Army Gen. George Patton, perhaps the most iconic American commander of the twentieth century, destroyed Nazi formations in North Africa, Sicily and the Ardennes Forest. We all know this story; but before the fury of “Old Blood and Guts” was felt on World War II battlefields, he bolted through East Texas alongside his newly formed 2nd Armored Division, symbolizing the U.S. Army’s modernizing force and Patton’s surging leadership.
His dramatic dash through the Lone Star State reminds us of the crucial but forgotten peacetime training operations called the “Louisiana Maneuvers” of September 1941, only a few months before the nation entered the war after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.
The Texas-Louisiana borderlands represent a site of forgotten American military triumph of the second World War. The fact that this triumph occurred before real bullets started flying toward American troops is precisely the point. Peacetime training is crucial, and the Louisiana Maneuvers serve as an excellent example of such preparation. Despite that, the massive mobilization efforts during World War II remain a footnote in the minds of many who celebrate Allied victories, such as the Normandy beach landings on D-Day and the freezing struggle of the Battle of the Bulge. But before boasting about the famous victories, there should be an understanding of how the U.S. got there.
The world in September 1941
The Louisiana Maneuvers commenced two years after Germany’s brazen invasion of Poland on Sept. 1, 1939, igniting the second World War. While this alerted Americans to the threat of widespread war, Germany’s swift victory over France in the summer of 1940 prompted the United States to actively prepare for war.i As European powers collapsed, Japan aggressively pursued control of the Pacific, directly threatening U.S. territories, bases, and allies.
By September 1941, much of Europe and North Africa were under Axis control. The Nazis seized Kyiv early that summer as part of its invasion of the Soviet Union. The world slowly came to realize the true nature of Adolph Hitler’s aggression and the horrors that lay in his wake. As the U.S. Army concluded its Louisiana Maneuvers at the end of September, German forces executed over 33,000 Ukrainian Jews outside of Kyiv at a ravine called Babyn Yar on Sept. 29 and 30. With Britain barely hanging on and the Soviet Union on the run, who was left to stop the destruction of civilization?
The United States in September 1941
Between 1939 and 1940, the U.S. Army’s size ranked 18th in the world, a far cry from what would be deployed between 1942 and 1945. On the same day as Germany’s invasion of Poland, Army Gen. George Marshall was sworn in as the U.S. Army chief of staff. Uniquely qualified to build a formidable military, Marshall recognized that war clouds were forming. He wrote to his friends the following day, “I do not anticipate peaceful years ahead.”ii Yet, the United States still resisted improving its defense posture.
In February 1940, Marshall warned Congress that if Europe “blazes in the late spring or summer, we must put our house in order before the sparks reach the Western Hemisphere.” The fall of France and the attack on Britain in the summer of 1940 finally awakened the country, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Marshall could then raise the army they needed. Roosevelt enacted the first peacetime draft in September 1940, dramatically increasing the size of the force.iii
While the United States remained uncommitted to joining the war, large-scale training operations became feasible and prudent. In 1941, Marshall, a World War I veteran who understood the consequences of sending an unprepared army into combat, organized the largest military training exercises in U.S. history. Tennessee, Louisiana and the Carolinas were selected as the primary sites for these massive training events, with the Louisiana Maneuvers becoming the most memorable.
Waiting for an attack on the country before preparing a modernized and well-trained force would have been a fatal mistake. The day before arriving in Louisiana to witness the massive training event, Marshall emphasized the historical significance of the milestone: “The present maneuvers are the closest peacetime approximation to actual fighting conditions that has ever been undertaken in this country. … In the past we have jeopardized our future, penalized our leaders, and sacrificed our men by training untrained troops on the battlefield.”iv
The fight was on; even though it was simulated combat, the news that 94 soldiers died during the training event, mostly from vehicle accidents, brought a sobering reality to what the looming war might bring.v
Phase I: Battle of the Red River
Twenty million acres of Texas and Louisiana land were acquired for the exercise, and the San Antonio-based Third Army helped secure permission for Texas properties. One Texan granted permission to use their land, stating, “You can dig it up or blow it up. I don’t care. You have to have the land to do your job.”vi This response was reportedly typical of the many Texans who happily provided their land to help support their country’s defense.
