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Good afternoon and welcome to the 

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Campaign of Learning warfighter Talk 

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hosted by Lieutenant General Mark 

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Simmerly . A special welcome to the 

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members of the DLA team who are 

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watching remotely . I'm Jake Boyer from 

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DLA Public Affairs , your MC today . 

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The Honorable Bill Evanina served as 

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the first Senate-confirmed director of 

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the National Counterintelligence and 

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Security Center , leading the US 

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government's counterintelligence effort . 

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In this role , he oversaw national 

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level programs focused on supply chain 

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risk management , cyber operations , 

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and information technology protection , 

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among other areas . He also led the 

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development of the president's national 

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counterintelligence strategy , which 

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emphasized raising awareness of foreign 

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intelligence threats to critical 

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infrastructure and the private sector , 

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specifically addressing supply chain , 

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economic security , and cyber risks . I 

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would like , I would now like to 

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welcome General Simmerly for opening 

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remarks . 

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So good afternoon everybody . This is 

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Mike working ? Hey , I appreciate 

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everybody , uh , turning out today . A 

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lot of things going on , of course . 

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We're exercising in global thunder , so 

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I know that's taken up a lot of 

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people's time , uh , and also we're 

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dealing with all the consequences of 

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the shutdown , ensure that we can 

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continue to support and all the other 

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variety of missions that are ongoing , 

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but this is important . Uh , so I 

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appreciate you all taking time out for 

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this , uh , here in the headquarters 

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and at all the other sites as well . 

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And here's why it's important , right ? 

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We have to consider and constantly 

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review . What it's going to take for us 

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to be successful to support the war 

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fight , and that's changing . That 

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answer is constantly changing . And so 

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as we think , act , and operate 

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differently , we have to listen to 

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those that we support . We have to 

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listen to those who understand what the 

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threat is to our operations , and 

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that's really , I think , the insights 

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that we're going to get today , 

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understanding with greater precision . 

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What our adversaries can do . To 

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Unhinge to disintegrate , to 

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corrupt our data and our capabilities 

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writ large , and not only things that 

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they hypothetically can do , things 

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they have done before and probably are 

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doing right now to our ability to 

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support the fight . And so today we've 

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got a fantastic speaker , Honorable 

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William Evanina , who's got a 30 year 

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plus career of public service . He told 

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me before this meeting that he's the 

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grandson and the son of sailors , so 

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we're really proud of that part of his 

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family history , and the father of an 

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airman , actually . Cadet at 

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the Air Force Academy right now , so we 

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know that he's really proud of his son 

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and his service as well . So he's got 

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skin in the game . And so not only from 

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his 30 years of public service in the 

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FBI , the CIA . And at the highest 

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levels of the federal government , but 

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also as a citizen of the United States , 

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as the son , grandson , as the father 

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of warfighters as well . So he gets us 

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and he's going to have some powerful 

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insights to share with us , and sir , 

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we're really looking forward to the 

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dialogue and conversation with you . I 

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know people are already thinking about 

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questions for you , but those will even 

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proliferate during your discussion . So 

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please join us and thank you so much 

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for being part of this discussion today . 

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Thank you sir , thank you . 

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Good afternoon . Good afternoon . 

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So I'm bringing some energy , so I 

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expect some of that energy back . All 

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right , um , it's the fact that you're 

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here , you're not furloughed . I wanna 

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say thank you all for your service , 

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whether you're in the military or 

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you're a civilian or you're supporting 

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either of the above , uh , a candid 

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thank you for not only being . A loyal 

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patriotic member of the military or the 

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civilian force that supports and 

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partners with it or you're a vendor , 

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it doesn't make a difference . You're 

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part of the team , and I'm going to 

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talk a lot about team today and why 

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this matters as we face some of the 

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gravest threats that our nation has 

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ever seen . Um , next slide , my next 

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slide here . Um , so here we go , um . 

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But it talks about eyes wide open . Why 

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does that , what does it mean when I 

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say that you'll get a feel for that 

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situation with the eyes wide open 

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mindset . Um , you heard a little bit 

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of my bio . I appreciate that , very 

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humbling , um , where I sit right now , 

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what I do , what I did . I have been 

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unbelievably blessed of a career to be 

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surrounded by just the most amazing 

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women and men to help us . Conduct 

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mission and where that mission is , 

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it's irrelevant what that mission was 

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all those years in those agencies , but 

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it's all about mission and for me it 

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was about protecting . The United 

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States of America , the people , the 

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places , the data , the buildings , you 

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name it , it was all mission , and 

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mission is only as good as the human 

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beings you have around you . And I was 

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absolutely blessed to have some of the 

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best , and we'll talk about why that's 

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important in a couple of seconds 

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because where we are now in our 

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nation's history and what we're facing , 

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the threats that we're facing , the 

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only way we get out of this is having 

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those continued partnerships with 

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amazing women and men because they are 

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going to be your partners in making 

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strategic decisions that are going to 

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protect us moving forward . Um , I have 

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up there Operation Warp Speed . If we 

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get a chance at the end , someone asked 

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me a question because I know I'm gonna 

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forget about it because it's a great 

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story as to why what we're doing here 

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today and me being part of this amazing 

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speaker series is gonna matter because 

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what we do as Americans , what we can 

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do when the time is right , second to 

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none in the history of the world . Next 

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slide . So why don't you just take a 

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look at this chart . This is where we 

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are . I call it world on the blink on 

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the brink you can call it what you want . 

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This is real life situations that are 

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ongoing right now . And for DLA 

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and what you do every day . 

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365 days a year . Think about those 

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locations and what impact just one of 

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them is gonna have on what you do every 

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day . From the desks that you sit in . 

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Whether or not it's Venezuela , what's 

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going on right now , whether or not in 

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the Philippines , the Houthis , or as 

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my neighbor calls them the Hadi . A lot 

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of people don't know who they are . 

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They are very integral to the movement 

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of goods and services around the world , 

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and we as the United States of America 

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are really , really keenly interested 

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in whether they come up or they go down . 

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So I heard a great CIA case officer 

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once tell me that the Houthis were 

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analogous to herpes . You never know 

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when they're gonna come out , but when 

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they come out , they're visible and 

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they cause destruction . Kind of 

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graphic , but I get it , right , 

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because Iran has a finger on them and 

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we have to keep that . Tiger cage , so 

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to speak . TSMC , I don't need to tell 

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you about that . Really critical to 

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where we are in the global ecosystem . 

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You see the interoperability of the of 

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the concentric circles of the president , 

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tariffs , negotiations with China , or 

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big tech companies , and all the 

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smaller companies who are worth 

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billions of dollars in the impact they 

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have on that one little company in 

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Taiwan . I would proffer to you that if 

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that company was out in Taiwan or 

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aperture . And our interest in Taiwan 

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would be considerably different than it 

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is right now . Next slide . So , 

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transitioning to the global world on 

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the brink , this is domestically . The 

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threat that we face right now , 

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specifically from China . It's 

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completely permeated and complex and 

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sophisticated , especially in the 

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private sector and academia . They have , 

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they being the Communist Party of China 

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under the leadership of Xi Jinping , 

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have repositioned strategically . The 

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offensive measures and countermeasures 

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against the United States from the US 

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government into the private sector . So 

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why I say this is important , but I 

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think it's also important for this 

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audience to think about what you do 

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every day . And your criticality to the 

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DOD ecosystem . But also your vendors . 

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Last I checked , I checked this morning 

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on the internet , DLA doesn't really 

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make anything . You don't manufacture 

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anything . But you buy things and you 

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service things and you provide to 

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others , so that private sector threat . 

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That we face It is important to 

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you It's important to what you do . 

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It's important to your vendors . And 

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the reliability you have on someone to 

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provide x to get it to a warfighter . 

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That's why that part is important , but 

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that complexity of the threat , the 

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persistence of the threat . Not only 

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from Russia , from Iran , on the supply 

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chain . Cyber and 

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mostly China . It gets more persistent , 

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more complex every single day . When I 

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get my pre briefings and I go out to 

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the intelligence community , I hear new 

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and creative things from the FBI and 

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CISA and DHS , and I say to myself , 

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wow , just 6 months ago , who would 

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have thought of these things ? Raise 

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your hand if you know what . Vault 

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typhoon is About 

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10 . How about salt typhoon ? 

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45 First piece of homework for today . 

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If you have an ink pen , if you don't , 

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if you have a cell phone , write down 

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volt typhoon . And salt typhoon . 

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From my perspective of what you do here 

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in this organization and the 

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criticality you have to the war fighter , 

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you need to have fidelity and complete 

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understanding of what the Chinese have 

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done with Volt Typhoon . Basically , Vu 

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Typhoon , in a nutshell , is the 

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Chinese . Manipulation , penetration , 

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and placement of malware in our 

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critical infrastructure nodes around 

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the US to prevent The movement of goods 

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and services and also the destruction 

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of the movement of goods and services . 

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Raise your hand if you think that 

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doesn't affect DLA . So I would say for 

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you to be a great leader from where you 

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sit . Understand Volt typhoon . And 

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then share that with your coworkers . 

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Just Google it . It's really , really 

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important to understand the strategic 

271
00:10:52,080 --> 00:10:54,169
intent of our adversaries and how 

272
00:10:54,169 --> 00:10:56,336
they're trying to impact our lives and 

273
00:10:56,336 --> 00:10:58,447
your business lives outside the fence 

274
00:10:58,447 --> 00:11:01,530
lines . Of a DOD installation , why 

275
00:11:01,530 --> 00:11:04,429
does that matter ? And then what if 

276
00:11:04,429 --> 00:11:06,869
this happens ? What if China decides to 

277
00:11:06,869 --> 00:11:09,469
go and make a move on Taiwan and then 

278
00:11:09,469 --> 00:11:11,450
they interact this volt typhoon 

279
00:11:11,750 --> 00:11:13,694
domestically in the US and then we 

280
00:11:13,694 --> 00:11:16,028
don't have power , we don't have energy , 

281
00:11:16,028 --> 00:11:18,250
we don't have telecoms . Salt typhoon , 

282
00:11:18,440 --> 00:11:20,607
another thing , great thing to realize 

283
00:11:20,607 --> 00:11:22,551
is their ability of the Chinese to 

284
00:11:22,551 --> 00:11:24,119
penetrate all of our major 

285
00:11:24,119 --> 00:11:26,640
telecommunications networks . Their 

286
00:11:26,640 --> 00:11:30,000
ability to read our SMS texts from me 

287
00:11:30,000 --> 00:11:32,222
to you , you to me . More importantly , 

288
00:11:32,320 --> 00:11:34,153
tens of thousands of phone calls 

289
00:11:34,153 --> 00:11:36,320
they're able to listen to every single 

290
00:11:36,320 --> 00:11:38,542
day . All US government law enforcement 

291
00:11:38,669 --> 00:11:41,780
needs either a FISA warrant . Or search 

292
00:11:41,780 --> 00:11:43,836
warrant signed by a federal judge to 

293
00:11:43,836 --> 00:11:45,891
listen to your telephone calls , but 

294
00:11:45,891 --> 00:11:48,113
the Communist Party of China does not . 

295
00:11:48,113 --> 00:11:50,002
But yet we don't find anywhere in 

296
00:11:50,002 --> 00:11:52,336
America that people are upset with that . 

297
00:11:52,336 --> 00:11:54,502
I am , but something to inquire and to 

298
00:11:54,502 --> 00:11:56,558
learn as you understand your job and 

299
00:11:56,558 --> 00:11:58,724
what you do , whether or not you are a 

300
00:11:58,724 --> 00:12:01,002
logistician in charge of A and B and C , 

301
00:12:01,002 --> 00:12:03,159
how does Volt Typhoon represent and 

302
00:12:03,159 --> 00:12:05,326
understand what you do ? The last part 

303
00:12:05,326 --> 00:12:07,989
of this is data . Xi Jinping , it's all 

304
00:12:07,989 --> 00:12:11,130
about data . Technology and data , 

305
00:12:11,650 --> 00:12:13,706
technology and data , technology and 

306
00:12:13,706 --> 00:12:15,539
data . We'll talk about why that 

307
00:12:15,539 --> 00:12:17,960
matters in a second . Next slide . So I 

308
00:12:17,960 --> 00:12:20,071
put this list together this weekend . 

309
00:12:20,359 --> 00:12:23,140
How am I going to , in aggregate , 

310
00:12:23,289 --> 00:12:25,345
explain to this really sophisticated 

311
00:12:25,345 --> 00:12:28,039
audience , DLA , the overarching last 

312
00:12:28,039 --> 00:12:30,640
couple of years . Of the impact of the 

313
00:12:30,640 --> 00:12:32,973
Communist Party of China and what we do . 

314
00:12:33,690 --> 00:12:36,340
As Americans , as a government , as a 

315
00:12:36,340 --> 00:12:39,469
military . As private citizens and 

316
00:12:39,469 --> 00:12:41,830
their ethos . I just listed a bunch of 

317
00:12:41,830 --> 00:12:43,997
stuff up there . I'll talk about a few 

318
00:12:43,997 --> 00:12:46,219
of them in general , but it's important 

319
00:12:46,219 --> 00:12:48,441
to understand the strategic intent of a 

320
00:12:48,441 --> 00:12:50,608
nation-state threat who looks at us as 

321
00:12:50,608 --> 00:12:52,460
not only a competitor , But an 

322
00:12:52,460 --> 00:12:56,400
adversary Why do all of these things 

323
00:12:56,400 --> 00:13:00,359
matter ? What makes them individually 

324
00:13:00,359 --> 00:13:02,760
devastating , but collectively a 

325
00:13:02,760 --> 00:13:06,190
strategic intent . To put us in a 

326
00:13:06,190 --> 00:13:09,789
position we are not able to respond 

327
00:13:09,789 --> 00:13:11,969
either kinetically . In a cyber 

328
00:13:11,969 --> 00:13:14,609
capability or an actual want , so one 

329
00:13:14,609 --> 00:13:16,776
of the strategic intents of Xi Jinping 

330
00:13:16,776 --> 00:13:18,998
is if we do get to a place where things 

331
00:13:18,998 --> 00:13:21,220
are difficult , they may make a move on 

332
00:13:21,220 --> 00:13:23,387
Taiwan or something bad happens in the 

333
00:13:23,387 --> 00:13:25,109
Philippines . Their ability to 

334
00:13:25,169 --> 00:13:27,280
influence our domestic landscape , so 

335
00:13:27,280 --> 00:13:30,780
there's no appetite or interest in the 

336
00:13:30,780 --> 00:13:32,836
US population to want to do anything 

337
00:13:32,836 --> 00:13:35,590
overseas . Some of the latest data , 

338
00:13:36,130 --> 00:13:38,297
you probably saw what I saw in USA USA 

339
00:13:38,297 --> 00:13:40,510
Today and some of the periodicals , US 

340
00:13:41,010 --> 00:13:42,954
Americans , whether you're in high 

341
00:13:42,954 --> 00:13:45,066
school or college , inability to pick 

342
00:13:45,066 --> 00:13:47,288
Taiwan out on the map . So , how are we 

343
00:13:47,288 --> 00:13:49,288
going to get people revved up to go 

344
00:13:49,288 --> 00:13:51,510
protect Taiwan in the case of a kinetic 

345
00:13:51,510 --> 00:13:51,270
issue when no one even knows where it 

346
00:13:51,270 --> 00:13:53,549
is in a position ? Raise your hand if 

347
00:13:53,549 --> 00:13:55,169
you know what ZPMC is . 

