 --> 00:39:35,151 up by the time we need it . So let's go 1049 00:39:35,151 --> 00:39:37,207 ahead and start this project . So if 1050 00:39:37,207 --> 00:39:37,030 you've ever done a home improvement 1051 00:39:37,030 --> 00:39:39,197 project and made 7 trips to Home Depot 1052 00:39:39,197 --> 00:39:41,141 throughout the course of the day , 1053 00:39:41,141 --> 00:39:43,197 which is like everyone I do , that's 1054 00:39:43,197 --> 00:39:45,530 material availability , right ? Um . So , 1055 00:39:45,530 --> 00:39:47,752 so that's exactly where we've been . So 1056 00:39:47,752 --> 00:39:51,090 I am laser focused on my folks , uh , 1057 00:39:51,260 --> 00:39:53,427 especially for modernization which I'm 1058 00:39:53,427 --> 00:39:55,593 responsible for . If we don't have the 1059 00:39:55,593 --> 00:39:57,871 material , we're not starting . And so , 1060 00:39:57,871 --> 00:40:00,429 so , uh , very demand focused on that , 1061 00:40:01,290 --> 00:40:05,199 um . That's a challenge . So , so we're 1062 00:40:05,199 --> 00:40:07,250 working very hard to predict the 1063 00:40:07,250 --> 00:40:09,361 material that is required . So I have 1064 00:40:09,361 --> 00:40:11,306 an organization called the Surface 1065 00:40:11,306 --> 00:40:13,139 Maintenance Engineering Planning 1066 00:40:13,139 --> 00:40:14,972 Program or SURFMA . And Surf map 1067 00:40:14,972 --> 00:40:17,194 manages those class , uh , those , uh , 1068 00:40:17,194 --> 00:40:19,194 life cycle , uh , class maintenance 1069 00:40:19,194 --> 00:40:21,194 plans that we talked about , making 1070 00:40:21,194 --> 00:40:23,306 sure that we're taking care of , uh , 1071 00:40:23,306 --> 00:40:25,194 corrosion and structural wear and 1072 00:40:25,194 --> 00:40:27,417 everything that's necessary to make the 1073 00:40:27,417 --> 00:40:27,179 ship , uh , meet its expected surface 1074 00:40:27,179 --> 00:40:29,012 life , but they also do material 1075 00:40:29,012 --> 00:40:30,590 forecasting for maintenance 1076 00:40:30,590 --> 00:40:32,830 availability . So as we are going into 1077 00:40:32,830 --> 00:40:35,052 a maintenance availability , here's all 1078 00:40:35,052 --> 00:40:37,219 the work that we know we're gonna do , 1079 00:40:37,219 --> 00:40:39,386 and we're forecasting that and sharing 1080 00:40:39,386 --> 00:40:41,386 that with the logistics community , 1081 00:40:41,386 --> 00:40:43,552 both NASA and DLA . Hey , this is what 1082 00:40:43,552 --> 00:40:46,489 we need to order . So getting our our 1083 00:40:46,489 --> 00:40:49,949 communications tighter uh between our 1084 00:40:50,370 --> 00:40:52,259 material forecasting , which is a 1085 00:40:52,259 --> 00:40:54,850 relatively nascent process for us , and 1086 00:40:54,850 --> 00:40:57,989 your material ordering and receipt . Uh , 1087 00:40:58,070 --> 00:41:00,070 that's a huge relationship that I'm 1088 00:41:00,070 --> 00:41:02,149 very focused on investing in over my 1089 00:41:02,149 --> 00:41:04,316 next several years in this job because 1090 00:41:04,316 --> 00:41:06,149 if I get the availability in the 1091 00:41:06,149 --> 00:41:09,110 shipyard before we start , then we're 1092 00:41:09,110 --> 00:41:11,277 far more likely to be successful , and 1093 00:41:11,277 --> 00:41:13,443 the guidance I'm giving to my folks is 1094 00:41:13,443 --> 00:41:15,554 if you don't have everything you need 1095 00:41:15,554 --> 00:41:17,709 money , drawings , the plan , the 1096 00:41:17,709 --> 00:41:19,709 people , and the material we're not 1097 00:41:19,709 --> 00:41:21,820 starting because if I start something 1098 00:41:21,820 --> 00:41:23,931 and I can't finish it , all I'm doing 1099 00:41:23,931 --> 00:41:25,765 is creating what we call days of 1100 00:41:25,765 --> 00:41:27,598 maintenance delay . And a day of 1101 00:41:27,598 --> 00:41:29,653 maintenance delay is a day that I've 1102 00:41:29,653 --> 00:41:31,820 taken a ship away from the operational 1103 00:41:31,820 --> 00:41:31,429 commander because I was incapable of 1104 00:41:31,429 --> 00:41:33,540 finishing my job on time as we talked 1105 00:41:33,540 --> 00:41:35,707 about with 80% combat surge ready , we 1106 00:41:35,707 --> 00:41:37,818 don't have any of those spare days to 1107 00:41:37,818 --> 00:41:41,459 lay around . OK , um , so the 1108 00:41:41,459 --> 00:41:44,540 second for my team is very much 1109 00:41:44,540 --> 00:41:48,520 understanding . Uh , our data better , 1110 00:41:48,560 --> 00:41:51,229 we have tons of data on , uh , 1111 00:41:51,239 --> 00:41:53,239 maintenance and modernization . I'm 1112 00:41:53,239 --> 00:41:55,350 trying to get that into a much better 1113 00:41:55,350 --> 00:41:57,461 ecosystem for us to understand it and 1114 00:41:57,461 --> 00:41:59,572 apply to it , and that should help us 1115 00:41:59,572 --> 00:41:59,239 improve that modeling and that 1116 00:41:59,239 --> 00:42:01,600 forecasting for material and also share 1117 00:42:01,600 --> 00:42:04,580 better information with you guys . Uh , 1118 00:42:05,010 --> 00:42:07,290 and then , uh , lastly , strategic 1119 00:42:07,290 --> 00:42:09,346 inventory optimization . So I am the 1120 00:42:09,346 --> 00:42:11,401 single accountable officer for whole 1121 00:42:11,401 --> 00:42:13,512 mechanical and electrical sustainment 1122 00:42:13,512 --> 00:42:15,679 for the surface force . So I don't own 1123 00:42:15,679 --> 00:42:17,846 the combat systems . Um , but I do own 1124 00:42:17,846 --> 00:42:19,734 just about everything else and so 1125 00:42:19,734 --> 00:42:21,901 making sure that we