Although it was simulated combat, the Louisiana Maneuvers marked the largest military exercise in American history. The mock war featured 19 full divisions and 400,000 soldiers. To fully appreciate its scale, consider that if it were conducted today, it would involve nearly the entire active-duty U.S. Army roster of approximately 460,000 troops.vii
The opening phase of the Louisiana Maneuvers featured Lt. Gen. Ben Lear’s smaller, tank-heavy Red Army attacking Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger’s larger, less armored Blue Army. The implications for European warfare were clear, as smaller German Panzer divisions had frequently trounced larger defending forces. However, this battle occurred in the swamplands of East Texas and Louisiana, instead of the firm grounds of northern France. The maneuvers were staged as a realistic combat simulation, with no stoppages or days off, but also as an elaborate display for the American public showcasing the new army’s readiness to defend the nation. As historians Debi and Irwin Unger put it, “Many of the foot soldiers on maneuvers slogging through the marshes and forests of Louisiana and East Texas, swatting mosquitoes and crushing ticks, were draftees getting their first taste of combat’s rigors.”viii
Patton and his tanks were assigned to Lear’s Red Army, but this was not their battle to shine. The Red Army’s inferior size needed to compensate with speed, flexibility and shock, none of which were displayed in this fight. Lear was a skeptic of swift armored maneuvers, and as a result, Patton’s tanks were trapped by swamplands, forcing them to move along main paved roads. This situation ultimately made them vulnerable to the Blue Army’s effective dive-bomb attacks.ix
The Blue Army’s 1st Cavalry Division, lurking across the Sabine River in East Texas, clinched the victory by fording an improvised ferry and boldly charging into Louisiana near Zwolle after dark. The charge from the storied Texas cavalrymen put Lear’s Red Army on the ropes. One journalist compared it to the daring cavalry raids of the Civil War. Hours later, the Blue Army’s bombers dropped propaganda leaflets that read, “Rout, disaster, hunger, sleepless nights in the forest and swamps are ahead of you — unless you surrender, surrender while there is still time.”x
Patton’s 2nd Armored Division was effectively destroyed in Phase I, bogged down by weather and terrain, and outmaneuvered by infantry and anti-tank units. Patton was disappointed at the battlefield loss and at the missed opportunity to capture his old friend, despite offering his troops a $50 reward to capture “a certain s.o.b. called Eisenhower,” as historian Piers Brendon quoted him saying. Patton’s tankers, eager to redeem themselves and show their tanks’ true speed and power on a larger, more open battle space, lamented, “Wait ‘til the next time.”xi The final phase of the event provided that open battle space, and Patton’s tanks found their path to victory, moving toward Shreveport through East Texas.
Phase II: Patton Storms Through Texas
For Phase II of the exercise, Patton’s 2nd Armored Division was transferred to Krueger’s Blue Army in southern Louisiana, tasked with attacking Lear’s Red Army to the north. Lear’s smaller force was now tasked with defending Shreveport. The smaller Red Army’s mission was to hold off the Blue’s attack led by Patton’s tanks for as long as possible, with notional Red reinforcements en route.
Adverse weather presented an additional obstacle for Patton, as hurricane season peaked. A strong hurricane blasted Galveston and Houston just as the final battle began. Heavy winds and rain drenched the troops but did not halt their movements. The storm strengthened as it neared the Gulf Coast, and the Army quickly moved hundreds of aircraft inland for shelter. An Associated Press report from Sept. 22, 1941, indicated, “Approximately 500,000 troops in western central Louisiana were in the area affected by the disturbance, but were believed in no danger unless the storm swings due north. Today the storm was 500 miles south of the troop concentration.” Winds of 100 miles per hour hit the coast of Galveston before moving toward Houston, killing three in the area, and causing millions of dollars of damage to property and crop loss.xii
The hurricane’s residual impact benefited the defending Red Army, as the muddy terrain obstructed the Blue Army’s swift and direct northbound advance. However, with the planning genius of Krueger’s promising chief of staff, then-Col. Dwight Eisenhower, the attacking Blue Army utterly confused the defending Red Army. Expecting a direct attack north through muddy Louisiana between the Red and Sabine Rivers, Lear’s Red Army destroyed as many bridges as possible, hoping to slow the Blue armored advance toward Shreveport.