348
00:13:58,799 --> 00:14:02,710
2 , that's it . Anybody know what 

349
00:14:02,710 --> 00:14:05,219
OK , this is awesome . Uh , so exciting , 

350
00:14:05,270 --> 00:14:07,437
this is exciting . So ZPMC is the name 

351
00:14:07,437 --> 00:14:10,169
of a company . The number one provider 

352
00:14:11,010 --> 00:14:14,599
of maritime cranes in the world . Now 

353
00:14:14,599 --> 00:14:16,655
raise your hand if you've heard of a 

354
00:14:16,655 --> 00:14:19,039
ZPMC crane . You got a couple , a 

355
00:14:19,039 --> 00:14:21,317
couple here . So just think about this . 

356
00:14:21,969 --> 00:14:25,549
90% of US ports . Have 

357
00:14:25,549 --> 00:14:28,159
ZPMC cranes facilitating the movement 

358
00:14:28,159 --> 00:14:30,640
of goods and services shipped ashore , 

359
00:14:30,820 --> 00:14:33,479
shore to ship . All those cranes are 

360
00:14:33,479 --> 00:14:36,520
made where ? So when they make them in 

361
00:14:36,520 --> 00:14:38,742
China and they sell them to the port of 

362
00:14:38,742 --> 00:14:40,964
Los Angeles , port of Long Beach , Port 

363
00:14:40,964 --> 00:14:43,298
Elizabeth , Port of Newark , Charleston , 

364
00:14:43,298 --> 00:14:45,353
they come with people and software . 

365
00:14:45,849 --> 00:14:48,940
Whose software is it ? Every single one 

366
00:14:48,940 --> 00:14:51,219
of the ZPMC crane systems around the 

367
00:14:51,219 --> 00:14:55,090
United States are connected . How 

368
00:14:55,090 --> 00:14:57,349
easy is it for this Communist Party in 

369
00:14:57,349 --> 00:15:00,729
China to disable those port . Crane 

370
00:15:00,729 --> 00:15:02,929
capabilities when they want to . So 

371
00:15:02,929 --> 00:15:05,010
those cranes , not only are they the 

372
00:15:05,010 --> 00:15:07,409
highest thing those ports with Huawei 

373
00:15:07,409 --> 00:15:09,742
cameras and capabilities on top of them . 

374
00:15:10,270 --> 00:15:12,381
But there it was used to commission . 

375
00:15:13,869 --> 00:15:16,880
Who ships ? Our ships , not just 

376
00:15:16,880 --> 00:15:19,669
commercial , but military . So we 

377
00:15:19,669 --> 00:15:21,891
briefed Congress on this multiple times 

378
00:15:21,891 --> 00:15:23,669
and I think 2023 , they finally 

379
00:15:23,669 --> 00:15:25,558
allocated a bunch of money in the 

380
00:15:25,558 --> 00:15:27,780
billions of dollars to facilitate these 

381
00:15:27,780 --> 00:15:30,002
ports , to rip out the software and put 

382
00:15:30,002 --> 00:15:31,947
US-based software on there so they 

383
00:15:31,947 --> 00:15:34,169
can't have connectivity between Port of 

384
00:15:34,169 --> 00:15:36,336
Charleston , Port of Long Beach , Port 

385
00:15:36,336 --> 00:15:38,447
of Los Angeles , and port of Newark , 

386
00:15:38,447 --> 00:15:40,336
right ? You can't allow a foreign 

387
00:15:40,336 --> 00:15:42,280
country to be able to do that . So 

388
00:15:42,280 --> 00:15:44,650
these cranes . are devastating , but 

389
00:15:44,650 --> 00:15:46,872
it's strategically part of Xi Jinping's 

390
00:15:46,872 --> 00:15:49,130
perspective to domestically put us in a 

391
00:15:49,130 --> 00:15:51,809
position of inferiority . So again , 

392
00:15:51,890 --> 00:15:54,090
the ZPMC cranes , along with the 

393
00:15:54,090 --> 00:15:56,257
typhoons are all strategically part of 

394
00:15:56,257 --> 00:15:58,368
it . On the top of that , I have some 

395
00:15:58,368 --> 00:16:01,119
numbers . So economically , when you 

396
00:16:01,119 --> 00:16:04,849
think about where we are . On average , 

397
00:16:04,859 --> 00:16:08,030
from 2018 till now , we are losing 

398
00:16:08,030 --> 00:16:11,929
$600 billion a year in real losses . 

399
00:16:12,820 --> 00:16:14,820
Just from the theft of intellectual 

400
00:16:14,820 --> 00:16:17,419
property and trade secrets , just from 

401
00:16:17,419 --> 00:16:19,419
the Communist Party of China , just 

402
00:16:19,419 --> 00:16:23,179
from what we know . $600 billion a year . 

403
00:16:23,909 --> 00:16:26,131
So DLA is a big organization . You have 

404
00:16:26,131 --> 00:16:28,242
a little smart people here . That's a 

405
00:16:28,242 --> 00:16:30,465
lot of money . But I'm not that smart . 

406
00:16:30,465 --> 00:16:32,687
I need more fidelity in that , which is 

407
00:16:32,687 --> 00:16:34,909
why the next number is important . It's 

408
00:16:34,909 --> 00:16:37,890
$4000 for each American family of four 

409
00:16:37,890 --> 00:16:40,619
after taxes . That's how much it's 

410
00:16:40,619 --> 00:16:43,229
costing us for the theft of 

411
00:16:43,229 --> 00:16:45,562
intellectual property and trade secrets . 

412
00:16:45,659 --> 00:16:47,715
So what does China do when they sell 

413
00:16:47,715 --> 00:16:50,048
this stuff ? Steal it from universities , 

414
00:16:50,109 --> 00:16:52,440
whoever they steal the IP . They go out 

415
00:16:52,619 --> 00:16:55,700
on the Black market . They manufacture 

416
00:16:55,700 --> 00:16:57,756
the same capability and they sell it 

417
00:16:57,756 --> 00:16:59,811
for 30 cents on $1 . So not only are 

418
00:16:59,811 --> 00:17:02,033
they stealing our intellectual property 

419
00:17:02,033 --> 00:17:01,849
and trade secrets , they're 

420
00:17:01,849 --> 00:17:04,260
manufacturing it back in China and 

421
00:17:04,260 --> 00:17:06,316
selling it to some of the vendors we 

422
00:17:06,316 --> 00:17:08,427
would sell it to for 30 cents on $1 . 

423
00:17:08,427 --> 00:17:10,538
So not only is it a vicious , vicious 

424
00:17:10,538 --> 00:17:13,619
wound with the dollar amount that we 

425
00:17:13,619 --> 00:17:16,300
have , but more importantly , there's 

426
00:17:16,300 --> 00:17:18,300
salt in that wound because we can't 

427
00:17:18,390 --> 00:17:20,780
sell that to our vendors . One specific 

428
00:17:20,780 --> 00:17:23,550
example I'll give you is On one of my 

429
00:17:23,550 --> 00:17:25,661
conversations I had with Tim Cook out 

430
00:17:25,661 --> 00:17:27,772
in . Apple . So , you know , I said , 

431
00:17:27,772 --> 00:17:30,329
hey , sir , um , it's 2018 , uh , the 

432
00:17:30,329 --> 00:17:32,551
Chinese stole the intellectual property 

433
00:17:32,551 --> 00:17:34,739
trade secrets ideation for the making 

434
00:17:34,739 --> 00:17:36,961
of the new Apple vehicle . Anybody here 

435
00:17:36,961 --> 00:17:39,819
drive an Apple vehicle ? Has anybody 

436
00:17:39,819 --> 00:17:41,969
seen an Apple vehicle ? There's a 

437
00:17:41,969 --> 00:17:45,420
reason why there's not . Because 

438
00:17:45,420 --> 00:17:47,642
strategically the Chinese stole off the 

439
00:17:47,642 --> 00:17:49,698
capability to compete with and Apple 

440
00:17:49,698 --> 00:17:51,864
said , you know what , we're not going 

441
00:17:51,864 --> 00:17:51,300
to do this . So I asked Mr . Cook , I 

442
00:17:51,300 --> 00:17:54,410
said , sir , I need to know . I'm 

443
00:17:54,410 --> 00:17:56,632
aggregating these dollars . What is the 

444
00:17:56,632 --> 00:17:58,521
dollar value of a loss ? That you 

445
00:17:58,521 --> 00:18:02,160
incurred with this theft of China . I 

446
00:18:02,160 --> 00:18:04,271
didn't know how many billions is it ? 

447
00:18:04,271 --> 00:18:06,382
He's like , Bill , we're not going to 

448
00:18:06,382 --> 00:18:08,438
get into that information . I said , 

449
00:18:08,438 --> 00:18:10,271
sir , I just need to know . It's 

450
00:18:10,271 --> 00:18:12,438
important for us and the government to 

451
00:18:12,438 --> 00:18:12,160
be able to quantitatively understand 

452
00:18:12,400 --> 00:18:14,479
the dollar value that you lost from 

453
00:18:14,479 --> 00:18:17,199
ideation to manufacturing to what could 

454
00:18:17,199 --> 00:18:19,421
have been . And he said , Bill , you're 

455
00:18:19,421 --> 00:18:21,366
missing the whole point . It's not 

456
00:18:21,366 --> 00:18:23,699
about the loss of the technology of 

457
00:18:23,699 --> 00:18:27,520
building an autonomous EV vehicle . 

458
00:18:27,859 --> 00:18:29,660
It's how many plants are we not 

459
00:18:29,660 --> 00:18:31,827
building in the US ? How many jobs are 

460
00:18:31,827 --> 00:18:33,771
we not commissioning in the United 

461
00:18:33,771 --> 00:18:35,771
States ? How many , what's the long 

462
00:18:35,771 --> 00:18:37,938
term loss of dollar value ? And it was 

463
00:18:37,938 --> 00:18:39,716
for me it was an opportunity to 

464
00:18:39,716 --> 00:18:41,882
understand , wow , it's not just about 

465
00:18:41,882 --> 00:18:44,104
dollars and cents or how much we lose . 

466
00:18:44,104 --> 00:18:46,271
In IP and trade secret , it's the tail 

467
00:18:46,271 --> 00:18:48,493
that goes along with that , the lack of 

468
00:18:48,493 --> 00:18:48,160
our ability to build plants and hire 

469
00:18:48,160 --> 00:18:50,920
people . So for me there is a long 

470
00:18:50,920 --> 00:18:53,260
process to this particular threat . You 

471
00:18:53,260 --> 00:18:55,482
don't need to go into fentanyl . It's a 

472
00:18:55,482 --> 00:18:57,704
big problem , but this just to me looks 

473
00:18:57,704 --> 00:18:59,871
like what opportunities and those land 

474
00:18:59,871 --> 00:19:02,038
purchases , you've seen the articles , 

475
00:19:02,038 --> 00:19:04,204
you've seen the 60 Minutes reports . I 

476
00:19:04,204 --> 00:19:03,900
was part of this for a decade . The 

477
00:19:03,900 --> 00:19:06,719
strategic intent of the Chinese 

478
00:19:06,859 --> 00:19:09,140
Communist Party to buy land purchases 

479
00:19:09,140 --> 00:19:11,699
near a military base and installations 

480
00:19:12,020 --> 00:19:14,020
and nuclear organizations is not by 

481
00:19:14,020 --> 00:19:16,640
accident . So we look at some of the 

482
00:19:16,640 --> 00:19:18,862
issues that we have with supply chain . 

483
00:19:19,099 --> 00:19:21,500
And Volt Typhoon and integrate them 

484
00:19:21,500 --> 00:19:23,722
with , wow , why do they buy that strip 

485
00:19:23,722 --> 00:19:25,556
mall right outside the base ? It 

486
00:19:25,556 --> 00:19:27,611
doesn't make any sense . They all go 

487
00:19:27,611 --> 00:19:30,430
together . Next slide . So , I don't 

488
00:19:30,430 --> 00:19:32,619
know if we can see this . Just take a 

489
00:19:32,619 --> 00:19:34,675
look at this . Chuck , I'm gonna get 

490
00:19:34,675 --> 00:19:37,099
out of the way here . I put this 

491
00:19:37,099 --> 00:19:40,609
together . Probably 45 of these , but I 

492
00:19:40,609 --> 00:19:42,776
wanted to put some of the big names up 

493
00:19:42,776 --> 00:19:45,640
here . Let me know what you think all 

494
00:19:45,640 --> 00:19:47,260
these companies represent . 

495
00:19:53,510 --> 00:19:55,343
Raise your hand if you think why 

496
00:19:55,343 --> 00:19:57,579
they're all on this board . They have a 

497
00:19:57,579 --> 00:19:59,690
lot of data , correct . Good answer . 

498
00:19:59,690 --> 00:20:03,660
That's not why . 150 

499
00:20:03,660 --> 00:20:06,640
college universities , all 50 states . 

500
00:20:09,540 --> 00:20:13,290
Close . They've all been breached . 

501
00:20:14,380 --> 00:20:17,000
They've all had cyber . I'll call them 

502
00:20:17,000 --> 00:20:19,380
malfunctions and significant data . 

503
00:20:20,300 --> 00:20:23,119
Removed from the organizations by who ? 

504
00:20:23,859 --> 00:20:26,081
Communist Party of China . So just look 

505
00:20:26,081 --> 00:20:28,699
at a couple of them . Remember the 

506
00:20:28,699 --> 00:20:32,300
movie Too Big to Fail ? My argument is 

507
00:20:33,119 --> 00:20:35,920
we can't have these failures . And I 

508
00:20:35,920 --> 00:20:38,142
would proffer that DLA works with a lot 

509
00:20:38,142 --> 00:20:40,969
of these organizations . We as 

510
00:20:40,969 --> 00:20:43,250
Americans have to have confidence in 

511
00:20:43,250 --> 00:20:45,969
Microsoft and AT&T and Verizon and 

512
00:20:45,969 --> 00:20:48,849
Google and CrowdStrike . CrowdStrike 

513
00:20:48,849 --> 00:20:51,150
gets breached . CrowdStrike is the 

514
00:20:51,410 --> 00:20:54,949
fixer of breaches . So the reality of 

515
00:20:54,949 --> 00:20:57,339
what we deal with here is problematic . 

516
00:20:57,430 --> 00:20:59,541
So the previous slide you saw all the 

517
00:20:59,541 --> 00:21:01,652
strategic intent of what they do , Xi 

518
00:21:01,652 --> 00:21:03,949
Xi Jinping's intent , but this is the 

519
00:21:03,949 --> 00:21:06,400
end of the day . So everyone of those 

520
00:21:06,400 --> 00:21:08,622
companies when they get breached , when 

521
00:21:08,622 --> 00:21:10,622
TransUnion gets breached , and I'll 

522
00:21:10,622 --> 00:21:12,678
talk a little bit about an example . 

523
00:21:12,678 --> 00:21:14,956
With why they are breaching TransUnion . 