understand what is 1126 00:42:21,901 --> 00:42:24,123 when I am looking at a system , whether 1127 00:42:24,123 --> 00:42:25,957 it's an air conditioner or a gas 1128 00:42:25,957 --> 00:42:27,957 turbine engine or a diesel engine , 1129 00:42:27,957 --> 00:42:30,123 what's the material that is causing me 1130 00:42:30,123 --> 00:42:32,689 to have downtime . Um , and is that 1131 00:42:32,689 --> 00:42:34,856 because , uh , we need to , you know , 1132 00:42:34,856 --> 00:42:36,856 and not everything I've learned , I 1133 00:42:36,856 --> 00:42:38,967 used to blame suppos for everything , 1134 00:42:38,967 --> 00:42:41,133 and not everything is a part problem , 1135 00:42:41,133 --> 00:42:43,245 um , but it all starts looking like a 1136 00:42:43,245 --> 00:42:45,300 part problem , and then you actually 1137 00:42:45,300 --> 00:42:44,479 dig into it and figure out what it 1138 00:42:44,479 --> 00:42:46,929 actually is . So for me it's , OK , is 1139 00:42:46,929 --> 00:42:49,040 this no kidding , a part problem , or 1140 00:42:49,040 --> 00:42:50,873 is this something that I need to 1141 00:42:50,873 --> 00:42:52,873 improve the training on ? I need to 1142 00:42:52,873 --> 00:42:55,040 improve the documentation on , uh , or 1143 00:42:55,040 --> 00:42:57,151 we need to redesign this part because 1144 00:42:57,151 --> 00:42:59,485 it's failing far earlier than it should . 1145 00:42:59,485 --> 00:43:01,651 But what I'm holding my people account 1146 00:43:01,651 --> 00:43:01,350 to account for is , hey , on your 1147 00:43:01,350 --> 00:43:03,406 system you better be able to tell me 1148 00:43:03,406 --> 00:43:05,406 what is your , what is your primary 1149 00:43:05,406 --> 00:43:07,294 cost driver , what's your primary 1150 00:43:07,294 --> 00:43:09,406 downtime driver , what's your primary 1151 00:43:09,406 --> 00:43:11,572 mean logistics delay time driver , and 1152 00:43:11,572 --> 00:43:13,683 then what are we doing about it ? And 1153 00:43:13,683 --> 00:43:13,590 what we're finding on a lot of , a lot 1154 00:43:13,590 --> 00:43:15,989 of our HM&E systems is we have not done 1155 00:43:15,989 --> 00:43:17,878 the sustainment planning that was 1156 00:43:17,878 --> 00:43:19,878 necessary up front and so now we're 1157 00:43:19,878 --> 00:43:22,100 kind of doing it on the back end . Um , 1158 00:43:22,100 --> 00:43:24,267 and so that's building the plane while 1159 00:43:24,267 --> 00:43:26,489 you're flying in . And so what I'll ask 1160 00:43:26,489 --> 00:43:28,656 from the team here , where it's , uh , 1161 00:43:28,656 --> 00:43:30,767 the , their DLA relevant parts , is , 1162 00:43:30,767 --> 00:43:32,822 is help us do that successfully . So 1163 00:43:32,822 --> 00:43:34,989 that's , I'm gonna , I'm gonna hold my 1164 00:43:34,989 --> 00:43:34,899 team to account for that and , uh , and 1165 00:43:34,899 --> 00:43:37,899 ask them to work closely with you . So 1166 00:43:38,379 --> 00:43:41,350 fundamentally , Navy that's too small 1167 00:43:41,620 --> 00:43:43,731 uh for the demand signal that's being 1168 00:43:43,731 --> 00:43:45,953 placed on it . The answer to that is to 1169 00:43:45,953 --> 00:43:48,064 have a higher percentage of that Navy 1170 00:43:48,064 --> 00:43:50,064 materially ready to go at any given 1171 00:43:50,064 --> 00:43:52,231 time . And the way we're gonna do that 1172 00:43:52,231 --> 00:43:53,787 is by closely balancing the 1173 00:43:53,787 --> 00:43:55,731 modernization and maintenance that 1174 00:43:55,731 --> 00:43:57,953 we're doing , making sure that we still 1175 00:43:57,953 --> 00:44:00,287 meet our life cycle health requirements , 1176 00:44:00,287 --> 00:44:02,176 and working closely with a larger 1177 00:44:02,176 --> 00:44:04,453 sustainment community to get the parts , 1178 00:44:04,453 --> 00:44:06,620 uh , and support that are necessary to 1179 00:44:06,620 --> 00:44:08,509 get those ships in and out of the 1180 00:44:08,509 --> 00:44:10,731 shipyard on time , going into the basic 1181 00:44:10,731 --> 00:44:12,842 phase , ready to train and then ready 1182 00:44:12,842 --> 00:44:12,689 to deploy as soon as they're properly 1183 00:44:12,689 --> 00:44:14,745 trained . So that's what I wanted to 1184 00:44:14,745 --> 00:44:16,919 talk to you about , uh , today , um , 1185 00:44:17,179 --> 00:44:19,219 and I am open , so hopefully you'll 1186 00:44:19,219 --> 00:44:21,052 you'll see kind of the tie there 1187 00:44:21,052 --> 00:44:23,108 between the operational lessons that 1188 00:44:23,108 --> 00:44:25,108 we're learning the surface navy and 1189 00:44:25,108 --> 00:44:27,108 then the force structure challenges 1190 00:44:27,108 --> 00:44:29,275 with which we're currently dealing and 1191 00:44:29,275 --> 00:44:31,441 then the implications that it does for 1192 00:44:31,441 --> 00:44:31,139 all of us that are responsible for 1193 00:44:31,139 --> 00:44:33,250 sustaining and supporting the sailors 1194 00:44:33,250 --> 00:44:35,306 and marines on those ships . So with 1195 00:44:35,306 --> 00:44:37,361 that , uh , open to your questions . 1196 00:44:38,159 --> 00:44:40,215 Thank you , sir . We , uh , and no , 1197 00:44:40,215 --> 00:44:42,437 you're not hallucinating . My colleague 1198 00:44:42,437 --> 00:44:44,548 had to tap out , but the show must go 1199 00:44:44,548 --> 00:44:46,659 on . So we're ready to take questions 1200 00:44:46,659 --> 00:44:48,881 here in the room , and we have somebody 1201 00:44:48,881 --> 00:44:50,937 who's collecting them via email . So 1202 00:44:50,937 --> 00:44:53,103 folks who are watching online , if you 1203 00:44:53,103 --> 00:44:55,103 want , you can scan this QR code or 1204 00:44:55,103 --> 00:44:57,370 email questions to COL@DLA.mil , and 1205 00:44:57,370 --> 00:44:59,481 we'll start with seeing if anybody in 1206 00:44:59,481 --> 00:45:01,537 the room has a question . And if you 1207 00:45:01,537 --> 00:45:03,592 have a question , please wait just a 1208 00:45:03,592 --> 00:45:05,703 second . We'll get you a microphone . 