But Patton’s armored force suddenly turned left and launched an epic mounted ride west into Texas, cutting almost 400 miles through the heart of East Texas in three days. Crossing the Louisiana-Texas state line over the Sabine River close to today’s Interstate 10 near Orange, Texas, Patton’s tanks bolted toward Beaumont before heading north. Covered by the 1st Cavalry Division, which was already moving through East Texas, Patton swung his tanks far from his supply lines, an immense risk for an armored unit that relied heavily on constant refuels.xiii
Patton did not neglect logistical constraints; he just redefined them. After years of mystery, it was revealed that Patton used his own cash to refuel his tanks at local Texas gas stations as he raced north. Storming through Beaumont, Patton then sprinted north through the Texas towns of Woodville, Nacogdoches and Henderson, before closing in on Shreveport to envelop the enemy.xiv
On Sept. 27, the Shreveport Journal carried a dramatic report of the wargames from AP journalist Jerry Baulch, who was embedded with Lear’s Red Second Army: “The more than 300 tanks of the second armored division swept from Texas in a wide arc that carried them completely out of the maneuver area to hit the Red stronghold (in Shreveport) from the rear.”xv
Baulch described how Patton’s route through Texas forced him onto established roads, which risked his unit’s capture and incentivized a swift run through East Texas: “To reach Shreveport, Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. sent his mechanized columns deep into Texas, but being out of the maneuver area, they were forced by rules to stick to roadways.” Therefore, Lear’s Red Army tried to capitalize on this “handicap faced by (Patton’s) armored division attacking from Texas, … and the tank-killers were sitting in wait at all possible approaches into Louisiana.”xvi
Baulch captured the drama of Patton’s plunge through Texas: “The troops set for a knockout blow to the second army all were on the Texas side of the treacherous Sabine River, an obstacle that apparently will take super military acumen to cross safely in an attack as closely watched as the third army’s.”xvii
Even the defending Red Army crossed into Texas in search of Patton’s tanks, deploying 15,000 troops into the small town of Center, Texas, hoping to cut off the attacking Blue forces from Patton’s armored unit. The Red soldiers were camped around Center, watching “for a surprise movement by the mechanized units of the Blue forces supposed to be in Nacogdoches in considerable numbers.” Red Army machine guns were emplaced at all four corners of the small Texas town, waiting for Patton to walk into the trap. Patton’s tanks instead marched on towards Nacogdoches, and the Red Army came up empty. Baulch noted that “a number of Blue scouts were seen in Center, but none was captured.”xviii
Patton’s tanks advanced north of Shreveport before crossing back into Louisiana, surprising the Red Army during a nighttime raid in highly disciplined and dangerous blackout conditions. Patton and his troops seized the airport, water supply, and the surrounding area of the Red Army headquarters. This bold flank through Texas was described by one of Patton’s officers, Captain Norris Perkins, as “the longest and most completely self-sustaining maneuver ever made by a large force in a short time.”xix
Lear protested Patton’s unorthodox tactic, complaining that his Texas route lay outside of the legal Louisiana Maneuvers area. Patton responded, “I am unaware of the existence of any rules in war.” More protests were lodged against Patton’s alleged refueling methods at Texas gas stations. Patton seemed to relish the outrage over his clever tactics and responded that “the tanks are there; what are you going to do about it?”xx
Wargames conclude, but war looms
The Louisiana Maneuvers concluded on Sept. 28, 1941, just before 5 p.m., with Army Lt. Gen. Lesley McNair declaring an armistice. Patton’s tanks had effectively encircled the Red Army headquarters at Shreveport, but the Blue Army’s main force was still 25 miles away. The official tie disappointed the press and the soldiers, leading to great debate about which side actually won. With the massive wargames over, the South returned to normal. The next day, airlines resumed flights into Atlanta, New Orleans, Houston, San Antonio, Corpus Christi and Brownsville while local colleges, schools and parishes reopened.xxi
The Louisiana Maneuvers became a hotbed for crucial military innovation and experimentation, as well as a media circus. The Army sold the event as an attraction and a laboratory, with journalists nationwide covering the event with intense interest. Some experiments led to doctrinal changes and others did not, but all offered valuable information for the evolving force. Newly formed paratrooper units dropped into wargames for the first time, untested armored units learned the challenges of moving with a dismounted infantry element, and the Quartermaster Corps’ armed laundry units debuted their efficient sustainment capabilities in the field. Testing new equipment and techniques became invaluable, but testing leadership and combat power topped the Louisiana Maneuvers’ list of achievements. This is where Patton made his mark.