524
00:21:15,030 --> 00:21:16,586
And why some of the biggest 

525
00:21:16,586 --> 00:21:18,697
organizational breaches we've had was 

526
00:21:18,697 --> 00:21:20,863
by accident . It's not really the data 

527
00:21:20,863 --> 00:21:23,141
they wanted . They wanted other things . 

528
00:21:23,141 --> 00:21:25,363
We'll talk about that in a second , but 

529
00:21:25,363 --> 00:21:27,419
my goodness gracious , they breached 

530
00:21:27,419 --> 00:21:29,586
Disney . I mean , if that's not a slap 

531
00:21:29,586 --> 00:21:31,697
to Americana like Disney . We gotta , 

532
00:21:31,770 --> 00:21:33,881
we gotta protect Disney . Like , I go 

533
00:21:33,881 --> 00:21:35,714
to Disney . We can't have Disney 

534
00:21:35,714 --> 00:21:37,826
getting breached . My bank , I'm good 

535
00:21:37,826 --> 00:21:39,881
with that . But not Disney , but not 

536
00:21:39,881 --> 00:21:42,079
Disney . But there's strategy involved 

537
00:21:42,079 --> 00:21:45,989
in this , strategy . So , 

538
00:21:46,020 --> 00:21:49,020
some of the biggest breaches in my life 

539
00:21:49,020 --> 00:21:51,180
have been the OPM data breach . Raise 

540
00:21:51,180 --> 00:21:53,347
your hand if you're a victim of that . 

541
00:21:53,709 --> 00:21:55,876
Right ? It's gonna take us 25 years to 

542
00:21:55,876 --> 00:21:58,489
recover from that , 25 years . But when 

543
00:21:58,489 --> 00:22:02,180
they breach Organizations like 

544
00:22:02,180 --> 00:22:04,859
TransUnion and other credit bureaus . 

545
00:22:06,089 --> 00:22:08,410
They get all the data There's been some 

546
00:22:08,410 --> 00:22:10,577
breaches in the last 5 years , some of 

547
00:22:10,577 --> 00:22:12,799
the biggest breaches ever . 145 million 

548
00:22:12,799 --> 00:22:15,021
Americans lost all their financial data 

549
00:22:15,021 --> 00:22:17,132
to China . But that was gravy for the 

550
00:22:17,132 --> 00:22:19,354
Chinese . That's not what they wanted . 

551
00:22:19,354 --> 00:22:21,354
What do they want ? They wanted the 

552
00:22:21,354 --> 00:22:23,466
algorithms . They wanted the business 

553
00:22:23,466 --> 00:22:25,688
processes for how these . Organizations 

554
00:22:25,688 --> 00:22:27,910
who aggregate financial data share that 

555
00:22:27,910 --> 00:22:29,910
data with big banks , small banks , 

556
00:22:29,910 --> 00:22:31,854
lending institutions . They wanted 

557
00:22:31,854 --> 00:22:33,854
those algorithms . Why do they want 

558
00:22:33,854 --> 00:22:36,021
those algorithms ? So they can disrupt 

559
00:22:36,021 --> 00:22:38,077
them when they need to . They're not 

560
00:22:38,077 --> 00:22:40,188
trying to build transunion in China . 

561
00:22:40,188 --> 00:22:41,966
They're trying to find a way to 

562
00:22:41,966 --> 00:22:44,188
backdoor and understand how to get into 

563
00:22:44,188 --> 00:22:46,354
cyber capability , human-enabled cyber 

564
00:22:46,354 --> 00:22:48,466
to disable the movement of money . In 

565
00:22:48,466 --> 00:22:52,319
the US Next slide . So why do they do 

566
00:22:52,319 --> 00:22:54,430
all this stuff ? What are they trying 

567
00:22:54,430 --> 00:22:56,541
to steal ? He just put a few things . 

568
00:22:56,541 --> 00:22:58,486
These are the latest numbers , the 

569
00:22:58,486 --> 00:22:58,199
latest things from the intelligence 

570
00:22:58,199 --> 00:23:00,366
community . What is the latest Chinese 

571
00:23:00,380 --> 00:23:02,491
five-year plan ? What is it that they 

572
00:23:02,491 --> 00:23:04,824
want ? And the greatest part about this , 

573
00:23:04,824 --> 00:23:07,199
our intel collection absolutely mirrors 

574
00:23:07,199 --> 00:23:09,319
their public awareness campaigns with 

575
00:23:09,319 --> 00:23:11,263
their five year plans . So this is 

576
00:23:11,263 --> 00:23:13,486
public . This is what Xi is telling his 

577
00:23:13,486 --> 00:23:15,520
interior directors , his cabinet 

578
00:23:15,520 --> 00:23:17,880
members , his MSS , his PLA , go get 

579
00:23:17,880 --> 00:23:21,719
this stuff . My argument here is 

580
00:23:21,719 --> 00:23:23,886
DLA is involved in every single one of 

581
00:23:23,886 --> 00:23:27,790
those . So , for 

582
00:23:27,790 --> 00:23:29,846
me , your vendors need to know , you 

583
00:23:29,846 --> 00:23:32,012
need to understand that if you were in 

584
00:23:32,012 --> 00:23:33,957
the pharmaceutical world , it is a 

585
00:23:33,957 --> 00:23:36,234
priority for them , precision medicine , 

586
00:23:36,234 --> 00:23:39,579
DNA , biodata . The data , the 

587
00:23:39,579 --> 00:23:41,801
information of not only the consumers , 

588
00:23:41,801 --> 00:23:44,023
but the people who give blood , COVID , 

589
00:23:44,023 --> 00:23:43,780
we can get in there all day long about 

590
00:23:43,780 --> 00:23:45,891
your nasal swabs and where they ended 

591
00:23:45,891 --> 00:23:48,489
up . It wasn't a trash bin . Why do 

592
00:23:48,489 --> 00:23:50,489
they want that information ? Why do 

593
00:23:50,489 --> 00:23:52,656
they want pharmaceutical information ? 

594
00:23:52,656 --> 00:23:54,878
What are they getting it for ? It's not 

595
00:23:54,878 --> 00:23:57,045
because They just want to share . It's 

596
00:23:57,045 --> 00:24:00,750
all the fair's capabilities . For me , 

597
00:24:00,819 --> 00:24:02,849
the concept of what do they want to 

598
00:24:02,849 --> 00:24:04,793
steal , how are they stealing it , 

599
00:24:04,793 --> 00:24:06,959
what's the operational impact on that 

600
00:24:06,959 --> 00:24:09,070
matters no different than when you're 

601
00:24:09,070 --> 00:24:10,709
doing logistics of moving . 

602
00:24:12,790 --> 00:24:15,449
Any kind of equipment for a warfighter , 

603
00:24:15,760 --> 00:24:17,982
whether it be a jet , someone who needs 

604
00:24:17,982 --> 00:24:20,339
a Bradley vehicle , a rifle , or a part . 

605
00:24:20,439 --> 00:24:22,939
It's the same mindset they are trying 

606
00:24:23,439 --> 00:24:25,106
to facilitate disruption of . 

607
00:24:27,479 --> 00:24:30,790
G In his current mindset , economic 

608
00:24:31,609 --> 00:24:34,689
instability in his own country , firing 

609
00:24:34,689 --> 00:24:36,856
of the recent generals that are trying 

610
00:24:36,856 --> 00:24:38,856
to fight his war fight , the stress 

611
00:24:38,856 --> 00:24:41,022
that he's under right now puts Xi in a 

612
00:24:41,022 --> 00:24:43,022
position of a little bit of chaos , 

613
00:24:43,530 --> 00:24:46,420
similar to Putin . I think for now 

614
00:24:46,420 --> 00:24:48,560
we're putting Iran maybe in a box and 

615
00:24:48,560 --> 00:24:50,560
they're OK , but right now Putin is 

616
00:24:50,560 --> 00:24:53,109
doing what he's doing . But , long term 

617
00:24:53,109 --> 00:24:55,331
plan might be getting short plan . Some 

618
00:24:55,331 --> 00:24:57,390
of the current estimates on Taiwan , 

619
00:24:57,439 --> 00:24:59,495
you've all seen them in the public . 

620
00:24:59,495 --> 00:25:01,383
They come from Admiral Popero and 

621
00:25:01,383 --> 00:25:03,383
everybody else . Is it 2027 ? Is it 

622
00:25:03,383 --> 00:25:05,106
2026 ? Is it 2028 ? To me it's 

623
00:25:05,106 --> 00:25:07,161
irrelevant . My question is , are we 

624
00:25:07,161 --> 00:25:09,329
ready for it ? Are we , are we ready 

625
00:25:09,329 --> 00:25:11,930
for it as a country , as an ecosystem , 

626
00:25:12,089 --> 00:25:14,890
as a society , as a military , is DLA 

627
00:25:14,890 --> 00:25:17,057
ready for it , and are we ready for it 

628
00:25:17,057 --> 00:25:19,168
at home ? Do , are we ready for it in 

629
00:25:19,168 --> 00:25:22,119
our own home ? Are we ready for it to 

630
00:25:22,119 --> 00:25:24,119
be able to have strife ? Raise your 

631
00:25:24,119 --> 00:25:26,397
hand if you remember Colonial Pipeline . 

632
00:25:26,479 --> 00:25:29,199
Did that cause a lot of stress ? We in 

633
00:25:29,199 --> 00:25:31,479
America do 2 things better than anybody 

634
00:25:31,479 --> 00:25:33,810
in the history of the world . We panic 

635
00:25:33,810 --> 00:25:36,369
like no one ever . We are phenomenal at 

636
00:25:36,369 --> 00:25:39,109
panicking . And #2 , we'll click on any 

637
00:25:39,109 --> 00:25:42,550
link anybody gives us . Nobody can beat 

638
00:25:42,550 --> 00:25:44,494
us at those two things , panic and 

639
00:25:44,494 --> 00:25:46,717
clicking on links , and if you put them 

640
00:25:46,717 --> 00:25:48,828
all together , holy cow , we are in a 

641
00:25:48,828 --> 00:25:50,661
tough spot . So for me , I would 

642
00:25:50,661 --> 00:25:53,359
admonish you , and I say that kind way , 

643
00:25:53,599 --> 00:25:56,369
have an emergency plan at home . Have 

644
00:25:56,369 --> 00:25:59,890
an emergency plan , have a kit together 

645
00:25:59,890 --> 00:26:01,834
in your car with bottled water and 

646
00:26:01,834 --> 00:26:04,250
protein bars , batteries , have a plan 

647
00:26:04,250 --> 00:26:06,250
with your family members who are in 

648
00:26:06,250 --> 00:26:08,361
school . What happens when the lights 

649
00:26:08,361 --> 00:26:10,361
go out . What happens when the cell 

650
00:26:10,361 --> 00:26:12,139
phones don't work ? What's your 

651
00:26:12,139 --> 00:26:14,472
emergency action plan ? Where do you go ? 

652
00:26:14,472 --> 00:26:16,528
Where do we meet ? No difference you 

653
00:26:16,528 --> 00:26:18,694
would have if you lived in Florida and 

654
00:26:18,694 --> 00:26:20,750
you have hurricanes . Or floods , we 

655
00:26:20,750 --> 00:26:22,917
need to do the same for resiliency and 

656
00:26:22,917 --> 00:26:24,861
redundancy of our own families and 

657
00:26:24,861 --> 00:26:27,083
organizations . We do it all the time . 

658
00:26:27,083 --> 00:26:29,250
There's an exercise going on right now 

659
00:26:29,250 --> 00:26:31,472
at DLA , right ? There's a big exercise 

660
00:26:31,472 --> 00:26:33,806
going on . Let's have exercises at home . 

661
00:26:33,806 --> 00:26:33,459
Have an exercise with your family . 

662
00:26:33,760 --> 00:26:35,982
What do you do if ? And they don't need 

663
00:26:35,982 --> 00:26:38,149
to know about big bad actors and state 

664
00:26:38,149 --> 00:26:40,316
sponsors . They need to know about the 

665
00:26:40,316 --> 00:26:42,593
power going out , and you're at school , 

666
00:26:42,593 --> 00:26:44,649
traffic lights are out , cell phones 

667
00:26:44,649 --> 00:26:44,589
don't work . I was in New Jersey in 

668
00:26:44,589 --> 00:26:46,829
9/11 . I spent time in the World Trade 

669
00:26:46,829 --> 00:26:50,750
Center , no cell phones . Not 

670
00:26:50,750 --> 00:26:52,750
able to communicate , we need to be 

671
00:26:52,750 --> 00:26:54,972
able to practice that as a family , and 

672
00:26:54,972 --> 00:26:57,139
I'm telling you my experience has been 

673
00:26:57,139 --> 00:26:59,250
your family members , your children , 

674
00:26:59,250 --> 00:27:01,472
your mothers , your fathers will really 

675
00:27:01,472 --> 00:27:00,510
appreciate that you're thinking about 

676
00:27:00,510 --> 00:27:02,510
them and you're putting together an 

677
00:27:02,510 --> 00:27:04,732
operational plan for when things go bad 

678
00:27:04,732 --> 00:27:06,843
because they will go bad . Just think 

679
00:27:06,843 --> 00:27:09,010
about Colonial Pipeline . Next slide . 

680
00:27:14,410 --> 00:27:16,188
All right . So , where are they 

681
00:27:16,188 --> 00:27:18,299
stealing this stuff from ? Quick list 

682
00:27:18,299 --> 00:27:20,466
here . To me , think about this from a 

683
00:27:20,466 --> 00:27:22,688
dealer perspective . Where on that list 

684
00:27:22,688 --> 00:27:25,260
do you not integrate with ? So not only 

685
00:27:25,260 --> 00:27:28,109
the Chinese . Still go after DOA 

686
00:27:28,109 --> 00:27:31,369
DOD infrastructure , but now more 

687
00:27:31,369 --> 00:27:33,480
importantly , more successfully , the 

688
00:27:33,480 --> 00:27:36,869
last 5 or 6 years , NIH , NSF , HHS . 