1209 00:45:09,729 --> 00:45:11,840 Sir , how are you doing , Chris Wed , 1210 00:45:11,840 --> 00:45:15,649 uh , DLAJ 3 , awesome . I , I really 1211 00:45:15,649 --> 00:45:17,871 appreciate the , the overview of , uh , 1212 00:45:17,871 --> 00:45:20,038 the Red Sea and , and all the dilemmas 1213 00:45:20,038 --> 00:45:21,982 that are going on there , uh , the 1214 00:45:21,982 --> 00:45:24,205 conflict . How does that look , uh , in 1215 00:45:24,205 --> 00:45:26,290 the Baltic as it relates to the 1216 00:45:26,290 --> 00:45:28,770 interoperability and capability of , uh , 1217 00:45:28,929 --> 00:45:30,873 our new NATO partners , that being 1218 00:45:30,873 --> 00:45:32,929 Finland and Sweden , but also Norway 1219 00:45:32,929 --> 00:45:36,760 and , and , um . Quite frankly , uh , 1220 00:45:36,879 --> 00:45:38,879 Estonia and others , how , how does 1221 00:45:38,879 --> 00:45:41,080 that same scenario play out there ? 1222 00:45:41,479 --> 00:45:43,423 Yeah , that's a , that's a complex 1223 00:45:43,423 --> 00:45:45,060 question . So , um , 1224 00:45:47,169 --> 00:45:49,370 So you're seeing more and more ships 1225 00:45:49,370 --> 00:45:51,919 operating in the Baltic , US Navy ships , 1226 00:45:52,250 --> 00:45:54,570 and part of that is to build the reps 1227 00:45:54,570 --> 00:45:56,514 and sets on that integration . The 1228 00:45:56,514 --> 00:45:59,479 challenge is this , uh , it depends on 1229 00:45:59,479 --> 00:46:01,669 the navy how interoperable we are from 1230 00:46:01,669 --> 00:46:03,780 a technical perspective . So Norway , 1231 00:46:03,790 --> 00:46:05,734 for instance , which is one of our 1232 00:46:05,734 --> 00:46:07,790 Aegis partners , they have the Aegis 1233 00:46:07,790 --> 00:46:09,457 weapons system . We're pretty 1234 00:46:09,457 --> 00:46:11,568 interoperable with them . They , they 1235 00:46:11,568 --> 00:46:13,679 bought our stuff , um , pretty good , 1236 00:46:13,679 --> 00:46:15,790 and , and I would say that's probably 1237 00:46:15,790 --> 00:46:18,012 the case , um , at different levels for 1238 00:46:18,012 --> 00:46:20,012 pretty much every what I would call 1239 00:46:20,012 --> 00:46:22,012 legacy NATO nation . Uh , Finland , 1240 00:46:22,090 --> 00:46:24,570 Estonia , Sweden , some of the newer 1241 00:46:24,570 --> 00:46:26,681 NATO partners , probably a little bit 1242 00:46:26,681 --> 00:46:28,889 less so , um , both from a technical 1243 00:46:28,889 --> 00:46:30,889 standpoint and experience operating 1244 00:46:30,889 --> 00:46:32,945 together , but I think we're , we're 1245 00:46:32,945 --> 00:46:35,056 very much investing in doing that . I 1246 00:46:35,056 --> 00:46:37,167 think what we are seeing from some of 1247 00:46:37,167 --> 00:46:39,000 the Eastern European countries , 1248 00:46:39,000 --> 00:46:41,222 especially , they're highly motivated . 1249 00:46:41,222 --> 00:46:43,699 Um , is , uh , they're in some ways 1250 00:46:43,699 --> 00:46:45,699 skipping past some of the equipment 1251 00:46:45,699 --> 00:46:47,810 that we've had for 20 or 30 years and 1252 00:46:47,810 --> 00:46:49,977 focusing and certainly lots of lessons 1253 00:46:49,977 --> 00:46:52,088 from Ukraine with unmanned operations 1254 00:46:52,088 --> 00:46:54,310 and stuff like that . I think , I think 1255 00:46:54,310 --> 00:46:56,643 we're seeing some of that there as well , 1256 00:46:56,643 --> 00:46:58,643 but , uh , tons of investment being 1257 00:46:58,643 --> 00:47:00,810 done in , uh , in getting the reps and 1258 00:47:00,810 --> 00:47:03,179 sets with those countries . Um , the 1259 00:47:03,179 --> 00:47:06,959 reality is there's , uh , um , 1260 00:47:07,340 --> 00:47:10,530 you know , they've . They've got really 1261 00:47:10,530 --> 00:47:13,199 small footprints in terms of , in terms 1262 00:47:13,199 --> 00:47:16,239 of their navies , um , the , uh , when 1263 00:47:16,239 --> 00:47:18,239 I was , when I was , you know , and 1264 00:47:18,239 --> 00:47:20,461 they've , they've started making pretty 1265 00:47:20,461 --> 00:47:22,461 significant investments we're gonna 1266 00:47:22,461 --> 00:47:22,389 take them a while to get there . It's 1267 00:47:22,389 --> 00:47:24,500 pretty fascinating when I was working 1268 00:47:24,500 --> 00:47:27,500 for , uh , for ASN RDA , we had a , um , 1269 00:47:28,000 --> 00:47:30,520 a minister or a , a procurements 1270 00:47:30,520 --> 00:47:32,576 minister from a Scandinavian country 1271 00:47:32,719 --> 00:47:36,389 come and talk , and they were , uh . A 1272 00:47:36,389 --> 00:47:38,389 significant , almost doubling their 1273 00:47:38,389 --> 00:47:40,699 defense budget after , um , after the 1274 00:47:40,699 --> 00:47:43,129 invasion of , uh , of Ukraine , and , 1275 00:47:43,270 --> 00:47:45,492 and this guy was kind of , he's kind of 1276 00:47:45,492 --> 00:47:47,492 joking with , uh , with my boss Jay 1277 00:47:47,492 --> 00:47:49,826 Sean . He's like , he's like , you know , 1278 00:47:49,826 --> 00:47:51,881 President Obama told to , told us to 1279 00:47:51,881 --> 00:47:51,620 increase our defense spending , and , 1280 00:47:51,750 --> 