Patton’s ride through Texas proved thrilling for the many reporters covering the wargames, but his flank through Texas should do more than entertain. It’s a reminder that peacetime training matters. This training may have been crucial to the American victory in World War II and certainly reduced battlefield losses.
Senior Army leaders, such as Marshall, directly credited the Louisiana Maneuvers as being critical to victory in World War II. Years later, he stated that the rough realities of the wargames helped Eisenhower become an effective strategist and “is the reason that Patton and Hodges and Bradley were able to move as rapidly as they did across the face of Europe.”xxii
Patton provided the most remarkable endorsement of the maneuvers in a letter to the Shreveport Times’ editor Don Ewing on Jan. 7, 1945, just weeks after his legendary Battle of the Bulge breakthrough in the Ardennes Forest. Eisenhower had called on Patton to rescue the surrounded 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne, Belgium, given that Patton’s aggressive instincts — showcased in the wargames years earlier — were world famous.
Patton’s letter confirmed that his successful attack on the Nazis’ southern front in Bastogne resembled the nighttime maneuvers in Shreveport. Patton had befriended Ewing as they traveled through East Texas during the wargames. In his letter from battered Bastogne, Patton informed Ewing that he had not forgotten his flank through Texas and his several training raids in blackout conditions: “I recall very well our trip through the night; and I can assure you that our success, particularly in this present operation, has been due to the ability of our people to move rapidly at night.”xxiii
Military readiness can easily be overlooked during peacetime. However, Patton’s forgotten ride through Texas in 1941 is a reminder that peacetime preparations are crucial for winning uncertain future conflicts.
Editor’s Note: This article was previously published in Houston History Magazine, Volume 23, Number 1.
1 Robert Citino, “The Louisiana Maneuvers,” The National World War II Museum, July 11, 2017, www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/
louisiana-maneuvers.
2 Nancy Beck Young, Why We Fight: Congress and the Politics of World War II (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2013), 23; Debi and
Irwin Unger, with Stanley Hirshon, George Marshall: A Biography (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2014), 88.
3 Unger and Unger, 91; Paul Dickson, The Rise of the G.I. Army 1940-1941: The Forgotten Story of How America Forged a Powerful Army Before
Pearl Harbor (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2020), 94.
4 Dickson, 220-221.
5 Dickson, 233.
6 Dickson, 196.
7 Dickson, 190; U.S. Department of Defense, “2022 Demographics Profile: Army Active-Duty Members,” Military OneSource, https://download.
militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Infographic/2022-demographics-active-duty-army-members.pdf.
8 Unger and Unger, 107.
9 Dickson, 223.
10 Christopher Gabel, The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941, Commemorative ed. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1991),
www.google.com/books/edition/The_U_S_Army_GHQ_Maneuvers_of_1941/62vbAAAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1, 84; Dickson, 222.
11 Dickson, 224; Piers Brendon, Ike: His Life and Times (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 74; Donald Houston, Hell on Wheels: The 2d Armored
Division (San Rafeal, California: Presidio Press, 1977), 85.
12 Gabel, 100; Associated Press, “Gulf Storm Is Headed For Texas,” The Evening Independent, September 22, 1941, https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=aqkLAAAAIBAJ&sjid=KVUDAAAAIBAJ&pg=3460,5129833; Sumner, 264-266.
13 Citino; Gabel, 103.
14 Dickson, 231; Citino; Gabel, 103-105.
15 Jerry Baulch, “Lear’s Army Halts Attack From Rear,” The Shreveport Journal, September 27, 1941.
16 Baulch.
17 Baulch.
18 Baulch.
19 Dickson, 231.
20 Citino; Don Ewing, “Night March in Louisiana Beat Germans at the Bulge,” The Shreveport Times, March, 2, 1945.
22 Forrest Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942 (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), 89.
23 Dickson, 325; Ewing.