689
00:27:40,989 --> 00:27:44,060
DHS , Department of Labor . Why 

690
00:27:44,060 --> 00:27:45,949
Department of Labor ? We just had 

691
00:27:45,949 --> 00:27:48,300
someone arrested and charged and going 

692
00:27:48,300 --> 00:27:50,640
to trial now , a Department of Labor 

693
00:27:50,849 --> 00:27:53,219
analyst for selling secrets to the 

694
00:27:53,219 --> 00:27:56,089
Chinese . Department of Labor have a 

695
00:27:56,089 --> 00:27:58,145
lot of good data , the Chinese would 

696
00:27:58,145 --> 00:28:00,145
want , sure do . So , it's not just 

697
00:28:00,145 --> 00:28:01,867
someone who wants a top secret 

698
00:28:01,867 --> 00:28:03,867
clearance . Now , the last argument 

699
00:28:03,867 --> 00:28:06,033
there , and this is what I'm trying to 

700
00:28:06,033 --> 00:28:08,200
explain to the current people in power 

701
00:28:08,200 --> 00:28:10,200
now , disenfranchised employees . I 

702
00:28:10,200 --> 00:28:10,119
think we have a few of those in the 

703
00:28:10,119 --> 00:28:13,900
government right now . People that are 

704
00:28:13,900 --> 00:28:16,790
impacted by dosh . Way back when , 

705
00:28:17,040 --> 00:28:19,151
February , March , April , May , tens 

706
00:28:19,151 --> 00:28:21,560
of thousands of employees who've been 

707
00:28:21,560 --> 00:28:23,616
removed and released from work , you 

708
00:28:23,616 --> 00:28:25,727
think they're disenfranchised ? Who's 

709
00:28:25,727 --> 00:28:27,949
providing them with the tools necessary 

710
00:28:27,949 --> 00:28:29,838
for them to protect themselves on 

711
00:28:29,838 --> 00:28:31,838
LinkedIn ? Because the Chinese have 

712
00:28:31,838 --> 00:28:33,949
really exacerbated their attacking of 

713
00:28:33,949 --> 00:28:36,060
these employees and going after Mount 

714
00:28:36,060 --> 00:28:38,060
LinkedIn . We need to be able to be 

715
00:28:38,060 --> 00:28:39,893
more effective and efficient and 

716
00:28:39,893 --> 00:28:41,949
protect our employees , even when we 

717
00:28:41,949 --> 00:28:43,949
let them go because they still have 

718
00:28:43,949 --> 00:28:45,782
what's up here . They still have 

719
00:28:45,782 --> 00:28:48,004
knowledge and power of how we do things 

720
00:28:48,004 --> 00:28:51,449
in the government . Next slide . No 

721
00:28:51,449 --> 00:28:53,616
doubt , I live in a depressing world . 

722
00:28:53,729 --> 00:28:55,896
Everything I do , everything I've done 

723
00:28:55,896 --> 00:28:57,673
in the last 1520 years has been 

724
00:28:57,673 --> 00:28:59,840
depressing , demoralizing , negative , 

725
00:28:59,840 --> 00:29:02,959
scary . It's emotional , right , in a , 

726
00:29:03,010 --> 00:29:05,239
in a good way because my objective is 

727
00:29:05,239 --> 00:29:08,119
to be able to sell this to right now to 

728
00:29:08,119 --> 00:29:09,952
military leaders , to government 

729
00:29:09,952 --> 00:29:13,239
leaders , to bank CEOs , energy CEOs , 

730
00:29:13,319 --> 00:29:15,599
telecommunications CEOs . We have to 

731
00:29:15,599 --> 00:29:18,800
have a whole of society approach for 

732
00:29:18,800 --> 00:29:21,839
protecting what we love near and dear 

733
00:29:21,839 --> 00:29:23,950
to our hearts , which is our nation , 

734
00:29:24,199 --> 00:29:26,920
our ethos , our democracy , our 

735
00:29:26,920 --> 00:29:29,589
children , our grandparents . Our 

736
00:29:29,589 --> 00:29:31,700
traditions , everything we've known , 

737
00:29:31,700 --> 00:29:33,867
it's vulnerable right now . So this is 

738
00:29:33,867 --> 00:29:35,978
demoralizing , it's depressing , it's 

739
00:29:35,978 --> 00:29:38,810
sad . However , next slide . We are the 

740
00:29:38,810 --> 00:29:41,260
best the world has ever seen . As 

741
00:29:41,260 --> 00:29:43,260
depressing and demoralizing as this 

742
00:29:43,260 --> 00:29:47,260
gets . These up here matter . You were 

743
00:29:47,260 --> 00:29:49,459
a part , I would say , of the 2nd 

744
00:29:49,459 --> 00:29:51,515
greatest generation America has ever 

745
00:29:51,515 --> 00:29:55,180
seen . We just haven't had that 

746
00:29:55,180 --> 00:29:57,469
stressful time in our life subsequent 

747
00:29:57,469 --> 00:30:00,140
to 9/11 to be able to show what our 

748
00:30:01,140 --> 00:30:03,307
Ancestors were able to do in World War 

749
00:30:03,307 --> 00:30:07,150
II . Our military apparatus , what we 

750
00:30:07,150 --> 00:30:09,372
have , what you are part of , has never 

751
00:30:09,372 --> 00:30:11,550
been seen . Our democracy has never 

752
00:30:11,550 --> 00:30:13,772
been seen in the history of the world . 

753
00:30:14,140 --> 00:30:16,339
The ability to have a democracy and 

754
00:30:16,339 --> 00:30:18,819
capitalism working together like no one 

755
00:30:18,819 --> 00:30:21,739
has ever seen before . Are we a little 

756
00:30:21,739 --> 00:30:24,072
bit polarized as a nation ? Sure we are , 

757
00:30:24,260 --> 00:30:26,371
but we can still go have a beer and a 

758
00:30:26,371 --> 00:30:28,427
glass of wine with those same people 

759
00:30:28,427 --> 00:30:30,538
because we are like nothing the world 

760
00:30:30,538 --> 00:30:32,849
has ever seen before . America still 

761
00:30:32,849 --> 00:30:35,569
today possesses pride , work ethic , 

762
00:30:35,770 --> 00:30:38,010
and a commitment to excellence that no 

763
00:30:38,010 --> 00:30:40,232
country could ever even come close to . 

764
00:30:40,810 --> 00:30:42,921
My argument is when we get to a place 

765
00:30:43,170 --> 00:30:45,281
that phase line zero where things are 

766
00:30:45,281 --> 00:30:47,281
really hot and heavy , we will come 

767
00:30:47,281 --> 00:30:49,503
together and be able to join forces and 

768
00:30:49,503 --> 00:30:52,030
solve big problems . Because we are 

769
00:30:52,030 --> 00:30:54,197
Americans , this is what we do . We do 

770
00:30:54,197 --> 00:30:56,363
really well . We can't get lost in the 

771
00:30:56,363 --> 00:30:58,363
minutia every single day of our job 

772
00:30:58,363 --> 00:31:00,474
because our job matters and where you 

773
00:31:00,474 --> 00:31:02,586
sit matters and what you do matters . 

774
00:31:02,586 --> 00:31:04,808
But I'm just asking you , where you sit 

775
00:31:04,808 --> 00:31:06,586
here at the LA , whether you're 

776
00:31:06,586 --> 00:31:08,641
military or civilian , what you do , 

777
00:31:08,709 --> 00:31:10,930
you need to modernize how you do it . 

778
00:31:11,270 --> 00:31:13,548
You need to think about this big scope , 

779
00:31:13,548 --> 00:31:15,714
the big bad Chinese coming after you . 

780
00:31:15,714 --> 00:31:17,881
Are they coming after you , or they're 

781
00:31:17,881 --> 00:31:19,937
looking for you to click a link . To 

782
00:31:19,937 --> 00:31:22,103
use your credentials in your system to 

783
00:31:22,103 --> 00:31:24,214
get into the DLA system . And if they 

784
00:31:24,214 --> 00:31:26,437
are , and if they're not , what are you 

785
00:31:26,437 --> 00:31:26,060
doing to prevent that from happening ? 

786
00:31:26,569 --> 00:31:28,625
What are you doing to join with your 

787
00:31:28,625 --> 00:31:30,736
co-workers in the coffee shop to talk 

788
00:31:30,736 --> 00:31:32,791
about threats that you see DLA might 

789
00:31:32,791 --> 00:31:34,958
face and raise them with your bosses ? 

790
00:31:34,958 --> 00:31:37,459
We need to rethink the way we do things 

791
00:31:38,079 --> 00:31:40,301
from each and every cubicle that we sit 

792
00:31:40,301 --> 00:31:42,190
in . Because the threats are more 

793
00:31:42,190 --> 00:31:44,357
persistent and aggressive than they've 

794
00:31:44,357 --> 00:31:46,412
ever been , and my excitement is you 

795
00:31:46,412 --> 00:31:48,690
from where you sit can do these things . 

796
00:31:48,690 --> 00:31:50,912
Just don't get caught in the malaise of 

797
00:31:50,912 --> 00:31:53,023
doing your same job over and over and 

798
00:31:53,023 --> 00:31:55,246
over again , and I'm worried about this 

799
00:31:55,246 --> 00:31:57,468
not only here in the government , but I 

800
00:31:57,468 --> 00:31:56,650
also worry about this in the financial 

801
00:31:56,650 --> 00:31:58,872
services sector , the telecoms sector , 

802
00:31:59,130 --> 00:32:01,380
energy sector , teachers , firemen , 

803
00:32:01,660 --> 00:32:03,938
police officers need to be on our toes . 

804
00:32:03,938 --> 00:32:06,060
My argument is we're only as good as 

805
00:32:06,060 --> 00:32:08,282
the next person sitting next to you and 

806
00:32:08,282 --> 00:32:10,504
their ability to have a little bit more 

807
00:32:10,504 --> 00:32:12,560
cyber hygiene than the next person . 

808
00:32:14,310 --> 00:32:16,421
Boss and I were talking earlier about 

809
00:32:16,421 --> 00:32:18,421
blocking and tackling . It's really 

810
00:32:18,421 --> 00:32:20,477
about blocking and tackling , and if 

811
00:32:20,477 --> 00:32:19,829
you could still block and tackle the 

812
00:32:19,829 --> 00:32:21,910
right way , we're halfway there . My 

813
00:32:21,910 --> 00:32:23,966
argument is we have to learn the new 

814
00:32:23,966 --> 00:32:25,854
ways to block and the new ways to 

815
00:32:25,854 --> 00:32:28,077
tackle , because it's not like it was 5 

816
00:32:28,077 --> 00:32:30,243
years ago . And if you're not familiar 

817
00:32:30,243 --> 00:32:32,299
with the new ways , ask , raise your 

818
00:32:32,299 --> 00:32:34,521
hand . Because again , this is the best 

819
00:32:34,521 --> 00:32:36,743
we've ever been in America . We're part 

820
00:32:36,743 --> 00:32:39,050
of it . And I want our children to be 

821
00:32:39,050 --> 00:32:40,994
part of that going forward . So it 

822
00:32:40,994 --> 00:32:43,050
takes each and every one of us to be 

823
00:32:43,050 --> 00:32:45,569
able to say , go home today from here 

824
00:32:45,569 --> 00:32:47,347
or wherever you are and there's 

825
00:32:47,347 --> 00:32:49,625
installations around the world and say , 

826
00:32:49,625 --> 00:32:51,736
hey , today I learned A , B , and C , 

827
00:32:51,736 --> 00:32:53,847
and tomorrow I want to learn about LM 

828
00:32:53,847 --> 00:32:55,736
and N , and I want to make myself 

829
00:32:55,736 --> 00:32:57,958
better so I can make my peers better so 

830
00:32:57,958 --> 00:32:59,847
I can make my work ecosystem more 

831
00:32:59,847 --> 00:33:02,069
effective and efficient . So I'm really 

832
00:33:02,069 --> 00:33:04,125
humbled and proud to be part of this 

833
00:33:04,125 --> 00:33:06,180
operation , the speaker series , but 

834
00:33:06,180 --> 00:33:08,347
it's really exciting for me to be able 

835
00:33:08,347 --> 00:33:07,479
to say , as you have these speaker 

836
00:33:07,479 --> 00:33:09,646
series from all the great speakers you 

837
00:33:09,646 --> 00:33:11,868
have , when you leave here , say , OK , 

838
00:33:11,868 --> 00:33:14,090
I learned a few things . Maybe I didn't 

839
00:33:14,090 --> 00:33:16,257
today , but you usually learn a lot of 

840
00:33:16,257 --> 00:33:18,368
things . But what can I take home and 

841
00:33:18,368 --> 00:33:17,920
learn and tomorrow be a better , more 

842
00:33:17,920 --> 00:33:19,920
effective and efficient employee to 

843
00:33:19,920 --> 00:33:22,680
protect America , to protect DLA , our 

844
00:33:22,680 --> 00:33:24,902
people , our data , and our places that 

845
00:33:24,902 --> 00:33:27,069
you were not as good at yesterday . So 

846
00:33:27,069 --> 00:33:29,291
with that , let's open some questions . 

847
00:33:31,250 --> 00:33:33,472
We'll now open it up for questions both 

848
00:33:33,472 --> 00:33:35,583
in the room and from our remote sites 

849
00:33:35,583 --> 00:33:37,806
who can submit via email to COL@DLA.mil 

850
00:33:37,806 --> 00:33:39,972
or by scanning the QR code . For those 

851
00:33:39,972 --> 00:33:41,750
in the audience , if you have a 

852
00:33:41,750 --> 00:33:43,972
question , please raise your hand and a 

853
00:33:43,972 --> 00:33:43,489
member of the staff will bring you a 

854
00:33:43,489 --> 00:33:47,300
microphone . No Area 51 questions . 

855
00:33:47,439 --> 00:33:50,729
They're off limits . Yes , sir , in the 

856
00:33:50,729 --> 00:33:51,130
back . 