00:47:53,694 and we ignored him , and President 1281 00:47:53,694 --> 00:47:55,806 Trump told us to increase our defense 1282 00:47:55,806 --> 00:47:55,709 spending and we ignored him . President 1283 00:47:55,709 --> 00:47:57,820 Biden told us to increase our defense 1284 00:47:57,820 --> 00:47:59,931 spending , we ignored , but President 1285 00:47:59,931 --> 00:48:02,042 Putin gets some results , um . And uh 1286 00:48:02,409 --> 00:48:04,810 Um , and it was , it , you know , so , 1287 00:48:04,979 --> 00:48:07,201 so we are seeing a significant increase 1288 00:48:07,201 --> 00:48:09,368 there , um , and , and we're seeing it 1289 00:48:09,368 --> 00:48:11,535 on the , on the FMS side too . It just 1290 00:48:11,535 --> 00:48:13,590 takes , it takes time , uh , but the 1291 00:48:13,590 --> 00:48:15,969 inter interoperability piece , um , 1292 00:48:16,260 --> 00:48:18,427 lots of investment happening in that , 1293 00:48:18,427 --> 00:48:20,649 but mostly focused on , on the reps and 1294 00:48:20,649 --> 00:48:22,482 sets as opposed to big technical 1295 00:48:22,482 --> 00:48:24,889 solutions . Is there anyone else in the 1296 00:48:24,889 --> 00:48:28,679 room with a question ? Mr . Mr . Grey . 1297 00:48:29,979 --> 00:48:33,070 Oh . We had one back here and then one 1298 00:48:33,070 --> 00:48:35,403 over here , so , and then one back here . 1299 00:48:35,403 --> 00:48:38,260 Holy cow . Alright , uh , hello , uh , 1300 00:48:38,270 --> 00:48:40,520 Conrad Stutzman with Transformation . 1301 00:48:41,070 --> 00:48:43,489 My question is , do we have any intel 1302 00:48:43,489 --> 00:48:46,030 on the Chinese navy ? I know from the 1303 00:48:46,030 --> 00:48:49,790 last warfighter talk they out do us on 1304 00:48:49,790 --> 00:48:51,846 shipbuilding . I think it was what , 1305 00:48:51,846 --> 00:48:54,179 1200 shipbuilding , uh , facilities 1306 00:48:54,179 --> 00:48:57,620 compared to our , what , 30 or . So do 1307 00:48:57,620 --> 00:48:59,731 we have any intel how good they are ? 1308 00:49:00,139 --> 00:49:02,417 Yeah , absolutely . So obviously we're , 1309 00:49:02,419 --> 00:49:04,586 we're in an unclass environment here . 1310 00:49:04,586 --> 00:49:06,810 I will tell you that , um , we , we 1311 00:49:06,810 --> 00:49:09,540 recently saw open source , a , uh , a 1312 00:49:09,540 --> 00:49:11,429 Chinese aircraft carrier underway 1313 00:49:11,429 --> 00:49:13,762 operating 3 different types of aircraft . 1314 00:49:13,762 --> 00:49:15,984 They've been working with uh . Aircraft 1315 00:49:15,984 --> 00:49:18,040 carrier flight operations are really 1316 00:49:18,040 --> 00:49:20,040 hard to do . They've obviously been 1317 00:49:20,040 --> 00:49:22,151 focused a lot of attention and energy 1318 00:49:22,151 --> 00:49:25,060 on that , um . The , uh , uh , their , 1319 00:49:25,189 --> 00:49:26,967 their ships have been operating 1320 00:49:26,967 --> 00:49:29,419 globally . Um , they have a base in 1321 00:49:29,419 --> 00:49:31,641 Djibouti if you back on that map they , 1322 00:49:31,641 --> 00:49:33,752 they have a base there . They've been 1323 00:49:33,752 --> 00:49:35,919 operating ships in the Red Sea Gulf of 1324 00:49:35,919 --> 00:49:37,919 Aden region since the Somali pirate 1325 00:49:37,919 --> 00:49:40,139 problems of about 2009 , 2010 . Um , I 1326 00:49:40,139 --> 00:49:42,195 was , uh , I mean , I will just tell 1327 00:49:42,195 --> 00:49:44,820 you , uh , the scope of Chinese 1328 00:49:44,820 --> 00:49:47,699 maritime operations , both civilian and , 1329 00:49:47,739 --> 00:49:51,080 uh , and military is . A little hard 1330 00:49:51,080 --> 00:49:53,136 for us to fathom . I , when I was in 1331 00:49:53,136 --> 00:49:55,302 command of truckston , we were down in 1332 00:49:55,302 --> 00:49:57,191 the Gulf of Aden , and I remember 1333 00:49:57,191 --> 00:49:59,413 seeing a Chinese convoy coming over the 1334 00:49:59,413 --> 00:50:01,524 horizon , a bunch of Chinese merchant 1335 00:50:01,524 --> 00:50:03,636 ships with about 5 Chinese destroyers 1336 00:50:03,636 --> 00:50:03,500 protecting them , and it , if you've 1337 00:50:03,500 --> 00:50:05,611 watched Greyhound with Tom Hanks , it 1338 00:50:05,611 --> 00:50:08,459 looked like a scene out of that , um , 1339 00:50:08,580 --> 00:50:11,159 just it was probably 30 ships , and , 1340 00:50:11,260 --> 00:50:13,371 you know , and technically it was one 1341 00:50:13,371 --> 00:50:15,427 of those , it was one of those where 1342 00:50:15,427 --> 00:50:15,260 like we were trying to cross and 1343 00:50:15,260 --> 00:50:17,316 technically I had the right of way . 1344 00:50:17,629 --> 00:50:19,620 But I was gonna turn around anyway 1345 00:50:21,570 --> 00:50:23,403 because the law of gross tonnage 1346 00:50:23,403 --> 00:50:25,514 applies and they had a lot more gross 1347 00:50:25,514 --> 00:50:27,514 tonnage than I did , um , so pretty 1348 00:50:27,514 --> 00:50:29,737 fascinating . So yeah , if you take all 1349 00:50:29,737 --> 00:50:32,389 the ship construction yards in the 1350 00:50:32,389 --> 00:50:35,610 United States right now . And uh you 1351 00:50:35,610 --> 00:50:38,129 could put them in geographically you 1352 00:50:38,129 --> 00:50:39,962 could put them in China's single 1353 00:50:39,962 --> 00:50:42,073 largest shipyard uh with some room to 1354 00:50:42,073 --> 00:50:43,851 spare so the the scope of their 1355 00:50:43,851 --> 00:50:46,370 shipbuilding uh industry is , is pretty 1356 00:50:46,370 --> 00:50:49,000 massive um and I would say , uh , 1357 00:50:49,010 --> 00:50:51,649 without getting into , um , beyond the 1358 00:50:51,649 --> 00:50:53,649 scope of this conversation they are 1359 00:50:53,649 --> 00:50:56,560 certainly improving , uh , both , uh , 1360 00:50:56,570 --> 00:50:59,550 technically and tactically , um , now 1361 00:51:00,169 --> 00:51:02,510 we have had a real advantage we've had . 