An official website of the United States government
A .mil website belongs to an official U.S. Department of Defense organization in the United States.
A lock (lock ) or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .mil website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

News | March 5, 2024

Book review: On the Psychology of Military Incompetence

Courtesy review by Philip Shands

Editor's Note: March is National Reading Month. Everyday reading increases knowledge and develops personal and professional skills. Throughout the month, DLA Disposition Services Pathways to Career Excellence program participants are sharing insights from books* they recently finished. 

*No official Defense Department endorsement implied.

Cover of book with toy green soldier laying down on it
Book cover 2
Cover of book
Photo By: Jeff Landenberger
VIRIN: 240226-D-DO441-0002

Something I am very passionate about and believe is crucial for holding our world together is good, sound leadership. Norman F. Dixon’s book On the Psychology of Military Incompetence perfectly illustrates this concept because, outside of war, nothing humanity has encountered so far has brought us closer to the deepest and darkest catastrophes that threaten lives, especially of those who are not responsible and are mostly innocent casualties simply trusting incompetent leaders.

The book examines the psychological factors that contribute to leaders making terrible decisions and, most importantly, the consequences of those decisions. Overall, the author provides insights into the complex interplay of human psychology and military operations. Key psychological barriers highlighted include arrogance, ignorance, groupthink, and resistance to change – for example, when past military leaders kept promoting the use of obsolete cavalry in warfare instead of the modern tank. 

Dixon divides the book into three sections. First, he presents evidence of historical leaders' worst military failures. Then, he explains why and how the military establishment attracts, breeds, and, unfortunately, promotes authoritarian leaders. Finally, he compares successful generals with their incompetent counterparts, such as Maurice Gamelin, who led the French army in May 1940. When German armor stormed across the Meuse River, Gamelan’s men described him at the time “as a submarine without a periscope.” Instead of leading a counterattack against the invaders, he sat passively by at his headquarters at Vincennes. 

In comparison, he names leaders like Erwin Rommel, Horatio Nelson, and Napoleon Bonaparte as men who he concludes had the brains and confidence to repel and roll back the negative psychology of the flawed typical military mindset.

Some may argue that Dixon's analysis is flawed because he selectively chose his examples. While this may be true, we can all agree that leaders of this kind are more common than we would like to admit. One aspect of the writer's analysis that I disagreed with was his use of Freudian psychology, which lacks credibility due to a lack of modern empirical data. However, in my opinion, the book is still very well-written and credible in all other aspects. 

I believe its content is timeless and applicable not only to British matters or military history, but to any hierarchical organization in any country and society. Dixon's insights into psychology, though possibly outdated and British-centric, still offer valuable lessons for those tasked with selecting and becoming leaders. 

In today's environment of budget constraints and escalating global challenges, the stakes of leadership decisions are higher than ever. Dixon acknowledges the complexity of prescribing a perfect formula for military commanders, yet he bravely ventures into this realm. On the Psychology of Military Incompetence serves as an invaluable resource for anyone seeking to navigate the complexities of leadership selection amidst the pressures of modern military dynamics.