857
00:34:02,949 --> 00:34:04,893
Good afternoon , sir . I'm Brendan 

858
00:34:04,893 --> 00:34:07,116
Murphy down the hall at Ditra CI . Um , 

859
00:34:07,116 --> 00:34:08,838
question regarding some AI and 

860
00:34:08,838 --> 00:34:11,060
logistics . So recognizing the increase 

861
00:34:11,060 --> 00:34:13,116
in AI in shipping and logistics writ 

862
00:34:13,116 --> 00:34:15,310
large , how can we remain resilient to 

863
00:34:15,310 --> 00:34:17,520
the , in the face of PRC or Russian 

864
00:34:17,520 --> 00:34:20,719
cyber threats , especially since a lot 

865
00:34:20,719 --> 00:34:23,045
of AI is generating its own coding . So 

866
00:34:23,045 --> 00:34:24,989
we're not able to get into the the 

867
00:34:24,989 --> 00:34:27,166
initial root code of that AI . Thank 

868
00:34:27,166 --> 00:34:29,525
you . Great question . So AI is a very 

869
00:34:29,525 --> 00:34:31,581
complicated situation for me because 

870
00:34:31,581 --> 00:34:34,085
it's an area where I think AI is moving 

871
00:34:34,085 --> 00:34:36,845
at such a fast pace . Um , my metaphor 

872
00:34:36,845 --> 00:34:39,135
for this would be AI is on the Amtrak 

873
00:34:39,135 --> 00:34:41,385
Acela and our ability to understand 

874
00:34:41,385 --> 00:34:43,718
what AI is doing to us on the . Railway , 

875
00:34:43,812 --> 00:34:46,412
right , so as humans we are not ready 

876
00:34:46,412 --> 00:34:49,011
yet to be able to even contemplate that 

877
00:34:49,011 --> 00:34:51,011
question . So unless you are in the 

878
00:34:51,011 --> 00:34:52,900
AIMO world and you understand the 

879
00:34:52,900 --> 00:34:54,733
different types of AI and you're 

880
00:34:54,733 --> 00:34:57,067
procuring , working , and you're coding , 

881
00:34:57,067 --> 00:34:59,289
the rest of us don't know . I looked at 

882
00:34:59,289 --> 00:35:01,511
this is back to 2008 and 2009 when they 

883
00:35:01,511 --> 00:35:03,511
created this whole new world called 

884
00:35:03,511 --> 00:35:05,649
cyber . So I , I , I was a senior FBI 

885
00:35:05,649 --> 00:35:08,209
agent in 2010 . I went to a cyber 

886
00:35:08,209 --> 00:35:10,376
school and I'm like , what , what is a 

887
00:35:10,376 --> 00:35:13,070
cyber ? Listen , I'm a , I'm , I'm 

888
00:35:13,250 --> 00:35:15,194
fighting terrorism . What , what's 

889
00:35:15,194 --> 00:35:17,469
cyber ? AI is in the same spot right 

890
00:35:17,469 --> 00:35:19,580
now . So to your question about where 

891
00:35:19,580 --> 00:35:21,747
we are and how we understand this , we 

892
00:35:21,747 --> 00:35:23,989
need to be able to team up with offense 

893
00:35:23,989 --> 00:35:26,709
versus defense because as great as AI 

894
00:35:26,709 --> 00:35:28,876
is , which is , is , it's gonna change 

895
00:35:28,876 --> 00:35:30,987
the world that it hasn't already , my 

896
00:35:30,987 --> 00:35:32,820
world , what I do with corporate 

897
00:35:32,820 --> 00:35:34,820
America is show them how it's bad , 

898
00:35:35,389 --> 00:35:37,611
right ? How our adversaries in the UA , 

899
00:35:37,611 --> 00:35:41,189
uh , using AI to data . Because AI is 

900
00:35:41,189 --> 00:35:43,245
only as good as the data that you're 

901
00:35:43,245 --> 00:35:45,300
using , but the data is bad , and my 

902
00:35:45,300 --> 00:35:47,356
argument is think about the data the 

903
00:35:47,356 --> 00:35:49,300
Chinese have stolen in the last 20 

904
00:35:49,300 --> 00:35:51,411
years . That's why they're so good at 

905
00:35:51,411 --> 00:35:53,522
AI because they had the data you'd be 

906
00:35:53,522 --> 00:35:55,578
able to use to train that data , but 

907
00:35:55,578 --> 00:35:57,745
they have initiatives right now trying 

908
00:35:57,745 --> 00:35:59,745
to our data and our capabilities to 

909
00:35:59,745 --> 00:36:01,911
drive AI because they don't want us to 

910
00:36:01,911 --> 00:36:04,133
be at equilibrium with them . So for me 

911
00:36:04,133 --> 00:36:06,411
to get to where you wanna get to , sir , 

912
00:36:06,411 --> 00:36:08,578
and understand that I think we have to 

913
00:36:08,578 --> 00:36:10,689
raise our ship , raise all ships . We 

914
00:36:10,689 --> 00:36:12,856
have to get the majority of our people 

915
00:36:12,856 --> 00:36:14,689
who are actually in use of AI to 

916
00:36:14,689 --> 00:36:14,199
understand what it is . So it's not 

917
00:36:14,199 --> 00:36:16,310
just a button you click . So it's not 

918
00:36:16,310 --> 00:36:18,477
just check GPT you press the button on 

919
00:36:18,477 --> 00:36:20,421
your phone . We have to be able to 

920
00:36:20,421 --> 00:36:22,477
understand holistically what that is 

921
00:36:22,477 --> 00:36:24,643
like we did with cyber because to me . 

922
00:36:24,643 --> 00:36:26,477
The quicker we get to a place of 

923
00:36:26,477 --> 00:36:28,310
understanding how we protect AI 

924
00:36:28,310 --> 00:36:30,429
development and utilization , we need 

925
00:36:30,429 --> 00:36:32,429
to understand what the bad guys are 

926
00:36:32,429 --> 00:36:34,651
doing to be able to do that to us , but 

927
00:36:34,651 --> 00:36:36,596
to me that has to happen before we 

928
00:36:36,596 --> 00:36:39,149
could put in mitigation strategies 

929
00:36:39,149 --> 00:36:41,371
because I've seen in the private sector 

930
00:36:41,371 --> 00:36:43,482
they're moving so fast down the drain 

931
00:36:43,482 --> 00:36:45,705
security is not part of that at all and 

932
00:36:45,705 --> 00:36:47,871
again in a couple of years we're gonna 

933
00:36:47,871 --> 00:36:49,982
pay for that dearly . Next question . 

934
00:36:50,629 --> 00:36:52,962
It's in the back . I got one back there . 

935
00:36:57,530 --> 00:37:00,120
Hey sir , thanks for coming over . Drew 

936
00:37:00,120 --> 00:37:03,040
Song with supply chain security for DLA . 

937
00:37:03,479 --> 00:37:05,646
So I'm seeing a lot of adversaries cut 

938
00:37:05,646 --> 00:37:07,868
into our subtiers . Any recommendations 

939
00:37:07,868 --> 00:37:09,979
on how we combat that , maybe from an 

940
00:37:09,979 --> 00:37:12,159
acquisition standpoint ? Yeah , great 

941
00:37:12,159 --> 00:37:14,679
question . So , going back a decade for 

942
00:37:14,679 --> 00:37:16,901
me , and we started to do this a lot in 

943
00:37:16,901 --> 00:37:18,290
the government , and the 

944
00:37:18,290 --> 00:37:20,290
counterintelligence world , and the 

945
00:37:20,290 --> 00:37:22,068
security world , was be able to 

946
00:37:22,068 --> 00:37:24,123
facilitate standards and I would say 

947
00:37:24,123 --> 00:37:26,179
policy measures . So and the private 

948
00:37:26,179 --> 00:37:28,346
sector is getting there now that we're 

949
00:37:28,346 --> 00:37:28,320
so . Could you go back a couple of 

950
00:37:28,320 --> 00:37:31,520
slides to that , um , oh , we can't go , 

951
00:37:32,639 --> 00:37:34,806
we can go back oh I'm sorry , to the , 

952
00:37:34,806 --> 00:37:37,139
the beautiful charts of those companies . 

953
00:37:37,139 --> 00:37:39,083
OK , here we go . So , a couple of 

954
00:37:39,083 --> 00:37:41,195
facts I don't want to get too deep on 

955
00:37:41,195 --> 00:37:44,780
this , but of those companies . 90% of 

956
00:37:44,780 --> 00:37:48,389
all those breaches . Occurred from what 

957
00:37:48,389 --> 00:37:52,199
way ? Anybody know ? A link , 

958
00:37:55,030 --> 00:37:57,889
but not from these companies . So those 

959
00:37:57,889 --> 00:37:59,833
companies were all breached from a 

960
00:37:59,833 --> 00:38:02,129
vendor who swam upstream . Remember the 

961
00:38:02,129 --> 00:38:04,250
OPM breach we talked about ? OPM was 

962
00:38:04,250 --> 00:38:06,139
never breached , the vendors were 

963
00:38:06,139 --> 00:38:08,879
breached . So in 2015 , we decided to 

964
00:38:08,879 --> 00:38:10,935
be able to have some government-wide 

965
00:38:10,935 --> 00:38:12,879
policies to say , hey , if you are 

966
00:38:12,879 --> 00:38:15,449
going to contract with a vendor , you 

967
00:38:15,449 --> 00:38:17,989
need to put requisite clauses in there 

968
00:38:18,250 --> 00:38:20,139
to be able to make sure they have 

969
00:38:20,139 --> 00:38:22,250
minimum manor requirements from cyber 

970
00:38:22,250 --> 00:38:24,417
capabilities . Right , we're not gonna 

971
00:38:24,417 --> 00:38:26,639
get there everywhere , but we end up we 

972
00:38:26,639 --> 00:38:26,310
want legislation to be able to help us 

973
00:38:26,310 --> 00:38:28,477
do that , but we never got that far in 

974
00:38:28,477 --> 00:38:30,699
Congress . We could not get legislation 

975
00:38:30,699 --> 00:38:32,754
to mandate . So think about from a , 

976
00:38:32,754 --> 00:38:34,532
from an acquisition procurement 

977
00:38:34,532 --> 00:38:36,699
perspective . From DOD , if we're able 

978
00:38:36,699 --> 00:38:38,866
to say to our vendors , we need you to 

979
00:38:38,866 --> 00:38:40,866
have compliance , and we're getting 

980
00:38:40,866 --> 00:38:43,088
there with CMCC , we're getting there , 

981
00:38:43,088 --> 00:38:45,254
right , but we're not there yet and we 

982
00:38:45,254 --> 00:38:45,120
haven't been there . My argument is we 

983
00:38:45,120 --> 00:38:47,231
haven't been there for 20 years . I'm 

984
00:38:47,231 --> 00:38:49,398
not sure how we catch up because we're 

985
00:38:49,398 --> 00:38:51,620
only as good from a supply chain threat 

986
00:38:51,620 --> 00:38:53,676
perspective as our vendors , and the 

987
00:38:53,676 --> 00:38:56,009
vendors have no incentive to get better . 

988
00:38:56,350 --> 00:38:58,560
Until we give them an incentive , this 

989
00:38:58,560 --> 00:39:00,449
is even more of a problem in the 

990
00:39:00,449 --> 00:39:03,550
private sector . In New York City , in 

991
00:39:03,550 --> 00:39:05,606
the energy sector , because of their 

992
00:39:05,606 --> 00:39:07,494
vendors the same way , there's no 

993
00:39:07,494 --> 00:39:09,494
incentive . Either contractually or 

994
00:39:09,494 --> 00:39:11,939
other to up their game on a supply 

995
00:39:11,939 --> 00:39:13,883
chain defensive perspective and or 

996
00:39:13,883 --> 00:39:15,810
cyber . Yes sir . 

997
00:39:20,209 --> 00:39:22,870
At what point do you feel ? 

998
00:39:24,300 --> 00:39:26,439
Cyber offensive operations by our 

999
00:39:26,439 --> 00:39:29,070
adversaries get to the point where they 

1000
00:39:29,070 --> 00:39:32,729
deserve a kinetic response . Um , well , 

1001
00:39:33,010 --> 00:39:35,177
this is my opinion . I think we're way 

1002
00:39:35,177 --> 00:39:37,399
past that point . Um , I think so . I , 

1003
00:39:37,399 --> 00:39:40,030
I've been . I've been in a lot of 

1004
00:39:40,030 --> 00:39:42,086
situations where my world comes into 

1005
00:39:42,086 --> 00:39:44,308
the White House and we say what happens 

1006
00:39:44,479 --> 00:39:46,146
and then I think , oh , we're 

1007
00:39:46,146 --> 00:39:48,257
definitely gonna have a response that 

1008
00:39:48,257 --> 00:39:50,479
that Bill wants , but then I sit around 

1009
00:39:50,479 --> 00:39:52,423
and I realized quickly that the US 

1010
00:39:52,423 --> 00:39:54,646
government decision-making apparatus is 

1011
00:39:54,646 --> 00:39:56,868
a pizza . Right , in my world , there's 

1012
00:39:56,868 --> 00:39:58,812
only one slice of that pizza . The 

1013
00:39:58,812 --> 00:40:00,979
other slices are Treasury , Commerce , 

1014
00:40:00,979 --> 00:40:03,035
right , State Department , the White 

1015
00:40:03,035 --> 00:40:05,090
House itself , all the organizations 

1016
00:40:05,090 --> 00:40:07,201
have equities . So the policy world , 

1017
00:40:07,201 --> 00:40:09,479
which I'm not part of , is complicated . 

1018
00:40:09,479 --> 00:40:11,701
So my , I would argue that Volt typhoon 

1019
00:40:11,701 --> 00:40:13,868
and salt typhoon are as close as we're 

1020
00:40:13,868 --> 00:40:15,923
gonna get . What , and as you Google 

1021
00:40:15,923 --> 00:40:17,757
this , you'll find out what Volt 

1022
00:40:17,757 --> 00:40:20,020
Typhoon has done . It's basically a 

1023
00:40:20,020 --> 00:40:23,060
terrorism-based action by state 

1024
00:40:23,060 --> 00:40:26,899
sponsored . Intelligence service To put 

1025
00:40:26,899 --> 00:40:29,121
malware in critical infrastructure that 

1026
00:40:29,121 --> 00:40:31,343
they can destroy at a moment's notice . 

1027
00:40:31,343 --> 00:40:33,510
Now , my argument would be if that was 

1028
00:40:33,899 --> 00:40:37,500
al Qaeda . If that was a 

1029
00:40:37,500 --> 00:40:39,540
Muslim country in the Middle East , 

1030
00:40:39,699 --> 00:40:41,699
would we act differently ? We sure 

1031
00:40:41,699 --> 00:40:44,219
would . So for me , I think we've 

1032
00:40:44,219 --> 00:40:46,780
crossed that Rubicon in my world . I'm 

1033
00:40:46,780 --> 00:40:48,780
not quite sure how we get out of it 

1034
00:40:48,780 --> 00:40:51,060
from a policy perspective . It's going 

1035
00:40:51,060 --> 00:40:53,060
to actually take an effort where we 

1036
00:40:53,060 --> 00:40:55,379
could say the power went off in Boston . 

1037
00:40:55,620 --> 00:40:58,659
26 people died because China put this . 

1038
00:40:58,919 --> 00:41:01,086
While we're an electrical that's gonna 

1039
00:41:01,086 --> 00:41:03,308
take , it's unfortunately America's and 

1040
00:41:03,308 --> 00:41:05,308
I testified in Congress a lot about 

1041
00:41:05,308 --> 00:41:07,141
this , we are so predicated upon 

1042
00:41:07,141 --> 00:41:10,050
kinetic action and deaths of humans and 

1043
00:41:10,050 --> 00:41:12,639
until humans die from a cyber-based 

1044
00:41:12,639 --> 00:41:14,861
operation , we are not going to get the 

1045
00:41:14,861 --> 00:41:16,750
place where you talk about . It's 

1046
00:41:16,750 --> 00:41:19,030
unfortunate . What else we got ? 

1047
00:41:21,379 --> 00:41:22,657
Yes sir , right here . 

1048
00:41:28,409 --> 00:41:30,729
Right , uh , Ken Morris , DLAJ 6 , 

1049
00:41:31,050 --> 00:41:33,409
quick question for you relative to 

1050
00:41:33,409 --> 00:41:35,520
everything that you've shared with us 

1051
00:41:35,520 --> 00:41:37,409
today and given the recent , uh , 

1052
00:41:37,409 --> 00:41:39,520
lessons learned from the AWS , uh , 

1053
00:41:39,530 --> 00:41:41,252
outage earlier this week about 

1054
00:41:41,252 --> 00:41:43,419
interconnected everything is now , how 

1055
00:41:43,419 --> 00:41:45,969
do we balance our modernization efforts 

1056
00:41:45,969 --> 00:41:49,169
with retaining the human capital and 

1057
00:41:49,169 --> 00:41:51,310
knowledge that will be necessary to 

1058
00:41:51,689 --> 00:41:53,356
continue operations when that 

1059
00:41:53,356 --> 00:41:55,578
modernization is attacked to the levels 

1060
00:41:55,578 --> 00:41:57,522
that you've been describing ? It's 

1061
00:41:57,522 --> 00:41:59,467
another great question . I , I , I 

1062
00:41:59,467 --> 00:42:01,633
think I'll challenge your premise that 

1063
00:42:01,633 --> 00:42:03,856
we need to have the human capital to be 

1064
00:42:03,856 --> 00:42:03,689
able to solve the first problem . I 

1065
00:42:03,689 --> 00:42:05,911
think there's a lot of people who would 

1066
00:42:05,911 --> 00:42:07,967
disagree with you , and I think that 

1067
00:42:07,967 --> 00:42:10,022
that tech world right now led by the 

1068
00:42:10,022 --> 00:42:12,133
tech billionaires , Elon Musk , who's 

1069
00:42:12,133 --> 00:42:14,356
out , they don't believe that to be the 

1070
00:42:14,356 --> 00:42:13,739
case . They believe that automation , 

1071
00:42:13,750 --> 00:42:15,917
AI can solve a lot of these problems , 

1072
00:42:15,917 --> 00:42:18,028
but your point on AWS again , too big 

1073
00:42:18,028 --> 00:42:20,340
to fail . I I haven't put them on . 