1362 00:51:03,340 --> 00:51:06,320 About 50% of the surface navy has been 1363 00:51:06,320 --> 00:51:08,264 in a shooting war for the last two 1364 00:51:08,264 --> 00:51:10,320 years , and we've learned a lot from 1365 00:51:10,320 --> 00:51:12,098 that and we've got now , um , a 1366 00:51:12,098 --> 00:51:15,159 fantastic crop of really sharp sailors 1367 00:51:15,159 --> 00:51:17,103 and junior officers who are combat 1368 00:51:17,103 --> 00:51:19,370 hardened , um , who , who have , who 1369 00:51:19,370 --> 00:51:21,469 have been doing that , that , that , 1370 00:51:21,530 --> 00:51:23,550 that is , that is irreplaceable 1371 00:51:23,550 --> 00:51:25,772 expertise , uh , that the Chinese don't 1372 00:51:25,772 --> 00:51:27,770 have , and I would put our sailors 1373 00:51:27,770 --> 00:51:29,714 against Chinese sailors any time I 1374 00:51:29,714 --> 00:51:32,219 think . Um , as John Paul Jones said , 1375 00:51:32,300 --> 00:51:34,939 men count more than guns in , uh , in 1376 00:51:34,939 --> 00:51:37,217 the rating of a ship , and I , I , I'm , 1377 00:51:37,217 --> 00:51:39,161 I'm still a pretty huge fan of the 1378 00:51:39,161 --> 00:51:41,383 American Blue jacket , but yeah , it is 1379 00:51:41,383 --> 00:51:43,328 a challenge now , uh , I think one 1380 00:51:43,328 --> 00:51:45,860 thing that is of note has been , um , 1381 00:51:46,139 --> 00:51:49,340 and I'm seeing it in my job , uh , the 1382 00:51:49,340 --> 00:51:51,620 increased engagement of South Korea , 1383 00:51:51,830 --> 00:51:54,179 uh , in US shipbuilding , um , there's 1384 00:51:54,179 --> 00:51:56,479 a , um , focus on make American 1385 00:51:56,479 --> 00:51:58,780 shipbuilding great again , MASGA . Uh , 1386 00:51:58,850 --> 00:52:00,979 the Koreans actually , um , have 1387 00:52:00,979 --> 00:52:03,750 committed up to $150 billion to , uh , 1388 00:52:04,100 --> 00:52:06,100 for Korean companies to invest in 1389 00:52:06,100 --> 00:52:08,322 American shipbuilding and Hanwa Ocean , 1390 00:52:08,629 --> 00:52:10,796 um , which is a massive shipbuilder in 1391 00:52:10,796 --> 00:52:12,407 Korea , probably the largest 1392 00:52:12,407 --> 00:52:14,629 shipbuilder . Well , Korea is certainly 1393 00:52:14,629 --> 00:52:14,060 the largest shipbuilding industry 1394 00:52:14,060 --> 00:52:16,189 outside of China . Um , Hanwa Ocean , 1395 00:52:16,310 --> 00:52:19,030 uh , recently purchased , um , and made 1396 00:52:19,030 --> 00:52:21,469 an American subsidiary , uh , Hanwa 1397 00:52:21,469 --> 00:52:23,080 Philly Shipyard , so the old 1398 00:52:23,080 --> 00:52:25,136 Philadelphia Navy shipyard , um , is 1399 00:52:25,136 --> 00:52:27,979 now , is now owned by a Korean company , 1400 00:52:28,270 --> 00:52:31,270 and you can walk it and see Koreans 1401 00:52:31,270 --> 00:52:33,381 side by side with Americans . They're 1402 00:52:33,381 --> 00:52:35,214 bringing in some really high-end 1403 00:52:35,214 --> 00:52:37,103 shipbuilding stuff . The American 1404 00:52:37,103 --> 00:52:39,103 shipbuilding industry has been very 1405 00:52:39,103 --> 00:52:40,937 protected . From competition for 1406 00:52:40,937 --> 00:52:42,992 decades now , the Jones Act requires 1407 00:52:42,992 --> 00:52:45,159 that if you're going to operate a ship 1408 00:52:45,159 --> 00:52:47,326 that goes from one US port directly to 1409 00:52:47,326 --> 00:52:49,214 another US port , uh , it must be 1410 00:52:49,214 --> 00:52:51,548 American crewed and American built . Um , 1411 00:52:51,689 --> 00:52:53,689 what that means is that pretty much 1412 00:52:53,689 --> 00:52:56,010 every American shipyard either makes 1413 00:52:56,010 --> 00:52:58,810 Jones Act vessels or things for the US 1414 00:52:58,810 --> 00:53:00,921 government , either MARAD , the Coast 1415 00:53:00,921 --> 00:53:03,939 Guard , or the Navy . And um and so 1416 00:53:03,939 --> 00:53:05,939 they've been pretty happy . They've 1417 00:53:05,939 --> 00:53:08,106 been able to make a pretty good living 1418 00:53:08,106 --> 00:53:10,439 there , but I would say that the change , 1419 00:53:10,439 --> 00:53:12,606 the technological chasm between us and 1420 00:53:12,606 --> 00:53:14,717 shipbuilders that have been competing 1421 00:53:14,717 --> 00:53:16,495 on the global economy is pretty 1422 00:53:16,495 --> 00:53:18,383 significant . So this infusion of 1423 00:53:18,383 --> 00:53:20,550 Korean capital and expertise has a lot 1424 00:53:20,550 --> 00:53:22,661 of potential to significantly improve 1425 00:53:22,661 --> 00:53:24,772 our shipbuilding . I was at the fleet 1426 00:53:24,772 --> 00:53:24,500 maintenance and modernization symposium 1427 00:53:24,500 --> 00:53:26,620 last week talking to a bunch of 1428 00:53:26,620 --> 00:53:28,842 industry folks . And I pointed out that 1429 00:53:28,842 --> 00:53:31,064 there were , there were two Korean guys 1430 00:53:31,064 --> 00:53:33,231 sitting in the back of the room taking 1431 00:53:33,231 --> 00:53:33,024 notes , and I said they are here to eat 1432 00:53:33,024 --> 00:53:36,445 your lunch , and I am all about it . So , 1433 00:53:36,895 --> 00:53:39,604 so I , I'm enjoying that infusion of 1434 00:53:39,604 --> 00:53:41,826 competition and expertise . So I , that 1435 00:53:41,826 --> 00:53:44,014 will be an interesting see if that 1436 00:53:44,014 --> 00:53:45,958 becomes a counterbalance , uh , to 1437 00:53:45,958 --> 00:53:47,958 China from a tactical level . We're 1438 00:53:47,958 --> 00:53:49,958 thinking really , really hard about 1439 00:53:49,958 --> 00:53:51,570 China , and we can have that 1440 00:53:51,570 --> 00:53:53,792 conversation in a different form . OK , 1441 00:53:53,792 --> 00:53:55,514 sir , let's see if we have any 1442 00:53:55,514 --> 00:53:55,350 questions that have been submitted from 1443 00:53:55,350 --> 00:53:58,300 the field , OK . Sir , uh , your first 1444 00:53:58,300 --> 00:54:00,189 question from the field is from a 1445 00:54:00,189 --> 00:54:02,411 threat mitigation standpoint . Um , the 1446 00:54:02,411 --> 00:54:04,467 question is from DLA Aviation , what 1447 00:54:04,467 --> 00:54:06,578 steps are the United States taking to 1448 00:54:06,578 --> 00:54:08,500 counter the threats of Cypersonic 1449 00:54:08,500 --> 00:54:10,667 missiles to our maintenance facilities 1450 00:54:10,667 --> 00:54:12,739 and ships ? Yeah , uh , it's a great 1451 00:54:12,739 --> 00:54:14,199 question . So , um . 1452 00:54:17,459 --> 00:54:20,659 So first off , uh , I would say , I 1453 00:54:20,659 --> 00:54:22,979 mean hypersonic missiles are an 1454 00:54:22,979 --> 00:54:25,340 interesting definition . Um , what we 1455 00:54:25,340 --> 00:54:27,780 have seen , uh , on the Red in the Red 1456 00:54:27,780 --> 00:54:30,129 Sea area is the ability , um , 1457 00:54:30,139 --> 00:54:32,300 certainly against , certainly against 1458 00:54:32,300 --> 00:54:34,959 Iran , uh , and competitors like that 1459 00:54:35,179 --> 00:54:37,290 to very effectively defend land-based 1460 00:54:37,290 --> 00:54:39,457 facilities and and seagoing facilities 1461 00:54:39,457 --> 00:54:41,623 against a variety of missile attacks . 1462 00:54:41,623 --> 00:54:45,060 So , so we're pretty good at that , um . 1463 00:54:45,800 --> 00:54:48,540 In Europe already you have two Aegis' 1464 00:54:48,540 --> 00:54:51,379 shore sites in Romania and Poland , uh , 1465 00:54:51,399 --> 00:54:53,399 that can provide , uh , some pretty 1466 00:54:53,399 --> 00:54:56,530 effective anti , um , missile defense , 1467 00:54:56,810 --> 00:54:58,588 uh , against Europe for threats 1468 00:54:58,588 --> 00:55:00,840 emanating from the east . So , uh , and 1469 00:55:00,840 --> 00:55:02,562 then , uh , I would say that's 1470 00:55:02,562 --> 00:55:04,780 foundational to , uh , the Golden Dome 1471 00:55:04,780 --> 00:55:07,800 effort , um , and I don't know anything 1472 00:55:07,800 --> 00:55:09,744 other about the Golden Dome effort 1473 00:55:09,744 --> 00:55:12,479 other than it's big and golden , um , 1474 00:55:12,800 --> 00:55:14,770 but it's , uh . Um , but that's 1475 00:55:14,770 --> 00:55:16,826 certainly , that's certainly a focus 1476 00:55:16,826 --> 00:55:20,550 there , uh , so , so , um . You know 1477 00:55:20,550 --> 00:55:22,550 we're looking really hard at places 1478 00:55:22,550 --> 00:55:24,772 like Guam and other places that we have 1479 00:55:24,772 --> 00:55:27,139 to be able to protect , uh , um , 1480 00:55:27,149 --> 00:55:29,316 because they'll be critical to us , so 1481 00:55:29,316 --> 00:55:31,205 there , there's a lot of , lot of 1482 00:55:31,205 --> 00:55:34,389 thought going into that . Thanks , sir . 1483 00:55:34,469 --> 00:55:36,636 I know we have one that's been waiting 1484 00:55:36,636 --> 00:55:38,691 patiently up here , and then I think 1485 00:55:38,691 --> 00:55:40,858 we'll have to make that our last one . 1486 00:55:40,858 --> 00:55:43,191 Thank you . Yes sir . Eric Gray from J6 , 1487 00:55:43,191 --> 00:55:42,729 sir . I got a real good friend of mine 1488 00:55:42,729 --> 00:55:44,896 who is , uh , in the shipyards down in 1489 00:55:44,896 --> 00:55:47,118 Norfolk , and he's sharing with me that 1490 00:55:47,118 --> 00:55:49,229 he is a hard , his company has a hard 1491 00:55:49,229 --> 00:55:51,229 time finding qualified young people 1492 00:55:51,229 --> 00:55:53,562 coming into the industry and the trades . 1493 00:55:53,562 --> 00:55:52,989 What are we doing , sir , as a country 1494 00:55:52,989 --> 00:55:55,629 to get more young people into welding 1495 00:55:55,629 --> 00:55:57,851 and electricians and things like that , 1496 00:55:57,851 --> 00:56:00,018 sir ? Well , let me tell you , I , I , 1497 00:56:00,018 --> 00:55:59,790 so as a country it's a bit beyond my 1498 00:55:59,790 --> 00:56:01,846 scope , but I'll tell you what we're 1499 00:56:01,846 --> 00:56:03,790 doing as a navy and in fact , Um , 1500 00:56:03,790 --> 00:56:05,790 assuming , assuming I , I can still 1501 00:56:05,790 --> 00:56:07,919 travel on Monday , I'm flying out to 1502 00:56:07,919 --> 00:56:10,030 Southern California . I am the , uh , 1503 00:56:10,030 --> 00:56:11,919 flag champion for the Navy talent 1504 00:56:11,919 --> 00:56:14,030 pipeline Southern California region . 