FORT BELVOIR, Va. –
Editor’s note: “Celebrating 60 years” is a series of seven articles highlighting DLA’s support to America’s military since the agency was created Oct. 1, 1961.
The world and defense procurement changed in the 1980s, and the Defense Logistics Agency had to adjust. Japanese manufacturing success, claims of waste in government procurement, an expanding military and new weapons systems all prompted DLA directors to refine the agency’s acquisition and management practices.
Japan’s increasing share of the global electronics and automotive trades in the 1980s shocked American companies. Using advanced techniques, Japanese companies produced items with fewer defects and at less cost than their American counterparts. Their performance prompted introspection by the defense industrial base and concern at DLA. At the same time, reports of $640 toilet seats and other extravagant expenditures caught the attention of Congress and the public. While few and unfounded, these claims implicated the agency either directly or through its Defense Contract Management Command.
Other challenges dealt with rapid growth. Under President Ronald W. Reagan, the United States vastly increased the size of its military, forcing the Soviet Union into an arms race that damaged its economy and weakened its government. For DLA, more planes, tanks, troops and aircraft equated to more repair parts and fewer opportunities to ensure companies were abiding by their contracts. In addition, many of the weapons systems being serviced were new, traditionally a friction point between wholesale and retail provision. While the Air Force introduced the F-15E Strike Eagle and Navy the Ticonderoga-class cruiser, the Army underwent a complete transformation by starting full production of the Abrams main battle tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, Patriot air-defense system, Apache attack helicopter, and Multiple-Launch Rocket System.
Each of the three DLA directors to serve full terms during the 1980s introduced new ways to combat challenges. Navy Vice Adm. Eugene A. Grinstead, the agency’s seventh director, emphasized weapons systems support. He used national identification numbers and new technology to track parts. Grinstead also received permission to manage service-unique consumables. Supplying the items allowed the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps to focus on mission-essential items and DLA to buy in bulk.
Army Lt. Gen. Donald M. Babers, DLA’s eighth director, focused on quality. He used scholarship by business theorist Peter Drucker to write the agency’s first strategic plan. He also formed a group of DLA leaders to help sell his Pentagon superiors on the agency’s advantages. The messaging helped DLA with the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act, early drafts of which suggested the possible dismemberment of the agency. Instead, DLA emerged as a combat support agency that planned and participated in named operations.
DLA had a new director when Goldwater-Nichols became law in late 1986. Army Lt. Gen. Vincent M. Russo, the ninth officer to lead the organization, continued Babers’ strategic planning. To gain knowledge of operational plans and maintenance schedules, Russo dispatched liaisons to the Army, Navy and Air Force. He also accepted an expansion of the agency’s logistics support when DLA received the National Defense Stockpile from the General Services Administration in 1988.
When Air Force Lt. Gen. Charles P. McCausland became director in November 1988, America had just elected a new president. The director’s three-and-a-half-year tenure was influenced by the same events to affect the presidency of George H.W. Bush, to include the end of the Cold War and Hurricane Hugo in 1989. Look for the next article in the series to learn how the agency supported the Gulf War in 1990-1991.