1074
00:42:20,419 --> 00:42:22,641
They're going to go on that list . We , 

1075
00:42:22,641 --> 00:42:24,919
we cannot in our world , in your world . 

1076
00:42:25,340 --> 00:42:27,860
The reliance that we have on vendors . 

1077
00:42:28,909 --> 00:42:31,510
Cloud-based vendors , we as a 

1078
00:42:31,510 --> 00:42:33,843
government , as a Department of Defense , 

1079
00:42:33,843 --> 00:42:36,066
cannot be in a situation where are that 

1080
00:42:36,066 --> 00:42:38,909
reliant upon AWS and AWS cannot go down 

1081
00:42:38,909 --> 00:42:41,550
for that long for a minute reason . Now 

1082
00:42:41,550 --> 00:42:43,717
there's plenty of people out there and 

1083
00:42:43,717 --> 00:42:43,709
aren't going to get too deep in this 

1084
00:42:43,709 --> 00:42:45,987
that think maybe it wasn't an accident , 

1085
00:42:45,987 --> 00:42:49,050
but regardless . Accident or not 

1086
00:42:49,050 --> 00:42:51,010
accident , we cannot be in a place 

1087
00:42:51,010 --> 00:42:53,489
where AWS is that vulnerable . AWS , 

1088
00:42:53,689 --> 00:42:55,911
there's 10 companies out there throwing 

1089
00:42:55,911 --> 00:42:58,250
Microsoft , Google , Apple . We can't 

1090
00:42:58,250 --> 00:43:00,417
get to a place where those can be that 

1091
00:43:00,417 --> 00:43:02,528
vulnerable . We can't . Microsoft got 

1092
00:43:02,528 --> 00:43:05,139
breached last year . The government did 

1093
00:43:05,139 --> 00:43:08,500
a review of that breach , horrific 

1094
00:43:08,500 --> 00:43:10,979
breach . Microsoft is a global brand 

1095
00:43:10,979 --> 00:43:14,860
that everyone uses . One of the reasons 

1096
00:43:14,860 --> 00:43:17,027
they got breached because of a lack of 

1097
00:43:17,027 --> 00:43:18,971
security culture , and number 2 is 

1098
00:43:19,010 --> 00:43:21,699
someone plugged a foreign laptop into 

1099
00:43:21,699 --> 00:43:25,530
the mainframe . How could that 

1100
00:43:25,530 --> 00:43:27,649
happen ? I have a property that 

1101
00:43:27,649 --> 00:43:29,982
probably can't physically happen in DLA . 

1102
00:43:30,669 --> 00:43:32,780
But how does it happen at Microsoft ? 

1103
00:43:33,379 --> 00:43:35,360
We , the too big to fail is a real 

1104
00:43:35,360 --> 00:43:38,080
thing , and AWS for me , like Colonial 

1105
00:43:38,080 --> 00:43:40,699
Pipeline is a blinking red light saying 

1106
00:43:41,000 --> 00:43:43,333
we need to do better . More importantly , 

1107
00:43:43,333 --> 00:43:45,500
we need to hold them accountable . But 

1108
00:43:45,500 --> 00:43:47,667
think about the business processes and 

1109
00:43:47,667 --> 00:43:49,556
the shutdown of America for a day 

1110
00:43:49,556 --> 00:43:51,778
because of one company's inability to . 

1111
00:43:51,778 --> 00:43:54,010
Patch something unacceptable to me . So 

1112
00:43:54,010 --> 00:43:56,919
again , juxtapose that to DLA , where 

1113
00:43:56,919 --> 00:43:59,030
are your critical , and I do a lot of 

1114
00:43:59,030 --> 00:44:01,086
tabletops every single month where I 

1115
00:44:01,086 --> 00:44:03,308
work with companies to be able to do 30 

1116
00:44:03,308 --> 00:44:05,189
minute tabletops , crisis-based 

1117
00:44:05,199 --> 00:44:07,143
tabletops . So what's really gonna 

1118
00:44:07,143 --> 00:44:09,366
happen when things go bad ? Think about 

1119
00:44:09,366 --> 00:44:11,421
this from DLA perspective . Were you 

1120
00:44:11,421 --> 00:44:13,643
impacted by the AOS shutdown ? If not , 

1121
00:44:13,643 --> 00:44:15,643
but what if , who are the three big 

1122
00:44:15,850 --> 00:44:18,530
vendors that you are so reliable upon 

1123
00:44:18,689 --> 00:44:20,578
that if they go down tomorrow and 

1124
00:44:20,578 --> 00:44:22,633
they're down for 2 days , what's the 

1125
00:44:22,633 --> 00:44:26,040
biggest impact for DLA ? DLA is a 

1126
00:44:26,040 --> 00:44:28,320
humongous organization . A lot of war 

1127
00:44:28,320 --> 00:44:30,542
fighters around the world are rely upon 

1128
00:44:30,542 --> 00:44:32,709
what you do , and it's invisible every 

1129
00:44:32,709 --> 00:44:34,709
single day , all day long , but you 

1130
00:44:34,709 --> 00:44:36,820
have resiliency and redundancy that's 

1131
00:44:36,820 --> 00:44:39,042
predicated upon vendors out there . Who 

1132
00:44:39,042 --> 00:44:41,264
are those top five vendors that you can 

1133
00:44:41,264 --> 00:44:43,376
say are too big to fail ? Same aspect 

1134
00:44:43,376 --> 00:44:46,469
of AWS . What else we got ? We got time 

1135
00:44:46,469 --> 00:44:47,469
for a few more . 

1136
00:44:52,080 --> 00:44:53,969
Good afternoon , sir . My name is 

1137
00:44:53,969 --> 00:44:56,850
Doctor HL Barnum with J6 also . Uh , in 

1138
00:44:56,850 --> 00:44:59,120
regards to salt and bolt , uh , 

1139
00:44:59,129 --> 00:45:00,149
typhoons . 

1140
00:45:03,320 --> 00:45:05,487
We know we know some basic things that 

1141
00:45:05,487 --> 00:45:07,542
they like to attack and to explore , 

1142
00:45:07,542 --> 00:45:09,764
such as , you know , the outer edges of 

1143
00:45:09,764 --> 00:45:11,764
network , things like your VPNs and 

1144
00:45:11,764 --> 00:45:14,639
your routers and uh and your firewalls 

1145
00:45:14,639 --> 00:45:16,528
and things of this nature , which 

1146
00:45:16,528 --> 00:45:18,750
require a lot of patching and things of 

1147
00:45:18,750 --> 00:45:20,972
this nature . They also attacked , uh , 

1148
00:45:20,972 --> 00:45:23,879
end of life type systems as well as uh 

1149
00:45:23,879 --> 00:45:26,560
systems that are unpatched . And then 

1150
00:45:26,560 --> 00:45:28,616
when we take a look at the different 

1151
00:45:28,616 --> 00:45:30,671
layers that they like to attach , we 

1152
00:45:30,671 --> 00:45:32,893
got a lot of networks that are flat and 

1153
00:45:32,893 --> 00:45:35,004
there's no trust levels enough , uh , 

1154
00:45:35,004 --> 00:45:37,116
well , it's at a level where they can 

1155
00:45:37,116 --> 00:45:39,227
easily attack that as well . And then 

1156
00:45:39,227 --> 00:45:41,282
when it comes to the user , the user 

1157
00:45:41,282 --> 00:45:43,449
basically we have a cat card and a PIN 

1158
00:45:43,449 --> 00:45:45,625
number . When we got biometrics , we 

1159
00:45:45,625 --> 00:45:47,625
have fingerprints , we got a lot of 

1160
00:45:47,625 --> 00:45:49,569
different things to resolve that . 

1161
00:45:49,584 --> 00:45:52,324
Seeing is simple enough that funding 

1162
00:45:52,745 --> 00:45:54,856
could solve a lot of that in addition 

1163
00:45:54,856 --> 00:45:58,175
to adding more contractor support , uh , 

1164
00:45:58,185 --> 00:46:00,407
to be able to provide us the protection 

1165
00:46:00,407 --> 00:46:02,649
that we need . Yeah , I think , um , 

1166
00:46:03,030 --> 00:46:05,030
your premise is scary . I love your 

1167
00:46:05,030 --> 00:46:07,086
premise . I'm not sure I concur with 

1168
00:46:07,086 --> 00:46:09,363
your the solution with funding , right ? 

1169
00:46:09,363 --> 00:46:11,363
So I do think that we sometimes get 

1170
00:46:11,363 --> 00:46:13,363
locked in this mindset we need more 

1171
00:46:13,363 --> 00:46:15,586
money . My argument has been we need to 

1172
00:46:15,586 --> 00:46:17,808
be more effective and efficient in what 

1173
00:46:17,808 --> 00:46:17,469
we do with it now , like back to 

1174
00:46:17,469 --> 00:46:19,691
blocking and tackling . You can get all 

1175
00:46:19,691 --> 00:46:21,691
the more extra money you want to be 

1176
00:46:21,691 --> 00:46:23,913
able to provide , uh , more IT services 

1177
00:46:23,913 --> 00:46:26,025
and more capabilities , but if you're 

1178
00:46:26,025 --> 00:46:28,247
not doing the basic stuff . Like when I 

1179
00:46:28,247 --> 00:46:30,191
was in the government , we used to 

1180
00:46:30,191 --> 00:46:30,070
always have back to basics twice a year , 

1181
00:46:30,409 --> 00:46:32,409
back to basics for every employee . 

1182
00:46:32,639 --> 00:46:34,806
What does that mean , back to basics ? 

1183
00:46:34,806 --> 00:46:37,028
That means reinvigorating of your cyber 

1184
00:46:37,028 --> 00:46:39,250
hygiene , reinvigorating the importance 

1185
00:46:39,250 --> 00:46:41,306
of your cat card and utilization and 

1186
00:46:41,306 --> 00:46:43,361
getting through your entrance door , 

1187
00:46:43,361 --> 00:46:45,417
guns , gates , badges , and IT . You 

1188
00:46:45,417 --> 00:46:47,528
know what is your IT mobility ? Where 

1189
00:46:47,528 --> 00:46:49,306
are you printing from ? Are you 

1190
00:46:49,306 --> 00:46:51,306
understanding the vulnerabilities ? 

1191
00:46:51,306 --> 00:46:53,361
Back to basic stuff . So funding can 

1192
00:46:53,361 --> 00:46:53,195
come along , but my argument is funding 

1193
00:46:53,195 --> 00:46:55,251
gets lost and we don't get better at 

1194
00:46:55,251 --> 00:46:57,195
the simple things in life . So the 

1195
00:46:57,195 --> 00:46:59,362
thing about Bull Typhoon , I'll add on 

1196
00:46:59,362 --> 00:47:01,584
there , the scary part of it is some of 

1197
00:47:01,584 --> 00:47:04,060
the 1st 3 . Aspects we understood about 

1198
00:47:04,060 --> 00:47:06,110
V typhoon , we identified them was 

1199
00:47:06,120 --> 00:47:08,770
wastewater , water treatment , and 

1200
00:47:08,770 --> 00:47:11,489
electric grids , all outside the fences 

1201
00:47:11,489 --> 00:47:15,129
of military bases . Does it 

1202
00:47:15,129 --> 00:47:17,290
matter ? Yes , it matters . You think 

1203
00:47:17,290 --> 00:47:20,379
that was just by chance ? No , and then 

1204
00:47:20,379 --> 00:47:23,780
you add on the procurement of the 

1205
00:47:24,760 --> 00:47:26,982
This gets a little deeper , but I don't 

1206
00:47:26,982 --> 00:47:28,760
want to get people , you know . 

1207
00:47:29,610 --> 00:47:31,666
Boogeyman stuff here , but when they 

1208
00:47:31,666 --> 00:47:35,399
start to try and buy . Daycare centers 

1209
00:47:35,409 --> 00:47:37,699
around military bases . What do , what 

1210
00:47:37,699 --> 00:47:40,032
do they want daycare centers for ? What , 

1211
00:47:40,032 --> 00:47:42,088
what do they think they want to know 

1212
00:47:42,088 --> 00:47:44,310
the military service from women and men 

1213
00:47:44,310 --> 00:47:43,820
and their applications , the data 

1214
00:47:43,820 --> 00:47:45,931
that's on there , you think ? The DNA 

1215
00:47:45,931 --> 00:47:48,098
sites , when they're starting to buy , 

1216
00:47:48,098 --> 00:47:50,209
they want to buy fertility clinics in 

1217
00:47:50,209 --> 00:47:52,376
their military bases . Those are big , 

1218
00:47:52,376 --> 00:47:54,376
big issues to me , right ? And some 

1219
00:47:54,376 --> 00:47:54,179
people would say , and I have friends 

1220
00:47:54,179 --> 00:47:56,346
and relatives say , what do you care ? 

1221
00:47:56,346 --> 00:47:58,820
Why does it matter ? It does matter to 

1222
00:47:58,820 --> 00:48:00,653
me . It matters , and we have to 

1223
00:48:00,653 --> 00:48:02,653
understand the complexity of supply 

1224
00:48:02,653 --> 00:48:05,719
chain of all parts of our world . It's 

1225
00:48:05,719 --> 00:48:08,052
not just necessarily goods and services , 

1226
00:48:08,052 --> 00:48:10,219
but it's how we do things every single 

1227
00:48:10,219 --> 00:48:12,052
day . When you have a company in 

1228
00:48:12,052 --> 00:48:14,219
Chinese working for the military state 

1229
00:48:14,219 --> 00:48:16,163
security services trying to buy 15 

1230
00:48:16,639 --> 00:48:18,840
separate daycare centers in and around 

1231
00:48:18,840 --> 00:48:21,239
military bases , it's , it's a time for 

1232
00:48:21,239 --> 00:48:24,919
alarm in my perspective . So to me it's 

1233
00:48:24,919 --> 00:48:27,086
understanding the holisticness of this 

1234
00:48:27,086 --> 00:48:29,197
all the way down to also how are they 

1235
00:48:29,197 --> 00:48:31,308
breaching these companies , why , and 

1236
00:48:31,308 --> 00:48:33,530
what's the data they want to get into . 