1505 00:56:14,030 --> 00:56:16,252 So , uh , this started in the submarine 1506 00:56:16,252 --> 00:56:18,475 community because we saw the exact same 1507 00:56:18,475 --> 00:56:20,820 problem set . And um and there's a 1508 00:56:20,820 --> 00:56:23,042 bunch of things we're doing . The first 1509 00:56:23,042 --> 00:56:26,300 one is uh we had as a nation moved away 1510 00:56:26,300 --> 00:56:28,467 from encouraging people to go into the 1511 00:56:28,467 --> 00:56:30,633 trades and even within high schools we 1512 00:56:30,633 --> 00:56:32,967 got rid of shop classes , we got rid of , 1513 00:56:32,967 --> 00:56:36,054 uh , vocational , um . Industrial 1514 00:56:36,054 --> 00:56:37,887 manufacturing focused vocational 1515 00:56:37,887 --> 00:56:39,832 training , we still had vocational 1516 00:56:39,832 --> 00:56:41,998 training both focused on IT and health 1517 00:56:41,998 --> 00:56:44,110 care , um , which happens to be a lot 1518 00:56:44,110 --> 00:56:46,165 cheaper and easier to do because you 1519 00:56:46,165 --> 00:56:48,332 don't need a lathe or , you know , CAD 1520 00:56:48,332 --> 00:56:50,443 drawing systems or , you know , all , 1521 00:56:50,443 --> 00:56:52,534 all , all of the , um , high-end 1522 00:56:52,534 --> 00:56:54,590 manufacturing technologies , welding 1523 00:56:54,590 --> 00:56:56,756 machines that you need to train people 1524 00:56:56,756 --> 00:56:58,923 on to do that . So , um , so , so lots 1525 00:56:58,923 --> 00:57:00,923 of investment , uh , coming back to 1526 00:57:00,923 --> 00:57:03,169 that . The second piece is encouraging 1527 00:57:03,169 --> 00:57:05,336 people to go into those trades . So if 1528 00:57:05,336 --> 00:57:07,558 you have seen any , if you've watched a 1529 00:57:07,558 --> 00:57:09,613 sporting event in the past couple of 1530 00:57:09,613 --> 00:57:09,290 years , you've probably seen a 1531 00:57:09,290 --> 00:57:12,010 Buildsubmarines.com , uh , commercial 1532 00:57:12,010 --> 00:57:15,010 or ad , um , or the NASCAR car going 1533 00:57:15,010 --> 00:57:16,899 around , and that has been really 1534 00:57:16,899 --> 00:57:18,954 focused on investments originally in 1535 00:57:18,954 --> 00:57:20,954 the submarine industrial base , now 1536 00:57:20,954 --> 00:57:23,177 growing to the maritime industrial base 1537 00:57:23,177 --> 00:57:25,288 writ large , uh , to encourage people 1538 00:57:25,288 --> 00:57:27,621 to apply for for jobs in that community . 1539 00:57:27,621 --> 00:57:29,530 The um we actually stood up a a 1540 00:57:29,530 --> 00:57:31,610 specific program office called the 1541 00:57:31,610 --> 00:57:33,832 Maritime Industrial Base which is doing 1542 00:57:33,832 --> 00:57:36,054 that we're getting lots of support from 1543 00:57:36,054 --> 00:57:38,959 Congress on that um . And so we have 1544 00:57:38,959 --> 00:57:42,659 signing uh days for vocational programs 1545 00:57:42,840 --> 00:57:45,280 either in high schools or post high 1546 00:57:45,280 --> 00:57:47,919 school where uh students can go to 1547 00:57:47,919 --> 00:57:50,760 these programs for free . And if they 1548 00:57:52,010 --> 00:57:53,954 complete it successfully , they're 1549 00:57:53,954 --> 00:57:55,954 pretty much guaranteed a job on the 1550 00:57:55,954 --> 00:57:58,066 other end and , and , and , and we do 1551 00:57:58,066 --> 00:58:00,232 like a , like a high school basketball 1552 00:58:00,232 --> 00:58:02,454 player signing you come put on the head 1553 00:58:02,454 --> 00:58:01,939 of the company you're gonna go work for 1554 00:58:01,939 --> 00:58:04,100 and shake hands . Now we still have 1555 00:58:04,100 --> 00:58:06,770 some challenges , um , at Huntington 1556 00:58:06,770 --> 00:58:08,937 Ingall , if I remember the last time I 1557 00:58:08,937 --> 00:58:11,899 checked , um , about $14 or $15 an hour 1558 00:58:11,899 --> 00:58:14,340 for an apprentice , uh , to start 1559 00:58:14,340 --> 00:58:16,562 learning something at Huntington Ingall 1560 00:58:16,562 --> 00:58:18,729 at Bucky's , who's been to a Bucky's ? 1561 00:58:18,810 --> 00:58:21,032 Yeah , so best bathrooms in the world , 1562 00:58:21,032 --> 00:58:23,254 right ? Yeah , because they pay you $20 1563 00:58:23,254 --> 00:58:25,310 to $22 an hour to clean the bathroom 1564 00:58:25,310 --> 00:58:27,366 there , and I will tell you cleaning 1565 00:58:27,366 --> 00:58:29,659 the bathroom at Buc-ee's in air 1566 00:58:29,659 --> 00:58:31,826 conditioning is a hell of a lot better 1567 00:58:31,826 --> 00:58:33,770 than welding in an inner bottom in 1568 00:58:33,770 --> 00:58:36,103 Pascagoula , Mississippi in August . So , 1569 00:58:36,103 --> 00:58:38,103 um , so that's , that's a challenge 1570 00:58:38,103 --> 00:58:40,270 that , that we're dealing with as well 1571 00:58:40,270 --> 00:58:42,103 as there's a , there's some cost 1572 00:58:42,103 --> 00:58:44,159 differentials there so we're working 1573 00:58:44,159 --> 00:58:46,270 very hard , uh , to drive that talent 1574 00:58:46,270 --> 00:58:48,326 in to attract talent in the business 1575 00:58:48,326 --> 00:58:50,159 and then keep that talent in the 1576 00:58:50,159 --> 00:58:52,270 business because you can , I mean , I 1577 00:58:52,270 --> 00:58:54,492 am , um . I , I had a , a great uncle , 1578 00:58:54,969 --> 00:58:57,025 uh , who was a Ukrainian immigrant , 1579 00:58:57,025 --> 00:58:59,080 came to the US , boatsun mate in the 1580 00:58:59,080 --> 00:59:01,080 Navy , sunk twice in World War II , 1581 00:59:01,080 --> 00:59:02,969 once in either ocean , one in the 1582 00:59:02,969 --> 00:59:02,929 Atlantic , once in the Pacific , and 1583 00:59:02,929 --> 00:59:05,151 then , uh , retired as a chief boats in 1584 00:59:05,151 --> 00:59:07,262 mate and became a crane operator at , 1585 00:59:07,262 --> 00:59:10,149 uh , Norfolk Naval Shipyard , and I , I , 1586 00:59:10,449 --> 00:59:12,449 man , I , I didn't realize it , but 1587 00:59:12,449 --> 00:59:14,560 that was a good , I mean , he drove a 1588 00:59:14,560 --> 00:59:16,782 nice Cadillac . Um , you know , he made 1589 00:59:16,782 --> 00:59:18,782 a