FORT BELVOIR, Va. –
When the Defense Supply Agency became the Defense Logistics Agency on Jan. 1, 1977, it marked the end of an era. For a decade and a half, agency directors had based organizational and operational decisions on their World War II experiences. While these experiences varied, they all taught the same lesson: the need for efficiency in military logistics.
Army Lt. Gen. Andrew T. McNamara was a bonified war hero for removing fuel from the path of German tanks in the Battle of the Bulge. Yet it was his experience as quartermaster general of the U.S. Army II Corps in North Africa and First U.S. Army in Europe before the battle that taught him the importance of efficiency. Both the North African and European campaigns were fought over great distances with tenuous supply lines. McNamara was forced to make tough decisions about what his forces needed and what they could do without. Even more influential was D-Day. The future director’s planning and execution roles in this joint operation were minor, but they were significant enough to launch him on a lifelong quest for efficiency.
While Navy Vice Adm. Joseph M. Lyle, DLA’s second director, didn’t have his predecessor’s combat record, his role in World War II was just as important. Lyle spent most of the conflict directing ship repairs at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Ensuring the right part was delivered to the right place at the right time was an exercise in efficiency at which he excelled. It also enabled the American Navy to face its Japanese opponents with the maximum number of ships possible.
DLA’s next two directors weren’t logisticians during World War II. Air Force Lt. Gen. Earl C. Hedlund was a P-38 pilot who flew over the Aleutian Islands early in the conflict and Europe before V-E Day. His transition to logistics occurred after suffering second-degree burns from being shot down over Germany, a painful experience that didn’t prevent him from escaping his captors and reaching friendly lines. Hedlund interpreted his multi-theater experience during World War II with an analytical mind. As director, he believed perishable subsistence could be transported from the United States to Europe and Southeast Asia if the processes were efficient enough. He also pushed his staff to fix glitches in automation and issued guidance on variables to consider when determining stock levels. The man who held a doctorate in mathematics and would teach college in retirement had little tolerance for inefficiency as director.
Marine Corp Lt. Gen. Walter Robinson Jr. also had a non-traditional career for a logistician. A junior officer during World War II, he fought in three Pacific Island campaigns as an artillery officer. By the Korean War, he was an engineer commanding a shore battalion in combat. Robinson joined the logistics field after fighting two wars at the receiving end of trans-Pacific supply lines. His admonitions against inefficiency guided the agency in the mid-1970s as it became the Defense Department’s worldwide manager of bulk petroleum. Upon leaving DLA, Robinson carried his dedication to organizational efficiency to the General Services Administration, where he served as commissioner of the Federal Supply Service.
DLA’s fifth director, Army Lt. Gen. Woodrow W. Vaughan, also fought in a distant theater. Like Hedlund and Robinson, Vaughan was a young officer when the war began; four years later, he was a colonel and quartermaster general of allied forces in China. His subsequent career included almost every job in material management, to include two senior-level assignments at DLA. Yet it was his World War II experience waiting weeks if not months to receive the little the China-Burma-India theater was authorized to receive that provided his most stark lesson in the need for efficiency.
Vaughan was director when the Defense Supply Agency became DLA. His next two successors were commissioned during the war but never fought in it. Air Force Lt. Gen. Gerald J. Post, the agency’s sixth director, navigated a B-26 Invader on 50 combat missions during the Korean War, a different conflict with different lessons. Navy Vice Adm. Eugene A. Grinstead, the agency’s seventh director, served his first assignment in the Pacific theater as a member of an underwater demolition team. While undoubtedly formative, this service likely taught Grinstead precision, not efficiency.
The directors after Grinstead were too young to have fought in World War II. As time passed, the conflict influenced the agency less and less. Even so, organizations change slowly. The effect World War II had on DLA’s first five directors shaped the agency for years to come. That it remains focused on efficiency today confirms the potency of their learned experiences.