1237
00:48:33,530 --> 00:48:35,697
They're all interconnected . What else 

1238
00:48:35,697 --> 00:48:39,639
we got ? Yes , sir . All right , 

1239
00:48:39,729 --> 00:48:41,889
all right . Uh , yes , sir . Peter 

1240
00:48:41,889 --> 00:48:45,350
Battalia with , uh , J3 . So 

1241
00:48:45,770 --> 00:48:48,889
what would the advice to leaders and 

1242
00:48:48,889 --> 00:48:51,056
decision makers , potentially everyone 

1243
00:48:51,056 --> 00:48:53,489
in this room , on how to balance 

1244
00:48:53,489 --> 00:48:56,649
concrete . Risks such 

1245
00:48:56,649 --> 00:49:00,040
as contractual defense , days in court , 

1246
00:49:00,250 --> 00:49:02,361
oversight committees , those sorts of 

1247
00:49:02,361 --> 00:49:06,090
things , versus this nebulous risk 

1248
00:49:06,090 --> 00:49:09,989
of what if . Almost how do you balance 

1249
00:49:09,989 --> 00:49:13,810
the intelligence communities more 

1250
00:49:13,810 --> 00:49:17,729
likely than not versus the contracting 

1251
00:49:17,729 --> 00:49:20,129
and court authority , uh , criminal 

1252
00:49:20,129 --> 00:49:23,810
court authority of beyond a reasonable 

1253
00:49:23,810 --> 00:49:26,032
doubt . It's a great question . I think 

1254
00:49:26,032 --> 00:49:28,254
you look at where we are right now in , 

1255
00:49:28,254 --> 00:49:30,366
in the adminis the administration and 

1256
00:49:30,366 --> 00:49:32,366
the way we're doing procurement and 

1257
00:49:32,366 --> 00:49:34,366
acquisition at such a fast pace , I 

1258
00:49:34,366 --> 00:49:36,532
would proffer like the FAR and the DFA 

1259
00:49:36,532 --> 00:49:38,810
are going to be gone in a year , right , 

1260
00:49:38,810 --> 00:49:38,050
because we're doing things faster , 

1261
00:49:38,620 --> 00:49:40,676
more effective , and efficient , and 

1262
00:49:40,676 --> 00:49:42,898
some would say , Well , we're violating 

1263
00:49:42,898 --> 00:49:42,540
the FAR . Some would say , Well , we're 

1264
00:49:42,540 --> 00:49:44,707
doing things we should have been doing 

1265
00:49:44,707 --> 00:49:46,929
20 years ago . Depends on where you sit 

1266
00:49:46,929 --> 00:49:48,984
on that fence . So I think the court 

1267
00:49:48,984 --> 00:49:51,040
related stuff is gonna change . It's 

1268
00:49:51,040 --> 00:49:53,318
gonna be um old school . It's gonna be , 

1269
00:49:53,318 --> 00:49:55,373
I think , uh , maybe in the rearview 

1270
00:49:55,373 --> 00:49:57,596
mirror . I think we have to be ready to 

1271
00:49:57,596 --> 00:49:59,262
be positioned into new modern 

1272
00:49:59,262 --> 00:50:01,373
capabilities and speed at which we're 

1273
00:50:01,373 --> 00:50:03,151
doing business right now in the 

1274
00:50:03,151 --> 00:50:05,318
government and DOD . We're not used to 

1275
00:50:05,318 --> 00:50:07,484
speed of any kind . And I think you're 

1276
00:50:07,484 --> 00:50:09,596
starting to see the push to speed and 

1277
00:50:09,596 --> 00:50:11,762
we're we're getting out of our comfort 

1278
00:50:11,762 --> 00:50:11,310
zones and I think those who could 

1279
00:50:11,310 --> 00:50:14,070
facilitate an understanding that speed 

1280
00:50:14,070 --> 00:50:16,870
and it could . Provide some maybe uh 

1281
00:50:16,870 --> 00:50:18,870
comfort and get with that train are 

1282
00:50:18,870 --> 00:50:20,870
gonna survive . Those who can't are 

1283
00:50:20,870 --> 00:50:23,037
gonna be out . I think that's just the 

1284
00:50:23,037 --> 00:50:25,259
way , the new way of the business , and 

1285
00:50:25,259 --> 00:50:25,229
honestly , uh , the way I look at it 

1286
00:50:25,229 --> 00:50:27,396
and if we're gonna be competitive with 

1287
00:50:27,396 --> 00:50:29,618
our adversaries but technologically and 

1288
00:50:29,618 --> 00:50:31,618
from an innovation perspective in a 

1289
00:50:31,618 --> 00:50:33,507
military with China , we gotta do 

1290
00:50:33,507 --> 00:50:35,729
things differently . We have to be able 

1291
00:50:35,729 --> 00:50:35,669
to do things different . I , I go back 

1292
00:50:35,669 --> 00:50:39,340
to 2017 . Working with DOD and I wanted 

1293
00:50:39,340 --> 00:50:41,780
to facilitate one hour of 

1294
00:50:41,780 --> 00:50:44,002
counterintelligence training , one hour 

1295
00:50:44,002 --> 00:50:46,058
of due diligence training in defense 

1296
00:50:46,058 --> 00:50:48,058
and acquisition program , right ? I 

1297
00:50:48,058 --> 00:50:50,280
wanted every single human being to just 

1298
00:50:50,280 --> 00:50:52,560
get one hour to understand the threat 

1299
00:50:52,979 --> 00:50:55,035
of being able to sign a contract , a 

1300
00:50:55,035 --> 00:50:57,312
procurement . Nope , the answer was no . 

1301
00:50:57,419 --> 00:50:59,739
Don't have an hour . There has to be a 

1302
00:50:59,739 --> 00:51:01,906
want to get better . There has to be a 

1303
00:51:01,906 --> 00:51:04,017
want to learn and understand what are 

1304
00:51:04,017 --> 00:51:05,628
the vulnerabilities . In the 

1305
00:51:05,628 --> 00:51:07,850
acquisition procurement world , and how 

1306
00:51:07,850 --> 00:51:10,072
could you mitigate and sometimes what I 

1307
00:51:10,072 --> 00:51:09,899
used to say all the time , I still say 

1308
00:51:09,899 --> 00:51:12,121
it now in the private sector is there's 

1309
00:51:12,121 --> 00:51:14,455
amazing tools out there , sophisticated , 

1310
00:51:14,455 --> 00:51:16,566
amazing tools . One's called Google . 

1311
00:51:17,000 --> 00:51:19,167
If you're going to award a contract to 

1312
00:51:19,167 --> 00:51:21,222
ABC Company , Google it . Before you 

1313
00:51:21,222 --> 00:51:23,389
give them $3 million to do X , Y , and 

1314
00:51:23,389 --> 00:51:25,610
Z . Google to see who's on their board 

1315
00:51:25,610 --> 00:51:29,050
of directors . Who's the CEO ? 

1316
00:51:29,790 --> 00:51:32,012
If you've got a name , Google that name 

1317
00:51:32,012 --> 00:51:34,379
and see that his father flew , you know , 

1318
00:51:34,510 --> 00:51:37,070
Russian jets or his mother still lives 

1319
00:51:37,070 --> 00:51:39,237
in China . These are easy things to do 

1320
00:51:39,237 --> 00:51:41,181
from a due diligence perspective . 

1321
00:51:41,181 --> 00:51:43,292
They're self-inflicted wounds that we 

1322
00:51:43,292 --> 00:51:45,514
incur every single day are not needed . 

1323
00:51:45,514 --> 00:51:47,348
We have to be more effective and 

1324
00:51:47,348 --> 00:51:49,570
efficient in being self-help , and some 

1325
00:51:49,570 --> 00:51:51,792
of that just uses tools that we have at 

1326
00:51:51,792 --> 00:51:53,848
our desktop . What else do we have , 

1327
00:51:53,989 --> 00:51:56,149
Sir Kyle McIntyre , DLA Legislative 

1328
00:51:56,149 --> 00:51:58,149
affairs . I'd be interested just to 

1329
00:51:58,149 --> 00:52:00,260
hear what's top of mind for you right 

1330
00:52:00,260 --> 00:52:02,260
now with TSMC , and I think you had 

1331
00:52:02,260 --> 00:52:04,260
Quantum up there as well . Yep , so 

1332
00:52:04,260 --> 00:52:07,459
TSMC is top of mind . Again . I spent 5 

1333
00:52:07,459 --> 00:52:09,570
consecutive years on the Hill . Still 

1334
00:52:09,570 --> 00:52:11,792
on the Hill a lot , I'm probably on the 

1335
00:52:11,792 --> 00:52:11,300
Hill more now than I ever was in the 

1336
00:52:11,300 --> 00:52:13,411
government , advising and informing , 

1337
00:52:13,411 --> 00:52:15,633
uh , senators and congressmen and staff 

1338
00:52:15,633 --> 00:52:17,578
of some of the threats that we see 

1339
00:52:17,578 --> 00:52:19,800
because , you know , I remember going , 

1340
00:52:19,800 --> 00:52:21,967
uh , I had retired and my first threat 

1341
00:52:21,967 --> 00:52:23,744
briefing on the Hill was to the 

1342
00:52:23,744 --> 00:52:25,856
Homeland Security Committee . So this 

1343
00:52:25,856 --> 00:52:28,790
would have been circa 2022 . The 

1344
00:52:28,790 --> 00:52:30,679
Homeland Security Committee , the 

1345
00:52:30,679 --> 00:52:32,846
Senate and the House . Now think about 

1346
00:52:32,846 --> 00:52:34,679
this for a second . The Homeland 

1347
00:52:34,679 --> 00:52:36,790
Security Committee . It was the first 

1348
00:52:36,790 --> 00:52:38,957
counterintelligence brief they've ever 

1349
00:52:38,957 --> 00:52:42,439
had . So myopically in my old 

1350
00:52:42,439 --> 00:52:46,280
world , my injection into Capitol Hill 

1351
00:52:46,280 --> 00:52:48,860
was either through Sissy or Hipsy or 

1352
00:52:48,860 --> 00:52:52,000
Hask and Sask . That was it . So it's 

1353
00:52:52,000 --> 00:52:54,780
jurisdiction power . So now that I'm 

1354
00:52:54,780 --> 00:52:56,836
out , I've been at almost , uh , you 

1355
00:52:56,836 --> 00:52:59,659
know , Energy and Water Committee who 

1356
00:52:59,659 --> 00:53:01,659
oversees the Department of Energy . 

1357
00:53:02,070 --> 00:53:03,848
Never had a counterintelligence 

1358
00:53:03,848 --> 00:53:06,070
briefing . So for me we have to be more 

1359
00:53:06,070 --> 00:53:08,292
effective and efficient in how we share 

1360
00:53:08,292 --> 00:53:10,403
intelligence that we collect from the 

1361
00:53:10,403 --> 00:53:12,070
government and be less , less 

1362
00:53:12,070 --> 00:53:11,750
restrictive on committees or 

1363
00:53:11,750 --> 00:53:13,820
jurisdiction and provide that 

1364
00:53:13,820 --> 00:53:16,042
information and intelligence to members 

1365
00:53:16,042 --> 00:53:18,098
and their staff across the ecosystem 

1366
00:53:18,110 --> 00:53:20,221
because no matter where you are , you 

1367
00:53:20,221 --> 00:53:22,443
know , your foreign services , whatever 

1368
00:53:22,443 --> 00:53:24,332
part you are in legislation , you 

1369
00:53:24,332 --> 00:53:23,939
should get the same kind of threat 

1370
00:53:23,939 --> 00:53:26,050
brief . Maybe not as deep . You don't 

1371
00:53:26,050 --> 00:53:28,217
need to get the compartmentalized part 

1372
00:53:28,217 --> 00:53:30,383
of it , but you need to understand the 

1373
00:53:30,383 --> 00:53:30,310
situations . So you're talking about 

1374
00:53:30,310 --> 00:53:34,050
the the cranes . That's for me , I look 

1375
00:53:34,050 --> 00:53:37,659
at some of the most complex , deep , 

1376
00:53:37,850 --> 00:53:40,017
and classified code word programs that 

1377
00:53:40,017 --> 00:53:42,199
I've been involved in , involve those 

1378
00:53:42,199 --> 00:53:45,320
ports . But yet we're in a position 

1379
00:53:45,320 --> 00:53:47,542
right now where we're so vulnerable for 

1380
00:53:47,542 --> 00:53:49,719
those ports . So to me we were able to 

1381
00:53:49,719 --> 00:53:51,919
not only like we did with Huawei , so 

1382
00:53:51,919 --> 00:53:55,040
we , same actions at Huawei , we 

1383
00:53:55,040 --> 00:53:56,929
notified all of Congress and told 

1384
00:53:56,929 --> 00:53:59,262
everybody how bad the Huawei system was , 

1385
00:53:59,262 --> 00:54:01,484
the cameras with Stratcom , the missile 

1386
00:54:01,484 --> 00:54:03,707
silos , whatever . So Congress was able 

1387
00:54:03,707 --> 00:54:06,830
to allocate $2 billion . To rip and 

1388
00:54:06,830 --> 00:54:08,941
replace the Huawei systems around the 

1389
00:54:08,941 --> 00:54:10,830
US , especially with the mid-tier 

1390
00:54:10,830 --> 00:54:12,941
telecommunications providers , the TV 

1391
00:54:12,941 --> 00:54:15,108
stations , you know , they had cameras 

1392
00:54:15,108 --> 00:54:17,070
on cell towers looking over our 

1393
00:54:17,070 --> 00:54:19,292
military installations , counting troop 

1394
00:54:19,292 --> 00:54:21,514
movement . We were intercepting that on 

1395
00:54:21,514 --> 00:54:23,737
the way back , right ? Well , of that , 

1396
00:54:23,737 --> 00:54:25,959
I think only 10% of that $2 billion has 

1397
00:54:25,959 --> 00:54:28,070
been spent . Because there's no way , 

1398
00:54:28,070 --> 00:54:27,489
there's no really no replacement for 

1399
00:54:27,489 --> 00:54:29,830
the Huawei . Like America doesn't have 

1400
00:54:30,000 --> 00:54:32,167
a Huawei in a box to replace it with . 

1401
00:54:33,129 --> 00:54:35,129
On the same token with the cranes , 

1402
00:54:35,129 --> 00:54:37,018
same situation . There's only two 

1403
00:54:37,018 --> 00:54:36,850
companies in the world that make these 

1404
00:54:36,850 --> 00:54:39,280
crane systems . One's in France and 

1405
00:54:39,280 --> 00:54:41,391
they're terrible , and one is China . 

1406
00:54:41,860 --> 00:54:43,916
So what we're doing now is trying to 

1407
00:54:43,916 --> 00:54:46,138
mitigate the software compatibility and 

1408
00:54:46,138 --> 00:54:48,249
connectivity . So if they're going to 

1409
00:54:48,249 --> 00:54:50,304
shut down one port , they can't shut 

1410
00:54:50,304 --> 00:54:52,193
down all 10 at the same time . So 

1411
00:54:52,193 --> 00:54:51,800
that's where we're at right now with 

1412
00:54:51,800 --> 00:54:54,022
funding . But Congress for me has to be 

1413
00:54:54,022 --> 00:54:56,022
a big player in legislating some of 

1414
00:54:56,022 --> 00:54:57,633
these changes like they have 

1415
00:54:57,633 --> 00:54:59,800
historically with Kaspersky and Huawei 

1416
00:54:59,800 --> 00:55:02,022
and now with the ZPMC cranes . So we've 

1417
00:55:02,022 --> 00:55:01,760
done some 60 Minutes reports . There's 

1418
00:55:01,760 --> 00:55:05,100
been some big articles on ZPMC , but 

1419
00:55:05,760 --> 00:55:07,816
you go to the ports , you go to Port 

1420
00:55:07,816 --> 00:55:10,500
Long Beach . LA , Newark , Charleston , 

1421
00:55:10,750 --> 00:55:13,399
they're like , whose cranes are these ? 