very nice career for himself , so 1590 00:59:18,782 --> 00:59:21,005 there are really good careers , uh , in 1591 00:59:21,005 --> 00:59:23,171 that field . We're trying to open that 1592 00:59:23,171 --> 00:59:22,679 up to more people , but the Navy is , 1593 00:59:22,760 --> 00:59:25,979 is avidly investing in , in that effort , 1594 00:59:26,040 --> 00:59:28,000 uh , with industry and academic 1595 00:59:28,000 --> 00:59:30,330 partners . All right , sir . And with 1596 00:59:30,330 --> 00:59:32,386 that , we're budding right up on the 1597 00:59:32,386 --> 00:59:34,330 hour , and I'd like to ask General 1598 00:59:34,330 --> 00:59:36,330 Sanford to come up for some closing 1599 00:59:36,330 --> 00:59:38,441 remarks . Uh , Andy , you got to come 1600 00:59:38,441 --> 00:59:40,719 out here with me . I'm sorry . OK . So , 1601 00:59:41,969 --> 00:59:44,191 Can you hear me ? That's on you , sir . 1602 00:59:44,191 --> 00:59:46,302 Sorry . So , hey , Andy , thank you , 1603 00:59:46,302 --> 00:59:48,302 uh , for your time today . I really 1604 00:59:48,302 --> 00:59:47,530 appreciate it . I , I do feel the 1605 00:59:47,530 --> 00:59:49,697 audience , uh , we probably left a lot 1606 00:59:49,697 --> 00:59:51,808 of questions on the field , um , that 1607 00:59:51,808 --> 00:59:51,689 we could have asked you , and you 1608 00:59:51,689 --> 00:59:53,745 really took us down a , a , a really 1609 00:59:53,745 --> 00:59:55,967 neat journey . Everything from what you 1610 00:59:55,967 --> 00:59:55,530 just talked about where we're trying to 1611 00:59:55,530 --> 00:59:57,697 grow people to manage our shipyards to 1612 00:59:57,697 --> 00:59:59,586 shipyard production , uh , to the 1613 00:59:59,586 --> 01:00:01,863 importance of making sure the fleet is , 1614 01:00:01,863 --> 01:00:03,641 is delivered on time , um . The 1615 01:00:03,641 --> 01:00:05,530 scarcity and the constraints that 1616 01:00:05,530 --> 01:00:05,260 you've got to work through on a day to 1617 01:00:05,260 --> 01:00:07,482 day basis and actually to that high-end 1618 01:00:07,482 --> 01:00:09,482 fight that everybody has to to work 1619 01:00:09,482 --> 01:00:11,649 toward and a lot of good points as far 1620 01:00:11,649 --> 01:00:13,816 as the constraints , uh , piece , uh , 1621 01:00:13,816 --> 01:00:15,927 I took some good notes there so we'll 1622 01:00:15,927 --> 01:00:15,409 try to take that back and see what we 1623 01:00:15,409 --> 01:00:17,590 can do to help and then obviously the 1624 01:00:17,850 --> 01:00:20,072 the look at Moe . Uh , the , uh , the , 1625 01:00:20,072 --> 01:00:22,072 the , uh , surf map , uh , we'll be 1626 01:00:22,072 --> 01:00:24,294 interested in data and operability is a 1627 01:00:24,294 --> 01:00:26,350 big thing for us , um , and so being 1628 01:00:26,350 --> 01:00:28,572 able to , uh , connect with you so that 1629 01:00:28,572 --> 01:00:28,260 we are your team to make sure that we 1630 01:00:28,260 --> 01:00:30,260 can ingest and download that data . 1631 01:00:30,449 --> 01:00:32,282 We're on a North Star journey to 1632 01:00:32,282 --> 01:00:34,505 improve forecasting . It's not where we 1633 01:00:34,505 --> 01:00:34,340 need it to be . We're trying to get . 1634 01:00:34,459 --> 01:00:36,989 85% accuracy . So happy to partner with 1635 01:00:36,989 --> 01:00:38,878 you on that as as we go forward . 1636 01:00:38,878 --> 01:00:41,100 That'd be fantastic . No , so thank you 1637 01:00:41,100 --> 01:00:40,909 for everything . I did want to , on 1638 01:00:40,909 --> 01:00:42,798 behalf of General Semmerly , just 1639 01:00:42,798 --> 01:00:44,798 wanted to pass on a little token of 1640 01:00:44,798 --> 01:00:46,965 appreciation from him much . Thank you 1641 01:00:46,965 --> 01:00:49,131 and thank you for your time . I know , 1642 01:00:49,131 --> 01:00:48,989 um , we drug you out of your digs to , 1643 01:00:49,080 --> 01:00:51,191 to come down here . Um , hopefully it 1644 01:00:51,191 --> 01:00:53,358 wasn't too bad . Sounds like you got a 1645 01:00:53,358 --> 01:00:55,524 full journey ahead of you . I , I live 1646 01:00:55,524 --> 01:00:55,050 like 10 minutes from here , so you've 1647 01:00:55,050 --> 01:00:57,790 been really good . I'm glad we could 1648 01:00:57,790 --> 01:01:00,012 help , but you guys , you guys have any 1649 01:01:00,012 --> 01:01:02,123 spare offices I can just commute here 1650 01:01:02,123 --> 01:01:04,290 all the time . We're happy to have you 1651 01:01:04,290 --> 01:01:06,290 a full-time employee . But no , I'm 1652 01:01:06,290 --> 01:01:06,139 sure we can , uh , we can work that out . 1653 01:01:06,229 --> 01:01:08,118 But no , thank you again . Always 1654 01:01:08,118 --> 01:01:10,229 welcome . Appreciate you being here . 1655 01:01:10,229 --> 01:01:09,750 Oh , my pleasure . Thank you very much , 1656 01:01:10,030 --> 01:01:11,030 everyone . 1657 01:01:16,580 --> 01:01:18,747 Thank you sir , ladies and gentlemen , 1658 01:01:18,747 --> 01:01:21,080 this concludes today's war fighter talk . 1659 01:01:21,080 --> 01:01:23,302 Thank you for attending . A link to the 1660 01:01:23,302 --> 01:01:25,136 full event will be posted on the 1661 01:01:25,136 --> 01:01:27,302 campaign and learning page , and while 1662 01:01:27,302 --> 01:01:29,358 you're there you can find the latest 1663 01:01:29,358 --> 01:01:31,580 episodes of our podcast DLA Dialogues , 1664 01:01:31,580 --> 01:01:33,802 a recommended reading list , and recent 1665 01:01:33,802 --> 01:01:35,969 white papers . Thanks and have a great 1666 01:01:35,969 --> 01:01:35,560 DLA day .