1422
00:55:13,800 --> 00:55:16,159
Like their job is to move stuff , you 

1423
00:55:16,159 --> 00:55:18,270
know , you have logistics at a port , 

1424
00:55:18,290 --> 00:55:19,790
as you know , are the most 

1425
00:55:19,790 --> 00:55:21,790
sophisticated things in the world , 

1426
00:55:21,790 --> 00:55:23,846
right ? And then if you're up in the 

1427
00:55:23,846 --> 00:55:22,959
Northeast Corridor , you got 

1428
00:55:22,959 --> 00:55:25,181
longshoremen , you have the mafia , you 

1429
00:55:25,181 --> 00:55:27,292
have unions , you've got all kinds of 

1430
00:55:27,292 --> 00:55:29,459
complexities of that . But to me , the 

1431
00:55:29,459 --> 00:55:31,681
ability to get things on a ship and off 

1432
00:55:31,681 --> 00:55:33,626
a ship are controlled by a foreign 

1433
00:55:33,626 --> 00:55:35,848
adversary , and to me that is a no go . 

1434
00:55:37,090 --> 00:55:39,312
We're just about out of time . The next 

1435
00:55:39,312 --> 00:55:41,423
question will be the last one today . 

1436
00:55:41,590 --> 00:55:44,979
Who gets the prize ? Got one from a 

1437
00:55:44,979 --> 00:55:47,739
remote site , sir . Sir , um , this 

1438
00:55:47,739 --> 00:55:50,110
question is , uh , from DLA Weapons 

1439
00:55:50,110 --> 00:55:52,388
Support Columbus Shipyard support team , 

1440
00:55:52,620 --> 00:55:54,676
and they would like to know what can 

1441
00:55:54,676 --> 00:55:56,787
you tell us about our offensive cyber 

1442
00:55:56,787 --> 00:55:59,449
attacks . Oh , awesome . So I talked to 

1443
00:55:59,449 --> 00:56:01,616
the general , the general about this . 

1444
00:56:01,616 --> 00:56:05,340
So , some of the Initiatives I 

1445
00:56:05,340 --> 00:56:08,739
had and I still believe are integral is 

1446
00:56:08,739 --> 00:56:11,060
putting in the same room offensive 

1447
00:56:11,060 --> 00:56:13,250
people with defensive people . Because 

1448
00:56:13,590 --> 00:56:15,701
as much as what you do here every day 

1449
00:56:15,701 --> 00:56:17,923
matters , there are great Americans who 

1450
00:56:17,923 --> 00:56:20,090
work to disrupt what you do overseas . 

1451
00:56:20,669 --> 00:56:23,090
It's the way it is , and I believe 

1452
00:56:23,270 --> 00:56:25,437
wholeheartedly that we can only get so 

1453
00:56:25,437 --> 00:56:27,659
good at protecting what we do every day 

1454
00:56:27,659 --> 00:56:29,826
at DLA from a supply chain perspective 

1455
00:56:29,826 --> 00:56:31,492
if we hear from those who are 

1456
00:56:31,492 --> 00:56:33,492
disrupting supply chains overseas . 

1457
00:56:33,492 --> 00:56:35,714
Because it's the same construct to best 

1458
00:56:35,714 --> 00:56:37,937
learn what the Chinese and Russians are 

1459
00:56:37,937 --> 00:56:40,048
doing here , we need to hear from our 

1460
00:56:40,048 --> 00:56:42,048
own brothers and sisters what we're 

1461
00:56:42,048 --> 00:56:43,770
doing overseas . So to me it's 

1462
00:56:43,770 --> 00:56:45,714
understanding of that supply chain 

1463
00:56:45,714 --> 00:56:47,992
penetration . What does that look like , 

1464
00:56:47,992 --> 00:56:50,159
taste like , smell like overseas , and 

1465
00:56:50,159 --> 00:56:52,270
how can we then look for it here . In 

1466
00:56:52,270 --> 00:56:54,437
the US , in our own organizations , in 

1467
00:56:54,437 --> 00:56:56,437
our government ecosystem , with our 

1468
00:56:56,437 --> 00:56:58,437
vendors , the more we can learn and 

1469
00:56:58,437 --> 00:57:00,603
pick up nuggets and share , the better 

1470
00:57:00,603 --> 00:57:02,714
we're going to be from a prophylactic 

1471
00:57:02,714 --> 00:57:02,169
perspective . We're going to be able to 

1472
00:57:02,169 --> 00:57:04,225
understand those vulnerabilities and 

1473
00:57:04,225 --> 00:57:06,336
then protect them , but at the end of 

1474
00:57:06,336 --> 00:57:08,169
the day , it still boils down to 

1475
00:57:08,169 --> 00:57:10,502
blocking and tackling and basic hygiene . 

1476
00:57:10,502 --> 00:57:12,725
If we , we are unable to even do that , 

1477
00:57:13,090 --> 00:57:15,257
we don't even do pen testing anymore . 

1478
00:57:15,257 --> 00:57:17,368
Why do we not do it anymore ? Because 

1479
00:57:17,368 --> 00:57:19,534
we kept failing at it so bad and there 

1480
00:57:19,534 --> 00:57:21,590
was no penalty . So , oh , you get a 

1481
00:57:21,590 --> 00:57:23,812
little note , sorry , if you click that 

1482
00:57:23,812 --> 00:57:25,923
link , you get 10 minutes' time out , 

1483
00:57:25,923 --> 00:57:25,919
whatever you get from the government . 

1484
00:57:26,110 --> 00:57:28,443
Like there's nothing bad happens to you , 

1485
00:57:28,443 --> 00:57:30,554
right ? So for me , we can't overcome 

1486
00:57:30,554 --> 00:57:33,280
that and we can't overcome our CIOs in 

1487
00:57:33,280 --> 00:57:35,502
the government and other private sector 

1488
00:57:35,502 --> 00:57:37,780
getting rid of languishing credentials . 

1489
00:57:37,780 --> 00:57:39,947
When you leave , you should be able to 

1490
00:57:39,947 --> 00:57:42,002
leave . So we can't have the Chinese 

1491
00:57:42,002 --> 00:57:41,260
know they can go in their window , 

1492
00:57:41,879 --> 00:57:43,990
assume a person whose credentials are 

1493
00:57:43,990 --> 00:57:45,879
there , and then own the system . 

1494
00:57:45,879 --> 00:57:47,935
That's self-inflicted wounds . If we 

1495
00:57:47,935 --> 00:57:50,046
can just stop self-inflicted wounds , 

1496
00:57:50,046 --> 00:57:52,157
we can get to a place that we need to 

1497
00:57:52,157 --> 00:57:53,990
be to be able to protect our our 

1498
00:57:53,990 --> 00:57:56,101
security processes more effectively . 

1499
00:57:56,101 --> 00:57:58,212
Last part I'll tell you on this is if 

1500
00:57:58,212 --> 00:58:00,323
you could do it at the smallest local 

1501
00:58:00,323 --> 00:58:02,379
level in your organization where you 

1502
00:58:02,379 --> 00:58:04,490
sit with your team , if you could red 

1503
00:58:04,490 --> 00:58:06,768
team what you do , it's always awesome . 

1504
00:58:06,768 --> 00:58:08,657
If you could red team at a bigger 

1505
00:58:08,657 --> 00:58:11,000
organization . You could red team all 

1506
00:58:11,000 --> 00:58:13,056
day long , bring the right people in 

1507
00:58:13,056 --> 00:58:15,679
and ask what if , what if and what if , 

1508
00:58:15,879 --> 00:58:17,990
and I'll say what I'll say grow up in 

1509
00:58:17,990 --> 00:58:20,268
Pennsylvania , yeah , but , yeah , but . 

1510
00:58:20,550 --> 00:58:22,719
Yeah , but , yeah , but what you don't 

1511
00:58:22,719 --> 00:58:24,775
even , it's not funny , so you don't 

1512
00:58:24,775 --> 00:58:26,941
know , but yabit , like , like what if 

1513
00:58:26,941 --> 00:58:28,886
but yabit . We have the best cyber 

1514
00:58:28,886 --> 00:58:30,997
secure in the world , yeah , but what 

1515
00:58:30,997 --> 00:58:33,052
if you don't , right ? So to me , if 

1516
00:58:33,052 --> 00:58:35,163
you could just do that even with your 

1517
00:58:35,163 --> 00:58:37,330
coworkers and you go into your group , 

1518
00:58:37,330 --> 00:58:39,108
your element , battalion , your 

1519
00:58:39,108 --> 00:58:42,379
squadron , do red team monthly about 

1520
00:58:42,379 --> 00:58:44,379
anything , it's gonna make you more 

1521
00:58:44,379 --> 00:58:46,435
effective and more efficient at what 

1522
00:58:46,435 --> 00:58:48,601
you do every single day . If you don't 

1523
00:58:48,601 --> 00:58:48,469
mind going back 2 more slides to my 

1524
00:58:48,469 --> 00:58:50,525
last slide , I'll finish up here and 

1525
00:58:50,525 --> 00:58:52,469
get , get everybody back to work . 

1526
00:58:52,590 --> 00:58:56,389
Remember this We are in a 

1527
00:58:56,389 --> 00:58:58,989
spot like we haven't seen in a long 

1528
00:58:58,989 --> 00:59:02,489
time , but right there . Matters . 

1529
00:59:03,090 --> 00:59:06,370
What you do every day matters . Who you 

1530
00:59:06,370 --> 00:59:08,592
work with every day , the women and men 

1531
00:59:08,592 --> 00:59:10,648
sitting next to you , matter because 

1532
00:59:10,648 --> 00:59:12,814
we're the best the world has ever seen 

1533
00:59:12,814 --> 00:59:14,981
for all these particular reasons . Not 

1534
00:59:14,981 --> 00:59:16,981
only we're the best military in the 

1535
00:59:16,981 --> 00:59:18,926
world , but our work ethic and our 

1536
00:59:18,926 --> 00:59:21,092
pride has never been seen in mankind . 

1537
00:59:21,092 --> 00:59:23,314
So no matter what the problems are , no 

1538
00:59:23,314 --> 00:59:22,409
matter how devastating this is , 

1539
00:59:22,489 --> 00:59:24,545
whether it be China , supply chain , 

1540
00:59:24,545 --> 00:59:28,209
cyber . Polarization or domestic 

1541
00:59:28,209 --> 00:59:30,542
landscape to me , at the end of the day , 

1542
00:59:30,542 --> 00:59:32,653
this is what's gonna solve everything 

1543
00:59:32,653 --> 00:59:34,931
because we're awesome . You're awesome . 

1544
00:59:34,931 --> 00:59:36,931
The people that sit next to you are 

1545
00:59:36,931 --> 00:59:39,042
even more awesome . So ask yourself , 

1546
00:59:39,042 --> 00:59:40,987
how do I get more awesome like the 

1547
00:59:40,987 --> 00:59:43,098
person who sits sits next to me , and 

1548
00:59:43,098 --> 00:59:42,929
we're gonna go home today and ask 

1549
00:59:42,929 --> 00:59:44,985
ourselves , hey , tomorrow I'm gonna 

1550
00:59:44,985 --> 00:59:47,151
come to work . I'm gonna energized and 

1551
00:59:47,151 --> 00:59:49,207
I'm gonna help DLA be more effective 

1552
00:59:49,207 --> 00:59:51,151
and efficient at what we do on our 

1553
00:59:51,151 --> 00:59:53,207
mission . I'm really humbled to have 

1554
00:59:53,207 --> 00:59:55,373
the opportunity to come here and speak 

1555
00:59:55,373 --> 00:59:55,080
with you today . I'm excited to be part 

1556
00:59:55,080 --> 00:59:57,247
of the speaker series . It's really an 

1557
00:59:57,247 --> 00:59:59,469
honor to me . Thank you , General , and 

1558
00:59:59,469 --> 01:00:01,524
thank you for your team , and I hope 

1559
01:00:01,524 --> 01:00:04,629
you have a great day . Thanks . General 

1560
01:00:04,629 --> 01:00:06,573
Simmerly , over to you for closing 

1561
01:00:06,573 --> 01:00:10,459
remarks . Hey sir , so thanks for those 

1562
01:00:10,459 --> 01:00:12,780
powerful insights , and I'll say that 

1563
01:00:12,780 --> 01:00:15,429
um . I , I really want to just draw 

1564
01:00:15,429 --> 01:00:17,596
upon something that you , you conclude 

1565
01:00:17,596 --> 01:00:19,818
with , and you know you think about the 

1566
01:00:19,818 --> 01:00:22,389
pride , work ethic , and patriotism of 

1567
01:00:22,389 --> 01:00:24,445
this team gives me inspiration every 

1568
01:00:24,445 --> 01:00:26,611
day that we're going to overcome these 

1569
01:00:26,611 --> 01:00:28,667
challenges together . We're going to 

1570
01:00:28,667 --> 01:00:28,469
work with our partners in industry , 

1571
01:00:28,550 --> 01:00:30,550
the warfighters , so we can develop 

1572
01:00:30,550 --> 01:00:32,717
solutions , but we won't do it without 

1573
01:00:32,717 --> 01:00:34,772
the insights of people like you . So 

1574
01:00:34,772 --> 01:00:36,939
thanks for coming today , contributing 

1575
01:00:36,939 --> 01:00:38,828
to our knowledge . And helping to 

1576
01:00:38,828 --> 01:00:40,828
inspire us to get better and just a 

1577
01:00:40,828 --> 01:00:42,994
very small token of our appreciation , 

1578
01:00:42,994 --> 01:00:44,994
Commander's coin of excellence . So 

1579
01:00:44,994 --> 01:00:47,328
thanks for all of you , sir . Thank you . 

1580
01:00:49,300 --> 01:00:51,780
Thank you sir . Thank you , sir . 

1581
01:00:53,770 --> 01:00:55,881
Ladies and gentlemen , this concludes 

1582
01:00:55,881 --> 01:00:58,103
today's warfighter talk . Thank you for 

1583
01:00:58,103 --> 01:01:00,270
your attendance . For those who missed 

1584
01:01:00,270 --> 01:01:02,326
this live event , a link to the full 

1585
01:01:02,326 --> 01:01:02,219
video will be posted to the Campaign of 

1586
01:01:02,219 --> 01:01:04,330
Learning website . There you can also 

1587
01:01:04,330 --> 01:01:06,441
find episodes of the latest podcast , 

1588
01:01:06,441 --> 01:01:08,552
DLA Dialogues , a recommended reading 

1589
01:01:08,552 --> 01:01:10,979
list , and recent white papers . Thank 

1590
01:01:10,979 --> 01:01:12,239
you and have a great day .